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Abstract 
This thesis is a sociological examination of racist humour that uses a) linguistic models 
of humour to highlight how the mechanisms of humour work rhetorically, and b) the 
sociological theories of Zygmunt Bauman on the characteristics of order-building 
discourse in modernity and postmodernity. These ideas are applied to four specific 
modes or case studies of racist humour to show how it impacts on modem and 
postmodern discourse. In my first case study, embodied racist humour, a derivative of 
biological racism, is identified as a racism primarily aimed at black people in the US 
context, by expressing racist dichotomies and images of the removal of the black 
`other'. Second, culturally racist humour is shown to have a similar impact on racism 
aimed at British Asians. Third, the humour of black and Asian comics is examined as a 
key site of resistance to embodied and cultural racism, but one that is fraught with 
problems associated with the rearticulation of racism. Lastly, in the postmodern period, 
liquid racism is highlighted as an increasingly confused and diluted type. 
Throughout the thesis, racist humour is shown to have a series of interconnected roles 
in supporting the meaning systems of racism. Overall, the thesis provides a means of 
analysing racist humour, and in so doing moves sociological humour studies beyond 
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Introduction 
I think humourless books about humour are a bad idea; some would say, of course, 
that all books about humour are a bad idea. (Arthur Asa Berger, 1995a: 3) 
Popular Sentiments 
Many in contemporary society would agree with Arthur Asa Berger's sentiment. 
Humour, it is assumed, is usually a good thing, the analysis of it is either unnecessary, 
or, worse than that, politically correct. This thesis argues against this sentiment. It is 
hoped that the thesis is, as far as any text can be, humourless for the reader, and it is 
implicitly and explicitly asserted throughout that the sober or serious study of humour is 
far more important for sociology than has been recognised to date, that there are serious 
implications and effects created by joking and these require sociological investigation. 
With this in mind, the thesis examines the ways in which racist humour acts as racist 
rhetoric, has a communicative impact, is persuasive, and can affect impressions of truth 
and ambivalence. Therefore, the aim of the thesis is to explain what racist humour does 
vis-ä-vis serious racism, and to provide a sociological critique of racist humour on that 
basis. Of course, the exact details of what I mean by a connection between humour and 
rhetoric will be explained early in Chapter One. What I would like to explain now is 
what I mean by `sociological critique'. 
Turning first to the notion of critique in humour studies, some have attempted to 
map the ethical limits of humour. For example, de Sousa (1987) attempts an ethical 
discussion of when it is wrong to laugh, and Lockyer and Pickering (2005a) present a 
collection of articles that map the line between the aesthetic appreciation and ethical 
evaluation of humour. Along these lines, this thesis follows recent examples that argue, 
`there are times when humour, or attempted humour, is not only inappropriate but also 
disastrous for the various social identities and relations that are drawn into it' (ibid: 1). 
It also seeks to understand `how humour at once permits, legitimates and exonerates an 
insult' (ibid: 12). While the project is concerned with offensiveness, this is not the sole 
focus. I am also concerned with non-offence where offence might be expected and vice 
versa. The thesis seeks to clarify the grounds for ethical criticism through establishing a 
particular form of sociological critique. 
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The type of sociological critique developed in this thesis, in relation to racist 
humour, is one that examines the linguistic structures and mechanisms of the particular 
discursive form. It is an explanation of what racist humour does and how it does it. The 
thesis does not argue for the censorship of racist humour, rather it shows how racist 
humour works, how it generates its meaning, and outlines the typology or repertoire of 
dominant forms in order to establish the role of humour in racism generally. This is 
achieved by mapping the specific socio-linguistic rhetorical readings that can be created 
by various types of racist humour, and how these types of humour reflect and refract 
wider social and/or discursive trends. It is at this point that the thesis becomes 
specifically sociological. I critically employ the theoretical repertoire of the sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman for this effect, specifically his thesis of modernity and 
postmodernity, his ideas on liquid modernity, and the occurrence of ambivalence in 
each of these social forms. By deploying Bauman's theoretical repertoire, I show that as 
far as racism takes on the characteristics of each of the social forms in which it 
emerges, racist humour can have a rhetorical impact on the truth claims and 
ambivalence produced in each. Bauman is especially important for the argument 
because he explains the occurrence of ambivalence and ambiguity in belief and 
language, an occurrence that provides the material for the formation of humour. 
Problems of Studying Humour 
The essential problem, I suggest, in talking seriously about humour is that 
humorous and serious discourse operate according to fundamentally different 
principles. (Mulkay, 1988: 5) 
There are a number of `problems' associated with studying humour, most of which 
relate to humour being a specific type of linguistic `frame' or `discourse'. Mulkay's 
comment highlights this. How can one seriously evaluate humour? It is not political 
discourse, it is not serious commentary, it is humour. I do not argue that humour 
functions in a singular way, that its readings are always of a particular type because 
they are humorous. However, I will argue that humour and joking structurally employs 
rhetorical devices, which implies that while humour may not be serious discourse, it can 
have a range of serious effects which are specifically heightened by the structural 
`rules' and differences of the comic. As Mulkay says on this, `it is precisely the 
symbolic separation from the realm of serious action that enables social actors to use 
humour for serious purposes' (1988: 1). This suggests that humorous utterances can 
generate more than one type of meaning - as serious or humorous. The thesis, therefore, 
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also has a concern with the polysemic, as the deflation of most protestations at racist 
and other types of humour usually originate from the idea that the language used is not 
offensive because it is not serious, that it exists in a different realm of meaning. Such 
accounts do not acknowledge the connections that are made in this thesis. 
Henri Bergson described this inherent polysemia in humour as relating to its 
mechanism, to the incongruity that all humour creates, when a word `belongs 
simultaneously to two altogether independent series of events and is capable of being 
interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the same time' (Bergson cited in 
Speier, 1998: 1363). The differences between humour and other types of discourse 
begin at this point, at what might be called the point of `slippage' or incongruity. This 
observation has implications that multiply throughout the thesis, but which remain 
centred on the idea of polysemia. The overall implication of this structural characteristic 
is that an instance of racist humour, while we may witness it as a form of social control, 
can never simply be described as social control. The polysemia that humour develops 
when creating its meaning is a process that is socially out of control, something that 
aggravates the unexpected. 
A second problem for the study of humour that needs to be tackled is the problem of 
functionalism, or more accurately, the problem of humour as multifunctional. While the 
study of humour is often functionalist, in that it looks for what humour does, for its 
serious effects, this need not mean recreating the problems associated with structural- 
functionalism. All significant accounts of humour are functionalist accounts, from 
Bergson's description of humour as a form of social discipline, to Freud's notion that it 
acts to express the unconscious. None of these thinkers argue that jokes are `just jokes'. 
This thesis does not reproduce structural-functionalist metaphors of biological 
organisms, or its conservatism. There is no defence of functional relationships, which 
are presented so as to be critiqued. It is, therefore, a form of critical discursive 
functional mapping that describes functionality in a non-positive format. Many have 
argued that humour is both important and unimportant. This thesis seeks to firmly 
establish the functional importance of humour, not just as an aesthetic phenomenon, as 
one that is pleasurable or positive, but as one that has a marked and significant 
functional effect on serious discourse that is often detrimental in terms of its expression 
and support of racism. This is not contradictory because, like most social phenomena, 
humour is multifaceted. 
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With these two issues in mind, the idea of humour as a particular frame and the 
possible functional effects of that frame, I now examine other attempts at critique and 
signal where they diverge from this thesis. Overall, it is clear that the critical analysis of 
racist humour is a topic in need of some development. 
Some argue that it is important to consider ethnic humour as a conflict device 
(Burma, 1946), others that racist humour can be offensive or cause psychological 
damage (Fry, 1977), or that it could affect group morale (La Fave, 1977). Many have 
suggested racist humour is of the Hobbesian kind, a laugh at sudden glory, a form of 
ridicule, or some other derivative of the superiority theory (e. g. Critchley, 2002: 70; 
Stott, 2005: 134). More critical accounts attempt to explain the wider consequences of 
racist humour, in terms of reinforcing racist ideology. In this vein, Sullivan argues that 
humour is `a powerful communicator of prejudice' (2000: 47), and Berger argues `that 
groups tend to seek out material... that reinforces their view of things and supports and 
validates their belief system' (1995b: 21). Boskin (1987) suggests that the act of comic 
repetition is significant for reinforcing beliefs and `leads to responses in which critical 
judgement can be seriously impaired' (1987: 257), and, quoting Levine, that it leads to 
`momentarily suspending "the rules of logic, time, place, reality, and proper conduct... " 
That momentary suspension can be extended through repetition so that the illusion 
becomes "locked in" and typed' (ibid: 260). However, he omits that humour has any 
effect above that achieved by serious racism without this repetition. Husband (1977, 
1988) argues ethnic humour in Britain is distinctly culturally racist and, in line with 
Davies (1982), that stereotypes in humour often appear as binary oppositions, 
suggesting `[t]he stereotypical ethnic joke is thus more than the current repetition of an 
ossified cultural prejudice' (Husband, 1988: 155). This indicates that humour articulates 
ambivalence. Again, he suggests that comedy reinforces and reinvigorates stereotypes 
but does not describe why humour is a specific and important vehicle in distinction to 
serious communication. 
The above studies highlight that while it is acknowledged that racist jokes reinforce 
serious stereotypes, most fail to explain the typology of mechanisms involved in the 
process. Without recourse to these mechanisms, such critiques lack the explanatory 
capacity to withstand the usual counterarguments employed to defend comic meaning. 
To provide detail of the relevant mechanisms and to elucidate those processes are the 
tasks of this thesis, and the original intervention it makes. Therefore, the argument, in a 
way that has not been done before, outlines how the semantic mechanisms of racist 
humour affect racist impressions of truth and ambivalence. 
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Summary of Chapters 
Chapter One of the thesis begins with a brief outline of approaches that are the 
antithesis of the project - those that see all humour in a benign or positive light. 
Following the positioning of the research in the field, the central argument is presented 
that humour is a form of rhetoric. The purpose of Chapter One is to explain how 
humour is structured with linguistic mechanisms that are rhetorical devices. This is 
achieved through an examination of, in turn, three prominent theories of humour - the 
superiority theory, the incongruity theory, and the relief theory. These theories are 
discussed in chronological order. Superiority theory is examined as the basis for a 
conceptualisation of humour and laughter as a form of ridicule. I also outline the origins 
of thought on humour as a form of rhetoric, which hypothesises on the emergence of 
superiority theory. Following this, incongruity theory is used to provide key insights 
into how humorous incongruity is structurally rhetorical, which allows for an 
understanding of how it can influence truth perceptions and ambivalent discourses. This 
section also offers an explanation of why certain incongruities are humorous, and others 
not, through Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the habitus. Relief theory is then examined to 
highlight an unconscious rhetorical expression in jokes, and how particular tropes aid 
the release of joking. The final two sections develop these observations; I formalise my 
methodology of rhetorical analysis, and finally, I use evidence from studies of humour 
that show humorous incongruities influencing the perception of serious discursive 
incongruity and ambivalence. 
Zygmunt Bauman is a social theorist who is not often appreciated as someone whose 
categories can be specifically applied in detail and is often critiqued on the basis of his 
lack of empirical substantiation. Chapter Two seeks to overcome this problem by 
presenting a Baumanesque understanding of the function and effect of contemporary 
humour. This does not just involve applying Bauman's concepts to `cases' of humour, 
rather it involves elaborating his categories with respect to racist humour and 
articulating them with other theorists. I employ Bauman's thesis on modernity, the 
development of order-building systems and the production and dislike of ambivalence 
in modernity, to argue that humour rhetorically affects the ambivalences and truth 
claims of racist discourse. Chapter Two outlines three types of race discourse - 
embodied, cultural and postmodern - and presents the case that humour can express and 
rhetorically resolve the incongruity, ambiguity, ambivalence and incoherence that is 
produced by each of these discourses, thus directly supporting the perceived truth of the 
discourse. Humour is not the only technique that can cope with or remove ambivalence. 
13 
Bauman conceptualises two other tropes that perform these tasks, namely 
`proteophobia' and `proteophilia'. Proteophobia is fear or hatred of multiform and 
proteophilia is love or adoration of multiform. These tropes are also shown to appear 
both in, and as responses to, race and ethnic humour, connecting with humour to form 
more robust rhetorical tropes for ambivalence removal. 
Overall, the thesis typologizes three types of racist discourse that are reproduced in 
racist humour. These are `embodied racism', `cultural racism' and `liquid racism'. In 
Chapter Three I apply the ideas of Chapters One and Two to the first type of racist 
humour - embodied racist joking - which is described as a derivative of biological 
racism. The central argument presented is that embodied racist humour rhetorically 
supports racist truth claims, and is used to disguise racist ambivalence and incongruity. 
First, the chapter presents Michel Wieviorka's dual logic of racism and specifically 
applies his theoretical dichotomy for an analysis of racist humour. This describes how 
humour socially includes the `other' through inferiorization while also excluding the 
`other' through expulsion. Following necessary discussions of race and racialization, I 
introduce the central dichotomy of embodied racism, which is created by the particular 
concepts of `civilisation' and `nature' and their associated connotations. Second, I give 
some examples of non-ambivalent or non-stereotyped racist jokes, with an outline of 
black and `nigger' jokes. These form `exemplary' embodied race signifiers that 
rhetorically support racism. This often occurs without the explicit presence of the 
stereotypes or dichotomies of embodied racism and conforms to the logic of exclusion. 
Third, I examine three themes of embodied racism that appear in humour, that develop 
as connotations of the civilisation/nature dichotomy and depict black people in the main 
through the logic of inferiorization. I examine a mind/body dichotomy that shows black 
people as stupid. I then examine jokes that portray a dichotomy that depicts black 
sexuality as savage and unrestrained. In connection with the racist description of the 
increased corporeality of black people, I examine jokes that depict the bodies of black 
people in certain types of social activity or habit. These include sport, crime and 
indolence. 
In Chapter Four I examine a similar set of processes in humour that expresses 
cultural racism. I analyse the culturally racist logics that appear in certain types of 
humour, and their connections to other forms of prejudice and embodied racism, 
arguing that culturally racist humour generally focuses on specific types of ambivalence 
resolution. The chapter begins with a discussion of cultural racism as one which 
demarcates between groups and discriminates against an `other' on the basis of an 
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identification of cultural difference. Cultural racism is also an order-building system 
because it attempts to order post-racial perceptions, and in so doing, creates logics that 
manage the image of the cultural `other'. I discuss whether there is evidence that racist 
joking is a specific problem both of and for the working classes. I then outline three 
rhetorical themes that appear in humour which have the functional effect of supporting 
cultural racism. First, cultural racism is a form of coded racism that appears in response 
to the increasing unacceptability of biological racism. This task negotiates the attitudes 
of acceptability and unacceptability. Second, a negotiation of national territory that 
fixates on the maintenance and fears the transgression of national boundaries is 
examined in humour. This anxiety is created from issues of space and exclusion in 
cultural racism, focusing on those `others' that move to the `wrong' side of the 
boundary, and is a proteophobic concern that enforces the exclusionary logic of racism. 
Third, cultural racism encourages an ambivalence of social identity that negotiates the 
competing categories of the `other' as an alien and a neighbour. This is generated by the 
presence of the `other' in the immediate social location and employs stereotypes of 
cultural and linguistic practice. This task tends to focus on the logic of inferiorization 
through knowledge of the `other' culture. 
Chapter Five outlines what I label the `reverse discourses' of black and Asian 
comedy. Reversed discourses appear in comic acts that employ the sign-systems of 
embodied and cultural racism, but develop a reversed semantic effect. It is argued that 
the humour of reversed discourses is significant in relation to racist truth claims and 
ambivalence management because it often forms resistance that can, first, act 
rhetorically against racist meaning and so attack both racist truth and points of 
ambivalence. Second, it can affect the ambivalence of the reversed discourse itself. 
Alongside this, and paradoxically, reversed discourses also contain a polysemic element 
that can, at times, reproduce racism. The chapter develops a means of analyzing this 
relationship between racist and non-racist meaning. The typology outlined shows some 
key styles in which racial stereotypes are employed and attacked in reversed discourse, 
and explains the potential degrees of functional influence that particular reversed 
discourses might have on the ambivalence of racism and the ambivalence of the 
reversed discourse. The chapter defines `reversed discourse', before connecting the 
definition with existing literature that theorizes humour as an expression of resistance or 
as a counter discourse. I go on to divide reversed discourses into two broad types along 
the lines of racial categorization. First, I outline the reversed discourses produced by 
black comedians, before giving a specific analysis of the use of `nigga' in the reversed 
discourse of embodied racism. Second, the chapter maps the reversed discourses in 
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British Asian comedy, by showing how this comedy reverses stereotypes and affects the 
ambivalence of hybrid identities. I employ Bauman's concepts of proteophobia and 
proteophilia in order to analyse responses to some of the comedians mentioned, which 
highlights the ongoing struggle to fix the meaning of the ambivalent 'other'. In a 
reversed discourse, with the `other' of embodied and cultural racism creating humour 
that openly attacks this racism, the discourse may actively produce further ambivalence 
for the racist discourses. In some instances, proteophobia and proteophilia are mobilised 
as a reaction to this active comic `other', which acts as a further attempt to fix the 
ambivalence that these comedians, or the `other', provokes. Hence, these reactions 
begin to appear outside of the comic frame. 
In building on the identification of polysemia, Chapter Six presents a further 
complication in race and ethnic humour and illustrates `postmodern humour' and the 
`liquid racism' that can appear in it. I argue the polysemic element present in all 
humour is multiplied in postmodern humour at the expense of a dissipation, or 
alongside a disguise of, authorial intention. The chapter argues postmodern humour and 
liquid racism appear in Sacha Baron Cohen's characters Ali G and Borat. Beginning 
with a definition of postmodern humour as a distinct type that exhibits Bauman's 
characteristics of postmodernity, the definition is distinguished from the cliched 
assumption of the postmodern mood as ironic. Second, I give a definition of liquid 
racism as the polysemic and elusive racism of postmodern social formations, including 
postmodern humour, and one that encourages reflexivity in the viewer. Ali G is 
examined as ambiguous and as misidentified, before being described as expressing 
three strands of liquid racism. These are labelled `postmodern minstrelsy', `ethno- 
cultural hybrid racism' and `anti-Asian racism'. It is the combination of the three, and 
the erasure they inflict on each other, that renders these forms liquid. After this, the 
chapter charts the appearance around Baron Cohen's characters of Bauman's tropes for 
ambivalence removal, proteophobia and proteophilia. The final section outlines some 
non-racist themes in Ali G that add to the polysemia and encourage analytic confusion 
because of the increased complexity of the material. Baron Cohen's character Borat 
Sagdiyev is then examined as a second postmodern character and as influenced by 
Jewish humour. 
In Chapter Seven the themes of postmodern humour and liquid racism are developed 
in a different direction, one that has specific political implications. The chapter 
undertakes a rhetorical analysis of the Danish Prophet Muhammed cartoons, published 
in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in October 2005, and the January 2006 
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reactions to them. I highlight how no other account of the cartoons from inside or 
outside of sociology describes them as, initially, polysemic humorous signs. The 
chapter begins with a brief outline of the events surrounding the publication of the 
cartoons, before concentrating on a description of the cartoons themselves. I consider 
the two cartoons that are usually viewed as most offensive. These two are given a 
specific rhetorical analysis and I describe the trajectory of meanings produced by their 
incongruity. Following this, I outline the general arguments of those who consider the 
cartoons offensive, evaluating the concepts of blasphemy, and importantly for this 
thesis, Islamophobia and racism in relation to the cartoons. Third, I outline the liberal 
secular defence of the publication of the cartoons, on the basis of freedom of speech, 
and explain how the cartoons fit the European tradition of satire. Finally, some 
comments are made on Bauman's argument on the relationship between the rise of 
postmodernity and fundamentalism, because while I argue the cartoons have a 
postmodern dimension, so too does Islamic fundamentalism, which is the target of their 
intended meaning and present in some reactions to them. 
The conclusion reiterates the central observations of the thesis, especially that racist 
humour is a form of racist rhetoric that supports serious racism, and presents the wider 
applicability of the thesis for what might be called an emerging subject - sociological 
humour studies. My method of analysis is shown to suggest uses for further 
development that, to date, sociological accounts have failed to offer. In the process I 
hope to re-specify the relation between humour and other discursive/ideological 
modalities. This restates the originality of the approach and situates the thesis in the 
fields of both sociology and humour studies, alongside accounts that have examined the 
structure and rhetoric of humour (e. g. Eco, 1985; Palmer, 1987; Berger, 1995a, 1998) 
and those that seek to develop critical accounts of humour (e. g. Billig, 2001,2005a, 
2005b; Lockyer and Pickering, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). All of which adds to the 
mainstream need and appeal of sociological humour studies. 
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Chapter One 
Humour Theories, Rhetoric and Critique 
Introduction 
The aim of Chapter One is to present an observation, from humour studies, that runs 
throughout the thesis and aids the development of a critique of racist humour. This is 
the observation of the identical semantic structure of humour and rhetorical devices. 
This leads to an understanding of the ability of these rhetorical humorous structures to 
have an influence on truth perceptions, ambivalent social discourses and, specifically, 
ambivalent racist discourses. This foundation will allow me to describe the range of 
effects that humour is capable of having and the functions it is able to perform, in 
differentiation to, and specifically for, literal or serious communication. When, in later 
chapters, this is applied to racist humour, it allows us to begin to see what it is - in 
relation to the spectrum of forms of racism - that racist humour actually does. While 
some of these points may seem obvious, they have not been specifically articulated as 
such in the analysis or normative critique of racist humour. 
The chapter examines humour theories in order to develop the necessary 
foundational points for a critique of racist humour, specifically moving through three 
dominant theories of humour - the `superiority theory', the `incongruity theory' and the 
`relief theory' - to elicit, from the relevant preceding work in the field, the key points on 
the relationship between humour, rhetoric, truth perceptions and ambivalence 
management. This relationship is then reinforced in the final two sections. First, 
through the development of a rhetorical method of humour analysis; and second, 
through an explanation of the influence of humour on ambivalence. 
Before that, the first two sections outline and critique two approaches to the study of 
humour that are especially problematic due to their partiality as explanatory 
frameworks. A partiality that leads to their mobilisation for the uncritical excusing of 
racist humour. These are, importantly, approaches that have an amount of contemporary 
popularity. I label these the `exculpatory approach' and the `positive approach'. 
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A Joke is a Joke is a Joke: Exculpatory Approaches to Humour 
An exculpatory approach towards humour can be typified as one that suggests that 
humour is, in all instances, a harmless or benign form of communication - that it can do 
no wrong. This has some everyday or `commonsense' articulation that usually describes 
humour as `just a joke', but it also appears in academic accounts of humour. Contrary to 
this, research shows that the use of the phrase `just a joke' can represent a rhetorical 
method of excusing the content and impact of the material of a joke, as a way `of saying 
one thing and meaning another' (Tannen, 1992: 51; see also Billig, 2005a). 
The journalist and writer Howard Jacobson offers an account that is exculpatory in 
nature (Jacobson, 1997,2006). His discussion attempts to reclaim all vulgar, coarse and 
offensive laughter as that which `makes our hearts strong' (1997: 37). This is a category 
that includes racist humour (ibid: 34). Those politically correct functionaries who 
oppose such humour are described with invective, or perhaps humour, and thus for 
Jacobson, `a humourless little shit will always be a humourless little shit' (ibid: 15). 
Importantly, and in direct opposition to the argument of this thesis, Jacobson sees the 
non-literal in humour, a `world of dramatic make-believe', or `a fiction' (ibid: 36), as 
the reason for humorous meaning being unimportant: 
Once accept that a joke is a structured dialogue with itself, that it cannot, by its 
nature, be an expression of opinion, and you have conceded its unalikeness to 
racist discourse, which by its nature is impermeable and cannot abide a 
contradiction. [sic] (ibid. Original emphasis) 
This statement fails for a number of reasons and highlights the perfect 
misunderstanding of Jacobson's position. Obviously, to suggest that humour cannot 
express opinion is wrong and to separate racist discourse from a particular type of racist 
discourse constructs a false dichotomy, but most importantly, the existence of 
contradiction and ambivalence in racism has been documented in the social sciences 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Billig et al., 1988: 106; Billig, 1982,1985; Rattansi, 2007: 114). 
What is ignored by Jacobson is that non-literal language is anything but meaningless, 
that racist humour has the ability to remove contradiction and anxiety from serious 
racism. Thus Jacobson's argument remains blind to the functionality of racist humour. 
Christie Davies' work is exemplary of the academic exculpation of humour. Davies 
aligns himself with the `semantic script theory' of Victor Raskin (1985), has produced 
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extensive empirical studies on the global phenomena of ethnic humour (Davies, 1996, 
1998a, 1998b, 2002,2005a), and has also edited non-critical, non-academic joke books 
(Davies and Lewis, 1973; Davies, 1978). His advocacy of a benign interpretation of 
humour is also highlighted in his critique of attempts to censure broadcast comedy 
(1994, c2004b), in which he labels recent BBC policy a `restrictive authoritarian 
ideology' (1994). Throughout his work there are recurring flaws that highlight the 
explanatory partiality of the exculpatory position. 
Davies accepts a straightforward dichotomy of the comic and the serious, via 
Raskin's separation of bona-fide communication and comic communication. This 
allows him to give little credence to the idea that humour can act seriously as a form of 
ridicule, thus ignoring over two thousand years of philosophical thought on the 
`superiority theory', which he would likely dismiss as a false paradigm. He therefore 
absolves the joker of any responsibly for causing ridiculous meaning in humour and 
argues `we should not mistake the glee of the winners in this successful piece of playful 
aggression for real hostility' (1998a: 13). While Davies (1994) has admitted that race 
and ethnic humour might be offensive, he does this through a reified concept of 
`political correctness'. He admits ethnic humour might offend `political correctness', 
but does not attach this offence to particular groups or individuals. 
Davies also argues that humour could have no `unconscious' or cryptic meaning, 
thus rendering `relief theory' obsolete. He claims that `it is pointless to search for 
hidden motives and resentments and, indeed, the attempt to do so, far from advancing 
our understanding of humour, has hindered it' (ibid: 25). These comments accompany 
no theoretical development or justification. 
While Davies is unwilling to examine the effects of humour in case it renders ethnic 
humour in need of critique, there are examples where he, inadvertently, gives an 
acknowledgement of the communicative and rhetorical effect that humour can have, in 
terms of the wider potential of the semantic mechanisms involved. This exposes 
contradiction in his approach and highlights the central relevance of my own. For 
example, he acknowledges that humour is `interesting, appealing and entertaining' 
(c2004b: 6), yet does not examine how it is that humour differs from literal 
communication - outside of the distinction between bona-fide and comic 
communication - or how it becomes `interesting, appealing and entertaining'. Davies 
refuses to fully examine the difference between the types of meaning generated by 
humorous and non-humorous language. 
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Davies also admits that jokes may use ambiguity and ambivalence but does not give 
a full analysis of the effects of humour on ambivalence. He suggests that humour 
`always introduces ambiguity as to both purpose and meaning' (2005b: 343), and that 
users of humour, `[b]y mocking peripheral and ambiguous groups ... reduce ambiguity 
and clarify boundaries or at least make ambiguity less frightening' (1982: 400). Despite 
this observation, his analysis of ambivalence is incomplete. So, for example, he does 
highlight how ambivalence surrounds attitudes to alcohol use and how this is expressed 
in humour, arguing that attitudes towards alcohol `are varied, unstable and 
contradictory' (1998a: 101) and that `[j]okes about alcohol are most common under 
circumstances of moral uncertainty and disagreement about whether and how alcohol 
should be consumed (ibid). However, he does not adequately explain why, in the very 
same jokes, this alcohol use is ascribed to ethnic groups outside of an explanation that 
argues, `[s]uch jokes are especially likely to be told about members of ethnic groups 
whose particular, visible and distinctive patterns of drinking reveal an even greater 
degree of ambivalence towards, and uncertainty and disagreement about alcohol than is 
usual in other western societies' (ibid). He adds that `[t]he jokes... are often pinned on 
ethnic groups whose alcohol problems are more severe than those of the joke-tellers' 
(ibid: 134). This suggests that stereotypes are simply an accurate reflection of reality. 
Davies can admit that ambivalence is relevant in the formation of jokes about alcohol 
because it is a morally ambiguous activity but, because he accepts the notion that ethnic 
stereotypes on alcohol use are relatively correct, he is unable to see how the jokes, 
through negative moralisation, render an ambivalent activity morally coherent through 
its placement on an ethnic `other' that drinks. This obscures the role of the joke as a 
rhetorical device that strengthens stereotypes, and in that strengthening, `repairs' 
ambivalent attitudes to alcohol use. 
Davies refuses to consider the potential effect of comic meaning on the designated 
`other' of the joke, perhaps as a form of rhetorical false consciousness. His work often 
expresses and supports ethnic and national stereotypes in a serious context as 
argumentation, which implies he believes in the stereotypes expressed. He argues that a 
joke content is at times created by the majority adhering to a stereotypical behaviour 
(1998a). For example, he argues `[t]he very generosity of the Irish character probably 
helps to account for the prevalence of thriftlessness and improvidence' (1982: 389) (see 
also: 2005b: 343). In sum, his rationale lacks empathy for the `other' of the joke, which 
is exemplified in the following comment: `We know that jokes are important to us and 
of no consequence to anyone else and we will have the jokes we want and on our terms 
whether you like them or not' (c2004b: 40). 
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Positive Accounts of Humour 
There is some overlap between exculpatory and positive accounts of humour, but there 
are also important differences. Exculpatory accounts tend to describe humour as having 
desirable consequences only, while positive accounts often acknowledge that there are 
ethically questionable types of humour, such as sexist or racist joking, but generally pay 
little attention to these. Positive accounts naturalise one particular type of humour as the 
majority type. The positive approach dominates the psychology of humour (Billig, 
2005a: Chapter Two, provides an excellent critique of this) and medical research. On 
the former, Billig argues `popular psychology books that are aimed at a wide non- 
academic readership... promote laughter as a means to improve the quality of their 
readers' lives (ibid: 16). In the latter, the healing properties of humour and laughter 
form a burgeoning research interest (e. g. Capple and Ziebland, 2004; Goodenough and 
Ford, 2005), yet it is rare to discover contemporary articles on the potential negative 
mental or physical consequences of humour, laughter and ridicule, which could be 
examined in relation to bullying at any social level. So, for example, Hogh and 
Dofradottir (2001) examine the role of humour as a coping strategy in response to 
Danish workplace bullying but do not mention the role of humour in bullying itself. 
In the discipline of humour studies, the idea that humour is in the main a positive 
social phenomenon has grown in popularity since the development of eighteenth 
century `incongruity theory' and the demise of the dominance of the `superiority 
theory'. Morreall provides an example of this view: `There are few things on which we 
place more value than having a good laugh' (Morreall, 1987: viii). Morreall, as is 
typical of this approach, does not add that there are also few things on which we place 
more value than having the ability to laugh at someone, to ridicule them, and then 
disguise any serious intent by explaining that it was all `just a joke'. Coupled with this 
is the supposedly frivolous nature of the academic subject, so Berger suggests `[w]riting 
one book on humor can be looked upon, by those who have a charitable disposition, as 
a youthful (or, in my case, not so youthful) indiscretion' (1995a: xi). Overall in humour 
studies, the functions of humour are described as positive (e. g. Attardo, 1994: 328), and 
descriptions appear one-dimensional because they do not consider the `nastier' side of 
interpretations of humour by joke targets. For example, Berger's (1998: 16) analysis of 
forty-five techniques for producing humour reads more like a guide for those attempting 
to become comedians than for those involved in serious analysis. This highlights the 
zeitgeist of humour studies. 
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Positive functional explanations of humour have been extended to ethnic joking. 
Some argue that ethnic joking may facilitate certain conversations (La Gaipa, 1977), 
and, crossing the boundary between exculpatory and positive accounts, Davies' 
numerous empirical studies of ethnic humour also frequently advocate its positive or 
entertaining dimensions. Husband (1977,1988), in a neo-Marxist account of racism in 
British humour, critically summarises the logic of a positive account of ethnic, race or 
racist humour. He argues that racist humour is informed by British race relations and 
reflects dominant race discourses. He outlines the commonsense `positive' attitudes to 
humour which suggest: `(a) humour is a positive social activity; (b) tolerance is a 
positive social value; (c) therefore ethnic humour is a quintessential manifestation of 
tolerance in praxis' (Husband, 1988: 152). This logic is directly reflected in the zeitgeist 
of humour studies. 
More detail of two positive functions are described below, those that see humour as 
a form of `conflict management' and those that see humour as a `coping strategy'. Each 
approach is shown to be inadequate for an analysis of racist or ethnic joking. 
An early account of humour as a form of `conflict management' appears in the 
anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown, who, through his concept of the 'joking relationship', 
identified `rules' that govern joke telling in particular tribal societies: 
What is meant by the term `joking relationship' is a relation between two persons 
in which one is by custom permitted, and in some instances required, to tease or 
make fun of the other, who in turn is required to take no offence. (Radcliffe- 
Brown, 1952: 90) 
Many joking relationships existed in the tribal societies Radcliffe-Brown studied, but all 
occurred at points in the social structure, around dynamics such as age, gender or 
kinship differences, where a relationship was considered ambivalent and held the 
potential for conflict. Radcliffe-Brown suggested that the joking relationship had a 
regulatory role, by controlling behaviour between members of the social group, or by 
restricting certain actions to a non-serious arena. In theorising such relations between 
in-laws, he argues, 
The theory that is put forward, therefore, is that both the joking relationship which 
constitutes an alliance between clans or tribes, and that between relatives by 
marriage, are modes of organising a definite and stable system of social behaviour 
in which conjunctive and disjunctive components, as I have called them, are 
maintained and combined. (ibid: 95) 
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Radcliffe-Brown explains how the joking relationship served to remove the tension and 
ambivalence of particular relations, with conjunctive and disjunctive components - or 
the various elements of ambivalence - forming the material of humour. Such joking did 
not appear around relations of friendship. 
The concept of the joking relationship has been applied extensively for the study of 
both tribal and industrial societies (Richards, 1927; Pedler, 1940; Moreau, 1941, in 
relation to tribal societies, and Sykes, 1966; Bradley, 1957, in relation to industrial 
societies), and has been applied, in a diluted format, in later sociology and 
conversational analysis, (Sacks, 1995; Gundelach, 2000; Sanders, 2004). The later 
diluted format acts as a means of overcoming the successful critique of its rigid 
structural-functionalism (Palmer, 1994: 15). Importantly, the joking relationship has 
also been applied to ethnic relations between tribal societies in Northern Rhodesia, 
tribes that either had a history of conflict or held the potential for conflict (Clyde- 
Mitchell, 1974: 36). 
Specifically, Clyde-Mitchell's study explains how the joking relationship appeared 
between tribal groups in situations that could be seen as ambivalent, as both conflicting 
and non-conflicting for the social actors involved. However, the description of the 
relations as a form of conflict management remains a partial analysis. While joking may 
allow for tensions to be resolved in the short term, much of the literature, especially 
contemporary uses of the concept (e. g. Gundelach, 2000; Sanders, 2004) emphasise 
conflict management as a positive value. This positivity ignores that joking may 
perpetuate serious tensions that might be resolved in other discursive forms. Likewise, 
by transferring the conflict into a linguistic realm that will, ultimately, do nothing to 
seriously question or work on the ambivalence that exists and continues to exist in 
serious discourse, humour might more adequately be described as something that can 
disguise as well as manage tension. Later in the chapter such joking will be shown to 
act as a palliative for serious discourse, a palliative that clears the path for the re- 
emergence of identical tension. 
The idea that humour acts as a `coping strategy' is closely connected to the idea that 
it acts as a form of conflict management, that it allows for events to be dealt with that 
might otherwise cause distress. It has been suggested that, in times of stress, humour 
can have a cohesive effect (Morreall, 1998: 115), and that through expelling tension it 
`facilitates social interaction in a number of situations' (ibid: 116). These ideas are 
popular in the social sciences and psychology (McGhee, 1979) and are applied to a 
24 
variety of topics. For example, Mealyea (1989) describes humour as a coping strategy 
in occupational change and Sanders (2004) describes how humour acts as a coping 
strategy for prostitutes. Gundelach (2000), in a study of national joking patterns 
between Scandinavian countries also describes jokes in a positive light as a form of 
coping strategy. In management psychology, Lee and Kleiner (2005) uncritically 
discuss how humour can be used for stress management, arguing `[l]aughter works to 
manage stress and has no side effects' (2005: 181) and Hoch and Dofradottir (2001) 
examine humour as a coping strategy for the victims of workplace bullying. 
By describing humour as a coping strategy, these approaches focus on the sense of 
release that humour may generate, or the effect for the joker and receptive audience. 
While the description of humour as a coping strategy has some commonsense 
explanatory power, it is only a partial explanation because it assumes coping, in every 
situation, to be an ethically equivalent activity. Events vary, so for example, coping 
with bullying or death are very different activities than an ethnic majority 'coping' with 
an ethnic minority. If the primary function of humour really was that of coping, we 
might expect far more jokes about events that people really do have to cope with. As 
death is an almost universal concern, whereas concerns over race, ethnicity and racism 
are far more eclectic, one might expect more jokes about death or fear of death. On the 
universality of death jokes, Cohen (1999) provides a critical discussion of the propriety 
of joking about death, suggesting that this is, at times, inappropriate (Cohen, 1999: 69). 
Davies has questioned the notion that death jokes are a coping strategy. He suggests 
that jokes about the death of Princess Diana were invented by `those who had no strong 
feelings about this particular accident and saw it as no different from the mass of 
anonymous events that make up French traffic mortality statistics' (c2004b: 13). While 
it is unlikely that the jokers saw the incident as no different from any other French 
traffic accident, it is quite uncommon for people to construct grotesque, unsentimental 
humour about their dead loved ones as a coping strategy. What is common are death 
jokes about groups for which one does not care where perhaps one should. It seems that 
jokes claiming to cope with the latest ethno-racial minority are also very common. 
In terms of racist humour, jokes may act as a type of coping mechanism for the 
racist, in the form of a palliative because the effects of joking allow for the expression, 
reinforcement and denial of racism. This in no way excuses racist humour and accounts 
of humour as a coping strategy that see it in a positive light should instead examine the 
ethical impact of what they claim is being coped with. These accounts rely on a narrow 
focus that may consider the joker and receptive audience, and their instant gratification, 
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but little else. For a more complete dissection of racist humour we must revisit some 
more established thought. 
Three Traditions in Humour Studies 
It is widely documented that three theories - the superiority theory, the incongruity 
theory and the relief theory - have dominated humour studies, and have influenced a 
wide array of disciplinary approaches (Morreall 1987; Palmer, 1994; Critchley 2002; 
Billig, 2005a). In some cases there exists a general preoccupation for developing 
universal accounts (Beryne, 1972; Latta, 1999), and the three theoretical positions have 
been reported as competing interpretations of humour. At a more sophisticated level, 
most pioneering theories of humour, for example Freud's (1991 [1905]) or Bergson's 
(1911), necessarily contain elements of all three theoretical strands. 
As such, this thesis does not present a simplistic three-step synthesis of the three 
theories (c. f. Wear et al., 2006), rather it is an account, like other contemporary 
examples (e. g. Billig, 2005a; Palmer, 1987) that presents a theoretical perspective on 
humour that serves to critically engage with and integrate elements of the three theories. 
I therefore do not see the three theories as competing accounts, but rather as necessary 
stops along the way to any developed theory. If there is a particular emphasis in my 
account it falls on `incongruity theory' which is often seen as the least relevant for 
analysing humour and offensiveness (c. f. Freud, 1991 [1905]; Billig, 2005a), because it 
tends to concentrate on the linguistic structure of humour, rather than the effect of that 
structure on joke content or meaning. 
Superiority Theories 
It is the orthodoxy in studies of humour to acknowledge the `superiority theory' as the 
earliest theoretical approach. As the oldest of the three theories, it is said to have 
dominated philosophical thought on the subject for two thousand years up until the 
eighteenth century (Morreall, 1998: 4; Critchley, 2002: 3). Although some doubt that it 
constitutes a theory at all and suggest, rightly, that it represents a collection of 
undeveloped philosophical comments on humour and laughter (Billig, 2005a: 38), it is 
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almost always acknowledged as significant as a point of departure for most subsequent 
and noteworthy theories. 
The superiority theory argues that humour and laughter are created from, and 
convey, a sense of superiority over the object of laughter. Humour is described as a 
means of mocking and ridiculing the subject of the joke, so describing laughter with a 
particularly invective intentionality (Scruton, 1987). For this reason, many superiority 
theorists have argued that humour and laughter should be resisted or controlled, or have 
`expressed a wish to reduce the amount of frivolity in the cause of a serious philosophy 
or theology' (Billig, 2005a: 37). This attitude appears in opposition to many subsequent 
or contemporary understandings of humour, such as the exculpatory and positive 
accounts outlined previously. 
Two examples of the superiority theory are presented as a means of elucidating its 
relevance for a critique of racist humour and for showing how there exists an implicit 
but ongoing historical recognition of the rhetorical structure of humour - as a 
specifically communicative and convincing art form -a connection that is often not 
recognised today. The discussion focuses on the comments of Plato and Aristotle, who 
are the two earliest such theorists. This is not a definitive history of the theory, and 
contributions from Thomas Hobbes and Rene Descartes are not mentioned. The aim is 
to show the direct relevance of the position for developing a critique of racist humour as 
a form of rhetoric, rather than to provide a comprehensive history of the theory. Plato 
and Aristotle, and the surrounding socio-political conditions in which their ideas 
emerged, do this particularly well. 
The superiority theory is said to have originated in Plato's comments on laughter and 
ridicule. To be overcome with laughter was, for Plato, not befitting of the philosopher 
and a threat to rationality and social order. For this reason, Plato thought it important 
that laughter should be controlled. He wrote that in enjoying ridicule, `the malicious 
man is somehow pleased at his neighbor's misfortune' (Plato in Morreall, 1987: 10), 
and that `the ridiculous is a certain kind of evil, specifically a vice' (Plato in ibid: 11). 
These comments were certainly not spurious. Plato's seriousness about laughter 
extended to argue that laughter that mocks authority was, along with the Arts, to be 
suppressed in the Republic (ibid: 102; Billig, 2005a: 41). 
Having said that, and while Plato sought to discourage laughter, if it was derived 
from a particular political ethic and directed at another, less suitable ethic, he thought 
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that it could be tolerated. This is acknowledged in the areas of Plato's writing that 
contain comic moments (Billig, 2005a: 41) and exposes Plato's position on laughter to 
be a class-based or partisan account of the acceptability of mirth, rather than the 
universal comment that it presents itself as. In describing the type of comedy that Plato 
found unsuitable, Billig outlines a specific example of a ridiculous Greek comedy that 
mocked Socrates: `Aristophanes mocked him and other philosophers on the stage. In 
The Clouds, Socrates, the master of high philosophical ideas, is portrayed as a comic 
figure' (ibid: 42). While The Clouds is an example of the type of ridiculous comedy that 
Plato disproved of, it is, importantly, also a comedy that illuminates the rhetorical 
structure of humour. I will return to this example below where I explain the particular 
rhetorical qualities of humour and laughter that Plato found so troublesome, and 
specifically, how this relates to a critique of racist humour. 
Aristotle held similar views on comedy, seeing it as often derisive and as providing a 
method for viewing the object of the joke as inferior (Palmer, 1994: 94). Like Plato, he 
also `opposed coarse humour and ribaldry' (Bremmer, 1997: 19), and wrote that 
`[c]omedy 
... 
is an imitation of people who are worse than the average... The 
ridiculous... is a species of the ugly' (Aristotle in Morreall, 1987: 14). Like Plato, 
Aristotle could appreciate the middle ground of educated wit over outright buffoonery 
or a complete lack of comedy, creating a distinction between educated and uneducated 
laughter (Billig, 2005a: 44). In Rhetoric, Aristotle acknowledged that `ridicule can be 
persuasively used' (ibid), and so educated laughter might serve an `important' function 
as a form of social discipline. Importantly though, Aristotle chose to ignore the 
persuasive potential of outright buffoonery. So while in Rhetoric, he signals an 
acknowledgement of the rhetorical potential of laughter, of it as a form of persuasion, 
we will see that it is significant that he did not investigate the persuasive potential of 
buffoonery. 
To develop these ideas, I examine what Plato found so troublesome about laughter 
and ridicule, and why Aristotle avoided examining the persuasive potential of 
buffoonery. Since all theoretical developments have a socio-historical situatedness 
influencing their emergence, these questions can be addressed through an examination 
of the conditions in which the superiority theory emerged. Aristophanes' The Clouds is 
particularly illuminating for it is the type of comedy that Plato would have disapproved 
of (Billig, 2005a: 42). The specific reasons for The Clouds being of significance are, 
first, it is a comedy that deals with the topic of sophistic rhetoric; second, it explicitly 
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shows that comedy is structured with the use of rhetorical devices; and third, it employs 
the comic technique of buffoonery. 
Beginning with sophistic rhetoric, in ancient Greece, `[r]hetoricians taught the art of 
public persuasion' (Billig, 2005a: 44), and this was disliked by Plato and others who 
saw it as an abuse of the search for philosophical truth. Aristophanes' was one of 
Socrates known accusers (Russell, 1946: 104), and principally, the subject of his 
comedy is sophistic rhetoric, The Clouds `begins with an ordinary man's search for 
new, more effective speech; [and] portrays his education (or lack thereof) at the hands 
of an abstracted, sophistic Socrates... ' (O'Regan, 1992: 3-4). In making a direct, albeit 
comic attack on Socrates, the socio-political events of the day are intertwined with the 
comedy. This had potential impact; such comedies were performed at comic 
competitions that were important expressions of Athenian ideology (Palmer, 1994: 31; 
O'Regan, 1992: 3), while the comic audience would have been drawn from a group 
with political status: 
Gathered in the theatre in "civic assembly, " they were the same group, seated in 
similar order, as that which elsewhere voted the political and legal decisions of 
the city. Thus political (and juridical) rhetoric and theatrical discourse would 
have influenced each other reciprocally, the audience for each conditioned by its 
experience of the other. Likewise, the tasks of a comedian were, in one sense, 
those of any other speaker: he had to further his own (and the public) good by 
winning over his listeners, who, in judging his logos, or speech, to be best, 
would render him victorious over his rivals. (ibid. Original emphasis) 
The political classes would have viewed comedy presented in this setting as a specific 
rhetorical endeavour. O'Regan continues: `To ignore the intellectual, rhetorical, and 
political background to Aristophanes' jokes is to misunderstand them and to overlook 
his participation in the intellectual ferment of the times' (ibid: 5). It is evident that the 
content of this comedy, which Plato disapproved of, is specifically connected to the 
serious issues of the day. 
Aristophanes also structured his comedies through the use of rhetorical devices 
(Slings, 2002). The Clouds employs a wide array of comic techniques, it uses, `farce 
and wit, stereotypical characters and situations, slapstick, wild dancing, obscenity, 
insult, puns, and sophisticated allusions to mock a wide variety of political, social, and 
theatrical butts' (O'Regan, 1992: 3). The various joke structures are employed to 
develop different types of incongruity, each of which has the potential for a specific 




The use of buffoonery is also significant in The Clouds, especially as Plato and 
Aristotle viewed this as a lower form of comedy. Specifically, the structure of The 
Clouds presents an incongruity between high philosophy and natural man, which is 
exaggerated through the use of buffoonery. The presentation of high-minded 
seriousness alongside buffoonery serves to construct an incongruity of extremes. 
Schopenhauer once said of the elements that make up an incongruity, `the greater and 
more glaring their incongruity with it from the other, the more powerful is the effect of 
the ludicrous which springs from this contrast' (1969: 59). In buffoonery, the 
incongruous elements are `stretched' beyond the range of that possible by the use of 
acceptable wit, and because of this, its comic impact is increased. This `stretching' of 
incongruity aids the rhetorical effect of comedy, by creating a greater disjuncture 
between the elements. This directly presents some reasoning for Plato and Aristotle's 
dislike of such a technique, especially when it was aimed at Socrates. Moreover, there 
is also evidence that buffoonery made The Clouds more successful. O'Regan explains 
that in the first unsuccessful version, 
Aristophanes had discarded many of the obscene and violent aspects of 
conventional comedy in favor of purely verbal wit. The failure of this early 
attempt, the inadequacy of Logos alone to win over the audience and carry the poet 
to victory, is written deeply into [its] ... 
humor, structure and even its "message". 
(1992: 5) 
The Clouds suggest that we can infer that the superiority theory, a theory of comedy as 
an expression of ridicule, which is central for an understanding of racist humour, 
developed at a specific historical point as a reaction to the potential socio-political and 
specifically rhetorical influence of certain instances of comedy. The Clouds shows how 
laughter was, for Plato and Aristotle, not considered to be benign or simplistically 
positive, as is often the case today. The sense of ridicule towards Socrates was 
generated by the rhetorical effect of the comedy, by the development of certain types of 
incongruity. It would seem that the ancient Greeks understood the rhetorical power of 
comedy and its ability to ridicule. Plato and Aristotle initiated the superiority theory on 
the basis of an understanding of how comedy and laughter can ridicule, yet today 
positive accounts dominate and hinder the development of critique. 
Contemporary studies have critically applied superiority theory for an analysis of 
laughter as mockery. De Sousa (1987) presents an ambitious argument for the 
development of an ethics of laughter. He argues that `emotions can be rationally 
evaluated' (1987: 227), and that a phthonic or malicious element exists in certain types 
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of humour. Through an example of a rape joke, he explains that shared attitudes are 
necessary for a joke to be considered funny by an audience (ibid: 232): 
In contrast to the element of wit, the phthonic element of the joke requires 
endorsement. It does not allow of hypothetical laughter. The phthonic makes us 
laugh only insofar as the assumptions on which it is based are attitudes actually 
shared. Suspension of disbelief in the situation can and must be achieved for the 
purpose of the joke, suspension of attitudes cannot be. (ibid: 240. Original 
emphasis) 
He explains that `attitudes are beliefs that one cannot hypothetically adopt' (ibid: 241). 
We cannot, therefore, pretend laughter through a process of empathy. For the content of 
the joke to be considered funny we must share an ideological predisposition, which will 
be rephrased later in my argument to suggest that a certain sign content is necessary for 
the construction of racist humour, and that this content must have serious relevance for 
the audience. In moving away from de Sousa, a critique of racist humour can be 
developed through mapping the meanings of humour rather than attempting to prove 
cases of intent or serious belief. 
Garfinkel (1967) gives an early account of the disciplinary function of humour and 
describes it as a part of a continuum of responses directed at anti-social behaviour. This 
continuum progresses from humorous reaction, definitions of the subject as crazy, to 
that of evil if the behaviour persists. Billig has also made significant progress through 
re-emphasising the role of humour as a form of ridicule and social discipline (2001, 
2005a, 2005b). He argues that humour has an important disciplinary function as a 
method of instilling embarrassment (2005a: 236), and describes that laughter is a learnt 
process that can have a rhetorical impact. This is successful as a general theory of the 
disciplinary nature of ridicule but does not address the important occurrence of humour 
in absence of the target, its rhetorical and incongruous structure or the range of 
discursive effects on ambivalence. 
The superiority theory has its detractors. It has been described by some in the 
incongruity camp as `sloppy theorising' (Morreall, 1987: 4), which `could not serve as a 
comprehensive theory of laughter' (Morreall, 1998: 14), and blamed for an ongoing 
neglect of humour in philosophy (Morreall, 1987: ix). Despite this it offers a basis for 
the development of a critique of racist humour. While Morreall describes the theory as 
one that `made humour ethically suspect' (ibid: 3), many types of humour are deemed 
to be ethically questionable (see de Sousa, 1987; Billig, 2005a; Lockyer and Pickering, 
2005a), which makes the reasoning of these philosophers especially interesting. 
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Specifically, the focus of the superiority theory leads towards the development of an 
account that can question specific types of humour, as Billig outlines, the `theory 
addresses aspects of humour that may lie at the root of social order in the form of 
disciplinary humour' (2005a: 39). Racist jokes can, through this approach, be seen as 
techniques for expressing superiority over the object of the joke (Berger, 1998: 65; 
Critchley, 2002: 70; Stott, 2005: 135). If humour can be mobilised as a form of 
mockery, if it is used to ridicule an ethnic or racial group, it is possible to begin a 
critique of racist humour at this point. This, however, is a fairly obvious point that does 
need elaboration through other theoretical perspectives. 
The theme of superiority is not a universal factor in joking, even if it is a contingent 
factor in some, and in terms of explaining the effect of racist humour, it is not adequate 
to merely apply the ideas without development. It is necessary to examine incongruity 
theory and explore the semantic mechanisms involved in constructing humour 
generally, as this will allow us to distinguish how these mechanisms convey meaning as 
ridicule in contrast to other forms of meaning. This will prove significant because it 
allows for a distinction to be made between the effect of humour and other types of 
language use, and to counter defences that claim that humorous utterances are 
universally benign. 
Incongruity Theories 
The second major theoretical approach for studying humour is described as `incongruity 
theory'. Of the three theories it provides the potential for developing new and novel 
ways to critique humour because it specifically highlights the structural connection 
between humour and rhetoric. 
It is suggested that Aristotle first mentioned that laughter is produced as a reaction to 
incongruity (Morreall, 1987: 14), although it did not receive theoretical development 
until the eighteenth century in Francis Hutcheson's Reflections on Laughter (1750) 
(Critchley, 2002: 3). It also appears in the work of the philosophers Immanuel Kant, 
Arthur Schopenhauer and Soren Kierkegaard. It is not possible to provide a complete 
history of the idea, so what follows is a presentation of those elements of the theory that 
are most helpful for highlighting what racist humour does, and that elucidate the 
semantic mechanisms that allow humour to create ridicule. 
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Incongruity theory argues that humour is experienced when we perceive 
incongruous elements, such as the experience of the unexpected, or two objects being 
placed together in an unusual way, and so represents an explanation of the generation 
rather than the effect or function of humour. `Incongruity' is usually loosely defined in 
humour studies to describe all humorous events or joke structures. As Berger outlines, 
`[t]he term "incongruity" has many different meanings - inconsistent, not harmonious, 
lacking propriety and not conforming' (1998: 3). There is a general consensus in 
humour studies that all humour is constructed through the observation of an incongruity 
of some kind (Morreall, 1998: 19), ' although not all incongruities are humorous (this 
issue is examined below). This consensus has led to it becoming the `most popular 
current philosophical theory of humour' (Morreall, 1987: 6), and to it being extensively 
applied in many areas of humour studies (e. g. Perlmutter, 2002). 
There are points relating to the structure of humorous incongruity that must be 
examined in order to build an effective critique of racist humour, most of which have 
some connection to the construction of a linguistic paradox. This section proposes that 
the incongruities of humour are structured using rhetorical devices (defined below), 
which leads to an appreciation of a number of functions that humour can serve. 
Specifically, it is argued that humour can (1) redefine reality, can (2) `co-agitate' 
disparate elements, and can (3) create semantic alienation. Each of these processes 
depends upon the acceptance of the reader or audience and the context; changes in the 
position of the audience will affect each process. Towards the end of the section, 
Bourdieu's notion of the `habitus' is employed to develop an account of changes in 
humorous context. 
1 Two exceptions appear in Latta (1999) and Scruton (1987). Latta presents a universal 
philosophical account of humour labelled `Theory U. He argues the basic humour process 
consists of three stages, 1) unrelaxation, 2) a cognitive shift, 3) relaxation. Latta dichotomises 
theories of humour into stimulus side and response side theories, with incongruity theories being 
placed on the stimulus side, and argues that `if theory L is true, then all incongruity theories - all 
theories which ought to be classified as such - are false' (1999: vii). His `response side' theory 
ignores the sociality of humour and any explanation of it, representing a reductive philosophical 
account of humour. Latta's aims are also singular and diverge from those of my own. He states, 
`surely the ultimate goal of research into humor is to describe and explain the global phenomena 
in all its main aspects and connections' (ibid: 13). Scruton (1987) argues that incongruity cannot 
form the `formal object' of humour (the object in every instance). He provides examples, one 
such is caricature, arguing that it is the similarity with rather than the difference between the 
object and the humorous image that creates humour in caricature. Of course this is not a 
criticism of incongruity theory per se, just the degree of incongruity, as all caricatures have some 
degree of both similarity and difference between objects. Scruton concentrates on the similarity 
or connection between the two elements of an incongruity, and so, in attempting to critique 
incongruity theory, simply highlights the aspect that would connect the elements, rather than the 
exaggeration that would separate them. In caricature this is especially evident. It is less evident 
in other types of humour. 
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The first step that needs to be taken in understanding humorous incongruity is an 
understanding of its rhetorical structure. As is hinted at in the writings of Aristotle, 
humour and laughter often work rhetorically as a form of ridicule, and structurally, 
humour is created with specific semantic mechanisms that either resemble those 
commonly labelled rhetorical devices or tropes, or create an incongruity that diverts 
literal meaning in a very similar way to that of a common rhetorical device. A 
rhetorical device can be defined as a particular linguistic mechanism that manufactures 
a play on words to create a non-literal meaning. Rhetorical devices will create dramatic 
non-literal images with language that often, paradoxically, add to the impression of 
truth in language. Umberto Eco makes a similar observation. He hypothesises that in 
the structure of comic incongruity, 
there exists a rhetorical device, which concerns the figures of thought, in which, 
given a social or intertextual "frame" or scenario already known to the audience, 
you display the variation, without, however, making it explicit in discourse. (Eco, 
1986: 272)2 
Eco's comments isolate the mechanics of humour by describing that rhetorical devices, 
which are devices that are designed to render language more convincing, are necessary 
structuring tools in the comic. For Eco the `frame' and its variation represent the two 
elements of discourse that are placed in the rhetorical device - this is the content. 
Importantly, an examination of comic techniques or structures highlights a marked 
similarity to rhetorical devices. Most commonly, the devices that structure humour 
resemble metaphor and metonym, but many others can be and are used. 3 Humour has, 
paradoxically, an implicit ability to have a rhetorical impact on truth impressions 
because of its structural incongruity, or lack of literal sense. It is important to clarify 
2 These comments form a part of a discussion on the differences between comedy and tragedy. 
Eco suggests, in defining the nature of comic incongruity, that a violated rule or transgression is 
explicitly stated in tragedy whereas it is not in comedy. The applicability of this to instances of 
everyday humour is obscure, and an alternative method of defining what constitutes humorous 
incongruity will be mentioned shortly. While Eco outlines the structure of incongruity, the 
distinction between types of incongruity needs to be given a specific sociological framing. 
3 Definitions of metaphor and metonym are best kept broad and simple. Metaphor is taken to 
mean a figure of speech that combines unconnected elements. Metonym is taken to mean a 
figure of speech that combines many images or objects. The general idea has some recurrence, 
for example, Freud suggests something similar with his observation of the techniques of 
`condensation' and `displacement' in jokes, which resemble metonym and metaphor respectively 
(Freud, 1991 [1905]; Berger, 1995). Condensation is, for Freud, the subsumption of many events 
or symbols under one object, and forms an unconscious method of disguise and expression. 
Displacement has a similar function but employs one object or event to symbolise another. 
Koestler (1949) also acknowledges the biosociative structure of metaphor (biosociation will be 
examined shortly), and Palmer (1987) presents a semiotic analysis of the similarity between 
humorous incongruity and metaphor. 
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that this would not just occur in the punchline of a joke, this effect will be created in 
any humorous incongruity, which would include jokes and non-linguistic humorous 
images. 
This has implications for the analysis of racist humour. While the rhetorical effect of 
the racist joke is also conditioned by the position of the reader, because of the existence 
of such a device, it has a certain structural potential to create particular effects, which 
include the strengthening of racist `truth', and as we shall see later, a variety of effects 
on racist ambivalence. 
In other examples of incongruity theory there are further techniques that can be 
aligned with the comments on rhetoric to provide a wider typology of the effects of 
humour. Preceding Eco, the anthropologist William Fry (1963) gave a description of 
incongruity as an explicit-implicit reversal. This is important because it shows how 
humour can redefine reality. He argues: 
During the unfolding of humor, one is suddenly confronted by an explicit- 
implicit reversal when the punch line is delivered. The reversal helps distinguish 
humor from play, dreams, etc... But the reversal also has the unique effect of 
forcing upon the humour participants an internal redefining of reality. 
Inescapably the punch line combines communication and meta-communication. 
(Fry, 1963: 158 in Berger, 1998: 5. Emphasis added) 
Fry's description of an explicit-implicit reversal (or humorous incongruity) shows that 
when successful, humour changes the expected meaning into something that is not 
present. Fry describes meta-communication as communication about communicating, or 
communication that is non-literal. The humorous utterance will contain an initial, literal 
discourse that works, Fry describes, as communication. It will present something that 
has a literal meaning, something that, in the incongruity of the joke, is transformed into 
a form of non-literal meta-communication. This implicit meaning is presented via a 
reversal or switch that refigures the meaning involved and which can redefine reality. 
Implicit in this idea is the acknowledgement that humour is able to alter, at some level, 
perceptions or impressions of sense. It therefore has, because of this explicit-implicit 
reversal, a certain structural, rhetorical potential to manipulate meaning that literal 
communication does not automatically possess. This observation has some similarity to 
Arthur Schopenhauer's comment that in humour, `two or more real objects are thought 
through one concept, and the identity of the concept is transferred to the objects... ' 
(1969: 59). Schopenhauer argued that while the objects may coexist, their meanings 
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have the potential to move around and change places. When applied to racist humour 
this will emphasise its power as a form of language that can bend truth. 
Another important theoretical advance shows how humour merges very different 
elements. The philosopher Arthur Koestler, in his theory of `bisociation', which 
discusses how disparate elements are combined in the creative process, also offers 
important information on the nature of incongruity: 
the three domains of artistic inspiration, scientific discovery and comic 
inventiveness - have a basic pattern in common: the co-agitation or shaking 
together of already existing but previously separate areas of knowledge, frames of 
perception or universes of discourse. (1967: 195. Emphasis added) 
While Fry gives us the impression that the act of humour is an act of redefinition, 
Koestler's co-agitation or shaking together of discourse, knowledge and frames of 
perception - all of which are connected - explains that humour, like scientific and 
artistic creation, allows for the merging of separate elements. These elements may exist 
in contradiction, or importantly, with specific reference to racism, may represent 
ambivalent or ambiguous positions. It is proposed that humour is able, through its 
structural incongruity, to merge ambivalent discourses. 
Koestler also adds that, `[t]he event (... ), in which the two intersect, is made to 
vibrate simultaneously on two different wave lengths, as it were' (Koestler, 1964: 35 in 
Attardo, 1994: 175. His omission). While this event or intersection is conditioned by 
the reception of the material, when successful, the site of incongruity will allow 
disparate elements to intersect and coexist. In relation to humour, Koestler's argument 
implies that two discourses, types of knowledge or frames of perception can intersect 
and co-agitate, and that while they may influence each other, their serious existence 
need not necessarily be threatened by the humorous event. Humour presents a type of 
gestalt shift where both discourses may exist without seriously challenging each other. 
This suggests that humour has the potential for a layering or combination of discursive 
positions and is fundamental for understanding the function of humour for allowing 
ambivalent or contradictory social discourses to receive rhetorical strengthening. Co- 
agitation will exist in all forms of humour, but in particular cases the effect is more 
significant. This is dependent on the discursive content of the humour and the type of 
'co-agitator' used, and the perception or reading of the discourse. 
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So far I have shown the connection between humour and rhetoric, outlined its 
possible affect on perceptions of reality and introduced the concept of co-agitation. 
Next, I present some more elements in my typology of humorous semantic effects. 
There are several theoretical branches in incongruity theory 4, but all describe, at 
some level, incongruity as a change of meaning or a semantic shift. The approach was 
developed by the Bologna School of Semiotics (Attardo, 1994: 177), who described 
incongruity through the tradition of Saussurian linguistics (Saussure, 1974). An earlier 
account also appears in Dorfles' description of the process: 
According to Dorffes, humor consists of a process of ostranenie (the Russian for, 
roughly, "alienation, " "detachment, " or "defamiliarisation") (Sklovskiy 1917) 
realised by a "shifting [lit: putting out of phase] of a sign (a word, an action) from 
its context" (Dorffes 1968: 101). Humor will be considered "a particular kind of 
message (... ) that operates when in a determined communicative circumstance a 
(... ) change of relationships between the sign and its referent is given" (Dorffes 
1968: 102). The fact that a sign no longer refers to its `natural' referent but to 
another "paradoxical" ... referent, gives a 
"negative, " "paradoxical" value to the 
sign, and so its humorous effect (Dorfles 1968: 104). (Attardo, 1994: 176. 
Emphasis added. )' 
As well as outlining the generic linguistic mechanisms involved in creating humour, or 
the site of co-agitation, Dorffes highlights the idea of a negative or paradoxical position 
emerging through humour, explained as alienation, detachment or defamiliarisation of 
the sign of the object of humour. In this case `negative' refers to a meaning that exists 
in some degree of opposition to the original. Important is the use of `alienation', which 
4 One approach is the `semantic script theory' of Victor Raskin (1985) and succeeding work by 
Salvadore Attardo (Attardo, 1994: 175). Raskin's semantic script theory describes incongruity as 
the product of a change from one joking script to another. While popular with some (e. g. Davies, 
1996,1998,2004a, c2004b), I have not employed this theoretical repertoire. First, the literal 
image of a script does not expand well from joke analysis to describe all types of humour, 
especially non-linguistic humour. Second, the idea of incongruity as a change of script promotes 
an impression of narrative that not all humour possesses. Third, and most importantly, it is a 
branch of theory that has not developed critical accounts of humour. Appearing uncritically 
empiricist, it has actually encouraged a movement away from the analysis of stereotypes in 
humour. On this, Davies argues that through script theory, `[t]he analysis of jokes does not 
necessarily require us to consider stereotypes at all. A script is a script is a script' (1994: 374). 
This movement in Davies' work is built on the incorrect premise that because not all of the 
content of ethnic or race joking relates directly to serious stereotypes, the content of race and 
ethnic jokes should be described as an interchangeable ethnic `script' even if it quite obviously 
depicts a stereotype. This develops from a selective reading of Raskin, who clearly states that 
ethnic scripts often, `capture stereotypes, which are at best very crude approximations of reality' 
(1985: 180), and that, `most of the ethnic humour is functionally deprecatory, or disparaging' 
(ibid). Overall, the positivist nature of the field lacks the critical capacity and inclination for 
evaluating the social impact of racist humour. 
5 In this quote Attardo's omissions appear as they do in his text, as: (... ). Mine appear as:... . 
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presents some explanation of how, because of the rhetorical incongruous structure of 
humour, the object of humour can be ridiculed in some instances. This reflects Henri 
Bergson's comment that `the comic demands something like a momentary anaesthesia 
of the heart' (1911: 11). It also adds to our understanding of how humour can be 
critiqued. Humour contains a structural reversal that makes ridicule frequently 
successful because the `natural' value of the sign, to use Dorffes language, but which is 
more accurately described as the dominant or accepted meaning, is translated into a 
paradoxical, contrasting meaning. So, while the site of co-agitation separates the 
meaning of the object of humour from its original meaning and allows meanings to be 
layered together under a single sign, these meanings may become alienated from the 
original meaning because of the specific contrast or paradox that is established. In the 
case of racist humour, the self-identity (the signs) of a minority group (the referent) 
may be wrenched from each other and redefined with racist intent. When successful, 
this linguistic `switch' has an instantaneous or automatic occurrence and so presents a 
very `efficient' method of creating ridicule or insult. The paradox of the unserious 
nature of any meaning also absolves the joker of responsibility for both the natural 
racial meaning, which may, in some instances, also be derogatory, and the alienated 
meaning. This observation forms an important link between the structure of humour, its 
effects and the basis on which to establish critique. 
The `shifting' of the sign outlined above has been conceptualised by others, outside 
of humour studies, as sign-slippage. While the approaches outlined are not as popular 
as Raskin's (1985) `script theory', they do present important theoretical explanations 
for understanding how it is that humour generates ridicule. So far then, I have shown 
that humour is clearly structured using rhetorical devices and that from this, the 
processes of redefining reality, co-agitation and semantic alienation provide a typology 
of concepts for the analysis of racist humour. 
6 De Sousa also suggests that there is a certain amount of alienation in the tendentious or 
phthonic joke. On the example of a rape joke he suggests, `[i]t also involves the presence of a 
characteristic mix of phthonic fear, identification and alienation. This combination makes it 
wrong to laugh, because it in effect involves an important variety of emotional self-deception' 
(ibid: 244). He argues `certain forms of laughter may be wrong because they represent an act of 
harmful alienation founded on distortion or denial of an underlying identification' (de Sousa, 
1987: 244). This is created from a denial of any underpinning identification to the expressed 
discourse (ibid: 244). He explains a `right to laugh' can be assumed only if we are able to 
identify with the object of the joke (ibid: 243), therefore phthonic jokes create alienation because 
they could not be told successfully face-to-face with the object of humour. This discussion 
attempts to develop an ethics of laughter through a consideration of the joker's wider belief 
structure. While it describes how jokes reflect wider problematic discourses, it does not explain 
how jokes have a particular impact, or how they create semantic alienation. 
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Of course it would be absurd to suggest that it is simply the structure of a racist joke 
that causes offence. Its content also has a constitutive role in the process. At this point 
it is appropriate to signal reference to the semiotician Roland Barthes (1977a, 1977b, 
1993). Although he did not provide a contribution to humour studies, Barthes explains 
the specific role of sign-slippage in the construction of ideology and myth. For ridicule 
or offence to be generated through humour a certain type of content, with particular 
serious meanings, is required inside a rhetorical device. It is possible to propose that, 
because the devices involved are identical, as myth is, for Barthes, created through 
devices such as metaphor and metonym, a Barthian reading would suggest that humour 
has the active potential to convey and construct racist meaning in a particularly 
effective manner. Importantly, what would make humour different from non-literal 
communication or usual ideological articulation is precisely that this active potential is 
structurally contained and forced in the single humorous utterance, which specifically 
contains connotation. This is of central importance to a critique of racist humour 
because it explains how it can help maintain racist ideology, but it also explains that the 
serious meanings have to be performative vis-ä-vis the comic. 
At this point an important caveat must be added to the incongruity discussion that 
connects the experience of incongruity with social experience and prevents the 
discussion from becoming tautological. Not all types of incongruity are humorous and 
neither are all types of sign-slippage, so in order to provide an effective analysis of 
incongruity it is necessary to explain why one type of incongruity might be humorous 
and another not. 7 
It is widely documented that while humour and laughter are said to occur in all 
societies, there exist myriad differences in joke subjects and content (Morreall 1987; 
Palmer, 1994; Critchley 2002; Billig, 2005a). People display vastly different 
preferences for humour; this is displayed socially and historically, both between 
societies and within societies. So when is one incongruity funny and another not? An 
answer to this question would also add to our understanding of why there are divergent 
reactions to racist humour. 
An early resolution to the problem of incongruity was attempted by the philosopher 
Herbert Spencer, who suggested `[l]aughter naturally results only when consciousness 
Alexander Bain in Emotions and the Will articulated this criticism of incongruity theory in the 
development of his relief theory (Billig, 2005a: 96). 
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is unawares transferred from great things to small - only when there is what we may call 
a descending incongruity' (Spencer, 1864: 116 in Billig 2005: 99. Original emphasis). 
This, to me, does not overcome the problem because it simply describes the movement 
from a serious frame to a comic frame. For Spencer, `great' is taken to imply the 
serious, grand or important while `small' signifies the trivial, unthreatening or common. 
Koestler also attempts a resolution of the problem when he suggests, through a return to 
the superiority theory, that humorous bisociation differs from artistic or scientific 
bisociation because it contains a `touch of the aggressive' (Koestler, 1964 in Parkin, 
1997: 144). This attempt fails to describe all comic incongruity, as much humour is 
clearly not aggressive, nor does it properly describe artistic or scientific creation, which 
might equally be more aggressive, or dialectical, than some instances of humour. 
Koestler has been critiqued on this basis (Parkin, 1997: 144-6). 
While the problem has not been suitably solved in humour studies, with Parkin 
suggesting that `it may prove impossible in the long term to resolve' (ibid: 144), 
Critchley makes some comments that point towards its resolution. He suggests that, `in 
order for the incongruity of the joke to be seen as such, there has to be a congruence 
between joke structure and social structure' (Critchley, 2002: 4), and that `humour is 
local and a sense of humour is usually highly context-specific' (ibid: 67). These 
comments are not developed any further by Critchley, but it is evident that they point 
towards an account of the social context in which incongruity sits. ' 
In developing this idea, it is possible to suggest that humour is formed in the 
`habitus', which - to link with Critchley's comment - is both a site of specificity, of 
locality and one that connects with, and is positioned in, social structure. It is a concept 
from the work of Pierre Bourdieu that describes the interaction between the social 
environment and the body. The habitus is generated socially but is simultaneously 
individual, a part of the environment and ingrained on the body, and can be defined as a 
set of `dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The 
dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes that are `regular' without 
being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any `rule" (Thompson in Bourdieu, 
1991: 12). 9 
S Eco also suggests that `[t]he comic ... seems bound to its time, society, cultural anthropology' 
(1986: 269). Eco is referring to the content rather than the interaction of content and structure in 
the comic. 
9 Koestler also inadvertently, and in spite of his alignment with the superiority theory on this 
issue, suggests something similar. He argues that, the receptivity for various kinds of comic 
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The use of the habitus provides a method for explaining that humour is socially and 
historically situated, while maintaining a structured element inside that situatedness. 
Incongruities may differ, and jokes will be funny in one social setting for some and not 
others, but it is the particular relationship of the social setting and habitus to the content 
and structure of the joke that will create humour. This is something that needs to be 
analysed in particular situations, although it is possible to generate an allegorical rule 
and to suggest that humorous incongruity will push away from the habitus before 
returning to it, while other types of incongruity create a different form of habitus 
separation. Humour is therefore a type of incongruity that does not `threaten' the 
existence of the habitus. This is reflected in Guthrie's comment in A Theory of the 
Comic (1903), Guthrie is said to have `believed that amusement ensues in a 
disharmonious situation only if we are simultaneously assured that everything is "all 
right"' (Keith-Spiegel, 1972: 8). Humorous incongruity maintains a closeness to, or 
affirmation of, a habitus boundary because it returns to it. 
I return to this point in my discussion of ambivalence at the end of the chapter, as 
ambivalence in the habitus has a key role to play in the formation of certain types of 
comic discourse. In relation to racist humour, humorousness will converge with, and be 
governed by, habitual discourse. Specifically, the habitus provides a concept that can 
articulate the analysis of humour preference and include a consideration of the effect of 
structural, individual, conscious and unconscious factors on this preference. 
Incongruity theories have not been explicitly applied for a critique of racist humour, 
yet they offer much as a method for highlighting the rhetorical structure of humour. 
This in turn explains its ability to ridicule through creating alienation and to cause 
offence, to redefine reality and so support notions of truth, and to co-agitate disparate or 
contradictory discourses. All of which transforms incongruity theory into a vehicle that 
can question interpretations of humour as benign or positive. 
stimulus thus varies according to the audience's intellectual habitus, its dominant trends of 
association' (Koestler, 1949: 29). Of course Koestler was using a definition of habitus that 
predates the Bourdieuian adaptation and is closer to the Latin meaning of habitus as condition or 
habit, but the similarity between the ideas is striking. Gundelach (2000) has also employed the 
`habitus', albeit in an undeveloped form, as a means of explaining the emergence of joking 
relationships between Scandinavian countries. 
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Relief Theories 
The third theoretical trend in humour studies are the `relief theories', which also 
provide important insight for building a critique of racist humour. Relief theory 
developed in the nineteenth century, after initial developments in the incongruity camp, 
and set out to explain how `laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift' 
(Morreall, 1998: 39), so providing a sense of emotional relief. This sense of relief is 
usually explained as the result of observing an incongruity, but relief theory 
concentrates on the change of psychological or physiological state of those involved in 
laughing, rather than on the condition of the external stimulus. Notable contributors 
include George Santayana, Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain. Contemporary relief 
theory explains how laughter releases endorphins (Rainham, 2003), which provides the 
basis for humour being able to reduce stress (Lee and Kleiner, 2005), and assist in the 
healing process (Capple and Ziebland, 2004; Goodenough and Ford, 2005). 
Relief theories have rarely developed critical accounts of humour. Often the relief of 
laughter is accepted as a benign or useful function. Little attention has been given to the 
types of tension that humour might dispel, of whether these tensions are justifiable, or 
ethically equivalent. Parkin presents a comment that is typical of this outlook: 
`laughter... achieves nothing in itself other than a working off of excess energy which 
for obscure psychological reasons is catalysed by certain types of incongruity' (1997: 
136). The question of whether the release of racial tension through humour is 
problematic has received little attention. 
Not all relief theories are so uncritical. Sigmund Freud's (1991 [1905]) theory of 
joking offers a number of insights that aid a critique of racist humour. Freud argues that 
humour results from a nervous release of energy (Parkin, 1994: 139; Keith-Spiegel, 
1972: 12), and that jokes often have a similar function to dreams or slips of the tongue 
because they represent the expression of repressed thoughts, or thoughts that are not 
socially acceptable as serious discourse. Freud distinguished between tendentious jokes 
and innocent jokes. Tendentious jokes are a mechanism for expelling tension through 
laughter that avoids the censorship of the super-ego, which can be equated with social 
censorship. The tendentious joke either expresses hostility, aggression or has a sexual 
content and so includes most jokes that generate insult. Innocent jokes are, for Freud, 
jokes or puns that do not insult, and are less purposeful. 
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For racist humour, it is the tendentious joke on which I concentrate. Palmer gives a 
useful, tripartite outline of the mechanisms involved in the telling of tendentious jokes: 
The moment a joke is told, Freud hypothesises, there are present in the mind a 
series of tendencies: 1 to do something that is the object of social 
disapprobation, e. g. insult somebody; 2 the repression of that tendency; 3 the 
pleasure specific to joking. (1994: 80) 
Taking each of Palmer's points in turn, the racist joke, having a certain discursive 
content that if expressed seriously might become the focus of disapprobation, allows for 
an expression to avoid the same type of censure to which serious discourse is subjected 
because it is 'just a joke'. By avoiding this censure, racist jokes, through Freud's theory, 
may express socially undesirable thoughts in a non-serious realm and avoid the 
necessary display of `guilt' generated by unacceptable serious communication. 
The second point in Palmer's outline concerns the repression of this tendency. This 
can be conceptualised in two ways that aid my typology. First, in the reaction of those 
who find the joke funny and, second, through a consideration of the impact of the joke 
on the `other'. 
First, as jokes are not serious, and jokers often deny serious expression or intent, 
Freud considered there to be an element of self-denial in the tendentious joke, that the 
joke involves an act of self-deception by the joker (Keith-Spiegel, 1972: 13). Stott 
describes this: `humour works because it appeals to unconscious thoughts that remain 
largely hidden in the majority of our social interactions' (2005: 138). Keith-Spiegel 
adds that humour might represent `a camouflage which functions to deceive the 
superego temporarily as repressions are being suddenly released' (1972: 13). Thoughts 
that could not be expressed in serious communication appear in humour because the 
joke allows for the expression of a fantasy realm for the joker and audience who accept 
the joke. This leads, paradoxically, to a denial of the reality or seriousness of the 
expression at an internal, psychological level, as well as the social level outlined in 
point one. 
Second, the tendentious joke can be seen as an expression of the unconscious 
because, through the process of creating humour that involves denial of any serious 
intent - which is often sincere on the part of the joker - there is an unconscious 
expression of, in the case of the racist joke, a discursive content in a specific rhetorical 
device. This can lead to a number of potential discursive and communicative effects 
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that are not comic for the object of the joke, and not consciously observed by the social 
actors involved in expressing or receiving the meanings of humour. An unconscious 
discursive expression is generated through the act of joking and this can lead to a 
problematic and non-humorous impact on the object of humour. Joking represents a 
type of rhetorical false consciousness for the joke teller, and audience who laugh, 
because they do not fully acknowledge the motivation for, and implications of, the 
rhetorical linguistic frame they are entering. 
The third of Palmer's points, the pleasure of laughter, represents the relief that 
humour generates, as a result of the enjoyable psychological shift. Pleasure, for some, 
can be gained by making others uncomfortable, causing offence or degrading an `other' 
who is not present. It would not be adequate to excuse the pleasure of joking as 
harmless simply because it is a pleasure, especially as it contains a sadistic element. The 
nervous release in racist humour is not beyond critique simply because it provides 
pleasure for the joker and receptive audience. It has been documented that hatred often 
involves pleasure. Billig explains how, 
Sartre, in Portrait of the Anti-Semite suggests that bigots take pleasure in `the joy 
of hating' (1948: 21). He argued that anti-Semites find it `amusing' to be anti- 
semitic (1948: 38). Although their opponents treat the issues involved as serious, 
the anti-Semites `treat the matter as a joke', knowing that their beliefs are at root 
absurd (1948: 15). Similarly, Adorno and Horkheimer, in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, suggests that the rantings of anti-Semites at fascist political 
meetings are nothing but `organised laughter' (1997: 184). (Billig, 2001: 268) 
The paradox of gaining pleasure from hating is an important observation for 
understanding racist humour. If hatred and pleasure are so closely associated, then a 
regular source of pleasure, such as humour and laughter, cannot be assumed to be 
positive or benign and needs to be viewed with critical awareness. Similarly, if there is 
an element of self-denial in the pleasure then the hatred is not fully admitted. This can 
be connected with the observation of the alienation of humour, which is created by the 
movement of meaning through incongruity, and suggests that to inflict this alienation 
often has a pleasurable effect on the joker and the receptive audience. 
Contemporary applications of relief theory have been attempted. Boskin describes 
humour as a form of social communication and `integrally connected to the cultural 
code of society' (1987: 254). He employs the superiority theory and draws on Freud's 
concept of the tendentious joke to discuss the destructive potential of humour. Freud's 
approach is also commensurate with an examination of the linguistic mechanisms of 
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humour. He developed an analysis described as `joke-work', which `resembles what 
today's analysts would call `semiotics' or `discourse analysis" (Billig, 2005a: 151). We 
have also seen that his key analytical concepts, condensation and displacement, are 
rhetorical devices. Despite this, there are limitations for applying relief theory in my 
later chapters, because I examine humour as `text'. In this thesis any comments on the 
release of joking remain hypothetical and theoretical because I undertake no empirical 
measurement of release from joking. This is a common problem, and overall in humour 
studies the collection of evidence of release remains difficult. 
In one such theoretical example I show in Chapter Two how the process of gaining 
pleasure via release in racist joking is connected with the expression of what Zygmunt 
Bauman calls `proteophobia' and `proteophilia' - fear and adoration of multiform 
respectively - which are defined as tropes that emerge because of the tension created by 
the ambivalent 'other' in social space. Bauman describes how these processes `recycle' 
ambivalence in social space. The proteophobic tension and proteophilic pleasure 
created by racial belief and racial hatred is expelled through humour, specifically 
through images of hatred and adoration of the ambivalent `other'. This serves to remove 
ambivalence from racist discourse while coupled with the pleasure of release through 
humour. 
Theoretical Developments 
I now provide a brief example of how the three theories can be applied to a single joke: 
Q: Which sexual position produces the ugliest children? 
A: Ask a Muslim...!! 
In this first example the racist humour is aimed at Muslims. 10 Superiority theory comes 
into play in the obvious ridicule of Muslims. To call a group of people `ugly' is a clear 
example of ridicule, highlighting perfectly Aristotle's notion of the ridiculous as a 
`species of the ugly'. Incongruity theory shows how the joke creates a metaphorical link 
between Muslims and ugliness. This is the rhetorical device of the joke that would 
create the sudden rhetorical effect in the correct habitus. Finally, relief theory highlights 
that the joke expresses a comment that might be unacceptable in serious 
communication, that might, as `humour', deceive the joker and audience of their hidden 
1° A full discussion of the racialization of Muslims will appear in later chapters. 
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anti-Muslim racism, and also, will deceive the joker and audience of their expression of 
racist rhetoric. This example highlights that an interpretation of the joke using all of the 
three theories need not create confliction. 
So far I have outlined how popular exculpatory and positive accounts of humour are 
inadequate for the analysis of racist humour. After this, a critique of racist humour is 
developed drawing on elements of the three theories of humour. These theoretical 
points are taken forward in the later chapters and specifically applied to examples of 
racist humour through a three stage methodological approach outlined next. This 
approach is, admittedly, in an emergent stage of development, as is the sociological 
critique of humour generally. My methodology constitutes a form of discourse analysis 
that allows for each theoretical part of the typology available for humour analysis to be 
applied to specific examples of racist humour. Lastly in the chapter, I explain the effect 
of rhetorical humorous devices on social ambivalence (including racist ambivalence), 
which provides a key link to the development of the argument in Chapter Two. 
Towards a Rhetorical Analysis of Humour 
As stated, this section outlines the method that I use for my analysis of the empirical 
material - the humour and jokes - that are the focus of this thesis. The race and ethnic 
humour that appears in the later chapters is subjected to a particular analysis that I use 
to identify how humour generates a variety of rhetorical effects, and how the elements 
of my typology come into play. In identifying these potential rhetorical effects, I will 
highlight the particular racist readings that have the potential to reinforce or redefine 
truth perceptions and have an influence on discursive ambivalence. This forms an 
adaptation of several pre-existing methodological approaches from studies of humour, 
all of which are types of semiology (e. g. Palmer, 1987; Berger, 1995a, 1998). It is, 
therefore, a method that approaches humour analysis as a form of deconstruction 
(Berger, 1998: 4-12). These sources have not received a great deal of attention in 
mainstream studies of humour, but a semiological analysis does offer a more 
sophisticated and specifically critical method than that developed by alternative 
approaches, especially by descendents of Raskin's `script theory' (e. g. Raskin, 1984; 
Attardo, 1994; Davies, 1996,1998a, 2002), and has the potential to sit well with the 
critical theory developed in wider semiology (e. g. Barthes, 1977a, 1977b, 1993; 
Derrida, 1990). 
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My approach shows some similarity with other studies. While some attention has 
been given in discourse analysis to accounts that explain how rhetorical devices often 
surround humour, little attention has been paid, at least in recent work, to the analysis 
of the rhetorical structure of jokes themselves. For example, Lockyer and Pickering 
(2001) give an analysis of how rhetorical devices are often used in the complaints 
regarding the offensiveness of jokes published in Private Eye magazine. Billig (2001) 
has outlined the use of rhetoric in the meta-discourses that excuse racist jokes on three 
Ku Klux Klan affiliated websites, and provides an account of how laughter and 
unlaughter (or not laughing) work rhetorically as social discipline (Billig, 2005a). My 
approach mirrors these in its concern to chart the emergence of types of rhetoric, but 
while these studies get quite close to the problem, neither of them hit the target that this 
thesis aims for, because neither suggest that jokes are rhetorical vehicles in and of 
themselves. 
Insight that has been gained from studies that have examined the rhetorical structure 
of jokes has not been applied for the development of a critical analysis of particular 
types of humour. Berger (1995a, 1998) and Palmer (1987) provide two useful and 
important examples of theories of humour that highlight the identical nature of the 
structuring of humour and rhetorical devices. My particular methodology intersects 
between the two, between what might be described as Berger's `broad' semiotic 
analysis and the `narrow' approach developed by Palmer, but unlike either, mine is 
developed and deployed as a critical methodology. 
Berger (1995a, 1998) explains the aim of his approach and how it differs from a 
wider rhetorical analysis. He states, 
My concern is not with the techniques that can be used to "persuade" people to 
believe something but the techniques that can be used to "persuade" people to 
laugh, or at least, to see or define some text or performance as humorous. (Berger, 
1995a: 53) 
These comments highlight the difference between Berger's approach and my own 
because I suggest that in most cases the techniques and structures of humour are 
identical to rhetorical devices, and that the act of laughing, the act rendering the joke 
funny, often also adds to the convincing or communicative nature of the humour - that 
it helps people to believe in something. This is then coupled with the various rhetorical 




Berger's broad analysis provides a list of forty-five comic techniques or structures 
that can generate laughter (ibid: 54 and Berger, 1998: 18. also see Appendix One), and 
suggests that one instance of humour might contain more than one of these techniques 
(Berger, 1998: 15). This list represents a useful typology of incongruities and I draw on 
and reference particular techniques from this list when it is necessary. While it is not a 
list of traditional rhetorical devices, some of the types or genres identified can be 
aligned with traditional devices. " 
An example of the second, narrow rhetorical analysis of humour appears in Palmer 
(1987), who postulates a clear link between the structure of humour and metaphor 
(1987: 60-3), and uses this to present a detailed theoretical investigation of the nature of 
the comic. Palmer suggests, rightly, that metaphors and jokes are similar because they 
both use words in a `deviant' or non-literal manner (ibid: 61). I wish to widen the 
analysis to include parallels between humorous structure and not just metaphor, but 
many more rhetorical devices. While Eco suggests that metaphor `has served to indicate 
every rhetorical figure in general' (1984: 87), that all rhetorical devices can be linked to 
metaphor, it is not imprecise to widen my own methodological approach to describe 
how other tropes are used in the creation of humour. In fact, this will add to the 
precision of the analysis. 12 
Having signposted these two similar approaches, I now give more detail of my own 
method of analysis, which has three interlinked stages. In particular instances of 
humour a different one of the three stages may dominate, but all exist to some extent. 
11 Importantly, it should not be assumed that these techniques automatically generate rhetorical 
effects. Often Berger's (1995) own analysis does appear to emphasise the structural techniques 
of humour, without adequate attention being given to the wider social or situational factors that 
create successful humour, or which generate rhetorical effects. Rather than viewing the 
structural techniques of humour as 'meaning conveyers', as the structural foundations involved in 
the creation of comic material, it is important to consider the wider significance of the discursive 
content that is used alongside a structure in humour. Berger's analysis does not do this 
adequately enough. 
12 Palmer asks what it is that makes an utterance comic rather than metaphoric. This is the issue, 
addressed previously, of how one incongruity comes to be funny while others do not. Palmer 
accounts for this difference by arguing that `we know that what we see ... 
is funny in so far as it 
is simultaneously plausible and implausible, but more implausible than plausible' (Palmer, 1987: 
56), whereas, he suggests, a metaphor would be more plausible than implausible. While 
Palmer's attempt at distinguishing between a metaphor and a joke is theoretically ambitious, and 
he does develop the notion of implausibility in relation to the ideological and social connotations 
of the language usage (ibid: 81), it is, ultimately, an account that contains the same tautological 
tendency exhibited by other explanations, because implausibility becomes a substitute for 
unserious, and plausible a substitute for serious. 
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First, my analysis outlines the discursive content of humour, which would involve an 
analysis of the particular linguistic signs that generate meaning in humour. In any 
semiology there are two interlinked considerations that need to be kept in mind when 
analysing content, which are just as salient in humour analysis. These are, firstly, the 
relationship between the specific signs and, secondly, a consideration of the narrative 
structure of the text. This twofold consideration is highlighted by Berger: 
Semiotics ask how meaning is generated in daily life and ... 
in any text. It seeks to 
answer this question by analyzing the signification found in a given text and by 
trying to elicit the polar oppositions (or sets of paired opposites) implicit in the 
work. It also seeks to understand the way the narrative functions (when there is 
one). These two operations involve investigating the paradigmatic (or 
oppositional) and the syntagmatic (or linear, narrative) aspects of the text. (Berger, 
1998: 5) 
The analysis of humour should be no different. One concern of this thesis is with the 
way in which humour affects ambivalence and how it serves an `important' social 
function for race and ethnic discourses because of these effects. Such discourses 
generate ambivalence around the binary divisions of the text or `paradigmatic 
oppositions' (ibid: 7). By investigating these paradigmatic elements, Berger suggests 
that we can uncover `the latent content, what the joke "really" means' (ibid: 5). In the 
case of humour this is of vital importance because it is these oppositions, contradictions 
or incongruities that will become, in particular readings of humour, the focus of 
rhetorical effect. Berger's second point, on understanding the narrative or syntagmatic 
element of humour, is important because it is this narrative element that will often 
allow for, and develop, the presentation of an incongruity. Berger identifies, rightly, 
that it is in the punch line that a shift from the syntagmatic to the paradigmatic will take 
place - that the joke will move from its linear form to its disjointed rhetorical form 
(ibid: 59). Language will remain in a linear form up until the point that the elements are 
placed in the linguistic `switch' or point of slippage. This gives me two methodological 
considerations when examining both Fry's `redefinition of reality' and Koestler's `co- 
agitation' in humour. 
The second stage of my textual analysis identifies the connection between the 
particular sign content and wider race and ethnic discourses. In many cases these 
connections are quite obvious, but it is important to highlight the etymology of signs 
involved in humour, so as to gain a clear idea of the meanings being rhetorically 
strengthened. This stage is connected with an explanation of the paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic, but it would place special emphasis on explaining the connotations that are 
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generated by the signs involved in the jokes (Palmer, 1987: 63). In other words, this 
stage explains what exactly, in terms of the meaning of the serious discourse, is to be 
rhetorically strengthened in the joke. Palmer argues it is always important to investigate 
`the narrative flow of the text, which is a form of production following its own logic, 
and the discourses of the social structure which clearly have an existence... independent 
of comic texts' (ibid: 59-60). This gives some idea of what meanings are the subject of 
alienation in humour. 
The third stage of the analysis outlines the particular structure of the humorous 
incongruity, identifying the rhetorical device that it is built on. While we saw, on the 
one hand, how Palmer suggests that metaphors and jokes are structurally identical (ibid: 
63), and on the other hand, how Berger identifies forty-five humorous techniques, I do 
not present a definitive list of techniques. Despite this reticence, it is possible to 
acknowledge that there are a number of common devices that often appear in humour 
and which can be signposted. These include metaphor, metonym, paradox, sarcasm, 
innuendo, hyperbole and irony. Aside from these devices, it is probable that further 
investigation will uncover other devices (Berger, 1998: 17). 
Berger gives some logistical tips for analysing joke structure. First, it is necessary to 
deconstruct humour into its basic elements by outlining which devices it contains. 
Second, it is necessary to rate the devices in order of `importance' or `impact' (ibid). 
Once the straightforward task of defining the basic elements is completed, ranking the 
importance of the rhetorical techniques will depend on measuring the potential impact 
that each of the devices could have in a particular reading, perhaps by estimating the 
`veracity' of the potential effect. In terms of analysing the devices for rhetorical effect, 
it would be important to gauge how the elements of an incongruity `build' the effect as 
the structure develops. On this, Jean Cohen offers an important comment: 
Every figure of speech requires a two-stage process of decoding, of which the first 
is the perception of anomaly and the second its correction, by the exploration of 
the paradigmatic field, the nexus of relationships, contiguity, etc., thanks to which 
a signified will be found which will give the statement an acceptable semantic 
interpretation. (Cohen, 1970: 22 in Palmer, 1987: 65) 
The incongruity that is presented in the joke is offered correction in the unfolding logic 
of the absurd and following the correction, the anomaly or ambivalence that was 
necessary for the humour to begin no longer exists. Palmer explains this as the presence 
of syllogism in humour (the existence of two propositions). A joke will present a major 
premise and a minor premise in its structure and content (ibid: 42), and in all instances 
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the first premise (the major premise), will remain incoherent, but the joke will always 
offer the minor premise some resolution through the false logic that develops in it (ibid: 
43). Returning to racist humour, it is this second false logic that may act as the point of 
rhetorical effect. The sudden break or slippage in the joke (or the peripeteia as Palmer 
describes it) occurs with the emergence of the false rhetorical impulse around this logic. 
When the false logic is a racist logic, a redefining of racist reality can take place. 
Humour and Ambivalence 
Throughout the chapter, I have stated that humour can impact on ambivalence. Before 
Chapter Two begins, where I state how humour specifically affects racist ambivalence, 
I give detail on what I mean by the notion of a generic impact on ambivalence. 
I define an ambivalent discourse as one that co-exists with other discourses in the 
subject, group or society, and provides an incommensurable description of the same 
referent in comparison to the description offered by other discourses. This is quite 
similar to the definitions developed by Bauman (1991). My definition is extended to 
describe ambiguous discourses, which contain ambivalent elements that attempt, but 
struggle, to fix definitions of a referent. Finally, it also refers to discourses that display 
logical contradictions, and so explain the same referent in a contradictory way at 
different times. 
Theories of humour have posited a link between the experience of ambivalence and 
anxiety and the experience of laughter (Berger, 1998: 73). These theories have 
developed as a subsection of incongruity theories, because ambivalent elements are 
experienced as a type of incongruity that cannot be reconciled literally. Keith-Spiegel 
outlines how ambivalence theories explain `that laughter results when the individual 
simultaneously experiences incompatible emotion or feelings' (1972: 10). Ambivalence 
theories have a long history. In Plato's dialogue Philebus, `the prototype of 
ambivalence theory emerged when Socrates taught Protarchus that laughter arises from 
the simultaneity of pleasure and pain resulting from envy and malice' (ibid: 10). It has 
also been suggested that a joke, through expressing ambivalence, can resemble a 
problem solving mechanism. Shillier elaborates on this: `The comic feeling is a logical 
joy aroused by a sudden change in the configuration of a thought pattern of unstable 
structure, showing the double aspect of a moment in its dynamic duality' (Shillier, 
1938: 234 in ibid: 12). 
51 
To illustrate how ambivalence is rhetorically affected by humour, I will draw on two 
specific examples from humour studies: Sullivan's (2000) discussion of social workers' 
use of gallows humour and Mulkay and Gilbert's (1982) analysis of jokes from the 
scientific community. 
Sullivan's (2000) account records how some social workers use gallows humour 
with their colleagues when describing service users. Sullivan quotes one of her 
respondents: 
the whole purpose of that lunch meeting was to discuss in really intricate 
detail... all the terrible things that we would do to these children, and how much 
we disliked what we did... anybody listening in would have thought we were 
either psychotic or genocidal (2000: 48). 
For the social workers, the humour process provides a means of expressing these 
attitudes. Sullivan describes this as a form of stress relief (ibid: 45), viewing the humour 
as a `socially acceptable form of expression' (ibid: 49) of anti-social emotions. 
Although critical of the content of the jokes, Sullivan provides no analysis of the 
functional outcome of this type of stress relief, focusing on a negotiation of the use of 
humour as a coping strategy and the discriminatory nature of the humour. 
More specifically, the article can be read to highlight an ambivalence in the humour. 
Sullivan outlines that: `The process may act to disguise the incompatibility between the 
worker's derogatory thoughts and her social work values, making it difficult to 
consciously make the connection between gallows humour and discriminatory practice' 
(ibid: 49. Original emphasis). Reframing this discussion, it is possible to show how two 
ambivalent or incongruous discourses co-exist in this site of humorous co-agitation. The 
two discourses are, first, the `social workers' values' and second, the `derogatory 
thoughts'. The coexistence of these discourses is incongruous and incommensurable, 
and leaves the social worker in a state of ambivalence and anxiety. The use of humour 
as a co-agitator works to remove this ambivalence because it allows for the social and 
psychological expression of both discourses. Both discourses remain unchanged in this 
process, but through mobilising the rhetorical and incongruous structure of humour, the 
ambivalence can be momentarily expressed and the derogatory thoughts momentarily 
dispelled. Alongside this, the social workers are also able, in this tendentious humour, 
to gain pleasure through malicious laughter. 
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Mulkay and Gilbert (1982) give a clearer account of ambivalence resolution in a 
discussion of the humour employed by scientists. Two interpretative repertoires are 
used by their scientists. Interpretative repertoires `are recurrently used systems of terms 
used for categorising and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena [and] 
particular stylistic and grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organised 
around specific metaphors and figures of speech' (Wetherell and Potter, 1987: 149). 
The scientist's repertoires are labelled the `empiricist' and the `contingent'. Mulkay and 
Gilbert draw on two examples, a proto-joke and an ironic journal article, and suggest 
that they `grow out of a fundamental interpretative task which regularly confronts 
practising scientists - namely, that of reconciling the empiricist and contingent 
repertoires' (1982: 604). In the empiricist repertoire, 
genuine scientific knowledge is presented as being determined by the controlled, 
experimental revelation of `the facts' about the natural world. The production of 
experimental facts is taken to follow from scientists' application of interpersonal 
procedural rules, and theoretical interpretation to derive unproblematically from 
the facts, as long as no personal judgements or social factors are allowed to 
influence scientists' judgements. (ibid: 589) 
The contingent repertoire appears in informal contexts and `treats action in science as 
much less uniform and scientific beliefs as much more open-ended. Emphasis is placed 
on the importance of personal commitment, intuition and practical skills' (ibid). When 
presenting their work, scientists do not use the contingent repertoire (ibid). Importantly, 
these two discourses exist in contradiction to one another and so provide examples of 
ambivalent discourse as defined at the beginning of the section. 
Mulkay and Gilbert found that humour often combined the two discourses and had 
the ability to remove the ambivalence created by the two repertoires. They suggest that 
`[h]umour constructed by scientists for other scientists is very frequently accomplished 
by juxtaposing the empiricist and contingent repertoires' (ibid: 592). In the case of the 
ironic journal article this process is directly enacted by the expression of a disturbing 
reality: 
We can now see it as a strongly ironic text which is organised... to bring out the 
supposedly contingent character of many scientific knowledge-claims, and to 
reveal how scientists can employ the formal mode of discourse to attempt to hide 
this contingency. (ibid: 600) 
The scientists used irony as a method of expressing and hiding the contradiction 
involved in their use of the contingent repertoire. Mulkay and Gilbert explain that 
`when scientists use ironic forms to communicate with their colleagues, the 
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combination of divergent perspectives is largely hidden from view' (ibid: 602-3). The 
literal failing of their repertoires is circumvented. This reconciling constitutes the 
removal of ambivalence from the repertoires. Gilbert and Mulkay state this explicitly: 
`We.. Identified certain possible recurrent organizational features of scientific humour, 
such as the sequencing of repertories and the use of primary repertoires to resolve 
incongruity (ibid: 606. emphasis added). This is one effect of humour on ambivalence. 
As the thesis develops others will be elicited, such as the highlighting of contradiction 
and tension, or the mediation of ambivalence. 
In Mulkay and Gilbert's reading, incongruity is resolved through the use of humour. 
The discourses that construct types of truth and knowledge, or formal discourses, have 
contradictory characteristics in relation to the discourses that develop in everyday 
situations. These contradictions are presented or framed in the humorous realm and so 
appear simultaneously and paradoxically true and false. This allows for both discourses 
to co-agitate. The mechanism used is a rhetorical device, which allows for the abrasive 
reality of these coexisting repertoires to be redefined, if only momentarily. The 
momentary aspect of this process gives some explanation for Mulkay and Gilbert's 
observation of the reoccurring and popular nature of these particular joke contents. 
Humour can dissolve uncomfortable truths that would otherwise have important and 
disturbing consequences for serious discourse, but only for so long, thus reflecting 
Bergson's `monetary anaesthesia'. 
Such humour becomes funny for the scientist and the social worker because of the 
particular play of ambivalence in the specific habitus. Their funniness would elude 
many people outside of the setting, or might be interpreted differently. The particular 
clash of ambivalence in the habitus and the placement of these incongruous elements in 
various rhetorical devices allows for a resolution in humorous expression. If these 
discourses were not incongruous they would not be suitable for inclusion in humour and 
so there would simply be no joke to produce, yet they can only become incongruous in 
a particular habitus. In Chapter Two these ideas are applied directly to racist discourse 
via a critical reading of Bauman's theoretical ideas. This shows how humour is able to 
remove, in specific instances, some of the ambivalence of racism. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter began with a critique of the exculpatory and positive approaches. I then 
examined the three theories of humour, the superiority theory, the incongruity theory 
and the relief theory. Each is relevant, not as a universal explanation of humour or 
laughter, but as an account that gives particular insights that develop a typology of 
theoretical processes for a critical analysis of humour. Humour and laughter have, 
historically, been viewed with suspicion because of their ability to generate ridicule. 
The structure of humour specifically encourages this because it is rhetorical. Other 
processes include the ability of humour to (1) redefine reality, (2) co-agitate disparate 
discourses and (3) create semantic alienation. All of these processes depend on 
humorous incongruity as a rhetorical device. I also show how there is an element of 
pleasure and self-denial specific to joking. Following this I integrate these ideas into a 
three stage `rhetorical analysis' of humorous texts. This examines (1) discursive 
content, (2) discursive connotation, and (3) discursive/rhetorical structure. Lastly, I 
show that humour can affect ambivalent social discourses. These implications give 
weight to the argument that, in some instances, jokes are far more than just benign or 
positive utterances. Chapter Two outlines, principally through an examination of 
Zygmunt Bauman's work, the major forms of ambivalence central to the structuring of 
various forms of racism, which in later chapters are shown to be affected in racist 
humour. This gives a specific and original analysis of three types of racist humour, 
namely embodied racist joking, culturally racist joking and liquid racist joking. I 
synthesise Bauman's ideas with the theory outlined here and explain that, as humour 
can alter structural ambivalence that would otherwise cause anxiety or cognitive 
dilemmas for social actors, (which is why it is often labelled a coping strategy or a form 
of conflict management), these forms are commensurate with the types of ambivalence 
outlined by Bauman. 
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Chapter Two 
Humour and Order-Building 
Introduction 
Chapter One outlined how humorous and non-humorous discourses relate to one 
another and gave a typology and methodology of the rhetorical potential of the 
humorous. The implications of this follow that in particular readings, and because of the 
rhetorical devices or co-agitators that form its structure, humour can have important 
implications for non-humorous discourse. This was described as the rhetorical 
resolution or dissipation of serious incongruity or ambivalence and the reinforcing of 
truth claims. The purpose of this chapter is to apply these ideas to racist humour, racist 
truth claims and racist ambivalence by making use of Zygmunt Bauman's thesis on 
modernity, the development of order-building systems and their hatred and production 
of ambivalence. Humour is shown to rhetorically act upon the ambivalences and truth 
claims of racist discourse. 
Following Bauman's assertion that ambivalence is the `alter ego' of language, 
modernity and the order-building processes involved in each, but also represents the 
most significant and problematic `waste product' of these order-building processes 
(Bauman, 1991,1993,1998), this second chapter outlines three types of race discourse - 
biological, cultural and postmodern. I argue the case, developed sequentially and 
individually in the later chapters, that during particular readings humour has a 
significant role to play in expressing and rhetorically resolving the incongruity, 
ambiguity, ambivalence and incoherence that is produced by each of these discourses. 
Thus directly influencing the perceived truth of the discourses. 
First, as a product of modernity, enlightenment and colonialism, race discourse 
reflects a particular set of ordering processes whose ambivalence is rhetorically affected 
in embodied racist humour. Second, and also in modernity, cultural racism is signalled 
as being affected through culturally racist humour. Third, postmodernity or liquid 
modernity, and what might be called the liquid racism that emerges in this social 
formation, are outlined and signalled as being connected to postmodern humour. 
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Humour is not the only technique that can affect ambivalence. Bauman (1993,1995) 
himself conceptualises two techniques that perform this task, namely `proteophobia' 
and `proteophilia'. Proteophobia can be defined as fear or hatred of multiform and 
proteophilia as love or adoration of multiform. These techniques are also shown to 
appear both in, and as responses to, race and ethnic humour, thus connecting with 
humorous co-agitators to form increasingly robust rhetorical techniques for 
ambivalence processing. 
Before this, however, it is necessary to outline Bauman's thesis on the emergence of 
ambivalence in language, to explain, first, the scale of the `problem' of ambivalence, 
and second, why it is that ambivalence causes problems for discourse that call for the 
mobilisation of removal techniques. After this I make some observations on the 
relationship between the social actor and the experience of ambivalence. This second 
discussion situates the theoretical points made in the chapter firmly in the context of an 
interaction between the individual and society, through language and discourse. 
Ambivalence and Language 
Zygmunt Bauman (1991) postulates a central relationship between the onset of 
modernity, the development of order-building systems and the generation of 
ambivalence. For Bauman, ambivalence has a particular and formative appearance in 
modernity, but it is not specific to this period. He explains that semantic ambivalence 
may appear both anywhere and at any time during the use of language, because it is 
generated through one of the most common forms of language use, namely category 
formation (ibid). From this observation, Bauman argues that ambivalence constitutes `a 
language-specific disorder: a failure of the naming (segregation) function that language 
is meant to perform' (ibid: 1). While ambivalence is potentially quite common, it is not 
the generic use of language to classify that principally concerns Bauman, rather his 
focus is specifically that of scientific and knowledge-building discourse and the use of 
language by such discourse to create classification, division and structure. Importantly, 
he suggests that ambivalence emerges as a normal, and moreover, inevitable product of 
these classificatory, definitional or structure building practices, and represents the 
product of an inevitable lack of precision that emerges through category formation 
(ibid: 7). 
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Ambivalence can be generated in several ways. First, through not categorising or 
ignoring certain objects. Once a category has been created, a content will be defined. 
The definition of a content will also, almost always, rely on objects that are not 
included inside the category, as an example of what is not a part of the definition. The 
imposition of a boundary between these objects will create, or at least emphasise, a 
distinction between the included and the excluded of a category. If the objects that are 
outside of a particular category remain undefined, then their existence may provoke 
ambivalence or anxiety. Second, ambivalence is generated through the failure of 
categories to describe correctly and so ambivalence will appear when linguistic 
definitions fail to map the objects of a category `correctly'. For example, an object may 
fail to `fit' a category completely, or may change and `resist' a category. Third, 
ambivalence is generated through inadequate or limited knowledge collection and 
would surround an object that little is known about, if it has not been subjected to 
`enough' mapping or categorisation. 
Following Bauman's rationale, such failures in semantic precision create an 
`outside' of discourse and knowledge and represent the inability of language to 
completely map or make sense of the world. To reiterate, ambivalence is specifically 
created by attempts to dissect, categorise and define the world and its objects. It is 
therefore a logical product of the linguistic process of categorisation, which always 
involves the imposition of boundaries that depend on a particular amount of detail of 
description, that can either be superseded, redescribed, or from which objects can `slip' 
away. Categorisation, therefore, contains an inevitable and unconscious drive towards 
fragmentation (ibid: 12), which suggests that techniques, such as humour and joking, 
which are able to express ambivalence, may have a significant social function as a 
rhetorical device that can overcome these problems. One criticism that can be made of 
Bauman here is the rather undeveloped way in which he assumes that knowledge 
manufactures ambivalence, and the lack of differentiation between types of 
ambivalence. A part of the distinctions created in this thesis will describe how different 
types of race discourse produce specifically different problems that are addressed in 
humour. These include truth reinforcement, the assertion of binary distinctions, and 
various consequences for not just ambivalence but also incongruity, contradiction and 
incoherence. Bauman's overuse of the term `ambivalence' as a concept serves to 
subsume the detail of these processes. 
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Ambivalence and the Social Actor 
Before I progress any further with my description of the types of ambivalence that 
appear in the various social formations and styles of discourse under investigation, I 
give a conceptualisation of the social actor, of how the social actor experiences 
discourse and of how the social actor experiences ambivalence. This is significant as a 
means of grounding the thesis, to make it understandable and to express its relevance 
for those engaged in mapping and negotiating the implications of humour. It is also 
important because humour is an everyday semiotic expression that, if it is to have any 
rhetorical effect, must always be `felt' or experienced in a semantic form by particular 
social actors. Jean Francois Lyotard conceptualises the experience of discourse by the 
social actor, which can be used to conceptualise the experience of comic meaning: 
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of 
relations... a person is always located at "nodal points" of specific communication 
circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a post 
through which various kinds of messages pass. No one, not even the least 
privileged among us, is ever entirely powerless over the messages that traverse and 
position him at the post of sender, addressee, or referent. (Lyotard, 1979: 15) 
By describing the social actor as a `nodal point' in discourse, Lyotard suggests that the 
social actor can take up the position of sender, addressee or referent in relation to 
discourse, as a node with some degree of control over the propagation of discursive 
meaning. In humour, this simply translates into an observation of the social actor as 
joker, audience, or `referent' of the joke. Coupled with Bourdieu's concept of the 
habitus, introduced in Chapter One to describe the site in which the definition of the 
comic is formed, we can see that if the social actor acts as a node for comic discourse to 
move through, comic discourse will `meet' the habitus within the social actor. This 
represents the site in which ambivalence is experienced. This ambivalence may exist 
either in a discourse, between a discourse and another discourse, or between the 
discourse and the habitus (which may also, but not always, be a discursive interaction). 
This may seem obvious, but it is important to understanding that the generation of a 
rhetorical effect produced by humour will depend on the reading that the comic 
discourse receives in the habitus, as it passes through a social actor or nodal point. The 
success of ambivalence resolution through humour will therefore relate to the 
relationship of the ambivalence to the habitus, which is a highly complex, and a 
frequently unpredictable or unknowable discursive phenomena for the analyst. 
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Having suggested that for ambivalence to exist it will always be felt by a social 
actor, we might ask the questions: what is racist ambivalence? And, why does racist 
ambivalence need to be resolved? In dealing with the latter question first, some have 
argued, rather uncritically, that while racism contains ambivalence, it survives, or 
functions, perfectly well with this ambivalence. For example, Wieviorka (1997) 
suggests that racism is characterised by its ability to exist with internal ambivalence and 
that this does not lead to the collapse of racism. He argues, `[t]he specificity of racism 
is, indeed, its capacity to merge incoherent or heterogeneous affects in a singular hatred 
of the Other; of wanting, for example, to exploit this hatred and at the same time to 
eliminate it' (1997: 147). Racism does not just survive even though it contains 
ambivalence, nor is this the specificity of racism. Rather, the creation and removal of 
ambivalence is a dynamic process that is not specific to racism but is an important part 
of its constitution, and one that employs linguistic techniques that are common to many 
discourses. Race discourses are essentially order-building discourses, and because the 
ambivalence they produce exists in contradiction to the aims of the discourse, they 
contain a logical propensity to seek ambivalence removal. This is a logical propensity 
because the aims and content of the discourse are challenged as logically coherent by 
ambivalence, incoherence and cognitive failure. 
Experiences and expressions of ambivalence by social actors in relation to racism 
have been documented in the social sciences. For example, in early research on the 
existence of the `authoritarian personality' (Adorno et al., 1950), and later, in the 
analysis of conversation and social discourse (Billig et al., 1988: 106; Billig, 1982, 
1985). Billig, in describing the earlier research, explains how Adorno et al. (1950) built 
on Fromm's psychological theorising to discover that the racist was often `[u]nable to 
handle ambivalence, [that] authoritarians need unambiguous truths and clearly 
demarcated hierarchies. They seek the security of a clear world-view in which evil 
`others' can be hated and a pure `us' loved' (Billig, 1995: 137). This highlights the 
racist urge to remove ambivalence. In later research, social actors have been recorded 
making contradictory or ambivalent comments about racism, race and ethnic groups, 
which provides important empirical evidence that social actors also do express, as well 
as experience, ambivalence in relation to race, ethnicity and racism. Although there is 
debate as to whether these expressions represent either a conscious and deliberate 
defence mechanism (e. g. Van Dijk, 1984), or `actual' ambivalence for the social actor 
(e. g. Billig et al., 1988), there is, in the literature, increasing acknowledgement that this 
type of `double-speak' represents a dilemmatic expression of contrasting positions. So 
for example, a social actor may express racism and values that exist in contradiction to 
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racism. While this research, at first glance, might seem to contradict the earlier work on 
authoritarian personalities and suggest that ambivalence may not need resolution, that it 
can simply `exist', there is also evidence that techniques for resolving these 
ambivalences are used by such people. For example, Billig has outlined how social 
actors may employ prolepsis as a rhetorical device that allows for the expression of 
particular contradictory elements (Billig et al., 1988: 109; Billig, 1982; 1985). Prolepsis 
is the device of anticipating a future state or criticism of the argument. In this research it 
refers to the refutation of potential accusations of racism while simultaneously 
expressing racism. Such uses of prolepsis can be seen as functionally similar to humour 
and joking, because, as a rhetorical device, they make compatible or co-agitate 
disparate discursive elements. Likewise, if earlier findings by the Frankfurt School are 
taken as comments about discourse, and the pressures of discourse on the dilemmatic 
social actor, then this can be incorporated into the argument. This early work might 
equally be conceptualised as presenting a conception of the staunch racist, who could 
also face `pressures' on their rigid belief system, which would also call on rhetorical 
devices. 
Having seen that it is the social actor that experiences ambivalence and that this 
experience often needs and seeks resolution, next I outline Bauman's thesis on the rise 
of modernity and the generation of ambivalence in modernity, which provides a 
theoretical basis from which to assert the widespread appearance of ambivalence in 
society and to contemplate the extent to which humour might be mobilised as a device 
of resolution. 
Modern Ambivalence 
Before discussing the ambivalences of embodied and cultural racism, I outline some of 
Bauman's observations on the overarching characteristics of modernity, because these 
characteristics are reflected in the race and ethnic discourses, which are, principally, 
modern inventions. It is also necessary to provide some critique of his distinctions. 
While Bauman's conceptualisation of the duration of modernity is purposely vague, 
the characteristics of modernity, its themes and trends, are clearly defined. He suggests 
that the central focus of the project of modernity was the creation of order and order- 
building systems (Bauman, 1991: 4), that modernity `had an insatiable thirst for 
legislating, defining norms, setting standards; for beauty, goodness, truth, propriety, 
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usefulness and happiness' (Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 73. Emphasis added). 
This order-building tendency relied on a stance towards the world that was predicated 
on the notions of control and mastery (Kellner, 1998: 74). Smith elaborates on this: 
`Modernity sees the world as ever more explicable, predictable, controllable, 
manipulable and improvable as long as we do the work of getting enough knowledge 
and developing effective practices' (1998: 42). Other features of modernity that are 
often described as constitutive, such as capitalism, democracy or industrialisation, are, 
under Bauman's theory, subsumed as expressions of the tendency to create order 
(Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 78). 
Central to Bauman's description of modernity is the observation that because it is a 
period that saw an unprecedented development of order-building systems, in parallel to 
the process of linguistic categorisation that these order-building systems employ, it is 
also a period that displays a structural and logical propensity to fail in its ordering task. 
The result of this failure is conceptualised by Bauman as the creation of ambivalence - 
this is both the product and the problem of modernity, because, paradoxically, 
modernity could not stand ambivalence from its outset. He describes this 
metaphorically: `if modernity is about the production of order then ambivalence is the 
waste of modernity' (Bauman, 1991: 15. Original emphasis). So for example, each of 
the practices mentioned in the quote at the top of the previous paragraph - legislating, 
defining norms and setting standards - also involve the creation of something that is 
`outside' of the process, of a `waste' product, which is, in these examples, the unlawful, 
the abnormal and the unsatisfactory. The `outside' of each of these constructed 
categories represents, for Bauman, the emergence of ambivalence. 
This leads to two critical revisions of Bauman. First, it is arguable that Bauman 
exaggerates the specificity of ambivalence in modernity, and that it is a more universal 
phenomenon. Second, Bauman has a tendency to overuse metaphorical rather than 
empirical examples. The first point can be accepted, but not overcome in this thesis, 
because I do not examine pre-modem humour. The second can be overcome through 
the use of specific empirical examples of humour to illustrate theoretical points, rather 
than metaphor. Hence, the thesis remains fairly literal in style throughout. 
Returning to the central argument - on ambivalence - importantly, and rather 
disturbingly, when such processes are used to categorise people, it often leads to those 
that are considered to be ambivalent in a particular order-building system being defined 
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as `strangers', `outsiders' or `aliens'. These groups come to represent the ambivalent 
`other' of the order-building process (Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 79). 
While the production of ambivalence is an inherent feature of modernity, it is also, 
as long as order-building systems continue in their pursuit of order, a process that is 
unending. This is because the order-building systems, and their attempts at problem 
resolution, will often create new problems or ambivalences that will become the focus 
of further or new order-building processes. This is a process that can continue 
indefinitely (Bauman, 1991: 14). Bauman explains this: 
the fit between the conceptual grid (ordering always entails dividing and 
classifying) serving as the design for the future orderly reality, and the `really 
existing reality' to be remade in the likeness of that grid, is seldom if ever perfect. 
For that reason, almost every ordering measure brings into being new ambiguities 
and ambivalences which call for further measures, the chase never ends. (Bauman 
in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 79) 
While the production of modern ambivalence appears to be both inevitable and 
unstoppable, it also has a number of specific consequences. Bauman explains that 
ambivalence may be experienced as a state of anxiety, as discomfort or as a threat. 
Ambivalence may provoke `the feeling of indecision, undecidability, and... loss of 
control' (Bauman, 1991: 2). While Bauman's outline of the effects of ambivalence 
often remains both generic and metaphorical, it is possible to envisage how these effects 
might be generated. by cognitive dilemmas for the social actor and how these cognitive 
dilemmas might create a desire to resolve ambivalence. Importantly, this anxiety, the 
`after-effect' of order-building, appears in direct contradiction to the aims of both the 
linguistic and modern process - the aims of control and mastery - yet it is an inherent 
product of its functioning. In attempting to overcome this, the `others', `strangers' or 
`outsiders' that become the `off cuts' of category formation have this anxiety projected 
onto them. This has human consequences: 
as long as the urge to put paid to ambivalence guides collective and individual 
action, intolerance will follow - even if, ashamedly, it hides under the mask of 
tolerance (which often means that you are abominable, but I, being generous, shall 
let you live). (ibid: 8) 
Returning specifically to the social functions of humour, it may seem risible - 
through an exculpatory or positive lens - that humour and joking might play a role in 
removing the key ambivalences of modernity. This seems too grand a task for humour, 
for such a marginal, under-theorised topic. Yet Bauman's ideas can be neatly 
synthesised with the theory outlined in Chapter One. I have explained that humour 
theories argue that humour can alter structural ambivalence that would otherwise cause 
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anxiety, indecision or confusion for social actors, which is why it is often labelled a 
coping strategy or a form of conflict management. Specific studies have shown how 
humour is able to resolve the incongruities (and ambivalence) of serious discourse in 
specific situations and these are commensurate with the types of ambivalence outlined 
by Bauman. Gilbert and Mulkay's examples from the scientific community are drawn 
from the discourses of typical scientific order-building systems (Mulkay and Gilbert, 
1982). Bauman himself also provides evidence in support of the argument that 
ambivalence can be resolved by humour. He notes that Edmund Leach observed that the 
`pun, obscenity, blasphemy, just like other, non-linguistic varieties of `taboo', are 
symptoms of the incurable `non-fit' between vocabulary with its delimited semantic 
fields and a not-so-discrete and neatly sliced reality' (Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 
2001: 80). While the pun is described as a symptom of `non-fit', or ambivalence, this 
can be extended to include not just punning, but a whole variety of humorous 
techniques, of which puns are but one. Perhaps though, rather than humour being a 
symptom of non-fit, it is more accurately described as a palliative that acts to relieve the 
non-fit of semantic field and reality. 
Added to this, we have seen that, in comparison to literal communication, humour is 
structurally distinct because it contains a rhetorical device that can, potentially, 
manipulate sense perceptions. Once the rhetorical structure of humour has been 
illuminated it seems incontestable that humour has the necessary features for helping to 
resolve ambivalence. If it is accepted that modern, order-building systems have an 
inherent and problematic tendency to produce ambivalence, social actors as nodal 
points in these discourses would certainly have a functional use for techniques, such as 
humour, which are able to express and resolve these ambivalences. 
It also seems obvious that those defined as `strangers', `outsiders' or `others' often 
become the referents of humour - this is clearly the case in racist and ethnic joking. 
They become the referents of humour because of the relationships of knowledge they 
invoke. Bauman describes how the `[tjhe tropes of "the other of order" are: 
undefinability, incoherence, incongruity, incompatibility, illogicality, irrationality, 
ambiguity, undecidability, [and] ambivalence' (Bauman, 1991: 7). These characteristics 
- the `other of order' - come to signify the social actors who become objectified as 
`others' by order-building systems. Importantly though, they are all, also, at one time or 
another, necessary constituents of humour. This is also a key point of expansion in my 
argument and divergence from Bauman's specific terminology. While Bauman 
describes each of these characteristics as synonymous with ambivalence - or 
64 
ambivalence as the dominant feature - humour will be seen to rhetorically affect all of 
these `problems' when truth strengthening, and at particular points, terms other than 
ambivalence resolution best describe the processes at work in humour. 
Something should also be said about the different effects that humorous co-agitation 
can have on ambivalence and other problems. Depending on the `strength' of the factors 
identified in humour analysis, it is possible to suggest that, in humour, ambivalence 
might be expressed, it might be mediated, or it might be resolved. A rhetorical effect, 
the effect on ambivalence, is not a unitary occurrence. The varying effects - resolution, 
mediation and expression - are a manifestation of the varying readings that can be 
received and represent the specificity of these readings. In adding some explanation of 
each of these effects, we might see the resolution or removal of ambivalence as the 
most influential reading and the one that would have a greater impact on truth 
perceptions. This might represent a more `successful' rhetorical impact because it 
leaves ambivalence to dissolve as it (re)affirms truth perceptions. The next step down 
would see ambivalence mediated. This might allow the incongruities to co-agitate 
without removing either of the elements, and so represents a less complete reading. The 
final effect, which is to express ambivalence, explains the ability of the comic to 
highlight where it is that ambivalence exists and represents a less active, more benign, 
reading of the comic. 
Now I examine some of the ambivalences of racism in more detail. We have seen that 
modern order-building processes have a preoccupation for creating categories. In their 
simplest form these categories created binary divisions. As Bauman states, `[t]he central 
frame of both modem intellect and modem practice is opposition - more precisely, 
dichotomy' (ibid: 14). Such dichotomies are usually uneven, giving the `illusion of 
symmetry' (ibid), but in all cases in these categories, `[b]oth sides depend on each 
other... The second side depends on the first for its contrived and enforced isolation. 
The first depends on the second for its self-assertion' (ibid). In the next two sections I 
outline a number of key dichotomies that construct race and ethnic discourse. Following 
the separation of racism into embodied and cultural types, I outline the dichotomies 
along which the ambivalences of each racism are created. These are presented and 
resolved in particular readings of racist humour. 
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Ambivalence in Embodied Racist Humour 
Bauman argues that one of the central dichotomies of modern order-building processes 
is the construction of civilisation or humanity as existing in opposition to nature (ibid: 7 
& 40). Inside this dichotomy, the natural comes to be seen as ambivalent, in opposition 
to the order of civilisation (ibid: 7). The civilisation/nature binary encouraged an 
approach to the natural that saw it become `something to be mastered, subordinated, 
remade so that it can be readjusted to human needs' (ibid. Original emphasis). This 
represents the imposition of instrumental rationality onto the natural so it becomes the 
focus of `civilised' and `civilising' processes, and any non-fit that the natural object 
exhibits constitutes an ambivalence. Biological racism was centrally constructed around 
this dichotomy, which emerged from enlightenment and colonial race science, 
philosophy and anthropology. This now appears in embodied racist humour. Embodied 
racism is the term I use throughout to describe the contemporary remnants of biological 
racism and is a key example of a typically modem and ambivalent discourse. 
Biological racism can be conceptualised as a racism that distinguishes between 
populations on the basis of biological, physical or phenotypical characteristics, with 
these characteristics forming a boundary between races. It is a discourse that focuses on 
the corporeality of the `other', with the cognitive, behavioural and cultural 
characteristics of the `other' being ascribed to this racial corporeality. Importantly 
though, it is also principally a discourse that constructs boundaries and places certain 
civilised bodies on the inside of favourable categories, and uncivilised `others' on the 
outside. Embodied racism, its remaining trace elements, can be defined as racism that 
focuses on parts of the body, but does not necessarily reproduce the discourses of 
biological racism in their totality or severity. 
Biological racism had a specific connection to the development of the concept of 
race, with some arguing that the two were synonymous. " Both biological racism and 
the notion of race are attributable to, and developed in, enlightenment philosophy - 
which is, arguably, an exemplar of an order-building discourse. Chukwudi Eze argues 
that enlightenment philosophy `was instrumental in codifying and institutionalizing 
both scientific and popular European perceptions of the human race' (1997: 5). In race 
13 See, for example, Fields (1982) and Appiah (1986). Both argue that any use of race is 
problematic and strengthens its inherently racist meanings, and that the use of race in any 
context is a form of biological reductionism. A full discussion of race will appear in Chapter 
Three. 
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discourse, biological racism, and embodied racism, there are a number of key order- 
building categorisations that follow binary divisions, which are structured around the 
dichotomy of civilisation and nature. For example, Chukwudi Eze outlines this through 
highlighting an `identifiable scientific and philosophical vocabulary: "race, " "progress, " 
"civilisation, " "savagery ," "nature, " "bile", "phlogiston, " etc. This vocabulary belongs 
to, and reveals, a larger world of analytical categories that exists as a universe of 
discourse, an intellectual world view... ' (ibid: 7). Chukwudi Eze's outline of this 
vocabulary contains both of the poles in Bauman's civilisation/nature dichotomy. Each 
of the other characteristics mentioned also provoke binary divisions that define the 
`other' in terms that are not `good', not unambivalent and not belonging to the civilised 
or enlightened group of the European philosopher. These binary divisions often 
appeared as hierarchies in biological racism, with Europeans at the top of the hierarchy 
and non-Europeans at lower positions in this `supposed human, rational and moral 
evolutionary capacity' (ibid: 5). 
For examples of biologically racist studies, Brett St. Louis describes a broad range of 
philosophical studies that each positioned the enlightened group in opposition to a 
deficient `other'. Examples include: 
Robert Knox's (1996) ethnological account of the degenerative effects of 
miscegenation; Hume's (1987) philosophical sketch of a hierarchical racial 
polygenesis; Kant's (1997) anthropological explanation of the moral and 
behavioural significance of human species racial variation; and Hegel's (1975) 
assertion of the geographical (read racial) sites of World History... (2005a: 117) 14 
Importantly, these discourses, or forms of knowledge creation, all fit the design of 
Bauman's description of modern, order-building discourses, whose perpetual pursuit of 
knowledge through category creation leads to the creation of ambivalence. In this case, 
the emergence of ambivalence in these race discourses is ostensibly highlighted by the 
internal debates and differences among Enlightenment thinkers, as not all simply 
created uncritical race hierarchies or agreed with the hierarchies of others (Chukwudi 
Eze, 1997: 6), but it is also signified by their very creation of the 'other'. 
Aside from its roots in the enlightenment, biological racism has also been described 
as specifically colonial in origin, as a pervasive ideological task preformed by the 
14 These hierarchies have also appeared in theories of humour as propositions for the explanation 
of supposed differences in the use and value of the different types of humour by different 
groups. For example, James Sully suggested that humour `improves as we pass from the lowest 
and most degraded to the higher of savage tribes' (Sully 1902: 251, cited in Billig, 2005: 106). 
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coloniser involving the categorisation and classification of the `other' that had been 
discovered (Fanon, 1967: 31-2; Miles, 1991: 62). Some have argued that the process of 
colonialism had a distinct impact on the content of race categories. For example, 
Grosfoguel suggests `[r]acial categories are built in relation to colonial histories' (2004: 
326). Others, such as Banton, have suggested that race ideologies were not caused by 
colonialism, and that race typologies emerged at an earlier point (Banton, 2005: 468). 
To circumvent these debates, it can be assumed that colonialism certainly encouraged a 
preoccupation with race. This preoccupation also created a number of binary divisions 
that were structurally prone to encourage the production of not just ambivalence but 
also anxiety. The first can be construed as the dichotomy of civilisation and savagery. 
This distinctly colonial dichotomy encouraged savagery to `be physically located 
outside of Europe, outside of light, so that Africa, for example, was considered the 
Dark Continent' (Chukwudi Eze, 1997: 5). 
A second colonial dichotomy would develop around the usefulness of the body of 
the `other', as slave or as worker - between usefulness and indolence - which sought to 
put the `other' to work. Bauman mentions this impression of indolence: `creatures of 
bizarre skin colour, bodily shape or behaviour, engaged in practices that make "no 
sense" - whose presence "may serve no useful purpose"' (1991: 40). This second 
dichotomy, which subjected the `other' to the task of becoming useful, also creates a 
situation for anxiety. In Chapter Three we will see how both the anxiety associated with 
the savagery and indolence of the `other' emerges in specific embodied racist jokes. 
Alongside enlightenment philosophy and colonialism, a third area of focus are 
modernity's race sciences, which also created and perpetuated dichotomies between the 
corporeality of the `other' and the `civilised'. Race science came to focus on the `other' 
as representative of degeneration and the 'self' s representative of purity, which 
encouraged and excused the manipulation of the degenerative `other'. An ostensive 
expression of this tendency appeared in the race science of Nazi Germany which, 
Bauman describes, saw the Jews as `ambivalence incarnate' (Bauman in Bauman and 
Tester, 2001: 80). Despite this, Bauman is keen to point out how race science was 
neither original nor specific to Nazi Germany, but represented a direct expression of 
modernity's order-building tendency (Bauman, 1991: 41). He explains that, 
the essential ideas of `racial stock' and eugenics (race-improving) policies were 
invented, acquired scientific credentials and received public acclaim far outside 
German borders; that they had been implemented, with ardour, long before the 
Nazis came to power (notably in the USA), and long after ... 
(notably in all 
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Scandinavian countries, under the supervision of social-democratic governments). 
(Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 86) 
Bauman (1989) argues that the holocaust represented the `logical' and conclusive 
modern strategy for removing the ambivalent `other'. While a huge difference exists 
between the genocide of the Nazis and racist humour, importantly, genocide is, for 
Bauman, a process of ambivalence removal. Bauman also argues that banal forms of 
ambivalence removal exist, and I show that humour is one. The same genocidal themes 
will often appear in humour, because racism, ideas of racial purity and degeneration, in 
their many forms, will also demand other more banal, acceptable, less extreme, or more 
day-to-day methods of ambivalence removal. Thus, in linking with the typology of 
Chapter One, racist reality can be `redefined' in humour through the fantasy of 
extermination. 
While the above dichotomies emerged some time ago, there are also a number of 
later, more contemporary ambivalences that embodied racist humour can help to 
resolve. There now exists a general consensus in academia that race is of no conceptual 
value as a means of phenotypic or biological description. This is often attributed to its 
association with the failed philosophy, science and the fascist ideology mentioned 
above (Miles, 1982,1991,1993; Fenton, 1999), which is now seen as unacceptable 
biological racism. Despite this, race is a normal explanatory term in commonsense or 
everyday discourse and so used `unproblematically' in a variety of social fields outside 
of academia. Most people using the term race have a limited awareness of such 
academic debates, allowing race to form a `legitimate' or understood means of 
distinguishing between populations. In these social fields, the ambiguities of race as a 
category-forming discourse will cause problems that also follow the concept into 
racism. These ambivalences focus on the dichotomies of acceptability and 
unacceptability of expression and on the representation and incomprehension of social 
reality by the social actor. 
To return to humour, in Chapter Three the dichotomies mentioned in this section 
will be highlighted in embodied racist joking. I provide an analysis of how humour 
expresses the typology of processes outlined in Chapter One. For example, I show how 
humour works specifically to co-agitate the disparate elements of these dichotomies, 
and in particular readings, rhetorically resolve ambivalence and strengthen the truth 
claims of the discourse. This co-agitation will mutate the rules of order-building, and by 
presenting the dichotomies in a linguistic frame with a different logic, provide a 
temporary anaesthetic from the pressures of order-building. Specifically, Chapter Three 
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outlines joking themes that focus on intelligence and stupidity, corporeality and 
athleticism, corporeality and sexuality, and an assortment of metaphorical depictions of 
bodily decay and disease in relation to the `other'. These examples are drawn from 
jokes in British stand-up comedy and jokes that thrive on American internet sites. These 
are two separate sites that reproduce themes from biological racism in embodied racist 
joking. In the internet based jokes, the unacceptable and ambivalent urges of modem 
embodied racism appear in embodied racist humour that has a specific connection to the 
history of slavery and race relations in the context of the United States. On these 
internet sites, joking, unfettered by censorship, represents the expression of a form of 
repressed racism that, in other situations, is the subject of social disapprobation. 
Ambivalence and Culturally Racist Humour 
`Cultural racism' is often said to have developed in the post-colonial period of 
modernity. This is also a racism that generates ambivalence because the discourse 
contains a number of key dichotomies. The major ambivalences that are produced by 
the discourse are outlined here and then, in Chapter Four, I highlight how humour is 
once again employed in an attempt to rhetorically assist the discourse. This is achieved 
by drawing on specific examples from British stand-up comedy, specifically comedians 
such as Jim Bowen, Jim Davidson, Jimmy Jones, Bernard Manning and Mike Reid, and 
occasional internet sources. 
While I show that embodied racism allowed the colonised and enslaved, or the 
objects of racial order-building systems, to be viewed as beings that existed in a land of 
nothingness, this presents a clear distinction with the various sociological definitions of 
cultural racism, which has been documented as appearing in the post-colonial period 
and is primarily concerned with the `somethingness' of cultural difference that is 
confronted in the `home' territory. Cultural racism is a racism that moves from `gazing' 
at and categorising the distant `other' towards categorising the space that the `other' and 
her culture `use up'. Although there are numerous sociological definitions of cultural 
racism, " it can, for the sake of brevity, be defined as a racism that is constructed with 
the use of referents of cultural difference rather than, or building on, embodied race 
15 The number of names that are used to describe cultural racism highlights the various 
sociological definitions that exist. While often labelled `cultural', it is also a racism that has been 
labelled `differentialist', `neo' or `new' (Wieviorka, 1997: 141). More detail of these debates 
and differences will be provided in the analysis of culturally racist humour in Chapter Four. 
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difference, and expresses the urge to keep cultures apart (Bauman, 1997a: 55-6). It may 
then, but certainly not in all examples, represent an acceptance of the existence or 
presence of the culture of the `other', as long as the `other' stays in her correct place. 
Bauman describes an opinion that can be termed culturally racist: 
different cultures produce their members in different shapes and colours - and this 
is good. Thou shalt not join together what culture, in its wisdom, set apart. Let us, 
rather, help culture - any culture - to go its own separate, and better, inimitable 
way. (ibid: 56) 
Sociologists have suggested that, in some cases, biological racism pre-exists and 
leads to the emergence of cultural racism (Fanon, 1967: 32-3; Modood, 1997: 155). In 
discussing the particularity of this emergence, Barker (1981) has suggested that `new' 
racism appeared as a result of Conservative Party policy in the mid 1970s. Others have 
argued that neo racism is far more extensive, or that it is a `racism in the era of 
decolonisation' (Balibar cited in Modood, 1997: 154-5), and represents a movement 
from pre-war scientific racism to post-war cultural forms (Gilroy, 1993: 44). Some go 
further still, and argue that cultural racism is at least as old as biological racism and as 
old as immigration itself (Modood, 1997: 155). More detail will be provided on these 
debates in Chapter Four, although in evaluating the appearance in humour, an exact 
dating of cultural racism is unnecessary. 
Coupled with these debates, it is often asserted that the groups attacked by the two 
racisms are often distinct. Modood (1997: 156-60) describes how different racisms tend 
to affect different ethnic groups and suggests that colour racism, is often, in the British 
context, aimed at black or Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups, whereas cultural racism tends 
to attack British Asians. In Chapters Three and Four we will see how cultural racism is 
often expressed towards British Asians in the British stand-up tradition, but also attacks 
black and Afro-Caribbean groups. 
In outlining the key ambivalences of cultural racism, there are three important 
themes that can be elicited if it is accepted that the discourse became more dominant in 
the post-colonial, post 1945 period. " First, there is a theme associated with the 
16 Outside of the mainly theoretical sociological debates mentioned above (e. g. Barker, 1981; 
Balibar, 1991; Gilroy, 1993; Modood, 1997), there is also empirical evidence of a change in 
styles of racist expression. For example, Billig et al. (1988) note that, `[i]nvestigators such as 
McConahay and Sears claim that this outwardly `reasonable' expression of racism is basically a 
modern, post-1960s development' (Billig et al., 1988: 107). These `reasonable' types of racism 
can be subsumed under the `differentialist' label. 
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increasing unacceptability of embodied racism as a mode of expression and the status of 
cultural racism in relation to this. Second, because of the increased presence of the 
`other' in the `home' territory, which was elicited by the onset of the post-colonial 
period and the growth of globalisation (Bauman, 1993,1998b), there is a theme of 
ambivalence that focuses on the dichotomy that conceptualises the `other' as either 
'alien' or 'neighbour' and seeks to inferiorize. Third, there exists an exclusionary theme 
that focuses on national identity and boundary crossing. 
Taking the first, I mentioned previously that users of embodied racism are frequently 
faced with the `problem' of acceptability and unacceptability in their use of language, 
which humour can specifically help to avoid, by presenting meaning in a non-serious 
context. This is also a challenge that faces the cultural racist, but it is a `problem' that is 
more nuanced and layered, because, as a cultural mode of expression, users of cultural 
racism often attempt to claim not to be racist because their repertoire does not use 
specific race terminology (Barker, 1981: Chapter Two). Therefore, one of the 
ambiguities that will be expressed by culturally racist humour is a negotiation of 
whether or not the language is racist. Discussions of whether or not cultural racism is 
racist will specifically enter humour, which will simultaneously provide further 
semantic defence layers. The processes outlined in Chapter One, such as `redefining 
reality', are mobilised for this cause. 
On the second point - of the increased presence of the `other' in the home territory - 
an increase in what Bauman described as the presence of the `other' or `vagabond' 
(Bauman, 1997b; 1998b), give the objects of racism an increasingly local presence and 
a target for inferiorization. Bauman (1993) describes how: 
Once a temporary irritant, the strangehood has become a permanent condition. The 
problem of modem society is not how to eliminate strangers, but how to live in 
their constant company - that is, under the condition of cognitive paucity, 
indetermination and uncertainty. (Bauman, 1993: 159) 
Bauman is outlining an ambivalence that centres on how to live with and know the 
`other', and which relate to the alien/neighbour dichotomy. This develops because, as 
Bauman states, `others' are constantly created by society, because there are 
`advantages'" to this for capitalist society (ibid: 160). Alongside the tacit acceptance of 
17 The inevitability of the presence of the stranger, the urge to remove the stranger, and the 
ambivalence of these positions, are for Bauman, central for the functioning of capitalist society. 
In drawing on Georg Simmel's The Philosophy of Money he explains that strangers are essential 
for the `correct' functioning of modem life (Bauman, 1993: 159). Simmel, in outlining the 
capitalist preference for strangers, points out that, `[t]he desirable party for financial transactions 
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the presence of the `other' in society is the negotiation of cognitive paucity. An anxiety 
of ideas that surrounds the `other' because of the lack of knowledge of her. This sets up 
a need to inferiorize, to overcome cognitive paucity. This is the urge to know (and 
assimilate or change) the `other' - to remove its otherness - or the lack of knowledge. 
Bauman encapsulates this chain of ambivalence: `The most striking and off-putting trait 
of strangers is that they are neither neighbours nor aliens. Or, rather - confusingly, 
disturbingly, terrifyingly - they are (or may be - who knows? ) both' (1993: 153). One 
important point of divergence from Bauman's thesis is that these ambivalences exist 
alongside those of embodied racism - but in different discursive loci/forms - rather than 
being the specific and dominant racism of modernity. This is empirically substantiated 
in the later chapters. 
The general ambivalence surrounding the presence of the culturally distinct `other' 
in the `home' territory is expressed through, or projected on to, a number of individual 
cultural characteristics as a form of inferiorization. A wide array of cultural 
characteristics form the content of cultural racism. Wieviorka outlines some of these: 
to speak of cultural racism is to insist on an image of racial difference which is not 
natural or biological but contained in language, religion, tradition, national origin; 
it is to stress the fact that for the racist, the culture of the Other, irreconcilable with 
his own, may constitute a threat to his cultural identity. (Wieviorka, 1997: 141- 
142) 
Ambivalence can emerge around any of the characteristics mentioned, around language, 
religion, tradition and national origin (some of these are dealt with in Chapter Four). 
Jokes may express the urge to remove, `accept' the presence of, or desire to know the 
`other', which can translate into anxiety about any ostensive cultural difference. 
Third, taking the example of nationality and national origin mentioned by 
Wieviorka, the third ambivalence and anxiety will develop in relation to national 
identity and boundary maintenance, and is an exclusionary logic, because the `other' of 
cultural racism is involved in `boundary ignoring' (Bauman, 1997a: 47). Bauman 
outlines this: 
the sight of people `unlike us' flocking to join the nation reshaped into a state must 
have been worrying and off putting for the defenders of the national myth. People 
whose ancestors were not present at the mythical and invariable ancient birth of 
- in which, as it has been said quite correctly, business is business - is the person completely 
indifferent to us, engaged neither for us nor against us' (Simmel, 1978: 227 in ibid: 152-3). 
Following this, Bauman echoes the need for strangers in society: `Were there no strangers, one 
may say, they would need to be invented... And they are - daily, and on a massive scale' (ibid: 
160). 
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the nation had no right to the insiders' status; were that status to be granted, the 
grounds for demanding unquestionable loyalty to the nation's heritage and destiny 
would be sapped. What can be freely chosen can also be freely abandoned. 
Nationalism was haunted by an endemic contradiction that could not but rebound 
in highly ambivalent policies towards the `others inside', waiting to be projected 
on to the targets of those policies. (Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 82) 
When joking draws on the themes of nationalism, boundary crossing and the `other', 
the humour focuses on the `other' as an immigrant, illegal immigrant or asylum seeker. 
It is likely that a reading can be produced in humour that can, at least momentarily, 
place the `other' on the correct side of the boundary, or at least co-agitate the problem. 
Humour can form what Billig describes as a `banally mundane way' (1995: 96) of 
reproducing nationalism, but it is one that moves beyond simply reproducing 
representations, as it also has the potential to rhetorically strengthen the `truth' of 
nationalism. 
Reversed Race and Ethnic Discourses in Humour 
This next section briefly outlines the presence of reversed comic discourses, which are 
primarily, but not always, articulated by minority comedians. These are analysed in 
Chapter Five. Reversed comic discourses can be defined as those that employ identical 
or similar sign-systems as embodied and culturally racist humour, but which do so with 
a reversed semantic focus. The extent to which these comedians employ identical sign- 
systems varies, in some cases including the employment of individual signs, in others 
collections of stereotypes. 
It is important to consider the potential rhetorical effect of such discursive 
expressions, which leads to the consideration of a number of questions; do reversed 
discourses work to support the original racist discourse? Or, do reversed discourses 
produce new meanings? Is it possible for these discourses to be involved in both of 
these tasks simultaneously? Each of these questions involves a consideration of the 
influence of reversed discourses on the ambivalences of embodied and cultural racism, 
and on the experience of ambivalence by the `other'. The analysis of humour in 
reversed discourses follows the same three stage methodology. First, the analysis of 
reversed comic discourses includes an analysis of the etymology of the sign-systems 
used in the discourse. Second, it requires an analysis of the intended meanings of the 
discourse. Third, it involves an identification of the rhetorical devices that structure 
humour. Added to this though, is a consideration of the polysemia of the discourse. 
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To consider the position of the social actor who is involved in articulating the 
reversed discourse, as a nodal point, is to consider the `other' as the original referent of 
the discourse, rearticulating the discourse that describes her as `other'. Bauman 
provides an impression of what the position of the `other' might look like: 
The resulting void was an utterly unpleasant place to inhabit, but it also gave its 
residents a chance to see through what the others, the occupants of more benign 
and safer places, could not penetrate: to spot contingency beyond the no-appeal- 
allowed verdicts of fate, human choices beyond historical necessities - indeed, the 
liquidity of human condition beneath the thin crust of apparently solid institutions. 
(Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 83) 
Bauman positions the `other' so as to allow for institutions, which would include the 
order-building discourses that construct ambivalence, to be viewed as contingent. This 
suggests that as discourses are not viewed as the unambivalent systems that they wish to 
be, the `other' occupies an important site of resistance. In humour, the `other' use of 
joking could be said to resemble what Mikhail Bakhtin described as an expression of 
the carnivalesque. Parkin outlines this: `carnivalesque laughter involved an enormous 
release of tension and an aggressive denunciation of established ideas in an ambivalent 
matrix of praise and abuse which defied linear logic' (1997: 140). The humorous 
represents a chance for the `other' to mock and resist the established order-systems. The 
overall potential of this is examined in Chapter Five. 
The meanings that are generated by a comic expression are not fixed in a 
straightforward manner even though they draw on sign-systems that have a pre-existing 
meaning. Staying with the Bakhtinian circle, the work of Volosinov, and also, from 
outside of the circle, the work of Gramsci, emphasised, as Hall outlines, how their work 
introduced `into the domain of ideology and language the notion of a "struggle over 
meaning" (which Volosinov substantiated theoretically with his argument about the 
multi-accentuality of the sign)' (1995: 358). The meanings of the reversed discourses of 
humour will constitute and construct such a `struggle over meaning'; they will form 
sites of unsettled, but potential rhetorical, resistance to the embodied and culturally 
racist order-building systems - they will also present a struggle over ambivalence - but 
importantly, they contain the potential to rhetorically support embodied and cultural 
racism if divergent readings are produced. Hall explains this process: 
For if the social struggle in language could be conducted over the same sign, it 
follows that signs (and, by a further extension, whole chains of signifiers, whole 
discourses) could not be assigned, in a determined way, permanently to any one 
side in the struggle. (ibid: 359) 
75 
Importantly, this is not just a process of struggle over articulation that leads to 
disarticulation. Rather, it is a process that can end with the simultaneous articulation of 
meanings around the same sign, which creates a polysemic discourse. This type of 
struggle does not have to produce a `winner'. Polyvocality will be created when the 
articulation of one meaning from one particular group is heard from a different 
semantic focus and is not automatically received with the preferred meaning. In a 
reversed discourse, it may be the case that in making this utterance, a comedian 
becomes a node in a polysemic discourse, as the discourse can be received in different 
ways. This leads to an aggravation of the humorous processes of redefining reality. 
A part of the process of charting the meanings of reversed discourses will involve an 
examination of the responses to humour. The comedy may work rhetorically to disturb 
the meanings of racist discourses and so will form a perpetual source of ambivalence 
for these discourses, forming a semantic weapon in the struggle against racist order- 
building. There are also instances where reversed comic discourses support the original 
meanings, in these instances the aim of reversal fails. It is important to evaluate how far 
these reactions remove ambivalence and support pre-existing typologies and 
categorisations. In Chapter Five a number of reversed comic discourses will be 
examined. First, comedians will be examined in relation to their use of the sign-systems 
of the embodied racist comedy outlined in Chapter Three. This will include the comedy 
of Richard Pryor and Chris Rock and their respective attitude towards, and use of, the 
racist signifier `nigger'. Second, in relation to British anti-Asian cultural racism, I will 
examine the emergence of similar sign-systems in, among others, the comedy of Omid 
Djalili and Shazia Mirza. 
Responses to Ambivalence 
It is now necessary to examine some concepts that are used in all of the later chapters. It 
has been argued that ambivalence and the related `problems' are created in discourses 
that have a modernistic and order-building structure, which, paradoxically, seek to rid 
themselves of this ambivalence. Such discourses contain a tendency towards 
fragmentation because they are principally concerned with the 'carving out' of 
dichotomies from reality. I show that embodied and cultural racism both conform to this 
specific structural style. In this section I outline two of the key responses to 
ambivalence that are identified by Bauman - namely `proteophobia' and `proteophilia' - 
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and explain their character and how they work to resolve ambivalence. Proteophobia 
can be defined as fear or hatred of multiform, whereas proteophilia is the opposite 
tendency, adoration of multiform. I signal that humour can combine with proteophobia 
and proteophilia to provide increasingly vigorous resolution techniques. 
Before I define proteophobia and proteophilia, showing how they work, it is 
necessary to outline Bauman's comments on `social space', as social space provides the 
site in which the social actor, through discourse, enacts proteophobia and proteophilia. 
Social Space 
For Bauman, social space is not synonymous with physical space. While physical space 
can be reduced to pure quantity of space or distance between spaces, social space is 
generated through the meanings attached to a physical space, which produce the 
geography of the social world (Bauman, 1993: 145). Bauman describes three processes 
that act to define and demarcate social space, or three types of social spacing. These are 
the cognitive, the aesthetic and the moral (ibid: 145). Each type of spacing has its own 
products and each works very differently, but each involves the mapping of socio- 
geography and social objects that move into social space. Specifically, cognitive 
spacing is assembled intellectually and involves the creation of knowledge that is used 
to define the meaning of social spaces and the objects in them. 18 Aesthetic spacing is an 
affective process and involves mapping the experiential acuteness generated in a 
particular social space from enjoying the various objects that enter it. Finally, moral 
spacing has to do with the attachment to, or understood responsibility for the objects of 
a social space (ibid: 146). Nothing more will be said about moral spacing as, for 
Bauman, it is less problematic in its reaction to ambivalence and will actively dismantle 
cognitive space and fix or stabilize aesthetic spacings (ibid: 165 & 180). 19 
18 Bauman (1993) provides an illuminating metaphorical description of cognitive spacing. He 
suggests `[i]f cognitive space could be projected upon the city map, or upon the map of a 
country or the modem world as a whole, it would take the shape of an archipelago, rather than a 
circle or any other compact and continuous figure. For every resident of the modern world, 
social space is spattered over a vast sea of meaninglessness in the form of numerous larger and 
smaller blots of knowledge' (1993: 158). 
19 Bauman does not discuss the process of moral spacing as being aided by proteophobia, 
proteophilia or a similar concept. Moral spacing is fundamentally less problematic as it `takes no 
notice of the rules that define the social/cognitive space' (1993: 165), and can disrupt it. Moral 
spacing also attacks aesthetic spacing because it will `fix' objects in place instead of discarding 
them after use. Bauman states that `the objects of moral spacing are the others we live for' (ibid. 
original emphasis), and `they remain forever specific and irreplaceable; they are not specimens 
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Returning to cognitive and aesthetic spacings, if there are objects that exist in society 
that exhibit ambivalence, or cause problems for the dominant processes of categorising 
or enjoying objects in social space, certain strategies are employed to remedy this and 
resolve the ambivalence, because actors will always make use of `an assortment of 
expedients' (ibid: 150) that aid its coherent reproduction. Bauman argues the `stranger', 
`outsider' or `alien' will often disturb the categories that are used to construct cognitive 
and aesthetic social spacing - or make territorial incursions - and that these strategies 
are then mobilised to condense or remove the ambivalence, or more specifically remove 
the alien, be it either conceptually or physically (ibid: 168-74). Specifically, Bauman 
argues proteophobia removes ambiguity from cognitive spacing. The ambivalent 
outsider who does not fit the categories of cognitive spacing will be exiled because she 
disturbs these categories. In proteophilia, the ambivalent outsider will be drawn into the 
space, deified and consumed, but not known because no knowledge is collected of her, 
and then disposed of once her novelty or intensity has worn off (ibid: 168-9). 
These types of social space appear in both modem and postmodem periods. While 
Bauman does not specify that a particular type of social space should be related to 
either modernity or postmodernity, I argue that one period might have a particular 
concern with either the cognitive, the aesthetic or the moral, and so an individual type 
of social spacing will be more prevalent. In this instance, the order-building discourses 
of modernity principally develop knowledge categories, and employ proteophobic 
responses towards cognitive ambivalence. In postmodernity, order-building discourses 
lose some of their hegemony, and so there is a greater variety of proteophobia and 
proteophilia in responses. I will now give more detail on the functioning of 
proteophobia for the ambivalence of cognitive spacing. 
Proteophobia and Proteophilia in Humour 
Proteophobia is defined as fear or hatred of multiform, as a reaction to difference that 
does not fit with the favoured categories of cognitive spacing. It will manifest socially 
as attempts to exclude the outsider, as a response to ambivalence that defies 'clarity- 
addicted knowledge, elide assignment and sap the familiar classificatory grids' (ibid: 
164). In later chapters I show how, in modernistic humour, the `other' of the joke is 
of categories' (ibid). Hence moral spacing has less pernicious consequences, makes less 
instrumental interpretations in defining social space, and negotiates rather than processes 
ambivalence (ibid: 181). 
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often described by stereotypes that have a configuration with Bauman's description of 
stereotypical classifications of the outsider. These responses are viewed in both 
embodied and culturally racist humour. Proteophobia often describes the outsider as 
being in opposition to rational, non-ambivalent characteristics: 
All traits ascribed to the outsiders signify ambivalence. Dirt is, as we know, a thing 
out of place, something which ought to stay elsewhere, lest it should blur the 
dimensions which ground the order of things... Unreliability means erratic 
behaviour which defies probabilities and makes calculation based on the 
knowledge of rules useless. Laziness stands for defying universality of routine and, 
by proxy, the very determined nature of the world. A similar semantic load is 
carried by other most common elements of the outsiders' stereotype: they are 
morally lax, sexually promiscuous, dishonest... overemotional and incapable of 
sober judgement - and altogether irregular and unpredictable... In other words, the 
outsiders are the gathering point for risks and fears which accompany cognitive 
spacing. (ibid: 162) 
Proteophobia is a fascistic theme, it sees the `other' as dirty, as an outsider, and wishes 
to expel the `other' from social space because of this. With the help of proteophobia the 
ambivalence created by the presence of the `other' inside the knowledge building 
categories of race and ethnic discourse can be resolved. Importantly, this is also a 
technique that can appear in humour, which places the proteophobic definition of the 
ambivalent `other' inside a humorous co-agitator that will provide an additional 
semantic layer for an attempt at fixity. 
In Chapter Three I show that jokes that contain proteophobia correspond to the 
second logic of racism outlined by Wieviorka (1995; 1997) - of exclusion or 
segregation - whereas the first logic, inferiorization or exploitation, is reflected in jokes 
that contain stereotypes. Hence, contradictory logics receive rhetorical strengthening in 
humour. 
If it is in proteophobia that the ambivalent outsider is to be excluded or exiled to the 
periphery, proteophilia is the opposite tendency. This manifests as the urge to enjoy, 
consume or deify the outsider and can be defined as adoration of multiform. Bauman 
explains that `proteophilia prompts the efforts of aesthetic spacing' (1993: 168. Original 
emphasis); it is, therefore, a process of resolving ambivalence for aesthetic social 
spacing. Proteophilia involves gaining pleasure from observing a perspective of a 
stranger who is not a threat and so occurs in a well-policed social space where the 
ambivalent outsider is controlled and cannot influence existing social boundaries or 
create tension. Because of this, it relies on proteophobia, and the two work together 
(although this is not likely to be a conscious process for the social actors involved). A 
social space, Bauman explains, only becomes well-policed once cognitive spacings have 
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been well defined. Bauman describes this process by suggesting the proteophilic `can go 
on drawing the strangers around into his private theatre without fear that those drawn 
inside will claim the rights of the insider' (ibid: 172). In this space the `other' becomes 
the object of curiosity, arousal and enjoyment (ibid: 146). 
While not appearing to be as obviously pernicious as proteophobia, proteophilia is 
problematic because the stranger can only transgress aesthetic spacings in play or in 
inconsequentiality (ibid: 168-169 & 172-173). It is always the novelty of the stranger 
that is consumed, rather than a more complete view of her, before she is discarded. It 
does not, therefore, represent a dialogic interaction with the `other' and depends on 
proteophobia and cognitive spacing to set-up the conditions of its emergence. 
While Bauman tends to describe proteophilia as a private process, as the `task' or 
game of the urban stroller, I intend to use the concept as one that can explain socially 
shared and agreed upon reactions to the ambivalent `other'. In a similar vein to 
proteophobia, proteophilia often appears in humour and as responses to it, which 
strengthens the rhetorical potential of the joke. These reactions tend to surface around 
the comedians engaged in reversed discourses, and so might impact on the sign-systems 
of embodied and cultural racism from inside instances of aesthetic spacing. 
Theoretical Developments 
I now present a number of critical amendments in my use of Bauman's concepts. First, I 
highlight another alteration in the terminology used in this thesis in comparison to that 
used by Bauman (1993). Bauman himself describes the recycling of the ambivalence of 
the `other'. I have decided that a more accurate and less allegorical description is to 
suggest that the ambivalence of the `other' is resolved. The term 'recycling of 
ambivalence' suggests that ambivalence is transformed into something else, or reused as 
ambivalence. I am, however, talking about linguistic meaning not material products, and 
so a literal description would see the processes more accurately described as the 
`resolution of ambivalence', of putting ambivalence into categories, or more precisely, 
of shoring up `truth'. 
In providing some more detail on how exactly proteophobia and proteophilia 
function to resolve ambivalence - on the mechanism that is employed. Bauman explains 
both processes as a form of projection: 
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The `solution' of ambivalence, that condition admittedly without solution, is then 
desperately sought through projecting its inner incongruity upon a selected social 
target (that is, focusing the ambivalence which saturates the whole of social space 
on a selected sector of that space), and ongoing efforts to `burn out' the germ of 
ambivalence in that effigy. (ibid: 160) 
The psychological process of projection has been well documented (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 2001 [1944]), but some types of projection are more likely to be successful than 
others. Although Bauman suggests that any solution is temporary, that ambivalence is 
overpowering, that, `[a]ll designation is, of course, a palliative, coming nowhere near 
the problem' (Bauman, 1993: 162), it would seem that even the temporary fixity of a 
concept like proteophobia or proteophilia would benefit from other types of semantic 
mechanism being involved and connected to the utterance. Bauman does not elaborate 
on these mechanisms. One answer to this problem is to conceptualise the 
reconceptualization of the ambivalent `other' of proteophobia and proteophilia as 
specifically metaphorical in structure. Because it describes the `other' through either 
images of fear and hatred, or images of adoration, both tropes draw on a semantic 
framework that is necessarily rhetorical, dualistic or less ambivalent, than the original, it 
therefore has greater `appeal' and gains some purchase as a definition. 
If other tropes can be employed alongside these tropes that also have the structural 
propensity to aid the process, or add additional rhetorical layers to it, then 
conceptualisations of the `other' are likely to be more successful in their ability to stay 
fixed. When proteophobia and proteophilia are expressed in joking, the ambivalence can 
be resolved in a twofold manner. First, it is `fixed' in a metaphorical definition at one or 
the other extremes of the binary. Second, the rhetorical device of the joke serves to 
reaffix the ambivalence through the success of the joke, which creates, theoretically at 
least, a more effective palliative. 
Proteophobia and Proteophilia are conceptually similar to Goffman's ideas on 
individuals who become Stigmaphobic or Stigmaphilic in their reactions to deviance. 
Thus the originality of Bauman's ideas should not be exaggerated. Goffman (1963) 
shows how this is a response that does not consider the self of the deviant, and forms a 
reaction that concentrates on the aspect of the deviant's body or personality that 
provokes the deviant label. Bauman specifically locates the development of the 
concepts alongside Levi-Strauss' description of anthropophagic and anthropogenic 
reactions to strangers (Bauman, 1993; 2003). He describes the anthropophagic as 
"eating the strangers up'. Either literally, in flesh - as in cannibalism allegedly 
practised by certain ancient tribes - or ... as in the power-assisted cultural assimilation 
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practised almost universally by nation states' (2003: 136-7). Anthropogenic reactions 
are metaphorically similar to "vomiting the strangers'... rounding them up and 
expelling them... either from the realm of the state power or from the world of the 
living' (ibid: 137). 1 employ Bauman's ideas rather than any other because of their ease 
of applicability to contemporary societies (c. f. Levi Strauss) and the macro-sociological 
emphasis of the account (c. f. Goffinan). 
One further point of revision on Bauman's division of types of social spacing 
concerns the specificity of the ambivalence removal process for each type of social 
space, and the potential overlap of processes and spaces. So for example, could 
proteophobic exclusion not become an aesthetic enterprise? As, for example, in the case 
of certain `others' being ugly, excluded objects while others are consumed? Likewise, 
knowledge collection need not always only exclude the ambivalent `other' because of 
cognitive paucity. It might also love or admire a certain culture through studying it, and 
it might only collect positive knowledge that is enjoyed in an aesthetic manner. 
Therefore, I am careful throughout not to assume the relationship between a reaction to 
the `other' and the type of social situation in which it occurs. 
I now examine a very different social formation, namely postmodernity or liquid 
modernity, to examine the interplay of humour, ambivalence and rhetoric in this social 
formation. 
Postmodern and Liquid Modern Ambivalence 
This section examines a different mode of society, racism and humour, which appears 
in what Bauman describes first as 'postmodern society', and later, as `liquid modem 
society' (Bauman, 2000a, 2003,2005). Whichever label is used to describe this social 
formation, there is a significant increase in the `amount' or the experience of 
ambivalence in it. This is reflected in the humorous products of these social formations, 
which I describe as postmodern humour. In this section, I signal, before describing fully 
in Chapter Six, that because the amount of ambivalence is significantly increased in 
postmodern humour, the functional effect of the rhetorical device becomes more 
`strained' and complex, and the rhetoric more unstable and unpredictable. Therefore, 
multiple meanings are produced around the objects of postmodern humour. At a generic 
level, this makes the labelling and the evaluation of racist humour more complex 
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because there exists a number of semantic layers around postmodern humour, and so it 
will produce a variety of interpretations that have to be negotiated. Before an 
examination of this, I define what both postmodernity and liquid modernity mean. 
Bauman (1992) describes the postmodern as having characteristics that make it 
significantly different to modernity, especially in relation to the voracity of social 
change and a diminishing potential for observation or classification of that change: 
It means the speed with which things change and the pace with which moods 
succeed each other so that they have no time to ossify into things. It means 
attention drawn in all directions at once so that it cannot stop on anything for 
long and nothing gets a really close look. (1992: p vii) 
Another significant characteristic of postmodernity20 as also characterised by Bauman is 
that it has a different relationship to ambivalence. In distinction to modernity, the onset 
of postmodernity sees an increase in `polyvocality' (Bauman, 1998: 15,2001: 84), 
which Bauman (1987) relates to changes in the status of expert authority. This increase 
in polyvocality leads to an `unfinishability' in postmodernity, that `the critical job has 
no limits and could never reach its terminal point' (Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 
2001: 75). It is, therefore, a form of society that cannot escape from the negotiation of 
ambivalence, it `is the era of disembedding without re-embedding' (ibid: 89), in which 
ambivalence is constantly produced and hardly, if ever, resolved. 
I now outline my stance on the relationship between modernity, postmodernity, the 
existence of each, and the styles of humour that dominate in each form of society. 
Bauman himself describes the postmodern perspective as a tendency that was always 
present in modernity. From the very start of modernity, postmodernity had represented 
`its indispensable alter ego: that restless, perpetually dissentful voice... ' (ibid: 75. 
Original emphasis). Likewise, despite society moving into liquid modernity, he insists 
the order-building tendencies of modernity reappear, so for example, `[w]e are as 
modern as ever, obsessively `modernising' everything we can lay our hands on. A 
quandary, therefore: the same but different, discontinuity in continuity' (ibid: 97). 
Others suggest that the world can be conceptualised as being both modern and 
postmodern simultaneously, as various parts of society conform to different definitions 
20 Bauman argues that 'postmodemity' should not be confused with the `postmodernism': 
`Unlike `postmodernism', which, like all `isms', referred to a programme or an attitude more 
than any particular features of the `world out there', `postmodernity' I hoped would refer to the 
quality of a particular type of society, which happened to be ours but unlike that of our fathers' 
(Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 96). This is a distinction that I employ throughout. 
Postmodern humour refers to the humour of this social formation. 
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(e. g. Smith, 1998: 42). For Bauman, the postmodern, or liquid modern as he likes to 
describe it now, represents contemporary society (the postmodern has also been 
described as the `liquid' stage of modernity, as a phase between modernity and liquid 
modernity [Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 89]). Liquid modernity is the term 
that Bauman uses instead of postmodernity in recent texts (Bauman, 2000a, 2003, 
2005), although the two have a great deal in common. A part of Bauman's move 
towards the use of `liquid modernity' occurred because of the confusion that exists over 
the meaning of the term `postmodernity'. On this he proposes `that because of the 
semantic confusion sensible discussion of contemporary trends under the rubric of 
`postmodernity' would be well-nigh impossible' (Bauman in Bauman and Tester, 2001: 
97). In defining liquid modernity, Bauman suggests the "`Liquid modern" is a society in 
which the conditions under which its members act change faster than it takes the ways 
of acting to consolidate into habits and routines' (Bauman, 2005: 1). It is, therefore, a 
society that has a similar relationship to ambivalence than that of postmodernity. 
Overall, I can see no substantive difference between Bauman's postmodernity and 
liquid modernity apart from the metaphorical potential of the term `liquid' - which is 
unquestionably his dominant argumentative technique - and thus I maintain a use of 
postmodernity but draw on the notion of liquidity in social formations. 
In understanding humour, an application of this conceptual framework would 
suggest that the trends in humour that exhibit modem tendencies and which work to 
dispel modern ambivalence, or the ambivalence of embodied racism, are somewhat 
older, or have a longer etymology, and exist because of the remnants of these discourses 
(however these remnants can be put to various uses in contemporary settings, even if 
these uses have been downsized). So while they may be put to use, their status and 
acceptability connects to the value that is placed on the serious discourse and may not 
have the polysemicity that postmodern humour develops, while the humour of cultural 
racism will fall somewhere between this. Despite these differences, all forms of humour 
exist in society at the same time. 
Liquid Racism 
I now discuss the effect of these changes on the appearance and structure of racism. I 
label the racism of postmodernity as `liquid racism', rather than `post-racism', because 
the term post-racism would imply that in this social formation we have moved beyond 
racism, that it no longer exists. The term `liquid racism', on the other hand, gives the 
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impression that racism still exists, but that we are now faced with a racism whose 
structure has changed. In adapting Bauman's definition of postmodernity and liquid 
modernity for a definition of the racism that can appear in it, I define liquid racism as a 
racism that does not produce a monolithic reading as racism, but is experienced as 
racism in particular circumstances. Because of the `volume' of sign-slippage in liquid 
racism, there is no straightforward way of establishing or asserting any semantic 
superiority of interpretation, and critique becomes more challenging. It therefore has a 
structure that is constructed with far more potential for ambivalence. More detail will be 
given on liquid racism in Chapter Six. 
Bauman has described the meeting of strangers in liquid modernity as a mismeeting 
because the encounter has no past referent and no future expectations (Bauman, 1993, 
2000a: 95). This becomes a relationship that exists without bonds but with a semantic 
void. It is this void that fuels the anxiety towards the `other' as it represents the area of 
ambivalence. This is quite similar to the experience of the ambivalence surrounding 
cultural racism, because the view of the `other' changes as society moves away from 
the fixity of modernity. Importantly this suggests liquid racism, a fluidity of 
interactions, is one within the home territory, or at least, inside the present territory of 
the social actor. Liquid racism is constructed through the referents of cultural racism 
and embodied racism, but the increased volume of the assemblage creates many more 
potential readings. It exists in an increased state of ambivalence of semantic expression. 
This would affect the definitions of the `other' which `are now as unsteady and protean 
as one's own identity; as poorly founded, as erratic and volatile' (Bauman, 1997a: 54). 
The principle difference of this increase in ambivalence suggests that liquid racism 
may be difficult to define, or that its definition will shift. This does not mean that such 
formations are not felt by the social actor as racism, as older forms of racism are. In 
many instances, because of this structural ambivalence, its impact may not be taken 
seriously because it is not visible from certain perspectives, thus developing some 
immunity to criticism. 
The discussion of liquid racism presents two questions: is liquid racism really a new 
racism or just older racisms hiding themselves better? If liquid racism is genuinely 
more open then the argument surely suggests itself that it is not racism at all, or is a 
weakened and challenged residue of racism? On the first point, I argue that liquid 
racism can use both embodied and culturally racist signs but that it is more ambiguous, 
containing more semantic layers. It is new in terms of structure but not new in terms of 
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content. On the second point, liquid racism should not be seen as a specifically 
weakened or challenged residue of racism but rather as an ambiguous form that is 
specifically encouraged nowadays and one that weakens various defences against 
claims of racism. To explain this more clearly, I describe liquid racism as a specific 
racism that is promoted and encouraged by the media. In Chapter Six, Ali G and Borat 
are presented as examples of characters that exhibit liquid racism, and in Chapter 
Seven, the Prophet Muhammad cartoons are also seen to have a `liquid' dimension. 
They are ambiguous, but more importantly, this ambiguity has, in part, encouraged 
media interest. Put simply, in an age of interactive and polyvocal media, liquid racism 
generates a `debate', providing more material because it is ambiguous. Traditional 
monosemic racism fails to provide this potential and so is less media friendly or 
malleable and less open to exploitation for media content. Liquid racism also leads to 
the specific staging of the proteophobic and proteophilic oppositions in media debate - 
and all social actors need do is take a side. Of course, it remains that many social actors 
do not `read' liquid racism in this way, and so, and as is explained in Chapters Six and 
Seven, I argue it is as much reader interpretation and (lack of) reflexivity, as well as the 
expression of liquid racism, that is in need of critique. 
Postmodern Humour 
In applying these ideas to humour, in postmodern humour the interplay between 
ambivalence and rhetorical device is significantly different because of an increased 
generation of sign-slippage, which significantly curtails the removal of ambivalence, or 
actively creates more ambivalence. This has specific consequences when liquid racism 
appears in postmodern humour. Significantly, postmodern humour that contains 
reference to race and ethnicity sees a mixing of genres that makes ethical interpretation 
or evaluation quite difficult. 
In particular readings of embodied and culturally racist humour, jokes can have a 
specific bearing on both serious discourse and the habitus - being to resolve ambiguity - 
that assists serious discourse in its self-maintenance and perpetuation, and facilitates the 
existence of contradictory discourse in the habitus. I suggested in Chapter One that 
sign-slippage is an essential trigger between incongruities in joke formation. In 
postmodern humour, processes of sign-slippage are multiplied which prevents a 
dominant interpretation from appearing. In these instances a strong rhetorical 
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interpretation cannot gain a foothold, or if it momentarily does it soon slips away under 
another meaning, as other meanings attempt to gain a similar foothold. Postmodern 
humour is therefore a quite different category of joking. When meaning in humour 
becomes saturated like this a situation is created where the potential for critique 
becomes more complicated because the experiences of `concealed' racism become 
more likely. 
In postmodern humour the saturation of slippages and meanings prevent a solid 
linkage of humorous and serious meaning. Any cumulative rhetorical effects created by 
a `critical mass' of humour are unlikely to appear. This increased level of sign-slippage 
may disturb the rhetorical techniques that support the serious. This contrasts sharply 
with the humour of embodied and cultural racism, where it is the recurring similarity of 
meaning and relative stability of sign-slippage in a rhetorical device that can 
successfully resolve ambivalence, which reinforces these discourses. Because of this 
difference, any rhetorical meaning will only appear momentarily in postmodern 
humour. 
Working through this problematic, Chapter Six outlines how racism can still be 
experienced in one or more of the layers or folds of the genre at the level of the habitus 
but is often constructed as one element of dichotomy in media debate. This is achieved 
primarily through an examination of the comedy of Sacha Baron Cohen, with specific 
reference to the characters Ali G and Borat, but also through a consideration of a 
number of other comic sources that have an affinity with this comedy. In Chapter Six I 
evaluate whether the saturation of meaning in postmodern humour produces a dominant 
interpretation, whether the humour can attach itself to, or support, a serious discourse in 
the same non-contradictory way that other humorous discourses do. In postmodern 
humour, meaning might be seen as far too saturated for `true' meaning to develop and 
social actors may see more than one meaning. Some of the meanings may be racist and 
some not. 
In the semantic field of postmodern humour, the reactions to humour and to the 
(even more) ambivalent `other' of humour - which include proteophobia and 
proteophilia - may be more confused and confusing. As the amount of ambivalence 
increases around the referents of humour, proteophobia and proteophilia are, 
theoretically, more likely to be observed around the same humorous object. As the 
ambivalence of the `other' of postmodern humour increases and expresses numerous 
race and ethnic signifiers, and invokes various habitus positions, so different social 
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actors can experience `opposite' readings of the same ambivalent `other', and both 
proteophobic and proteophilic responses are produced as a result. There is then an 
inability of the rhetorical structure to remove the ambivalence for any fixed period, so 
while an article of order-building may be modern in appearance and it may have 
originated in modernity, remnants of it may remain or even be replicated in 
postmodernity. Its status, however, will have changed. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the central importance of the generation of ambivalence in 
the dominant societal formations of modernity and postmodernity, and linked to this, 
the impact on the race and ethnic discourses that appear in these periods. We have seen 
that ambivalence represents Zygmunt Bauman's `alter ego' of language, or an 
unavoidable waste product that is inherent as the catalyst and the product of order- 
building systems. Ambivalence resolution can be conceptualised as a problem and 
demand that any linguistic, order-building process will be concerned with. In the 
proceeding chapters, these order-building processes will be shown to draw on humour 
as a rhetorical device that consumes the ambiguous waste of signification. As the `alter 
ego' of the serious, humour is shown to be used as a mechanism for removing this 
semantic waste, and so specifically aiding serious discourse in its continued existence. I 
have therefore shown how Bauman's ideas on ambivalence can be combined with my 
typology of rhetorical humour processes, as outlined in Chapter One. This theory is 
applied in Chapter Three, with an analysis of embodied racism in humour. 
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Chapter Three 
`Biological Racism' and Embodied Racist Humour 
Introduction 
This chapter applies the theoretical apparatus outlined in Chapters One and Two for an 
examination of the appearance of the remnants of biological racism in humour . 
21 These 
are described as forms of `embodied racism'. Embodied racism is a racism with an 
order-building and hierarchical propensity, and an invention of modernity alongside the 
development of race itself. 
The central argument presented is that embodied racist humour often rhetorically 
supports racist truth claims and is used to express racist ambivalence and incongruity. 
When successful, these rhetorical expressions will serve the function of reinforcing 
embodied racist truth and removing the `appearance' of ambivalence from both within 
embodied racism and between embodied racism and other competing or contradictory 
discourses outside of its boundaries. Therefore, the chapter analyses the interplay 
between the constitutive sign-systems and dichotomous stereotypes of embodied 
racism, and the rhetorical incongruous devices of humour, to show how this semantic 
combination supports racism through its rhetorical and communicative effect. 
The chapter reiterates and expands on the definition of embodied racism presented in 
Chapter Two, by situating it in relation to, first, a usage of race that considers the 
ongoing sociological debates on its meaning and usefulness and second, linked 
arguments on the concept of racialization. Informed by the preceding discussions, the 
chapter highlights some examples of the sociological downgrading of embodied racism, 
before introducing its central dichotomy, which is created by the particular concepts of 
`civilisation' and `nature' and their associated connotations. It is then suggested that 
these elements are reproduced in embodied racist humour. 
2' The methodology employed in this and the later chapters follows the form of the rhetorical 
analysis outlined in Chapter One. The jokes selected are taken from sources that follow or 
explicate the particular discursive frame under analysis, as embodied, cultural or liquid racism, 
and so are not easily or completely tied to particular social situations, but have a porous, 
discursive quality. In explicating these discursive trends, no attempt has been made to be 
quantitatively representative in relation to the occurrence of expressions of racist humour. This 
is beyond the scope of the thesis. Following this, the joke-by-joke analysis elicits theoretical 
observations, rather than an accurate survey of the available material. 
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Racist jokes do not always exhibit a direct expression of dichotomy. Such jokes do, 
however, maintain the ability to have rhetorical effects and may work implicitly on 
racist truth claims. The chapter gives some examples of non-ambivalent or non- 
stereotyped racist jokes with an outline of black and `nigger' jokes. These form 
`exemplary' embodied race signifiers that are expressed, and rhetorically effect racism, 
often without the explicit presence of the stereotypes or dichotomies of embodied 
racism. An analysis of these jokes is presented via a critique of Raskin's (1985) 
definition of the ethnic joke as that which always contains an ethnic script. 
The final section examines three areas of embodied racism that appear in embodied 
racist humour, that develop as connotations of the aforementioned civilisation/nature 
dichotomy and depict black people in the main. To begin, I examine a mind/body 
dichotomy that shows black people as stupid. After this, I examine jokes that portray a 
dichotomy that depicts the sexuality of the black `other' as savage and unrestrained. 
Third, in connection with the racist description of the increased corporeality of the 
black `other', I examine jokes that depict the bodies of black people in certain types of 
social activity or habit. These include sport, crime and indolence. In the last three, jokes 
that contain both embodied and cultural racism are shown to be connected in theme or 
target (the issue of connection is given more attention below). Before that though, I say 
something about the separation of the jokes in the chapter in correspondence to Michel 
Wieviorka's dual logic of racism. 
The Dual Logic of Racist Humour 
Racist humour will often describe the `other' as either lacking in `worth', or, as 
something that should be removed from society. This, in essence, forms the `rationale' 
of racist humour and corresponds to the logic of racism outlined by Michel Wieviorka, 
of consisting of paradoxical processes of inclusion, leading to inferiorization and 
exploitation, and exclusion, leading to segregation based on the observation of threat 
(Wieviorka, 1997: 141, also Wieviorka, 1995). 
First, I split my selection of embodied racist jokes along this dichotomy. I show how 
inclusive jokes depict inferiorization and exploitation, particularly inferiorization 
through stereotyping. The particular dichotomies of embodied racism present images of 
inferiorization and correspond to the first half of the logic. The joke below is an 
example: 
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Q: What do you call a black guy with a fan? 
A: Antique air conditioner 
(BlackJokes. net, no date) 
This joke, from a US website, inferiorizes through making reference to slavery, relying 
on a dichotomy of the master and the slave. 
Second, the chapter identifies jokes that address what might be done with the `other' 
- those that call for exclusion or destruction. Exclusionary jokes depict ways to get rid 
of the `other', but do not always depict stereotypes. Here is an example: 
Q: What do u call 1,000 black people on a plane back to Africa? 
A: A good start 
(ibid) 
Exclusionary jokes often employ Bauman's `proteophobic' trope and offer images of 
refuse categorisation or disposal (Bauman, 1993,2003). To reiterate, proteophobia is a 
fear or hatred of multiform and a reaction to the `other' who does not correspond to 
dominant styles of social spacing. Bauman argues it appears as an expression of the 
exclusion of the outsider, as a response to the `other' who defies knowledge 
classification (1993: 164). This observation demonstrates how racist jokes, while 
containing specific signs and stereotypes - which present deficient characteristics in a 
rhetorical device - often explicitly exhibit an urge to destroy or dispose of the body of 
the `other'. The themes of refuse can be divided into waste and excrement jokes, while 
the themes of disposal centre on expressions of expulsion, exclusion or death. 
Following Bauman's use of the concept, it is argued these proteophilic jokes form 
`palliatives' for the second logic and appear in the various tropes of humour to present a 
second symbolic `end' or means of resolving the `problem' of ambivalence. These 
jokes appear more often in the non-stereotyped jokes identified in section two. In this 
chapter and the next, I sketch a typology of proteophobic joking that becomes both 
more severe and offensive. It is not unreasonable to infer that an increase in the severity 
of racist expression might require a parallel level of increased proteophobic expression, 
which works dynamically to accommodate the particular exclusionary needs of 
different social discourses and situations, or individuals and groups 22 
ZZ While it is possible to observe the proteophobic tendency in embodied racist joking, Bauman's 
parallel technique for ambivalence disposal, proteophilia, is not observed in this type of racism. 
Proteophilia, or love of multiform, is not a method of ambivalence removal that is employed by 
the racist. As summarised in Chapter Two, both strategies exist in society but appear at very 
different points, and often, but not always, in relation to different positions on the political 
spectrum. Racist comedy and humour tends to fulfil the proteophobic urge. 
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Distinguishing Embodied Racist Humour 
Chapter Two explained that biological racism was a racism that divided populations 
through the use of phenotypical, biological and physical traits, which led to the 
formation of racist boundaries between populations. It was a racism that placed a great 
emphasis on defining corporeality. From this, remnants of biological racism - embodied 
racism - emerged with an intrinsic developmental link to enlightenment philosophy, 
science and anthropology, which mapped hierarchal conceptualisations of racial groups. 
This section and the next extends the definition by situating the thesis in relation to the 
contemporary sociology of race and ethnicity, by outlining my specific use of the terms 
`race' and `racialization'. Both are shown to be relevant for the analysis of racist 
humour. I define embodied racism as racism that depicts racialized characteristics of the 
body of the `other', but does not explicitly or implicitly include the systemic totality of 
older, often academic, forms of biological racism. 
During the analysis I also evaluate the overall importance or relevance placed on the 
concept of embodied racism in contemporary sociology and make two observations. 
First, in current sociology there is an under-emphasis in describing the appearance and 
consequences of embodied racism, in favour of an overall exaggeration of cultural 
racism as the dominant form. Second, this under-emphasis has led to an analytical 
blind-spot that, in many cases, has failed to describe racism as not simply the 
interconnection of embodied and cultural racism, but as an internally muddled and 
erratic supply of ideas and practices. The depiction of racism in sociological typologies 
quite often adds an unrealistic amount of analytic clarity to, or ignores certain aspects 
of, this plethora. So in essence, the separation of Chapters Three and Four into the 
themes of embodied and cultural racism aims to reassert the importance of embodied 
racism. I reintroduce this aspect of the plethora and highlight its connection to, and 
contextual overlap with cultural racism, rather than exaggerate their distinctiveness or 
downplay the impact of one or the other racist form. I elicit these points through a 
discussion of the dominant positions in the sociology of race and ethnicity in relation to 
examples of racist humour. The comedians mentioned in this chapter and the next tell 
jokes that contain both embodied and cultural racism and, importantly, this occurs not 
just in the same performances but in the same jokes or sections of their acts, which 
suggests that the comedians conceptualise the material as a whole. Likewise, the 
internet based jokes also exhibit a mixture of types of racism. 
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The Realities of Race and Racialization 
Embodied racism is tied up with concepts of race. Many have asserted or highlighted 
that a general consensus exists in sociology that sees the concept of race as having no 
conceptual value for phenotypical or biological description (e. g. Banton, 1995; Miles, 
1982,1991,1993; Fenton, 1999; Spoonley, 1995). This, in part, is due to its association 
with racism and fascist ideology, and also because of its failed or anachronistic status in 
biological and genetic science - or its failure as an ontological category with any 
verifiable foundation. This leaves a reality of race that Sampson aptly describes: 
`People make race. Differences in skin colour and other physical attributes exist, but on 
a spectrum rather than in neatly apportioned categories' (2005: 3). 
Although the dominant sociological reading of race exists in marked contrast to 
early enlightenment theoretical readings, arguments over the usage of race, of what to 
do with the term, are by no means settled. St. Louis typologizes these positions: 
On the one hand, race can be identified as a biological category that distinguishes 
between population varieties in the human species... or as a syncretic category that 
is formed (and continually reformed) at particular socio-historical junctures... On 
the other hand, race does not exist in any real objective sense and instead is a 
mythic category that biologically misrepresents existing ethnic groups... or is a 
reified category that conjures the fictive biological, social and cultural unity of 
arbitrary racialized collectives. (2005b: 29. Original emphasis) 
The various identifications of race continually resuscitate debate on how the concept 
should be used in the social sciences. Kim (2004) also crystallises the plethora of 
positions with a tripartite typology of users: first, 'anti-essentialists' who argue that 
`subordinated groups should stop using the concept' (2004: 338-39), second, 'strategic 
essentialists' who `retain and rehabilitate the concept of race in order to promote 
collective identity' (ibid: 339) and third, 'quasi-essentialists' who prefer to challenge 
whiteness as a hegemonic category (ibid). 
Both St. Louis' and Kim's typologies recreate the image presented by Gilroy in his 
early work, of race as a signifier whose `meanings are unfixed and subject to the 
outcomes of struggle' (1987: 24) (which is noticeable both inside and outside of 
academia), or of the semantics of race as fitting Hall's `floating signifier' (Hall, c 1996), 
or Ruskin's `empty signifier' (Ruskin, 1991). While all signs are more or less 
polysemic - can `float' or be `emptied' by different types of use - because of the 
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connection of race with racism, these struggles have a particular importance for this 
thesis above that of most signs. 
With the analysis of racist humour in mind, it is essential to recognise that race, 
despite its diminished scientific or social scientific status, still exists as a normal 
explanatory `concept' in commonsense23 or everyday language and communication, and 
is often used `unproblematically' outside of academia. Most people using race have a 
limited awareness of the etymology of it or of the academic debates surrounding this 
etymology. In these instances, race forms a relatively cogent and understood means of 
distinguishing between populations and groups. Not all of these utterances will be 
racist, but for those that are, for the utterances of embodied racism (and also cultural 
racialization), race, as an order-building and hierarchical discursive system, will 
develop problems and anxieties associated with the production of ambivalence. These 
problems (the anxiety, ambivalence and incongruity of racism) develop because its 
subject matter - the `other' - does not respond well to dichotomy formation and 
continues to elide assessment, principally through various challenges to racist discourse. 
This will find its way into humour. 
Because of the existence of this `unproblematic' use of race and because I am 
writing about racism in the main, rather than the identities of ethnic groups and the 
nomenclature they ought or wish to employ, I accept that race is a concept with an 
unsustainable ontological foundation, but cannot accept an anti-essentialist position 
because this would prevent me from recording and analysing embodied racist humour. 
Although the two are often interlinked, there are subtle differences between the study of 
racism and the anti-essentialist study, or conceptual formulation, of ethnic identity. 
Racism will have a semantic content that requires an analytic focus that often, quite 
obviously, differs from that of minority claims for recognition and attempts at identity 
formation. For the analyst, this means an interaction with quite different terms. Jenkins' 
(1994) distinction between consensual and imposed identities is useful here. He 
23 Commonsense discourse is defined as a concept that represents a certain fragmented use of 
language by people in myriad situations. This is quite similar to Antonio Gramsci's conception 
of common sense. In the `Prison Notebooks' he states that `common sense is not a single unique 
conception, identical in time and space.... Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a 
conception which, ... 
is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the 
social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is' (Gramsci, 1971: 419). The 
definition can be reworked to suggest that commonsense is certainly fragmentary, incoherent 
and ambiguous because it is made up of a number of discourses, but not inconsequential in 
effect, as it has ideological impact, although this often remains difficult to map in comparison to 
more `coherent' or formal discourses. This fragmentation is described throughout as the 
existence of contradictory beliefs in the habitus. 
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distinguishes between social categorisation and internal identity formation, and suggests 
that `there are few examples in the anthropological ethnicity literature of an explicit 
concern with social categorization' (1994: 207. Original emphasis). Here 
`categorisation' signifies a definition imposed on a social group, which can be taken to 
include race typology. When discussing a usage of race, it is important to specify 
exactly who is using the concept and its intended semantics. In agreement with Jenkins, 
it does seem that most contemporary commentators tend to concentrate on the use of 
race for internal identity formation, or of perceptions of racism via internal identity 
formation. 
For example, while Gilroy urges for the `renunciation of `race" (1998: 838), as `the 
only ethical response to the conspicuous wrongs that raciologies continue to solicit and 
sanction' (ibid: 838-9), his comments make little sense to the analyst of racist humour. 4 
Specifically for my concerns, while his comments might have some merit for the 
evaluation of the conceptual schema used in identity formation, if adopted literally, they 
would leave the analyst of racism without the ability to even begin to describe much 
racist humour and might manufacture an analytic lens through which only culturally 
racist humour is viewed. If one stage in combating racism is to record and analyse it, it 
is imperative that this is not limited by the normative linguistic fashions of the social 
scientific community. 
In relation to this, it is difficult to create a definitive normative or prescriptive 
grounding for terms such as `race' in the abstract because they are always attached to a 
multiplicity of social practices, happenings and utterances that do not appear in 
correspondence to, or engage with, (or in some instances have any knowledge of) this 
normative framework. So while Spoonley, following the sociological zeitgeist, argues `I 
want to reject this concept as oppressive and scientifically invalid' (Spoonley, 1995: 2), 
of course racism (and its usage of race) always is oppressive and scientifically invalid, 
but the recording of it, and subsequent analysis, is important. 
24 This normative argument appears in many sociological accounts and seems to consistently 
ignore 'the conspicuous wrongs that' ethnologies 'continue to solicit and sanction', and so does 
not subject ethnicity to the same level of scrutiny, or even test it through the same ontological 
lens. It seems odd that while many sociologists continue to place race in inverted commas as a 
dead concept, ethnicity is, despite the existence of ethnic hatred, ethnic conflict and ethnic 
cleansing, generally seen to be a `positive' concept, one that allows `an emphasis on the real 
potential of people and peoples to define themselves both in terms of what is particular to them 
and in terms of what they share with others' (Fenton, 1999: 237). This, to me, seems to be a 
slightly naive normative assessment of the power relations involved in ethnicization at all socio- 
structural levels. 
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Some have also suggested that a use of racism might replace race in sociological 
analysis. Spoonley outlines this: `The preferred alternative [to race] for analytical 
purposes is the concept of racism' (Spoonley, 1995: 3). 1 would maintain that it is not 
possible to not use race and still coherently talk about embodied racism, which actively 
draws on some notion, no matter how convoluted, of race. To disregard race in this way 
also ignores uses of race that are not racist - thus simultaneously setting a normative 
standard that either ignores, curtails or casts judgement over its potential for 
connotation. 
Finally, to clarify my position, when I talk of race I am talking about a socio- 
linguistic construction with its own etymology, not racist in all instances as Fields 
(1982) and Appiah (1986) suggest but, paradoxically, a key order-building and 
dichotomy-forming sign in the vocabulary of racism. In terms of situating this usage 
inside Kim's typology of academics and activists, it has more in common with the 
quasi-essentialist position, as this analysis of racist humour is a critical investigation of, 
in the main, white racist joking. 
Next I situate the thesis in relation to the concept of `racialization'. This is done so 
the concept can be employed where necessary and its meanings defined in advance. The 
term `racialization' was first recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1899 but 
specifically developed its contemporary social scientific meaning in the writings of 
Fanon and Miles (Barot and Bird, 2001: 602-3). The sociological usage of it, like that of 
race, is up for debate, with volumes being devoted to the discussion of its meaning and 
usefulness (e. g. ibid; Murji and Solomos, 2005). 
First some positions that diverge from my own. For example, Banton's interpretation 
of how racialization should be used mirrors Spoonley's comments on racism. Barot and 
Bird explain how `he uses this designation only after rejecting the usefulness of a 
number of other concepts including `race' and `raciation' (Barot and Bird, 2001: 606). 
For me, Banton's usage encounters the same logical dilemma that is faced by those, 
such as Spoonley, who replace race with racism, of removing or ignoring the 
conceptual object that is created by the process you are describing. Banton 
contextualises his position as one that would allow for increased conceptual clarity. He 
suggests that `racialisation has been taken up by sociologists as a way out of the 
difficulties caused by the multiplicity of meanings given to the word race' (Banton, 
1997: 35). This, to me, also seems to be a simplistic basis on which to ground the use of 
a particular term. First, while race may have a multiplicity of meanings, this is surely 
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important. These meanings are social occurrences and this should be studied rather than 
avoided or conceptually written out of the sociological map. Second, there is no way of 
knowing whether racialization, like race, will develop a multiplicity of meanings. 
Racialization might begin by signifying a social process, but become that of a biological 
process, become normatively positive or negative, become fixed or unstable, or as has 
evidently happened, develop a number of sociological interpretations similar to the 
typologies of race already mentioned. 
In an attempt to summarise the discussion, Barot and Bird describe the sociological 
development of racialization as a `replacement for `race': Miles, Goldberg and others 
come to see `race' as having real social consequences while being mythical; for them 
racialization is reintroduced into sociology as a more useful term' (2001: 606. Original 
emphasis). To reiterate my scepticism, it would seem that there is a certain amount of 
hyperbole involved in suggesting that the addition of a suffix to an existing concept 
creates a new concept, but despite this, racialization does specifically illuminate the 
existence of processes that create `race', and so moves the meaning of the term away 
from one that is biologically or genetically fixed or innate, towards one that is dynamic. 
An important characteristic of racism (and of language generally, although of course 
racism is not always linguistic) is that it is dynamic. Its sign-systems are flexible and 
porous, and always able to include new signs, practices, events and peoples, or to 
reinvent the old. All of which find a further place in racist humour. Racist humour 
could certainly be labelled, with its rhetorical effects that seek to support racism, a form 
of embodied and/or cultural racialization, race creation or race formation, as a process 
that actively develops racist meaning as `truth'. With this in mind, where I use the term 
it is to signify the processes of rhetorical reinforcement involved in racist humour that 
create racism or race. 
Embodied Racism and the Dichotomy of Civilisation and Nature 
Civilisation/nature is, I propose, the central dichotomy of embodied racism from which 
all others are derived, and connects very closely with notions of superiority and 
inferiority, which forms a key transferable, but not necessarily constitutive, component 
of other racisms. 
Before I elaborate on this, I describe the sociological status of embodied racism. As 
mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, embodied racism is often sidelined or 
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ignored in sociological analysis. In a specific example, Werbner, in the development of 
her concept of the `grand inquisitor', which is a productive description of the ideal type 
Muslim of the Islamophobe, describes biological racism as a `far cruder' form 
(Werbner, 2005: 7), and so as something the culturally racist view of grand inquisitor 
might attach itself to as an addition. The reliance on the older concept of biological 
racism, and its obvious anachronistic connotations, prevents such inquiry from seeing 
the widespread use of its remnants - embodied racism - which are much more free- 
floating. Likewise, it does not acknowledge that many past expressions of what has 
been labelled `biological racism' would not have exhibited systemic totality and would 
have had more in common with embodied racism. While embodied racism does not 
need to be a constitutive part of cultural racism, there is little evidence that it is any 
more or less `crude'. Werbner's account suggests Islamophobia exists in isolation to 
and without the need for embodied racism, yet it is evident that it has not been looked 
for. Overall, sociological approaches suggest it is a racism already analysed, already 
understood and already dealt with by the sociologist concerned with typologizing 
cultural racism, seeing it as dated and now irrelevant. Wieviorka presents a further 
example: 
racism was a way of thinking and acting that referred to the idea of human races, 
and the differentiation and ranking of groups and individuals in terms of their 
natural phenotypical or genetic attributes. Racism was in the terminal phase of its 
classical, biological era. (Wieviorka, 1997: 141. Emphasis added) 
Although Wieviorka does not specify the social field to which he is referring, it is likely 
that he intends us to apply his comments to the development and status of race science, 
rather than to that of humorous discourse. This concentration on the formal sphere does 
not consider that embodied racism still exists in other discourses. Here is an example: 
Hang about, hang about, don't get excited, have we got any in? Can we have the 
lights up or something and have a look for them. You can't see them in those dark 
corners though, they hide in them. Oh dear me, come on smile, show yourself, 
where are you? Any about? I know there's some in, I seen the canoes in the car 
park. Oh there's one over there [Italics signify a stereotypical West Indian accent]. 
Can we get a spotlight on him, let's have a look. Oh there's two of them there. 
How you gettin on brothers? Okay give me some skin young rascal man... Where 
about's you from mate? Hang on, I'll translate that for you [succession of drum 
beats follow]. Yeah you lot have a laugh, I'll get a blow dart in my arse now. 
That'll be great. (Davidson, 1980) 
Elements of biological racism exist and are reproduced in racist humour as embodied 
racism. While these depictions do not present the systemic totality of biological racism, 
they do reflect many of its internal truth claims. Jim Davidson's comedic career has 
98 
produced numerous examples of racist humour (see any of: Davidson, 1980,1982, 
1992,1993,1995,1996,2000,2001 a, 2001 b, 2001 c, 2001 d, 2001 e, 2002,2002b, 2003, 
2005a, c2005b; The Bad Boys of Comedy, 2004). In this example, from a performance 
in 1980, `natural' phenotypical characteristics are depicted - in the form of an emphasis 
on the skin colour of black people - and it is difficult to see how this racism exists in a 
terminal condition. Just one example of racist humour highlights the folly of believing 
that embodied racism died when it was supposed to. Importantly, what is also displayed 
in this example are the characteristics of savagery attributed to the black `other', 
through the mention of canoes and blow darts, and the culturally racist themes of 
language and vernacular that appear in the same humorous utterance. So while 
embodied racism exists, this also renders the sociological distinction between embodied 
and cultural racism rather artificial. 
Of major importance for the impact of embodied racism - and directly lifted from 
biological racism - is its ability to act as a classificatory system, or its ability to 
construct a dichotomy between the `civilised' body of the self and `uncivilised' body of 
the `other'. This dichotomy works because of its close connection to a chain of 
signification in which civilisation implicitly connects to the superior, the cultural, 
cultivation, an interest in cerebral pursuits, and intelligence, whereas nature connotes 
the inferior, the savage, instinctive responses, corporeality and stupidity. 
Embodied racism resembles a modern, order-building discourse imbued with an 
inheritance from enlightenment and colonial race investigations. David Hume suggested 
that, `I am apt to suspect that negroes and in general all other species of man to be 
naturally inferior than to the whites' (Hume, 1997 [1754]: 33), in what was a classic 
piece of biological racism. Embodied racism reproduces such notions of 
superiority/inferiority. Although there were internal differences and debates among 
Enlightenment thinkers and not all created straightforward or uncritical race hierarchies, 
or agreed on these hierarchies (Chukwudi Eze, 1997: 6), these ideas represent a clear 
site of early dichotomy formation, which had, following Bauman's thesis, the inherent 
propensity to create ambivalence. This uncertainty is reproduced in embodied racism to 
a far greater extent because of the failed status of its biological ancestor. 
Embodied dichotomies also have a colonial legacy, and so colonial racisms, or 
racisms that were developed, in part, through the colonial process and which symbolise 
the aims of that process, still exist in embodied racism. Banton has explained the link 
between the development of race and colonialism. Barot and Bird reiterate his position: 
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`Banton states clearly that the concept of `race' developed as Europeans came into 
contact with people whose physical appearance was very different. As Banton says, 
"the contacts were important to the development by Europeans of racial categories" 
(Banton 1977: 13 in Barot and Bird, 2001: 607). Embodied racism, as a racism that uses 
race, has a colonial heritage. In contemporary sociology, Grosfoguel links colonialism 
to contemporary racisms by suggesting they can be conceptualised through 
understanding that, `[t]he negative symbolic images of colonial racialized subjects... 
are related to the colonial histories of each empire and the `global coloniality' still 
present under a `post-colonial', `post imperial' capitalist world system' (2004: 331). As 
is documented later, these enlightenment/colonial racisms are directly transferred into 
embodied racist joking. 
The jokes in this chapter appear from two sources. First, there are internet based 
racist jokes from US websites. Second, there are jokes from British stand-up comedy. 
Dealing with the first category, the US jokes depict black people in the main, although 
such websites also carry jokes about Hispanics, Jews and Arabs. I have chosen the 
example of black jokes because they provide an exemplary case study of the influence 
of the US specifically as an ex-slave society on the content of embodied racism. This is 
probably not representative of UK or European joking, or of US ethnic humour overall, 
but its selection provides a clear example of embodied racist joking as a particular 
discursive frame. 
Specifically, in US society where, as Rattansi explains, the "`one drop" rule was 
adopted in many southern states, which implied that any black ancestry, however far 
back, consigned an individual to the wrong side of the white/black divide' (2007: 7), 
embodied characteristics of race difference play a far greater role in the construction of 
`otherness' than they do in the European context. In comparison to Europe, this is 
explained by the lack of an initial culture that the `other' moved into, of the cultural 
difference of all Americans at one level or another. It therefore firmly places this 
humour in a US context. What is significant is that the racial segregation of the US, 
which follows a binary distinction that places far more importance on the notions of 
black/white, is not a process devoid of the cognitive dilemmas outlined in Chapter Two. 
As Rattansi explains `the seemingly obvious categories of `white' and `black' began to 
throw up their own anomalies' (ibid: 39). For example, in generic discussions of `what 
is white? ', in relation to Europe, and in relation to new settlers in 19'h century America. 
Such ambiguity is exhibited around terms such as `mulatto', `creole', `mango', `sambo' 
and `meamelou' (ibid: 43), suggesting that whiteness in the US, `has never been a 
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simple matter of unambiguous visible difference' (ibid: 92). Therefore, in terms of 
racism, `[t]here is much inconsistency and contradiction in white American views of 
African Americans... Ambivalence, in other words, is as much a characteristic as simple 
racism in the views of those who might be simply dismissed as racist' (ibid: 124. 
Original emphasis). 
Non-stereotyped Black and `Nigger' Jokes 
As highlighted earlier, some racist jokes, while containing racist signs, do not contain a 
direct or explicit expression of dichotomy and so do not directly affect ambivalence 
resolution. Such jokes do still have the potential for rhetorical effect and can be argued 
to affect racist certainty. I describe these racist jokes as `non-stereotyped' and as having 
some similarity to the pseudo-ethnic jokes outlined by Raskin (1985: 205). The two 
styles of non-stereotyped jokes presented in this section are labelled black and `nigger' 
jokes. Neither of the styles are discrete or always non-stereotyped and so the signs 
`black' and `nigger' can also appear in jokes that express racist ambivalence. 
`Pseudo-ethnic' or Non-stereotyped Jokes 
The popularity of Raskin's semantic script theory in humour studies, as a theoretically 
informed method for the empirical analysis of jokes, is mentioned and critiqued in 
Chapter One. Raskin defines a joke script in the following way: 
The script is a large chunk of semantic information surrounding the word or 
evoked by it. The script is a cognitive structure internalised by the native 
speaker and it represents the native speaker's knowledge of a small part of the 
world. (1985: 81) 
In other words, a script is a stream of discourse, or system of connotations, evoked by a 
sign or by a collection of signs. This stream of discourse might be ideological, a 
stereotype, a part of formal discourse, or an aspect of commonsense communication. 
Two of these scripts are described as the material needed to form an incongruity. 
Raskin documents many ethnic scripts that form ethnic jokes, most of which are 
disparaging (ibid: 180). All of these scripts are identical to race and ethnic dichotomous 
stereotypes. From this, Raskin defines an ethnic joke as that which contains one or two 
ethnic scripts. Following the logic presented by Raskin, a race joke (and implicitly also 
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a racist joke), is, incorrectly, one that contains a relevant combination of racial scripts 
to form its incongruity. Raskin labels any jokes that make reference to ethnic groups 
but which do not contain ethnic scripts as `pseudo-ethnic jokes' (ibid: 205). On this he 
argues: 
In many cases, what is presented as ethnic humour, in fact, belongs solely to these 
other categories of humor [such as sexual or political] and is not all ethnic [sic]. 
Thus, (281) can be presented as a Hispanic joke: 
(281) "Angelo, did you take the school bus this morning? " "No, teacher, I can't 
drive. And my big brother didn't do it either - he is sick today. " 
It is obvious there is nothing Hispanic or ethnic about the joke besides the name... 
The name could be Ivan, Jacques, Chaim, or Ching, and the school bus could be a 
trolley bus, tram, shuttle, or rickshaw, respectively or (almost) irrespective, and the 
joke would still be the same. (ibid) 
Raskin argues, by using his definition of an ethnic script, that in this example no ethnic 
script is presented. He adds, `[t]he script of dumbness, often associated with the 
Hispanics in the United States, is clearly inapplicable here because the script of the 
incompetent student has nothing to do with it and is very universal' (ibid: 205). 
Raskin's concept of the pseudo-ethnic joke is problematic and in need of 
replacement. Despite the obvious connection between the themes of dumbness and 
incompetence, which renders Raskin's example of the Hispanic joke inappropriate, his 
argument has troublesome implications for the analysis of racist humour, and fails to 
identify a large section of it. Take, for example, the joke below: 
Q. Two black guys decide to jump off a building, who lands first? 
A. Who cares? 
(Blackjokes. net, no date) 
This joke, from a US website, following Raskin's definition of the pseudo-ethnic joke, 
would not qualify as ethnic humour and would be categorised as a pseudo-ethnic joke 
because it does not include ethnic scripts. The only specifically ethnic characteristic in 
this joke is the noun `black', and many others could replace this. So for example, 
`lawyers' could replace `black guys', and the joke, under Raskin's logic, would remain 
the same. This of course, is incorrect. The use of the word `black' changes the meaning 
of the joke completely and firmly establishes it as a race joke, and a racist joke. On this 
issue, Billig highlights that, `[t]he disturbing fact is that one word changes a joke., to 
the most bigoted humour. To use Freud's terminology, the `joke-work' is identical' 
(Billig, 2005b: 26). Small changes in `joke-work' evoke different meanings, and 
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importantly, what is not emphasised by Raskin is that the meaning of a joke is not 
solely constructed by the script elements of an incongruity, but by the meaning of all of 
the signs in the joke and the connotations they provoke. This invokes the distinction 
between points one and two of my methodology - between discursive content and 
connotation - as both need to be considered for clear analysis. This may seem an 
obvious point, but it is important to avoid the rigid definition of ethnic humour that 
prevails in the field of semantic script theory. I will say more about the meanings 
evoked by the signs `black' and `nigger'. In moving away from Raskin's pseudo-ethnic 
label, these jokes are more adequately described as `non-stereotyped'. 
Black and 'Nigger' Jokes 
To explain the category of black jokes, the comments of Hall (1995) on the influence of 
Volosinov, Gramsci and Laclau's ideas on ideological linguistic struggle are useful. He 
outlines how they discovered that, `[w]hat mattered was the way in which different 
social interests or forces might conduct an ideological struggle to disarticulate a 
signifier from one, preferred or dominant meaning-system, and rearticulate it in another, 
different chain of connotations' (Hall, 1995: 360). These struggles exist around racist 
and non-racist descriptions of skin colour as an indicator of race membership. The term 
`black' is an example of a noun that describes a racial group and encourages contested 
connotations that move between racist and non-racist descriptions. Hall explains that an 
interaction with Volosinov and Gramsci's philosophy of language has allowed for, 
`[t]he switch from "black = despised" to "black = beautiful" [which] is accomplished by 
inversion' (ibid). It is axiomatic that this has been highly significant in the formation of 
black political identity (e. g. Gilroy, 1987,1993; St. Louis, 2002). Before this though, 
signifiers of colour had a long history of use as racist expression. Enlightenment 
thinkers seem to have found the colour differences of colonial subjects to be 
fascinating, with reasons being stipulated for their causes and descriptions made of their 
characteristics. In these discourses it is `whiteness' that remains fixed and constant, and 
`blackness' that is seen as abnormal. 25 
25 For example, the Comte de Buffon highlights this perfectly: `if a colony of negroes were 
transplanted into a northern province, their descendants of the eighth, tenth, or twelfth 
generation would be much fairer, and perhaps as white as the natives of that climate' (Comte de 
Buffon, 1997: 24). This extract is interesting precisely because it displays the skin colour of the 
`other', and the difference this highlights, as something that is not fixed and that might be 
worked upon by civilising processes. 
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The acknowledgement that language always has a polysemic element is essential for 
understanding Hall's comments on the wrestled meaning of `black', which always 
leaves the semantic potential for a reversal of the process of meaning creation. The use 
of'black' in racist humour acts as a macro sign that refers to a racial group. In doing this 
it connotes meaning in non-stereotyped jokes and forms specific connections between 
stereotypes in other jokes. Therefore, the use of a term such as `black', which is central 
for informing a positive, anti-racist, political identity, still has a central role as a 
signifier in a second-order racist metalanguage (Barthes, 1993: 114-5), connecting 
stereotypes that include judgements of moral worth, intelligence, civilisation, modernity 
and sexuality (ibid: 113-7; Hall, 1995: 359-60). Below is an example: 
Q; Why are black peoples nostrils so big? 
A: Because that's what God held them by when he was painting them. 
(BlackJokes. net, no date) 
This joke sees the colour and physicality of black people as something to be examined 
by the racist. The rhetorical shift is created by a basic incongruity in the image formed, 
of God holding a black person by the nostrils. Here the discursive content - or 
stereotypes - are minimal, in that only nostril size is mentioned. The connotations 
created by `black' form a link though, and it is the incongruous image - and the 
alienation formed - that creates the racist meaning. 
What is significant in many non-stereotyped black jokes is their direct expression of 
the second logic of racist humour - proteophobic exclusion - particularly in the form of 
waste expulsion. Bauman (2004a) describes how the production of human waste was a 
significant feature of both the development of modernity and the colonial process. He 
argues `[t]he production of `human waste', or more correctly wasted humans... is an 
inevitable outcome of modernisation... It is an inescapable side-effect of order- 
building' (2004a: 5. Original emphasis). Below is a joke that depicts human waste: 
why does a black man's funeral only have 2 paulbearers? 
cause a trashcan only has two handles 
fsic] (d2jsp, 2003) 
We can identify this as a non-stereotyped racist joke because no dichotomous 
stereotypes are offered expression or resolution in it. Importantly though, this explicit 
expression of proteophobia does connote meanings of waste storage and disposal. In 
discourse, images of dirt, of something being dirty or an article of waste, are often used 
to signify an object that is seen to be socially out of place (Lockyer and Pickering, 
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2001). Proteophobia is a reaction to objects that are out of place in impressions of social 
space. Here the impression appears specifically aesthetic. The joke expresses the urge to 
see the `other' as a waste product, metaphorically allowing for the viewing of the 
`other' as in preparation for removal from social space, of being that object out of place. 
The joke sets up an imaginary, rhetorical and proteophobic arena in which the urge can 
be lived out - in which reality is redefined - this is the palliative of relief provided by 
humour. Yet the joke could quite easily be used to describe any group by replacing the 
word `black', and so fails to be included in Raskin's problematic category of the ethnic 
joke. Below is a second example: 
Q: What do you call a black man at the bottom of the ocean? 
A: Pollution 
(BlackJokes. net, no date) 
While these jokes do not directly express dichotomy, following Bauman's argument, 
they are directly related to the implicit management of the overall cognitive failure that 
the `other' provokes and of which proteophobia is a reaction. Here the semantic 
alienation of the joke replaces the black man with the image of pollution. 
One, if not the, most extreme and offensive racist signs is `nigger'. This sign is 
examined in jokes on US websites, as a specific form of embodied racist humour. I 
have explained that non-stereotyped jokes are a generic type in which terminology 
outside of the elements of the incongruity can be replaced to create very different jokes. 
`Nigger' jokes are a second subcategory, and like `black', `nigger' can be used 
interchangeably in non-stereotyped jokes (which serves to further highlight the 
inapplicability of Raskin's definition), or appear in jokes that contain ambivalent 
stereotypes. 26 What follows is an example of a non-stereotyped `nigger' joke: 
Q: What Do You call Mike Tyson if he has no arms or legs? 
A: Nigger, Nigger, Nigger!!!! 
(Black One Liners, no date) 
26 Billig (2001), in an article on the jokes found on three Ku Klux Klan websites, analyses one 
joke that presents a `definition of a nigger', which takes the format of a mock dictionary 
definition. In this example, the term `nigger' is presented alongside a number of dichotomous 
racist stereotypes. The rhetorical incongruity is generated by `mixing the language of prejudiced 
stereotypes (that is, the greasy fried chicken) with the sombre language of the apparently 
unprejudiced dictionary' (ibid: 277). It is possible to suggest that in specific racist readings, the 
joke could provide a rhetorical effect in the form of redefining the perception of the stereotypes 
presented. In this example, the appropriation of the serious dictionary format, or the confusion of 
serious and humorous contexts, allows the audience the momentary chance to redefine the 
discourse in the serious realm, of viewing it as being serious and truthful in humour that, 
paradoxically, have no truth criteria. 
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In this joke the extreme and offensive meaning of the word becomes an important part 
of the joke. The joke allows for the use of this most extreme racist expression towards 
the `dangerous' Mike Tyson, and imagines Tyson in a state of vulnerability. The 
positioning of the extremely prejudicial term `nigger', the threat of Tyson and 
vulnerability of Tyson minus his arms and legs, creates - through the rhetorical device 
of exaggeration - an incongruity and an imagined humorous situation for the `safe' 
articulation of `nigger' and its associated meanings. Once again the joke contains no 
obvious stereotypes inside its incongruity but it certainly is racist. 
In describing the associated meanings of `nigger' and the extreme nature of the 
word, I excerpt some terminology from Lizek (1995) and from Lacan before him, and 
describe `nigger' as a `master signifier' for embodied racism. In doing this, I use the 
term without employing either Lacan's or Lizek's theories of the unconscious, and aim 
only to utilise their ideas on language. `Nigger' acts as a master signifier because of its 
established stability as a pejorative epithet in embodied racism. This is highlighted 
further through some of Barthes' observations. Barthes (1993) outlines how myth or 
ideology is naturalised through connotation, or through the ability of second order 
signifiers to appear over literal meanings, and this was observed around the signifier 
`black'. While myth is created through connotation, it is evident that some signs, 
particularly at the level of second-order signification, exhibit a relative stability or fixity 
and have a particular ideological effect because of this. Barthes says of these cases, `the 
denoted image naturalises the symbolic message' (1977b: 44). 
This denotative power can limit the potential of a sign to connote. So while Barthes 
explains that, `there always remains, around a final meaning, a halo of virtualities where 
other possible meanings are floating: the meaning can almost always be interpreted' 
(1993: 132. Original emphasis), and so expresses a revolutionary potential and hope in 
language as a means of overcoming ideology; there is an important `almost always' in 
this quote. Concentrating on this `almost always', in some instances the denotation of a 
sign can be so powerful that Barthes' `halo' does not easily appear. This is unlikely 
around a first-order meaning, rather, a meaning may denote strongly after it has 
developed through a number of connotations that have since been erased, or have, 
perhaps more specifically, been swamped. 
As a master signifier, `nigger' has this denotative meaning in racism. Hall states that 
`[d]enotative meanings, of course are not uncoded; they, too, entail systems of 
classification and recognition in much the same way as connotative meanings do; they 
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are not natural but `motivated' signs' (1995: 359). In addition to this, signs with very 
strong denotative meanings that have emerged through connotation usually have a 
certain type of history. The association of `nigger' as a means of describing US slave 
populations denotes a history of oppression and violence. This denotive capacity is 
relatively fixed in the same way that the meaning of the swastika now denies 
connotation because of its connection with the racist and inhuman treatment of peoples. 
Barthes outlines this process, arguing that if pure denotation exists, 
it is perhaps not at the level of what ordinary language calls the insignificant, the 
neutral, the objective, but on the contrary, at the level of absolutely traumatic 
images. The trauma is a suspension of language, a blocking of meaning... One 
could imagine a kind of law: the more direct the trauma, the more difficult is 
connotation. (Barthes, 1977a: 30-31) 
The etymology of the term `nigger' conforms to this 27 `Nigger' is a sign that has 
become central to US expressions of embodied racism, with a strong denotative 
foundation as a master signifier. The meaning of `nigger' does not lend itself well to 
connotation; there is little potential for the term to come to mean something other than 
an extreme racist insult. 28 As a master signifier, its denotative meaning prevents it 
having a connotative ability, yet the denotative meaning is highly ideological because 
its past connotations have constructed it specifically in this direction. While it cannot 
move between discourses through connotation (because of its offensiveness), it does 
provide a reliable and extreme form of insult for racist discourse. 
Jokes that use the term are not only found on internet sites. Occasionally they appear 
in British stand-up comedy. Jim Davidson uses it to articulate racism in the third 
person. Davidson, while performing an impression of a US marine he is said to have 
met, has the marine say the word in the song of a drill march. Davidson describes 
27 The Latin word `niger' means black, and `negro' means black in Spanish and Portuguese, both 
of which are Romanic or New Latin languages. From this, the Spanish and Portuguese used the 
term to signify either black Africans or those of African descent. Later, between the eighteenth 
century and the middle of the twentieth century, negro became a noun for denoting African- 
Americans. This highlights the movement and adaption of `niger' from Latin into modem 
languages as a race signifier and represents one level of connotation. The slave trade again had 
an impact on the semantics of the term. In the US, Texan vernacular saw `negro' pronounced as 
`nigra' and this became a disparaging term for describing African-Americans. The pronouciation 
presents a short step to the development of the pejorative epithet `nigger'. As an extreme racist 
insult the connotations that the sign has undergone are not obviously clear and the connotative 
potential has now slowed down as its denotive meaning has become established. 
28 The term `nigga', when used by black people as a term of endearment, can be argued to 
contradict this. A full discussion of the appropriation is presented in Chapter Five and it is 
argued this new meaning is inherently connected to the old, and re-presents the semantic 
potential of the original meaning. 
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himself as the one who questions the marine by saying, `you can't say that', to which 
Davidson's marine exclaims `I'm in the US army, I can say whatever I want' 
(Davidson, 2005). While the truth or falsity of this story is both unverifiable and 
unimportant, and Davidson is being mildly xenophobic towards Americans in the first 
person, by articulating a `nigger' joke in the third person he provides himself with a 
defence against accusations of racism while still being able to gain a laugh through its 
use. This mirrors a technique identified in studies of everyday racism, where 
participants use the third person to express racism (Wetherall and Potter, 1992), and 
coupled with it being a comic expression, it provides two layers of protection for 
Davidson's joke. 29 
Non-stereotyped `nigger' jokes will, like black jokes, usually express the second 
logic of racist humour, which is Bauman's proteophobia. `Nigger' jokes that express 
proteophobia do so in a more extreme fashion, in addition to the use of `nigger', and 
often form death jokes: 
Q. What's the difference between a truck full of baby niggers and a truck full of 
bowling balls? 
A. You can't unload a truck full of bowling balls with a pitchfork. 
(racist-jokes. com, 2003) 
Death and exclusion jokes express a genocidal desire to destroy the `other', of removing 
the racial `other' through death. This particular joke depicts the horrific image of `baby 
niggers' being unloaded using a pitch-fork. It depicts the children of the `other' as 
objects to be disposed of, as subhuman `others' incomparable to `normal' members of 
society or occupiers of social space, and so adheres to Fanon's comment that in racism 
it is often the `corporeality of the Negro that is attacked' (1970: 115-16). It is noticeable 
that the racist terminology used in this joke, of `baby niggers', is a style that would be 
used to describe young animals, and so the joke depicts black children as alien or not- 
human, using a distinctly zoomorphic and metaphoric rhetorical device. This joke 
clearly resonates with much of the discourse of the extreme right, which sees cruelty, 
violence and ultimately the extermination of the `other' as quite acceptable. The joke is 
a rhetorical expression of this. 
29 Another example in the show saw Davidson discuss famine in Niger via a critique of `lefty 
goody-goodies'. In this example the term is referred to implicitly by suggesting that, when he 
heard about the famine, he thought the journalist had mispronounced `Niger' (Davidson, 2005). 
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The Key Dichotomies of Embodied Racism 
The presence of non-stereotyped racist jokes has been outlined. These jokes usually 
present the second of Wieviorka's logics of racism - exclusion - and so express 
proteophobia. I now chart three interlinked civilization/nature dichotomies in embodied 
racism that receive expression, and so in particular readings, resolution, in racist 
humour. First, a racist enlightenment mind/body dichotomy sees the `other' as having 
both less intelligence and increased corporeality. Second, a linked dichotomy focuses 
on the sexuality of the `other' and describes it as corporeal, savage and unrestrained. 
Third, jokes are identified that depict the `other' and her increased corporeality as 
taking part in specific social practices. The jokes often transgress the boundaries of 
embodied and cultural racism, hence emphasising the analytical nature of the distinction 
between the two forms, and this is identified where relevant. 
The jokes mentioned in the three examples express elements of the first logic of 
racist humour, which is that of inclusion at the cost of the inferiorization of the `other'. 
It is argued that even if dichotomous stereotypes are presented as `positive' they are 
attached to a chain of signification that promotes inferiorization through humorous 
semantic alienation or promote negative stereotypes in the second logic of the joke. 
Civilisation and Intelligence 
The first dichotomy is the enlightenment construction of the civilisation and 
intelligence of the white European in opposition to the nature and stupidity of the 
colonial subject, and reflects a supposed race hierarchy of intelligence and competence 
of language use and a parallel inverted hierarchy of corporeality. The section examines 
the stereotype in jokes that explicitly or implicitly connects intelligence to genetics, 
biology or race, and that juxtapose intelligence with references to physicality, all of 
which give the depictions a distinct embodied dimension. 
In its most common form, the dichotomous stereotype suggests that black people 
have lower intelligence levels than other races. The etymology of the dichotomy has 
been traced to a distortion of both seventeenth century Cartesian mind/body dualism 
and nineteenth century Darwinian `law of compensation' (St. Louis, 2005). With 
reference to Darwin, the stereotype represents a simplification of his theory that 
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describes how an organism, `through natural selection reduces redundant parts' (St. 
Louis, 2005b: 119. Original emphasis), and develops other areas in compensation. 
Other examples of enlightenment philosophical comment on the intelligence of the 
black race appear in Kant's writing from the eighteenth century, who once wrote, 
`[t]his fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was 
stupid' (1993b [1764]: 57). In another example, Kant uses metaphor to convince the 
reader of the lower cognitive capacity of the black race: `So fundamental is the 
difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in relation to 
mental capacities as in color' (1997b: 55). 
The eighteenth century philosopher David Hume joined in on the act, arguing on the 
intelligence of black men that, `[i]n Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man 
of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a 
parrot who speaks a few words plainly' (1997 [1754]: 33). Hegel, in the nineteenth 
century, wrote that, `[t]he characteristic feature of the Negroes is that their 
consciousness has not yet reached an awareness of any substantial objectivity - for 
example, of God or the law - in which the will of man could participate and in which he 
could become aware of his own being' (1997: 127). 
Race hierarchy did not only classify the black race. Kant is useful here: `Humanity 
is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites. The yellow Indians do have a 
meagre talent. The Negroes are far below them and at the lowest point are a part of the 
American peoples' (Kant, 1997c: 63). 
This provides proof of the anthropological grounding of race/intelligence theories. 
To bring us more up-to-date, St. Louis outlines recent additions: 
R. Meade Bache, ... writing at the end of the nineteenth century, recognised an 
`inverse relationship' between physical and intellectual capacities observable with 
the disparate boxing ability of different racial groups... Similarly Scott Fleming 
(2001) outlines the emergence of a racial hierarchy in relation to athletic ability 
that categorises `black physiques' as the appropriate type for physical activity. 
And, crucially, these understandings of physical suitability are dependant on the 
logical opposition between the `apparent physical superiority' of the black race 
with its `intellectual inferiority'. (ibid) 
Adding to the evidence, there are ample contemporary depictions of race having a 
bearing on levels of intelligence. In the British context, the stereotype has been 
recorded in empirical research. Jenkins found that the perception of West Indians as 
`lazy, happy-go-lucky or slow' appeared in 43 per cent of interviews in his study of 
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middle managers (Jenkins, 1986, cited in Modood, 1997: 162). Modood also cites a 
Runnymede Trust survey that found that `about 15 per cent of whites and nearly the 
same number of Asians agreed with the proposition "White people are more intelligent 
than black people"' (Amin and Richardson, 1992: 44, cited in ibid). This shows, if only 
in a cursory manner, that the dichotomy has a contemporary resonance. It also has an 
existence that, as a dichotomous stereotype, is prone to the affliction of instability, 
cognitive failure and ambivalence that Bauman outlines around order-building 
discourse. 
Rhetorical strengthening can subdue these afflictions. Hence the stereotypes of 
intelligence and race also find a home in racist humour: 
Q. What's long and hard on a black man? 
A. The first grade. 
(Blind Lemon's Nigger Jokes, 2005) 
In this joke, `black' performs the necessary connective role of its signification, the penis 
stereotype acts as the major premise (Palmer, 1987) (this stereotype is discussed in the 
next section), the intelligence stereotype acts as a connotative meaning or the minor 
premise (ibid), and the joke uses the two stereotypes to develop an incongruity. The use 
of `long and hard' creates a slippage of meaning between the two stereotypes, by taking 
the literal meaning, of penis size, and adding a connotative meaning, of black 
intelligence. This point of meaning creation - the slippage between the two stereotypes - 
is the point at which the joke creates its rhetorical effect and potentially resolves the 
instability of the minor premise, as meaning is connoted through humour and the 
convincing, yet convoluted, non-meaning of rhetorical expression momentarily 
appears. 3° The joke therefore offers resolution of the minor premise. Such jokes have 
been empirically documented. In humour studies, Raskin has shown the combination of 
sexual and intelligence stereotypes in jokes, and states, `the oversexed script is often 
associated with the minority labelled stupid as well' (Raskin, 1995: 195) (see also for 
further racist examples: Billig, 2001). Below is an example that does not draw on any 
other stereotypes: 
30 There are also versions of the above joke available on the internet that replace `black man' 
with `nigger' (see for example, White Arian Resistance, 2005), and various examples that also 
replace the `first grade'_[punch line with `third grade' or other signifiers of basic levels of 
schooling or intellectual achievement. The inclusion of `nigger' obviously makes the joke more 
offensive as it includes the denotative significance of this master signifier. 
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Q: Ever hear about the black man who went to college? 
A: Neither Have I. 
(BlackJokes. net, no date) 
This joke simply presents the stereotype on its own in the joke-work, which gives it the 
appearance of `true' humour. 
Competence of language use forms another important element for the dichotomy of 
civilisation and the mind. Fanon (1970) argued that stereotypical views of the linguistic 
ability of the `negro' sought to oppress, both in terms of definitions of ability and of 
how the `other' was to be spoken to: `To make him talk pidgin is to fasten him to the 
effigy of him, to snare him, to imprison him, the eternal victim of an essence, of an 
appearance for which he is not responsible' (1970: 26. Original emphasis). In this case, 
the mannerisms of the educated are incommensurable with the dispositions of the 
`negro'. 
In providing an allegorical representation of the stereotype of intelligence, giving 
some `actual' representation to intelligence, racialized linguistic competence finds its 
way into humour: 
Q: Why did the black man wear a tuxedo to his vasectomy? 
A: He said: "If I'ze gonna be im-po-tent, I wanna looks im-po-tant. " 
(Blackjokes. net, no date) 
The joke uses an `inversion of letters', or a play-on-letters to enact a diversion of literal 
rationality (see Speier, 1998: 1365, for some historical examples of `inversions of 
letters' as a humour trope), and draws on the comic technique of `ignorance' (Berger, 
1995a: 54). This inversion mocks the black man's supposed ability to understand the 
functioning of language, suggesting that he cannot distinguish the correct meaning of 
words, even where these meanings are quite different. The joke connects linguistic 
ability with intelligence levels and racializes both through the use of the race sign 
`black'. This racialization is more specific in the joke below, which simply equates 
`black' directly with stupidity: 
Q: Why can't black people spell. 
A: Because there black. 
[sic] (ibid) 
This joke makes the same allegorical representations preformed in the previous joke. In 
this case the joke may be read in two ways. First, as a joke that can only be read, the 
spelling error in the joke expresses the dichotomy of civilisation/intelligence and 
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simultaneously provokes its ambivalence. This, while placing literal doubt on the 
stereotype, does so in a rhetorical device and comic frame without serious truth criteria. 
Thus the joke can, paradoxically, express and rhetorically support the stereotype 
through changing the truth criteria of criticism and simultaneously highlighting its 
ambiguity. Second, as a verbal and a written joke, the spelling mistake might be 
genuine and so might disrupt the rhetorical message. In this written version, as we can 
imagine, the joke might be less funny for the racist who can spell. The intended 
rhetorical meaning is diffused by the spelling error and the racist who spots the error 
may not laugh as much. Importantly though, there are clearly some racist jokers who 
cannot spell, and this forms an important disjuncture between the racist stereotype 
believed in, and their own reality, which perhaps such jokes then help to dispel. This 
joke appears more polysemic than other examples. 
Finally, an example from Jim Davidson's comedy combines both elements of the 
dichotomy: 
There's these two Irishmen. Now isn't it nice to be able, to be able to say that 
now? These two Irishmen, or these two Welshmen, or these two Jocks, or an 
Englishman, Scotsman and Irishman, or these two Pakistanis, or these two 
Bangladeshis. Are we all going to join together and have some fun like it used to 
be or are we still going to have all this politically correct shit that goes on? Do you 
remember the stuff I used to do about Chalky? You remember Chalky? Yes. I used 
to love doing jokes about Chalky having a bigger dick. If that's fucking racist I 
want to be black. Do you remember the silly jokes I used to do? Right, like me and 
Chalky stood on the bridge having a wee in the River Thames and I said "that 
water down there's cold isn't it". "Yeah it's deep too" [italics in quotation marks 
signify a stereotypical Afro-Caribbean accent]. Remember that? Remember 
Chalky in the pink Vauxhall Cresta, 1976 New Faces, stuck at the traffic lights, 
"get going car, I fucking broke down at de traffic lights". Big queue of people, 
"get out the fucking way". "Fuck off""' and the light's red, amber, green. 
Remember Nick Nick? Oh my god, up came this biro refill copper, sarcastic fuck, 
looking at the traffic lights, looking at the queue. He said, "You alright mate? 
Haven't we got a colour you like then? " "Broke down ". "Broke down? " "Can't 
get me ve-hicle started". "Lift the bonnet up, I'll have a go". The copper gets it 
going first time. He said, "What was the matter with it? "You've got shit in the 
carburettor". He said, "how often have I got to do that then? " Marvellous jokes, 
lovely Chalky. (Davidson, 2001 e) 
This extract from Davidson's act is interesting precisely because it makes reference to a 
number of the most prevalent dichotomies in embodied racism. Before that though, and 
to begin the joke, Davidson makes the case that politically correct attitudes towards his 
comedy are absurd. This can be read as an attempt to negotiate, or rhetorically argue 
for, the acceptability of the racist expression. In Chapter Two I argued that 
acceptability and unacceptability formed an attitudinal dichotomy that might be 
negotiated in embodied racist humour. The example also forms a connection between 
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culturally racist or nationalist comic discourses, and shows the close connection of this 
material to the embodied racism that is to follow in the joke. They are, for Davidson, a 
part of the same genre. After this he articulates the sexual stereotype of the black man's 
penis size, which will be discussed next as a part of a collection of dichotomous sexual 
stereotypes. Finally, Davidson comes to his infamous `Chalky White' character, the 
Afro-Caribbean caricature in part responsible for Davidson's notoriety as a 
controversial comedian, and displays `Chalky's' affected linguistic competence and 
intelligence. 
Savagery and Sex 
The second dichotomy concerns the savage sexuality of the `other' in comparison to the 
civility of the European, but also relates to characteristics of indolence and 
degeneration. The dichotomy of the `other' as sexually dangerous also has a clear 
colonial origin, as fear of the dangers of miscegenation had a central place in colonial 
discourse (Sampson, 2005: 23). The early colonial period (circa 1600-1700) saw mixed 
race peoples disadvantaged in various colonial practices, with similar race hierarchies 
deployed to categorise and, in the main, disadvantage and racialize individuals and 
groups of mixed race. Concurrently, an amount of racial mixing took place in some 
colonies that most frequently occurred `between European men and non-European 
women... ' (ibid: 22-23). Embodied racism often endeavours to degrade the sexuality of 
the `other', and especially the sexuality of the black `other', and to describe them, in 
particular circumstances, as unsuitable sexual partners for whites. These ideas 
developed in the later period of colonialism. In the American context, Sampson 
highlights that, `[b]y the nineteenth century ... attitudes 
had changed ... marriage for 
higher-ranking American men meant `suitable' marriage' (ibid: 63), and did not involve 
the mixing of races as it previously had. This trend constituted a movement away from 
the strategic, economically motivated, intermarriage of the earlier colonial period and 
accompanied an increased movement of single women into the colonies, and the 
emergence of a new preoccupation - the sexual chastity of the single white women 
(ibid: 66). This preoccupation received formalisation in legal discourse, for example, 
`[i]n Australian-governed Papua New Guinea, the White Women's Protection 
Ordinance of 1926 imposed the death penalty for any indigenous man convicted of the 
rape or attempted rape of a white woman' (ibid). Similarly, in the US context, an 1883 
Supreme Court ruling saw `close personal contact', including marriage, to be outlawed 
between blacks and whites (Rattansi, 2007: 44). These colonial prejudices, of the 
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dangerous or problematic sexuality of the `other', appear extensively in embodied racist 
humour and develop around a number of particular stereotypes. Below is a sociological 
outline of the ideas: 
The men of Group B are equipped with huge genitals and are unrestrained in their 
lust to deflower the women of Group A. The thing to note here is not the untruth of 
the stereotypes, or the truth of the stereotypes... but that these and other such 
notions are largely invented and passed on to the women of Group A by the men 
of Group A. Many white women may come to desire or `fear' (often another word 
for desire) black men as a direct result of the white man's sexual propaganda about 
coloured people. The perception of Group B in purely sexual terms is something 
often insisted upon by the males of Group A. (Hernton, 1969: 12 - 13. Original 
emphasis) 
Hernton describes one of the most prevalent and reoccurring stereotypes in embodied 
racist joking, namely jokes about stereotypical beliefs in the differences of male 
genitalia between races. These jokes focus on black, Afro-Caribbean or African- 
American men as the principle subject of the joke but will also use other races, often as 
a means of comparison. Jokes of this type appear on both internet sites and in 
contemporary British comedy, as Davidson exemplifies: 
No when I'm Prime Minister ladies and gentlemen, if any of my ministers are gay 
that's fine with me but the first thing I shall say is `own up'. Don't be like certain 
fuckin blokes. There was this certain Welsh minister, from the Labour fuckin Party 
[Davidson spits on the floor]. Allegedly, he was on Clapham Common where he 
gave two Rastafarians a blow job. Which proves to me that he'd been gay for 
sometime. No, cos if you're just starting out you don't fuckin start on Rastafarians. 
No you work your way up to those via Filipinos or Bangladeshis. You can't start 
with stretch marks around your mouth. (Davison, 2003) 
In this joke, Davidson's homophobia is combined with the ubiquitous stereotype. He 
also racializes Filipino and Bangladeshi men in his genital continuum, who, in this 
example, inhabit a lower position in his race hierarchy of penis size. This joke uses the 
simple incongruity of `stretch marks' to emphasise and deliver its political message. 1 
31 There are a number of sociological accounts of sexual stereotypes and many employ a 
psychoanalytic dimension to expound the continued existence of the stereotype long after its 
initial colonial emergence. Returning to Hernton (1969), he wrote that `coloured men and 
women become the objects onto which all kinds of sexual derangements of the culture, as well 
as those of individual whites, are projected' (12), and Fanon, at a similar time, explained the 
coupling of this particular racist stereotype and race violence when he argued: 
when a white man hates black men, is he not yielding to a feeling of impotence or 
of sexual inferiority? Since his ideal is an infinite virility, is there not a phenomena 
of diminution in relation to the Negro, who is viewed as a penis symbol? Is the 
lynching of the Negro not a sexual revenge? We know how much sexuality there is 
in all cruelties, tortures, beatings. One has only to reread a few pages of the 
Marquis de Sade to be easily convinced of the fact. (1970: 113) 
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Of course the reoccurrence of this stereotype as a content of humour does not relate 
to the `truth' or `falsity' of the stereotype, which by definition is, like that of any 
dichotomous stereotype, already in some instances true and in some instances false, or 
internally incoherent and so ambivalent as a type of knowledge formed through 
dichotomy. The reoccurrence of the stereotype does, however, function as a rhetorical 
anxiety reduction process. In this case the stereotypes of sexuality and physicality 
connect directly with an image of barbaric and impure corporeality, which are a key 
aspect of the European and US racialization of blacks. Here is a second example: 
I do wear my pants in, I know it's not sexy girls, your pants in bed, but I fuckin do 
in bed in case a burglar comes in. And the reason is you've got to use reasonable 
force and puff-up like a bullfrog, "right get out of my fuckin house, you worry 
about it", and no matter how tough you are your little dick's gonna be fuckin 
backing in, like. It's gonna be frightened, it's gonna be fuckin scared finit? "Oh no 
a burrrglars coming in". Your dick's gonna be talking to your bollocks, "come up 
we're gonna get fuckin kicked". You know you can't stand there with the fuckin 
thing doing that. What if it's a black burglar? 'What da fuck is that little fuck?! ' 
[Italics signify stereotypical West Indian accent] (Davidson, 2003) 
Davidson uses his own physicality in the context of the joke and shows the black man 
as a burglar or invader, as a problematic and threatening `other' who can pass symbolic 
judgment on the masculinity of Davidson. This represents an expression of racist 
anxiety, an anxiety that is generated by the racist's own dichotomy. The potential theft 
the burglar is capable of, the fear of the invading `other', affects Davidson's own 
sexual presentation through the necessity of wearing pants that are `not sexy' in bed. As 
a dichotomous stereotype emerging in humour, functions can be served for the serious. 
First, the example shows the reoccurring technique of articulating a taboo subject, such 
as stereotypes of sexuality, in humour. The joke is able to articulate the stereotype in a 
form that will not be judged by the same standards of acceptability that serious 
discourses undergo. It will also not be judged by serious standards of truthfulness. 
Second, the existence of this dichotomous stereotype can be rhetorically strengthened 
through its presentation as a joke. In the case of this joke, it uses the rhetorical devices 
of hyperbole or exaggeration, and a device very similar to a pathetic fallacy or 
personification. Once again the minor premise that appears focuses on the penis 
stereotype. In terms of motive, one might draw on the notion of the tendentious 
projection of anxiety onto the `other' as the motor behind the expression. 
If psychoanalytic projection can be equated with a manifestation of attempts to define the 
`other', and impose this fixity in discourse against inherent ambivalences and contradictions 
generated by the dichotomies and counter discourses, then it is possible to connect these ideas 
with my argument. 
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On US websites penis jokes form a part of a dichotomy in embodied racism that 
connects with a number of other stereotypes of savage sexuality. These connections 
include the idea that black men are misogynistic and have a propensity to commit rape, 
that black people are sexually promiscuous and irresponsible, and that black children 
should be conceptualised as being of little value or as subhuman. All of these themes 
directly connect with older discourses of colonial sexual racism. Two variations of rape 
jokes that also employ the term `nigger' follow: 
How can you tell a nigger's just had sex? 
His eyes are all red from the mace' 
(White Aryan Resistance, 2005) 
Another example reads: 
What's a niggers idea of foreplay? 
"Don't scream or I'll cut you, bitch. " 
(Tight Rope, 2005) 
Added to this stereotype are examples of negligent and promiscuous sexuality, for 
example, 
How do you get a nigger to wear a condom? 
Put a Nike logo on it! 
(White Aryan Resistance, 2005) 
Finally, black children are depicted as being of little worth or potential, or simply as 
subhuman: 
How does a niggress take a pregnancy test? 
She sticks a banana up her pussy, if it comes out half-eaten you know there's 
another monkey on the way! 
(ibid) 
These jokes view black sexuality as problematic. It is worth noting that both `Tight 
Rope' and `White Arian Resistance' are websites of the American hard Right that 
depict Nazi and Ku Klux Klan symbols and carry serious articles that contain extreme 
racism, forming a discursive connection with past US anti-miscegenation laws and 
segregation. While comedians such as Jim Davidson may never tell such extreme jokes 
or hold these views, the jokes that they do tell on the sexuality of the `other' feed into 
and support the same collection of sexual dichotomies that inferiorize the `other' in 
embodied racism. 
Jokes about black childbirth move from the dichotomy of sexual racism towards the 
proteophobic register. These jokes tend to sit on the proteophobic typology as 
excrement jokes. This adds a disparaging connotation to the metaphor of refuse because 
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while waste is often described as a nuisance and something that needs to be removed 
from social space, excrement is viewed socially as a particularly disgusting form of 
waste, that should, under no circumstances, be tolerated in social space. These ideas 
develop in ubiquitous societal discourses of normality and civilisation. It is normal and 
civilised to dispose of your excrement efficiently - failure to do so is not just unhygienic 
or symptomatic of psychological disorder - it is also morally questionable. As Lockyer 
and Pickering explain `[f]ilth as a label necessarily refers to a boundary' (2001: 644). 
The metaphor dynamically accommodates a different type of proteophobia. By 
describing the `other' using `vituperative adjectives' (ibid: 643), as `shit' or as `crap', 
pre-existing societal discourses on excrement disposal are invoked in a description that 
adds to the rhetorical image of the `other' as being something that is out of place. 
Successful joking adds a rhetorical layer to this process. Here are some examples: 
Q: How long does it take a black lady to shit? 
A: 9 months 
(Black One Liners, no date) 
This joke directly labels the child of a black woman as `shit'. Another version follows: 
Q) What is it called when a black women is in labour? 
A) Constipation 
(Blackjokes. net, no date) 
A reversal of the question posed in the previous joke sees a black woman in labour as 
the major premise, before using the image of constipation as the minor premise, which 
works in much the same way as the previous example to support racism. 
Corporeality and Social Activity 
This third section outlines how certain social activities or habits are designated as the 
activities of black people because of their supposed increased corporeality. These are, 
first, their increased sporting ability, second, their increased criminality and, third, their 
increased indolence. These elements of the civilisation/nature dichotomy classify the 
corporeality of the `other' in the context of distinctly cultural practice, and so appear 
culturally racist. 
The first appears in discourses of black people having superior athletic ability and a 
number of linked assumptions concerning the sporting ability of other races. St. Louis 
elaborates: 
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Whether it is the reification of a fundamental African American athletic prowess 
(Hoberman, 1997), the archetypal tactical ingenuity of white athletes (Burfoot, 
1999), or the naturalistic mythology attached to Kenyan distance runners (Bale, 
1999; Maguire, 1999), sport can be used to ... reinforce embodied racial 
pathologies. (2003: 3. Emphasis added) 
In embodied racism the black race are not credited with the possession of high or even 
mediocre levels of intelligence. As St. Louis outlines, the black race are credited with 
`athletic prowess' and this is usually conceptualised in terms of possessing increased 
strength or power, and also endurance. Despite this, as soon as racialized descriptions 
of sporting ability require the inclusion of any `tactical ingenuity', of intelligence, 
white athletes are asserted as superior. As tactical ingenuity is a condition of the mind, 
of thought and intelligence, this belief supports the binary mind/body split of embodied 
racism (St. Louis, 2003,2005b). Because intelligence and corporeality are 
dichotomised, the identification of one will metaphorically negate the other. Below is 
an example from the US context: 
Q: What do you call one white guy surrounded by 10 black guys? 
A: The quarterback. 
(BlackJokes. net, no date) 
In American football the position of quarterback, as leader of the offence, is considered 
the most complex position to play, and until recently, professional quarterbacks were 
almost always white athletes, as racist attitudes saw black athletes as lacking the 
intelligence needed to play the position. This belief is rhetorically expressed in the joke 
despite the now numerous black professional quarterbacks of high ability. A second 
joke from a US website depicts black intellectual failing and sporting prowess in 
relation to basketball: 
Q. What do u call a black guy that goes to college? 
A. a basketball player 
(D. J. Sinc, 2004) 
Here the minor premise `explains' that the black man is not intelligent enough to go to 
college unless he attends on a sports scholarship. The joke works subtly by simply 
rearticulating the dichotomy in a comic realm. The incongruity developed in this joke is 
not as sharp as it is in many jokes, and so the joke functions as a form of `true' humour. 
Once again the truth criteria of joking does not require vigorous analysis, even in `true' 
humour, and so the joke can work without a great deal of scrutiny to reinforce the 
mind/body dichotomy. 
119 
Overall, it is clear that the corporeality/sport dichotomy, through describing the 
black `other' as less intelligent, designates the racial group as insignificant or inferior. 
In this dichotomy there is a simultaneous rhetorical support of the intelligence 
stereotype, as the logic of the binary will not allow for both characteristics to be 
possessed by the same race. The logic follows that, while the black race are included in 
society, they are inferior, but thankfully they are put to good use. The presentation of 
the binary in joking rhetorically supports this image. 
The next group of jokes that I examine focus on depicting the `other' as criminal. 
This is principally a cultural characteristic, but we will see that it also connects to 
embodied racism. Below is an example: 
Q: Why are black peoples hands white? 
A: Because there always leening up against cop cars. 
[sic] (BlackJokes. net, no date) 
This joke simply explains bodily difference through criminal activity. It connects 
blackness and criminality with one another and so ideologically essentializes the 
connection in a second-order racist discourse. The body of the `other' is simply 
different because it is deviant. Here is another: 
Q: Why are all black people fast? 
A: Because the slow ones are in jail. 
(ibid) 
This second example presents the stereotype of sporting ability as the major premise 
before introducing the criminality stereotype as the minor premise, thus rhetorically 
negating the positive element of the major (sporting) premise. A last example does 
much the same thing, but with less emphasis on positive characteristics (or their 
negation): 
Q: What's faster then a black guy running down the street with your TV? 
A: His brother behind with the VCR 
[sic] (BlackJokes. net, no date) 
In a final group of jokes the `other' is described as lazy. In these examples, social 
inactivity is given an embodied dimension as causal explanation. For example: 
Q: What does a black person have in common with a soda machine? 
A: They both don't work and always take your money. 
(ibid) 
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In what is a very common joke style, the black person becomes socially useless and 
unreliable, and a financial burden to boot. Black people are simply lazy; it is a 
possession of their body. The next example places embodied and cultural racism in the 
minor premise: 
Q: What are three things you can't give a black person? 
A: A black eye, a fat lip and a job. 
(ibid) 
In this joke, social habits are placed next to bodily characteristics, which might serve to 
essentialize all three characteristics inside the rhetorical device. Another example 
presents a more absurd version of the stereotype: 
Q: What's the difference between Bigfoot and a hard working black man? 
A: Bigfoot has been spotted 
(ibid) 
These brief examples show how the dichotomies of embodied racism also connect to 
cultural racism, creating a flexible plethora of racist joking possibilities. More 
examples of cultural racism and embodied racism interacting will be introduced in the 
next chapter. 
Conclusion 
I have presented a dual logic in racist humour that depicts, first, the inclusion of the 
`other' through inferiorization and, second, the exclusion of the `other' through 
expulsion. In both logics, `black' forms a connotative signifier in embodied racism. As 
a principle binary division in embodied racism, it allows for the mass classification or 
racialization of the `other'. Alongside this, `nigger' forms a highly pejorative and 
denotative master signifier for embodied racism. I conceptualised non-stereotyped jokes 
- those that do not directly express the dichotomies of embodied racism - but do express 
the exclusionary logic and proteophobia, principally through a number of images of 
refuse categorisation and disposal. These jokes offer rhetorical support for the 
exclusionary logic of embodied racism. After this, we saw how the second logic - 
inferiorization - appears in racist dichotomies. Dichotomous racist stereotypes are prone 
to what Bauman calls `ambivalence' because, as binary arrangements, they set up a 
number of cognitive pressures/impossibilities. These binaries focus on the intelligence, 
sexuality and corporeality of the `other'. I argued that racist humour serves to 
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rhetorically support, or resolve the emerging anxiety, incongruity or ambivalence of 
such dichotomies. 
Embodied racism thrives in humour, with its own internal logics and external 
connections to cultural racism and nationalism. Overall though, the central finding of 
this chapter is that the content that receives rhetorical strengthening in embodied racist 
humour would, when successful, act as a rhetorical palliative for the cognitive failure of 
embodied racism. Embodied racism inherently produces anxiety and incongruity 




`Cultural Racism' and Humour 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I outlined how embodied racist humour rhetorically supports 
embodied racism through the expression of a dual logic of inferiorization and exclusion. 
The first is achieved through supporting dichotomies, the second through expressing 
proteophobia. I argued the effect of humour on racism is specifically produced by the 
rhetorical incongruities that structure humour. This chapter examines a similar set of 
processes in humour that contains cultural racism, by analysing the culturally racist 
logics that appear in humour, their connections to other forms of prejudice and 
embodied racism, and the connections to Bauman's thesis on the ambivalence produced 
by order-building systems. 
The chapter begins with a critical discussion of cultural racism as that which 
demarcates between groups and discriminates against an `other' on the basis of an 
identification of cultural difference, rather than the bodily encoding or race difference 
that constitutes embodied racism. Cultural racism is subsumed under the category of a 
modem order-building system, as outlined by Bauman, because it attempts to order 
post-racial perceptions, and in doing so, creates logics that manage the image of the 
cultural `other'. This section also highlights the connections between cultural racism 
and other forms of prejudice. After this, I discuss whether racist humour is a problem 
specific for and of the working classes. 
I outline three rhetorical themes that appear in humorous co-agitators, which in 
specific readings have the functional effect of supporting cultural racism. The first 
rhetorical theme develops from cultural racism being a form of coded racism that 
appears in response to the increasing unacceptability of embodied racism. This task 
negotiates the attitudes of acceptability and unacceptability. The second task deals with 
a negotiation of national territory that fixates on the maintenance, and fears the 
transgression of national boundaries. This anxiety is created from issues of space and 
exclusion in cultural racism, focusing on those `others' that move to the `wrong' side of 
the boundary, and is a proteophobic concern that enforces the exclusionary logic of 
racism. Third, cultural racism encourages an ambivalence of social identity that 
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negotiates the competing categories of the `other' as an alien and a neighbour. This is 
generated by the presence of the `other' in the immediate social location and employs 
stereotypes of cultural and linguistic practice. This task tends to focus on the logic of 
inferiorization through knowledge of the `other' culture. 
The expression of each rhetorical theme occurs in British stand-up comedy. This is 
highlighted with examples from, in alphabetical order, the comedians Jim Bowen 
(2003), Jim Davidson32 (1980,1982,1993,1995,1996,2000,2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 
2001d, 2002,2003,2004,2005a, c2005b), Jimmy Jones (1981,1992), Bernard 
Manning (1984), Mike Reid (1993,1995) and to a lesser extent, Frank Carson (1993), 
Jethro (1993,1996,1999,2002) and Freddie Starr (1995 ). 33 I also draw on culturally 
racist jokes that originate on the internet where relevant. Overall, these jokes appear in 
the British context. They do not contain the same dichotomous elements of the post- 
slavery US humour of Chapter Three, but rather form a case study of culturally racist 
characteristics in a specifically British context. 
Defining Cultural Racism 
Sociologists have used a number of terms to describe cultural racism, all of which 
emphasise either a particular characteristic or a particular point of historical emergence. 
It was labelled `new racism' by Barker (1981) because of its supposed newness in 
relation to biological racism, which he argued, it had replaced as the dominant 
formation. The `neo racism' of Balibar (1991) represents the French nomenclature and 
describes a similar phenomenon. `Cultural racism' appears as an accurate and 
descriptive coinage in Modood's work, principally because he views cultural racism as 
something that is not particularly new and suggests it has existed for as long as, if not 
longer than, processes of immigration (1997: 155) The label 'differential ist racism' also 
appears in some accounts and highlights that it is cultural difference that is of principle 
32 I have mentioned that there are a number of overlaps between embodied and cultural racism, 
and will continue to identify these in this chapter. Jim Davidson expresses both embodied and 
cultural racism, and so is mentioned in both Chapter Three and Four. This sees him act as a 
`node' for both discourses and is more probably caused by the volume of material he has 
produced rather than him being particularly unique in attitude or material. 
33 As an aside, there are comedians who can be said to belong to this genre who do not express 
racism. Examples of comedians who are not discussed here include Roy `Chubby' Brown and 
Les Dawson. Both Brown and Dawson do articulate gender based material that would produce 
sexist and misogynistic readings and in both cases this tends to form a large part of their act, but 
they do not express racism. 
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concern in cultural racism, rather than the hierarchalisation of difference that is evident 
in traditional racisms. 
In summary, all accounts describe a racism that discriminates on the basis of cultural 
difference rather than race difference and so implies that `culture can also function like 
a nature' (Balibar, 1991: 22. Original emphasis). Farley defines it as following the 
argument `that minorities have developed cultural characteristics that in some way 
place them at a disadvantage. In more extreme forms, this view holds that groups are 
culturally inferior' (1988: 133). Because of its emphasis on culture, it is often seen as a 
racism that moves away from, or disguises a belief in a biological basis to racism. 
Balibar explains this: 
It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the 
insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not 
postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 
`only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incomparability of life-styles 
and traditions... (1991: 21) 
Balibar's comments echo Wieviorka's image of the dual logic of racism - through the 
issues of exclusionary frontiers and incomparable (read inferior or troublesome) 
cultures. From this, with its logic comparable to embodied racism, something more 
needs to be said on how it differs from and interacts with culturalism and embodied 
racism. 
Theorists have argued that biological racism often existed before, and led to the 
development of cultural racism (Fanon, 1967: 32-3; Modood, 1997: 155). It is often 
argued that cultural racism represents a replacement for biological racism because the 
latter had become increasingly unacceptable in the post-Holocaust, post-colonial, 
multicultural period. Barker argues that cultural racism developed after World War II as 
an alternative discourse due to a general discreditation and disgust with biological 
racism, and that in the UK this was especially prevalent in Conservative Party discourse 
of the mid 1970s (Barker, 1981). Cook and Clarke argue that it `started at the turn of the 
century and whose latest phase dates at least from 1962' (1990: 134). Gilroy and 
Balibar suggest a similar dating. Gilroy argues that cultural racism represents a post- 
war form of racism (1993: 44), and Balibar suggests: 
The new racism is a racism of the era of `decolonisation', of the reversal of 
population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the 
division of humanity within a single political space... [and] fits into a framework 
of `racism without races'. (1991: 21) 
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This represents a second characteristic of cultural racism that is usually accepted, after 
it being a system of prejudice developed through cultural difference, and concerns the 
situational perspective in which the culture of the `other' is viewed, which is the home 
territory of the post-war period. Therefore, in the multicultural context, where cultural 
difference is acknowledged, racism has the chance and material to form a backlash, and 
a new configuration as cultural racism. 34 
These arguments suggest that cultural racism develops in social situations where 
there is a history of embodied racism. These arguments are usually applied to political 
discourse, but as we saw in Chapter Three, embodied racism is not extinct in humour, 
and so I do not argue that cultural racism represents a replacement for it in joking. 
Rather, embodied and cultural racism represent equal and available racist resources for 
the content of humour, but emerge in situations that best suit their application. 
It is useful to highlight the idea of cultural racism as one that can discriminate 
against `physical appearance or ancestry but does not require any form of biological 
determinism' (Modood, 2005b: 12), because embodied racism is not always present in 
jokes that contain cultural racism. However, cultural racism is not something that 
directly attaches itself to, or replaces embodied racism, even though it can do so in 
some instances. Overall, I do not argue that embodied racism and cultural racism have a 
uniform causal connection. 
Culturalism is often defined as a type of discrimination that has no basis in biology 
and makes no reference to it, and so represents a form of discrimination that would only 
require the existence of cultural difference. This leaves only an incremental difference 
between certain instances of cultural racism (without embodied racism) and culturalism. 
I overcome this by qualifying and critiquing cultural racism as a descriptive concept 
through the use of more specific nomenclature. Therefore, as the chapter develops I will 
deconstruct the concept of culturally racist humour into smaller joke themes. This 
deconstruction will highlight the overall similarity of `othering' processes involved in 
34 Despite this, the general themes of cultural racism can be seen to have some historical 
ubiquity. In not wanting to overemphasise the specificity of cultural racism in the post-colonial 
context, Balibar's comment that `[a] racism which does not have the pseudo-biological concept 
of race as its main driving force has always existed... Its prototype is anti-Semitism' (1991: 23), 
provides a useful marker for this point. Although there are obvious historical points at which 
anti-Semitism is an embodied racism, and it might be argued that this is specifically when it 
becomes most problematic. 
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humour that contain embodied and cultural racism, culturalism, ethnic prejudice, 
nationalism, xenophobia and immigrational prejudice. 
A final area of discussion focuses on the identification of the groups that are 
subjected to cultural racism. Modood (1997: 156-60) describes how, in the British 
context, different racisms have tended to affect different ethnic groups and suggests that 
colour racism, is often, in this context, aimed at black or Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups 
whereas cultural racism tends to attack British Asians. He argues `the racialized images 
of Asians is not so extensively linked to physical appearance. It very soon appeals to 
cultural motifs such as language, religion, family structures, exotic dress, cuisine, and 
art forms' (Modood, 2005b: 7), and that `Asians suffer a double or a compound racism' 
(ibid). This compound racism exists because, for Modood, racism aimed at black and 
Afro-Caribbeans is primarily a form of colour racism, whereas that aimed at Asians also 
contains an element of colour racism but is primarily constructed as a cultural racism. 
As was shown in Chapter Three, embodied racism tends to be used in humour to 
describe black minorities. This chapter will show that cultural racism appears to focus 
on Asians in the main, but that embodied racism often appears as a part of this humour. 
Despite this, Modood's idea of a `double racism' is not supported in my argument 
because there is no basis on which to suggest that this joking is any more, or less, 
rhetorically severe or successful. Both types express and support the dual logic of 
racism - exclusion and inferiorization - which is perhaps a sturdier means on which to 
judge the impact. Take for example, the anti-Muslim internet based joke below: 
(Q) Why Do MUSLIM Women Cover Their Faces? 
(A) They think Cover-up means Cover Girl. 
(A) To hide their Bad Breath. 
(A) To hide the Camel Piss stains on their teeth. 
(A) To avoid public ridicule for being so fucking ugly. 
(A) To hide the fact they are Inbred Baboon decedents. 
(A) To avoid being a look alike Martha Stewart Clone Doll. 
(A) To hide their shame they are a Muslim and part of the biggest group of 
terrorist in the world. 
(sic) (Jack's Muslim Jokes, 2005) 
Importantly, as the above joke shows, one contemporary form of racism is anti-Muslim. 
It attacks Muslims but also leads to a general increase in racism towards all British 
Asians (The Runnymede Trust, 1997; Modood, 2005b). Focusing on terrorism, Gilroy 
explains how in the contemporary setting this represents a new depiction of the `other': 
As Islamophobia has increasingly shaped public debate and the figure of the 
traitor/terrorist has emerged to hold hands with the other well-worn iconic 
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representations of imminent racial chaos and disorder: the street criminal, the 
scrounger and the illegal immigrant. (2005: 433) 
This formation of cultural racism and its internal dichotomies appears in some humour. 
The previous joke is certainly an extreme and crude example of anti-Muslim racism. It 
is, however, very difficult to distinguish how the cultural, embodied and political 
characteristics or depictions mentioned in it can be separated or prioritised in relation to 
a compound racism and how this combination of elements make the racism any worse 
than the purely embodied racism seen in Chapter Three. Moreover, because black 
minorities are subjected to embodied and cultural racism (this was illustrated at the end 
of Chapter Three, but biological racism also always contained moral and cultural 
distinctions [Rattansi, 2007: 31]), they too suffer from a compound racism, but one that 
is reversed, and so I do not argue that British Asians represent an unusual case. 
Is Racist Humour a Working Class Problem? 
Before I discuss the central rhetorical themes preformed by culturally racist humour, I 
discuss the perceived habitus conditions of the comedians involved in its articulation. 
The habitus of any humour audience and those involved in creating and viewing racist 
internet joking is impossible to describe in textual research of this kind. Despite this, the 
comedians themselves and the content of the material can be approximately located in 
relation to socio-cultural structural characteristics, which hint at their appeal for certain 
audiences. 
The comedians examined in this chapter - Jim Bowen, Frank Carson, Jim Davidson, 
Jethro, Jimmy Jones, Bernard Manning, Mike Reid and Freddie Starr - are all male and 
either from a working class background or have come to prominence via the 
`workingmen's club circuit'. Davidson is mentioned more than any other because he is 
the most commercially successful, and has produced far more material. Some, 
especially Bowen, Davidson, Manning and Jones, reached the peak of their popularity 
in the 1970s and 1980s. While some theorists argue that it is irrelevant to ask whether 
racist theories emerge from what might be described as the `elites' or the `masses' (see 
Balibar, 1991: 18-19), it does appear that a very specific socio-structural group is 
involved in the production of this humour. There are two possible explanations for this. 
First, in a bottom-up manner, habitus conditions may encourage the production of this 
type of humour. Second, in a top-down manner, this type of humour might be a `culture 
industry' product that is aimed at a mass audience. A realistic explanation remains 
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somewhere between the two and has wider sociological implications - as Miles writes: 
`we have only limited evidence of the nature and extent of racist ideologies amongst the 
working class' (1989: 80). 
The rationale I present to explain this issue is one that follows Miles' thesis on the 
racialization of minority groups in the labour market. Miles explains how employers 
`believe not only that the labour market consisted of a number of different `races' but 
also that these `races' had different characteristics which influenced their 
employability' (ibid). So, when he argues that `[s]ince the 1950s, the British labour 
market has been racialised... ' (ibid: 126), we can assume that the white working classes 
will have specific relationships to these racializations, which are connected to the 
maintenance or improvement of employment position in the labour market. Maintaining 
a position in the labour market can involve excluding or inferiorizing the `other', who is 
seen as a threat to ordered/current employability. This is achieved through proteophobia 
and stereotyping, and is seen as a process of anxiety negotiation for which racist 
humour is especially useful. Despite this, the humour is ultimately useless for 
improving labour conditions. 
Coupled with this idea is the expression, which appears in the humour and is 
mentioned in this chapter, that working class people feel increasingly stereotyped, 
marginalised, stigmatised and de-valued, both economically and culturally. Rattansi 
(2007) outlines this sentiment: `complaints that whites have become second-class 
citizens in their own countries have a wide resonance' (2007: 167). These sentiments 
do not exist in abstraction from the material conditions of the working classes, who are 
affected by a number of global economic and social changes of recent decades: 
The increasing powers of supra-national entities such as the European Union, the 
forces of economic globalization which have involved the outsourcing of jobs to 
India and China, and the threat of a resurgent, militant global Islam are creating 
conditions in which broad cultural and political coalitions are being united by 
varying degrees of nationalism. (ibid: 167) 
While Rattansi aligns these events to a united `nationalism', many English working 
class people see their own sense of nationalism as something that has been stigmatized 
and repressed in the post-colonial period, especially by the political Left, and this, 
coupled with the relative success of anti-racist discourse in rendering racism 
increasingly unacceptable, and the linked establishment of multiculturalism, presents 
the conditions for a resentment fuelled and politically motivated working class racism. 
As expressions of these sentiments also increasingly fall under the remit of 
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unacceptable discourse, humour provides an alternative and rhetorical vehicle of 
expression. 
In presenting this argument, I do not want to exaggerate the class based differences 
in the enjoyment of racist comedy, as the architects of alternative comedy also produced 
racist humour. Such comedians enjoy a far greater reputation today in middle class 
circles than the stand-up comedians mentioned. For example, Peter Cook, Peter Sellars 
and Spike Milligan all produced racist humour. Specifically, Cook's expressions of 
embodied racism in Derek and Clive, Sellars' hit song Goodness Gracious Me (with 
Sophia Loren) and Milligan's `Paki Paddy' in Curry and Chips are all problematic. 
Although it is possible to argue that this humour is more polysemic than the stand-up 
and internet sources discussed in this and the previous chapter, usually because it is 
expressed through impersonation or character acting, it does produce racist readings. I 
do not include this material in the thesis because its age and accessibility pushes it 
outside of my remit of contemporary expressions. The thesis remains an investigation 
of popular and contemporary racist humour, rather than an historical account of racist 
humour. 
Three Rhetorical Themes in Cultural Racism 
Returning to Bauman's ideas on the creation of societal `others', cultural racism, like 
embodied racism, is an order-building discourse that relies on a series of rhetorical 
themes that help strengthen the truth status of the discourse. As Bauman argues, such 
order-building discourse necessarily develops cognitive failure and generates 
ambivalence, ambiguity, incongruity and anxiety. Bauman explains racism as `a theory 
of ascription to redeem boundary drawing and boundary-guarding concerns under new 
conditions which made boundary-crossing easier than ever before' (2000b: 212-13). 
Cultural racism can be seen to serve this function. In describing the effect of the `other' 
that racism processes, Bauman describes how the `other' makes, 
... obscure what ought to 
be transparent, confuse what ought to be a 
straightforward recipe for action, and/or prevent the satisfaction from being fully 
satisfying... they pollute the joy with anxiety while making the forbidden fruit 
alluring... in other words, they befog and eclipse the boundary lines which ought 
to be clearly seen. (1997b: 17) 
As stated, there are three rhetorical themes outlined in this chapter. The first centres 
on the removal or lack of biological heritage in cultural racism and an associated 
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negotiation or prescription of acceptability - of the presentation of the argument that the 
discourses are not racist. This is a dichotomy that centres on traversing the attitudes of 
acceptability and unacceptability, in which cultural racism will attempt a coding or 
considered, reflexive expression of its meaning in order to avoid criticism and appear as 
acceptable, legitimate discourse. Humour will aid this task in two ways. First, there is 
the placement of cultural racism in a comic frame that is not serious and so, to employ 
Freud's terminology, an expression of tendentious discourse with a lower level of social 
disapprobation. Second, the rhetorical devices of humour provide key coding 
mechanisms which confuse and multiply meaning and interpretation, and so help to 
hide racism. 
The second rhetorical theme focuses on frontiers, which, in my analysis, are 
highlighted as the dichotomous nature of national boundaries, but this can be extended 
to include a number of regional or super-national boundaries. The `other' who moves 
into the home territory across the national frontier can create racist anxiety. Humour 
offers a rhetorical expression of this anxiety and a resolution of the `problem' through 
an imaginary placement of the `other' in the `correct' category. As Marotta suggests in 
a Baumanesque analysis, `[t]he Other or the stranger, from the perspective of the will- 
to-order, epitomizes chaos and thus is a potential threat to the stable and fixed 
boundaries' (2002: 39). Cultural racism represents a reductionist account of the 
incompatibility of different cultures, and in its worst form, is a racism that sees cultural 
segregation as necessary (Miles, 1989: 62-4). In humour, the theme of segregation is 
given rhetorical strength through its enactment in the realm of linguistic fantasy. This 
appears as the expression of proteophobia in culturally racist joking. These jokes move 
through various types of segregation, which include preventing the arrival, the removal, 
and in the most extreme form, the death of the cultural `other'. Each stage of 
proteophobia can allow an additional rhetorical strengthening, aside from that 
resolution offered in co-agitation, by removing the `other' that is responsible for its 
generation. Once again, while coupled with humorous co-agitators, they provide a 
strengthened rhetorical resolution of the `problems' confronted by cultural racism. 
The third rhetorical task involves personal identity and inferiorization of the `other'. 
Bauman describes an ambivalence of identity, which he labels the `privatisation of 
strangerhood'. This is also offered resolution in culturally racist humour. Cultural 
racism presents the urge to keep cultures distinct, and separate the presence of the 
culture of the `other' in the home territory. It also shows concern for the influence and 
hybrid mixing of the culture of the `other'. The privatisation of strangerhood is 
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perpetuated by these concerns, and so this ambivalence focuses on life-style practices 
and traditions, and can be seen to negotiate the categories of the `other' as alien and 
neighbour in a style that leads to the inferiorization of the culture of the `other'. The 
cultural characteristics that are focused on include language use, custom, dress, cuisine 
and religion. 
The ambivalences of cultural racism and embodied racism both share the similar 
logics of exclusion and inclusion, and the tropes that accompany each. What differs in 
cultural racism is, first, an increased emphasis on the `acceptability' of expression and, 
second, a replacement of the `natural' but savage `other' with one that has cultural 
beliefs but a culture dangerously different than the home culture. Of course, and as I 
state throughout, there remains a great deal of overlap between embodied and culturally 
racist expressions in actual social contexts. 
1) Cultural Racism as Coded Racism - The Ambivalence of Acceptability in 
Humour 
Cultural racism is often described as a form of coded racism that has had some success 
in outwitting anti-racist critique (Balibar, 1991; Miles, 1989: 84-7; Modood, 2005b: 
11). This coding presents the rationale that cultural racism is not racist because it does 
not rely on embodied sign-systems and hierarchy, and, from this, it articulates genuine 
non-racist concerns about the consequences of cultural mixing. It has been described as 
a sophisticated discursive reworking of older racism that avoids critique focused on race 
as the concept underlying racism. Balibar calls this the 'turn about effect' of cultural 
racism (1991: 23). This 'turn about', which is inflicted on the discourses of anti-racism, 
allows social actors using cultural racism to assert that they are simply not racist 
because cultural separation, rather than race separation, is not an act based on race 
prejudice, but a natural and beneficial commonsense policy that has benefits for all 
groups. It therefore has a particular rhetorical argument that might entice social actors 
who shy away from embodied racism. 
These arguments are expressed in humour, where rhetorical devices can be 
employed to aid the coding exercise. Coding is evident in the articulation of any of the 
dichotomies of cultural racism (without embodied referents) in humour. Importantly 
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though, there are specific techniques of `acceptability' in racist humour that work in 
addition to the ostensive placement of culturally racist signs inside jokes. 
In a number of early performances from comedians in this genre there is little 
attempt at coding or disguising racism (e. g. Davidson, 1980,1982; Jones, 1981,1993 
[1982]). In many later performances, overt racism has been replaced with a more subtle 
form. Davidson exemplifies this in a 2001 performance: 
You know that farmer that shot that guy? It's a tragic incident and I don't know all 
the facts, all I know is he'd have been more useful in Zimbabwe training their 
fucking farmers than he would. Yeah, no don't get me wrong, I don't want that to 
sound racist, cos I get accused of that sometimes you know because I don't do 
things like Red Nose Day. You never see me do Comic Relief do you? And I'll tell 
you why. I was asked once to help and I thought about helping the starving 
Ethiopians and then I thought, fuck-um. No, no, I don't wish, I don't wish to be 
rude, "he's a racist" [Davidson affecting a woman's voice]. I just think, there's an 
old saying, give a man a fish, feed him for a day, teach him to fish, feed a man for 
life, right? Now these poor Ethiopians live in a fucking desert, nothing grows. 
How long are they going to take to realise that fuck-all grows in a desert?... I'd 
like to have red, white and blue nose day. That's what I'd like to have, so you have 
British people of all different colours, we're a multi-racial society, so lets look 
after all the different people in our country. It's a bit sad I think when we give 
millions of pounds away but yet old-age pensioners can't put two electric bars on 
their fire at Christmas. That's me, that's the way I look at it. I think the world's 
gone upside down. Have, we have all these illegal immigrants coming in don't we. 
It's a fucking nightmare. I'm sure, why the fuck they want to come here I've no 
idea. It amazes me why they want to fucking come and they don't stay in France 
do they? "Welcome to France" [French accent]. "No fuck we go to England", and 
now they're not even being arrested are they? They're not being arrested, 
thousands of them. (2001 e) 
As in many other examples from Davidson's performances, the actual punch lines and 
jokes are quite difficult to locate once the material has been transcribed. In this example 
the punch lines or points of laughter occur when the discourse becomes more 
exaggerated, for example after the comment on training white Zimbabwean farmers to 
shoot, after the `fuck-um' comment and after the 'fuck-all grows in a desert' comment. 
As well as the obvious use of exaggeration, which forms a humorous trope (Berger, 
1995a: 54), the text is also interrupted by incongruity with the use of various accents 
and voice changes, which takes the form of caricature and stereotyping (ibid: 54-5). It 
is, therefore, clearly a comic extract that receives laughter from the audience. While 
there are a number of humour tropes at work in the text, there are also a number of 
rhetorical techniques employed to `hide' racism and support the views expressed. The 
first, and most obvious, is the use of prolepsis, which is the anticipation of criticism. In 
this example it forms the anticipation of being called racist. Davidson presents the 
criticism in advance and then builds a response to it, which are jokes that seek to 
ridicule the anti-racist position (and his leftwing alternative comic rivals). Once this 
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defence has been undertaken, Davidson turns to the issues of inferiorization and 
exclusion that I focus on later. He acknowledges that Britain is a `multi-racial society', 
before going on to berate illegal immigrants, which invokes Bauman's comment that in 
racism the `other' is now often acknowledged as being `here to stay' (1997a: 54), as a 
neighbour, but is also presented as a troublesome alien and potential boundary 
transgressor. Davidson's use of prolepsis and the expression that Britain is a multi- 
racial society genuinely confuse the claim that the extract is racist - it could be read as 
an expression of the dilemmatic - of what Billig describes as the ambivalence of racist 
expression (Billig et al, 1988). Davidson's comments are also a reflection of the 
working class racism outlined above, which expresses genuine socio-economic 
resentment, in this case in the call for a `red, white and blue' nose day, but because of 
the culturally racist terms used, this has a self-defeating tendency within it and cannot 
form legitimate political expression. What is also expressed in the text is the idea of an 
`immigrational prejudice' that can be seen as a subsection of racism (and is often seen 
as a key element of cultural racism) and xenophobia. 
Bowen (2003), in a stand-up show entitled You Can't Tell These Anymore!, dedicates 
a full performance to the topic of jokes that can no longer be told because of the 
influence of political correctness. He employs tropes for either coding racism or 
distancing the perceived, intended meaning from any racist readings that might be 
elicited. In one example he specifically addresses the subject of racist humour and 
offence: 
Course you've got to be very careful now you know, you can't just romp on about 
anything, you have to be very careful. You can't tell racist, sexist, feminist jokes. 
You can't do any of them jokes. Like I mentioned the Scots earlier, you mus'unt 
do that, cos that's racist. Can't do it. And any Scots people in here tonight will be 
mortally offended if I was to tell the story about the drunken Scotsman who'd gone 
up to heaven, knocked on the gates and St Peter said, "who's that" and the 
Scotsman said, "it's Angus McTavish" [Scottish accent]. St Peter said, "you can 
piss off, we're not making porridge for one". You see, it's it's like the Welsh, how 
many Welsh people in? I hate the bastards, I hate the bastards. More than five and 
you've got a bloody choir on your hands... You've just got to be very, very careful 
haven't you? And it goes in circles doesn't it? In cycles, fashion, fashion. Got the 
alternative comedians now where you've got to think whether it's funny or not, 
you've got to say, "was that funny? Am I supposed to laugh or what? Have I got I 
got to be intelligent or can I be thick and watch basic stuff? " (2003) 
Offering a discussion of racism and political correctness, Bowen seeks to `address' 
some of the issues that are at stake in the telling of racist humour. Throughout this 
show, Bowen makes reference to older comedians and the material they used, and to 
the present state of comedy, where he emphasises how it has changed since the 1970s. 
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This example is interesting because, through a number of comic tropes, Bowen creates 
a humorous critique of politically correct attitudes to racist humour. Throughout the 
show Bowen creates an incongruity through the acknowledgement of the need to be 
`very careful' and not offend, and the juxtaposed articulation of the offensive discourse. 
In this example, Bowen begins by outlining the situation - that racist humour cannot be 
told (along with sexist and `feminist' humour, for which he means gender based 
humour rather than jokes told by feminists) - before giving an example of humour that 
is not racist (a joke about the Scottish). By providing this example, and suggesting that 
the Scots would be `morally offended', he employs the comic trope of exaggeration 
(Berger, 1995a: 54), and allows the politically correct attitude to be judged absurd 
through this mis-comparison. By telling a joke that is relatively inoffensive and not 
racist, Bowen is able to continue this exaggeration and to render criticism at those who 
find racist humour offensive. The joke finishes with the continued use of mockery, 
through an analysis of the humour of the politically correct - alternative comedy - 
which is seen as intellectual, of questionable humorousness, and rigid in the Bergsonian 
image of humour, which renders the enterprise of alternative comedy as a joke in itself. 
This comment also expresses the sentiment of the working class racism, that their 
culture is devalued in the face of alternative comedy. Overall, through the use of a 
combination of incongruities and comic devices Bowen is able to show the 
`unacceptability' of his humour to be absurd and firmly establishes his comedy in an 
`acceptable' category. This clears the way for more explicit expressions of racism. 
In the next example, Bowen tells a culturally racist joke in the third person, by 
recounting its original telling by Ken Goodwin. This joke draws on the theme of the 
`other' crossing national boundaries, which will be looked at in detail below. It is the 
distancing of intentionality that I highlight here: 
Do you remember another guy on The Comedians called Ken Goodwin? Do you 
remember Ken? Lovely man, lovely man. I'm going to tell you this story; we did 
Blackpool last year at the Opera House. It was lovely and Ken was on, and these 
stories, politically, they're so incorrect it's not true and I couldn't believe Ken is 
still doing the same act he was doing in 1970, and he's still wearing the same 
bloody suit he was wearing... And Ken went on, talk about innocent comedy, and 
it's all, we're only comics... And I couldn't believe what he did; he'd done the 
same every week... But then he went on, this is only last year. It was full, the 
Opera House, he said, "I was very big abroad you know, I was very popular in 
Pakistan. I was so popular thousands of them have come over here to watch me". 
And then he said, he carried on, I thought what's he saying, "I've got some bad 
news for people who live in Birmingham. Bus fairs have gone up two Rupees". 
(2003) 
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Bowen introduces Goodwin as `innocent', the experience of performance in Blackpool 
as `lovely' and uses a variation of an `it's only a joke' rhetorical excuse, by suggesting 
`we're only comics'. This line is used throughout the show to highlight the material and 
enterprise of the comedian as harmless. By doing this, Bowen is able to downplay the 
intentionality of Goodwin's racism, which is expressed in two jokes. His own 
intentionality is defended by the use of the third person account. Davidson (1980) has 
also used a similar technique for repeating Irish jokes told by other comedians. Overall, 
this extract uses these devices to make the two proceeding jokes acceptable or harmless, 
which deal with issues of boundary crossing and cultural change. 
2) National Identity and Boundary Maintenance - Space and Exclusion in 
Humour 
The second rhetorical theme that seeks resolution in culturally racist humour focuses on 
the `other' as a transgressor of national boundaries. This is primarily an ambivalence or 
anxiety generated if the `other' is perceived to cross these boundaries, and becomes the 
subject of humour coupled with proteophobic expression. In being connected to 
nationalism, it is one of the more prominent subjects of cultural racism. 
Parekh summarises the culturally racist view of nationalism and boundary 
maintenance, obsessed with the idea of national decline, that consists of beliefs that see 
a `loss of national identity, a weakening of the sense of patriotism and the decline of 
public culture and spirit' (1986: 34). The perspective of this `weakened' Britishness is 
reasserted and attached to an image of a natural or essential British culture (ibid: 35). 
Importantly, Parekh describes culturally racist constructions of Britishness as 
incoherent. He states that it `is so obviously incoherent and confused that, had it not 
found some support in influential circles, one would leave it alone to collapse under the 
weight of its own contradictions' (ibid: 38-9). What such commentators miss is that this 
incoherence can be rhetorically supported or resolved by humour, which helps prevent 
its `collapse'. " 
35 While I concentrate on culturally racist joking that specifically focuses on boundary crossing, 
these comedians also produce a number of jokes that draw on national stereotypes, some of 
which are examined in the next section. It is possible to argue that national characteristics are 
placed in humour for similar functional purposes. Here is an example from Reid: 
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The `others' who transgress national boundaries are described in several ways - the 
asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, the refugee and the immigrant worker. Balibar 
proposes that cultural racism will actually substitute arguments of race for those of 
immigration (1991: 20), as a part of its coding exercise. He argues that `[t]he 
functioning of the category of immigration [acts] as a substitute for the notion of race' 
(ibid. emphasis in original). Bauman adds similarly that the `concerns with boundary- 
drawing and boundary maintenance tend to focus today in most Western countries on 
immigrant workers' (2000b: 226), while Parekh provides a neat paraphrase of this 
culturally racist logic: 
Their presence erodes the unity of national sentiment and subverts Britain's sense 
of nationhood. The British feel deeply threatened by them and fear for their unity 
and integrity as a nation. They cannot be blamed for feeling this way for it is 
inherent in `human nature' to wish to live with men and women of one's kind. 
(1986: 37) 
A close connection exists between the themes of nationalism, xenophobia, 
immigrational prejudice, and the logic of exclusionary racism in this humour. This 
`othering' does not have to follow either strict `racial' lines or be applied to the usual 
suspects of cultural racism, and so those subjected to it do not need to embody the 
characteristics of old colonial subjects in order to become the victims and focus of 
cultural racism. As Gilroy explains, `[e]ven if they are `white', they can be held hostage 
by the racialized specification that they are immigrants. Even Poles and Kosovars can 
project dangerous discomfort into the unhappy consciousness of their fearful and 
anxious hosts and neighbours' (2005: 435). While Gilroy argues these newcomers 
provoke memories of lost empire, this is an unnecessary inference for my analysis. The 
focus on the boundary-crossing `other', no matter which group, reappears because of 
the transgression of the boundary that constructs the racist imaginary. This ambivalence 
of space may or may not have appeared in colonial times, but it is the fixing of 
cognitive categories that proteophobes desire rather than the return of a specific socio- 
historical period, which may or may not become attached to this. As Marotta explains 
`Nationalism seeks unification and homogeneity and this is achieved through the act of 
Saddam Hussein, Desert Storm, Jesus, having said that of course, that is one 
savage regime Saddam Hussein had there. If a man gets caught stealing they cut 
his right hand off, as you know. If the same geezer gets caught they cut his left 
hand off. The only thing he can steal after that is fucking doughnuts. Yes operation 
Desert Storm, we were there, the Yanks. France sent two planes; they got lost on 
the way. Germans sent 5000 towels to lie on the beach. The Italians surrendered 
just in case. 160 degrees in the shade and the Irish sent two fucking icebreakers. 
(1995) 
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drawing boundaries between natives and aliens' (2002: 42). Once again, Davidson's 
comedic career provides numerous examples. In a 1982 performance he asks, `anyone 
from England? Do you know what, don't you think Great Britain's the best country in 
the world? Don't you think? Yeah, it's got to be, every other bugger's living here ain't 
they' (1982). This joke expresses sentiments about any group at anytime because it 
mentions none. Jethro gives a more extreme example: `I saw a man in Shepton Mallet 
pouring petrol over asylum seekers. I said "what are you doing that for? " He said, "you 
can get fifteen to the gallon"' (2006). This is a more obvious example of proteophobic 
destruction expressed through absurdity (Berger, 1995a: 54). 
The most efficient method of creating waste free social space is simply not to 
generate waste in the first place, or to not allow the `other' into social space, to 
specifically exclude the `other'. This urge to expel the `other' appears in Davidson's 
comedy. On a supposed visit to Iraq, Davidson talks to an Iraqi civilian who mistakes 
him for Tony Blair. 
This bloke said "Mr Blair, you Prime Minister, you done fantastic job for our 
country " [italics signifies an Arabic accent], I said "what! " "Mr Blair you done ", I 
said "I'm not Mr Blair", "you tell Mr Blair he done fantastic job for our country", 
I said "we'll he's fucked our country right up! " Do you know what he said? Oh 
yes, oh yes, um, you know what he said? "Don't say that I'm going to live there 
next week" Now people listening to that might think, "oh here he goes, Jim 
Davidson doing a racist joke". Now I don't think it's racist cos we're worried 
about our borders ladies and gentlemen? Do you know what I'm saying? Let me 
give you, Uncle George is a lorry driver right, drives all round Europe and he got 
stopped by the British, British right, not French, this is down at Dover, by the 
British immigration officer. He said to him "vot have you got on your lorry? " 
[Indian accent] "What? " "vot have you got on your lorry? " He thought shit, I'll 
own up. He said "I've got forty two Croatian gypsies". He weren't nicked. Do you 
know what he said? "Are they on pallets? " It's a joke. No our blokes are doing a 
good job with what Iraqis are left in Iraq at the moment. (2003)36 
36 Davidson has produced several examples of this joke. In each case the joke changes slightly, 
often to accommodate the audience that he is performing to - thus highlighting how geography 
impacts directly on habitus. Here is an example from Jim Davidson. Uncovered and 
Uncensored: 
My mate drives a lorry, right, and he comes back to Dover and the security bloke 
says "Harry". "Oh what's up Fred? Hello sir, what can I do for you? " "Vot have 
you got on your lorry? " [Indian accent]. He said "vot have you got on vour 
lorry? " "Oh alright the game's up. I've got fifty two Croatian Gypsies". "Oh fuck 
me, are they on pallets? " That's what's happening, we get accused, British people 
aren't racist, we want to help people don't we? Fucking stupid. (2001 e) 
This next example from Jim's Silver Jubilee, altered for the Scottish audience, has a different 
ending: 
And it's got to be said the whole county's gone to rack and fucking ruin, we've got 
all these illegal bloody asylum seekers coming in the country now. Have you got 
any here yet? Want any more? My mate's a lorry driver okay, Glaswegian guy. 
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Davidson covers a lot of ground in this joke; he suggests an influx of Iraqi asylum 
seekers, attempts to render his humour acceptable, comments on existing British ethnic 
groups and expresses concern about Eastern European migrants. The joke contains the 
proteophobic theme. First, the joke depicts a problematic `other', in the form of the 
Iraqi that needs to be kept out of British society. Interestingly, noting Bauman's 
dichotomy of the `tourist' and `vagabond' (1997b), the movement of Davidson's 
`tourist' self is not judged as disturbing boundaries in the way that the `other' will. 
Davidson and the British Army are specifically not depicted as invading, overrunning 
or illegally visiting Iraq. Secondly, Davidson rhetorically excludes himself from being 
labelled racist by denying that excessive anxiety over illegal immigration (a common 
theme of cultural racism) is a racist preoccupation. This again evokes the ambiguity of 
the working class racism and highlights the problematic terms of expression involved in 
it. Again, the technique is rhetorical because it begins with the use of prolepsis in 
anticipation of an accusation of racism and then diverts attention through metonym, 
towards a particular aspect of Davidson's racism - his obsession with immigration and 
border control. The joke then moves on to discuss `Uncle George', who is perhaps the 
patron saint of British lorry drivers - this resonates with a further chain of patriarchal, 
British signification, and distinguishes Uncle George from the Asian policing the 
border. The infiltration of the `other' into positions of power, which is expressed 
through the accent and vernacular of the Asian customs officer, is a frequent fear. In 
this case the 42 Croatian gypsies enter the country because of the ineffective customs 
officer and represent a fear of the Eastern European 'other'. The joke is proteophobic 
because it attempts to justify keeping the `other' at bay, in this instance by preventing 
their arrival. It again specifically draws on nationalism, xenophobia and immigrational 
prejudice. 
Cuisine can also be linked with proteophobia and exclusion. In the 1982 
performance Davidson jokes `people think there's a lot of Pakistanis in Brixton, there 
ain't, the West Indians have found out they taste like chicken' (1982). This joke turns 
Lorry driver okay and he drives all the way, comes through Dover everyday. He 
delivers kitchen utensils. Well actually, the way he makes his money is smuggling 
tobacco. Ain't it funny the shit you'll smoke because it's cheap. "What you got? " 
"I've got a fucking load of this stuff, shite, have a look" [both Scottish accents]. 
"Oh that's fucking shite by the way", "I know but it's fucking cheap but", "but 
what? " "No I just fucking say but by the way". Smoking it, "give me, fill the boot 
up with it then. It's fucking cheap, no paying no fucking tax, cough, it's shite, 
cheap but by the way". And the Doctor says "I'm afraid Mr McDonald you've got 
cancer", "I might have but I didn'tee fucking pay VAT [Davidson gives V sign]. 
(2002b, and 2002a used a similar example) 
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the strangeness of the food of the `other' back onto the `other' as a removal technique. 
The proteophobic fantasy is acted out by the savage West Indians who are able to 
consume large amounts of the alien Pakistanis, all through an expression of the 
strangeness of the food of the 'other' . 
3' This next joke from Manning focuses on 
clothing. Although the logic of the joke is a little difficult to decipher, its intention, as a 
violent joke, is distinctly proteophobic. Manning says `Pakistani watching television, he 
said "wear something white at night". Put a white hat on, white coat, white suit, white 
gloves. Fucking snowplough knocked him down. Unlucky that isn't it' (1984). 38 
This section shows how the logic of exclusion in cultural racism - Bauman's 
proteophobia - is expressed in a number of styles in culturally racist humour. These 
include concerns over nationalism, immigration and inventive methods of removal in 
fantasy that focus on cultural difference. Overall, most examples exhibit the theme of a 
resentment based working class racism. 
3) The `Other' as Alien and Neighbour - Identity and Inferiorization in 
Humour 
In Bauman's postmodernity there develops a particular ambivalence of identity 
associated with the `privatisation of strangerhood' or the `universalisation of 
rootlessness' (1991: 94-8). An overlap of the concept of the privatisation of 
37 Below is a similar example from a Carson performance in 1993: 
Ko Che said to Jeronimo "here's good news and bad news", "what's the bad 
news", "they're putting six hundred Pakistanis on the reservation", "oh fuck" he 
said, `there's no room for six hundred Pakis on the reservation", "yes but there's 
good news, they taste like chicken" (1993). 
This example re-emphasises the specificity of racist humour. While the humorous co-agitator 
remains the same and the joke has the same structure, the altered content changes the meaning 
of the joke. The racism is altered somewhat with the use of the Native Americans, who become 
the savage in this example, rather than the Afro-Caribbean. 
38 The joke below by Manning, which is obviously racist and xenophobic, shows the violence 
that some of his humour depicts: 
You Japanese never laugh do you, never fucking laugh, do ya ah, never laugh. 
We've not forgotten Pearl Harbour pal, don't you fucking worry about that. What a 
fucking shit-house trick that was. He's fucking sat there can't wait to get home and 
make another Datson. You look like a nice fella, go and piss on that Jap. Bastards. 
Got no fucking time for them me. There was a plane crash in Madrid about 6 
months ago and 200 Japanese on that plane. Broke my fucking heart, six empty 
seats there were. (1984) 
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strangerhood in modern and postmodern humour is possible. The concept can also be 
used to describe the fixation on cultural stereotypes and socio-structural difference in 
humour. This is developed in an account of how culturally racist humour follows the 
logic of inferiorization. 
Cultural racism makes use of a number of cultural characteristics and stereotypes of 
the various groups defined as `other' inside its remit. These differences, which include 
language use, custom, dress, religion and cuisine, become the focus of humour because 
they are also used to signify identity, and so specifically connect with any ambivalence 
of identity that may exist. Humour is able to provide a `safe haven' for these 
differences, where their threat to the self is minimised by their impending resolution 
and inferiorization. 
Bauman argues that an ambivalence of identity is now a common existential 
experience. He describes the privatisation of strangerhood as a phenomenon where, `the 
mode of "being a stranger" is experienced to a varying degree, by all and every member 
of contemporary society with its extreme division of labour and separation of 
functionally separated spheres' (Bauman, 1991: 94). Such strangerhood can resonate 
with the working class racism outlined throughout, where divisions of labour and 
associated practises create alienation and resentment. Strangerhood manifests itself 
simply because of an increase in social and economic instability and uncertainty. Some 
commentators have psychologised this process - Marotta interprets Bauman as 
suggesting that, `part of the human condition is both the desire for security, which we 
gain from living in a `community', and the need for autonomy. These two desires 
cannot be reconciled nor satisfied simultaneously' (2002: 49). The ambivalence of 
identity should not just be seen as a psychological affair, but as this and a result of 
changing social and economic conditions. This privatisation of ambivalence is reflected 
in cultural racism, specifically through a concern to negotiate the presence of the `other' 
as both alien and neighbour - to negotiate the inferiorization of the `other' and prevent 
the inferiorization of the self through the feelings of not belonging, of being the 
stranger. It is perhaps in racism that such common ambivalences are allowed resolution 
for those who are least able - because of socio-economic position and uncertainty - to 
live with them. 
I begin to analyse this identity humour with an example that uses differences in 
language use. Perhaps the most well known case of racist language caricature in British 
stand-up comedy is Davidson's `Chalky White' character. Chapter Three saw how the 
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character draws on a number of racial stereotypes. His accent, that of a stereotypical 
Afro-Caribbean, also forms a key, if not central, component of the humour. It is often 
assumed that Davidson now rarely performs the character, but it often appears in a more 
discreet, coded manner. For example, in a 2002 performance he says, 
What ever happened to those old Chalky jokes? Remember those Chalky jokes? 
They got all the lefties moaning. I had a great mate called George Campbell. I used 
to go to school with him in Charlton. We used to play football, 4-4-2 formation. I 
was the two, me and George. There you are, you've got it in black and white now. 
And he used to talk like that, "Here Cam" [London accent], me. "Get your fucking 
act together, pass the fucking ball over". When we left school, six months later I 
saw him down in Lewisham. He's got dreadlocks put in and a couple of black 
mates. I said "George, it's me Cam". "Alright how's it going? Me see you later, we 
gonna have a few pipes and smoke some ganja" [West Indian accent]. I said, 
"what the fuck are you talking like that for George? " He said, "I'm with me mates" 
[London accent]. I love that story me. People say, "why don't you do Chalky 
anymore? " Well I do, but there's no real point because no one speaks with a West 
Indian accent any more, do they? They don't, even West Indians don't, they're all 
speak with, speak like Frank Bruno [performs a Frank Bruno impression while 
saying `Frank Bruno'] Do you like Frank Bruno? I do. I love him, I think he's 
great. I remember on Capital Radio, Mike Osmond interviewed him and he said, 
"Tell me Frank, they tell me you have a detached retina", "Well we do now but we 
used to live in a council house". When Chalky was a little boy him and his two 
brothers went as a witness cos they saw some bloke making love to this woman 
and the husband caught them and he ran off and grabbed them and they had to go 
to court, and the judge who had no thumbs, his name was just-his fingers, hah ha. 
That's the bit you can show the children. "Call the first witness"... "I'm coming" 
[West Indian accent], "State your name", "Leroy White", "Tell the court what you 
saw". "Yeah your honour, me out with two friends playing football inn't, you know 
all that and everyting, when all of a sudden we see the white man and the white 
woman, they're having a fuck". He said, "get out of my court", "1 tellin' the 
truth", "do not use that language", "what the fucks wrong with truth ", "get out, 
call the next witness"... "State your name", "Justin White ", "tell the court, in your 
own works, what you saw", "Oh, I was playing football with me two brothers and 
me see some fucking going on". "Contempt of court", "Oh that's very nice of 
you ", "£50 or fourteen days? " "I'll take the money ". He said "Chalky, when you 
go in there don't say there's any fucking going on or they'll sling you out or give 
you fourteen quid". He said 'fair enough ". "Call the last one"... "Coming", "state 
you're name", "Chalky White", "your age", "thirteen", "In your own words, tell 
the court what you saw". "Your honour, I was with me two brothers playing 
football and me see the white man and the white woman, they were fuuu. I'll tell 
you what I see man. I see ten toes up, ten toes down, a big white ass going round 
and round, a dick going in and a dick comin' out and if that ain't fucking you can 
sling me out" [gives the V sign]. God bless Chalky, rest in peace. (2002b) 
This joke begins with an attempt to goad a response, imaginary or not, from those who 
do not enjoy this type of humour - the lefties. Then, the discussion of his friend's 
change of accent signifies a preoccupation with cultural hybridity. The `Chalky' joke 
that follows is considerably mild in comparison to the embodied racist humour of 
Chapter Three. The racist intelligence and civility stereotypes remain, and the 
intelligence stereotype is also reinforced in relation to Frank Bruno, but the main 
incongruity in this section is created by the use of various accents, as the misplaced 
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accent of the school friend in the first example is reinforced in the proceeding `Chalky' 
joke. Overall, the use of accents and caricature simply sets out to demarcate groups, to 
create strangers, and inflict mild inferiorization. 
There are also a number of culturally racist jokes that focus on stereotypical Indian 
accents. Bowen provides an example: 
I got lost [in Blackburn] and I found myself on this industrial estate looking for 
this place and I saw this Indian gentleman walking towards me. He had all the gear 
on, pyjamas and turban and everything, and I thought well he's local, you know. 
So I said, "excuse me", nice chap, said, "excuse me". "What wanting" [Indian 
accent], I said "Tesco". "Bloody Tesco, what is bloody, bloody? ". "Tesco? ", 
"Tesco, what is? Just thinking, oh Tesco, West Indies 114 for 5 ". (2003) 
Bowen introduces the joke by way of a return to an old dwelling (specifically a 
neighbourhood). First, the alien clothing that comes into focus - which is 
simultaneously used as a signifier of the Indian man's belonging and non-belonging in 
the area - of his status as Bauman's neighbour and alien. This is the first incongruity. 
Specifically, the `test score' punch line introduces the linguistic exchange that also 
negotiates belonging in the location, through the presentation of a misunderstanding 
that highlights the neighbour/alien dichotomy. Such a joke would likely form an 
expression of linguistic ambiguity as it is not severe enough to generate extreme racism 
- but it does provide mild inferiorization. Below is a mild example from Reid that 
shows how language misunderstandings between ethnic groups are brought into 
humour: 
I've gone in the Chinese and said give me a three, fourteen, eighteen and sixty-four 
pale, I said how much is that, Bob will give you the money. And he said "what you 
do for a living? " [Chinese accent]. Said "what", he said "what you do for a 
living? " Oh I said, "I'm a comic", and it's like everyone you tell you're a comic 
they say "tell us a gag". He done the same thing. He said, "you tell me a joke". 
Then the frying pan went vurrum. I said "your pan's on fire pale". He said "what". 
"Wok, wok", "who there? ". (1995) 
While this example is fairly mild it does depict the Chinese man as the one who is 
failing to understand, as linguistically inferior. 
In the next example, Davidson stereotypes the Indian accent. He asks, `you been 
around Slough, there's bleeding millions of them, sounds like a motorboat factory, 
going but but but but' (1982). In this joke, a metaphorical description of the Indian in 
Slough making the noise that is produced by a motorboat engine uses the idea of the 
mechanised as humorous, which obviously inferiorizes through ridicule. While the 
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Bowen joke focused on misunderstanding, this joke concentrates on the absurdity of the 
alien sound. It also describes the number of aliens, perhaps `swamping' the sounds of 
the non-others, a theme that regularly appears in cultural racism. A similar example 
appears in a Jones performance from the same year: 
Here, went out for an Indian, you ever been in one of those Indian restaurants? 
Mark, where did we go? India? Tonight, sat in this Indian restaurant, thought I had 
a fucking outboard motor stood beside me, but but but but but, and don't they have 
big crisps? Have you seen the size of them crisps? But by Christ don't their 
vindaloos make your ass sore the following morning? You sort of cough and 
bluubluubluu, it's gone in'it and you sort of walk about like that thinking where 
the fucking hell's the germiloid. (1982) 
This joke uses the same absurdity but also introduces another well-rehearsed theme of 
culturally racist jokes directed at the Indian, that of the difference and effect of the 
cuisine of the `other'. There are frequent references in this genre to the effect of various 
types of curry on non-others, in terms of it giving the diner diarrhoea (e. g. Davidson, 
1980; Jethro, 1993). This, while acknowledging that `we' may enjoy the food of the 
`other', sees it as inferior in consequence. 
Jokes also focus on religious practice and seek to demean and inferiorize. For 
example, in a recent stand-up show, Jethro said `I saw this Muslim shagging a sheep in 
a field. They took him to court but the judge said he was well within his rights because 
it was his-lam' (2006). This joke presents the alien religion in a play-on-words that 
seeks to mock it, but might also express anxiety about dangerous `others' who seem 
unable to be sanctioned under British law. This is a further theme of the working class 
racism mentioned throughout. 
While the jokes in this section vary in the severity of racism expressed, because they 
all make reference to differences in cultural characteristics - to language, food, dress, 
religion - they all aid the rhetorical task of identity management and inferiorization that 
seeks to negotiate the `other' as alien and neighbour. They also appeal to those who 
require this type of ideology. 
Conclusion 
The chapter began with a discussion of cultural racism as a racism of cultural 
difference, but one specifically connected with nationalism, xenophobia and 
immigrational prejudice, and which all connect to a specific resentment based working 
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class racism. I then outlined three rhetorical themes that appear in humorous co- 
agitators, which have the functional effect of supporting cultural racism. The first 
rhetorical theme develops from cultural racism being a form of coded racism that 
appears in response to the increasing unacceptability of embodied racism. This task 
negotiates the attitudes of acceptability and unacceptability. The second theme deals 
with a negotiation of national territory that fixates on the maintenance and fears the 
transgression of national boundaries. This anxiety is created from issues of space and 
exclusion in cultural racism, focusing on those `others' that move to the `wrong' side of 
the boundary. This is a proteophobic concern that enforces the exclusionary logic of 
racism. Thirdly, cultural racism encourages an ambivalence of social identity that 
negotiates the competing categories of the `other' as an alien and a neighbour. This is 
generated by the presence of the `other' in the immediate social location and employs 
stereotypes of cultural and linguistic difference. This theme focuses on rhetorically 
affecting the logic of inferiorization. 
To reiterate, I have shown that both embodied and cultural racism follow the logics 
of exclusion and inferiorization, and in this respect they are similar. What differs 
primarily is a concentration in cultural racism on the exclusion on the non-racial 
immigrant and boundary transgressor, rather than the exclusion and disposal of the 
`waste' product of embodied racism. In relation to inferiorization, cultural racism sees a 
focus on the cultural difference of the Asian `other' in the multicultural context, rather 
than the cultural lack of the black `other' in the colonial or post-slave context. Where 
cultural racism falls on black people in the British context, there is an increased overlap 
of embodied themes. 
In the next chapter I move away from the analysis of racism created by white 
comedians towards an analysis of the use of the same sign-systems and stereotypes in 
what I describe as the `reversed discourses' of black and Asian comedians. 
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Chapter Five 
The 'Other' Laughs Back 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter diverges somewhat from that of the previous two chapters, 
which analysed embodied and culturally racist humour, and outlines what I label the 
`reverse discourses' of black and Asian comedy. These reversed discourses appear in 
comic acts that employ the sign-systems of embodied and cultural racism, but develop a 
reversed semantic effect. I argue the humour of these reversed discourses is significant 
in relation to racist truth claims and ambivalence management because it often forms a 
type of resistance that can, first, act rhetorically against racist meaning and so attack 
racist truth and points of ambivalence. Second, and connected to this, it can resolve the 
ambivalence of the reversed discourse itself. Alongside this, and paradoxically, 
reversed discourses also contain a polysemic element that can, at times, reproduce 
racism. The chapter seeks to develop a means of analyzing the relationship between 
racist and non-racist meaning. 
Considering the amount of black and Asian comedy available that could be included 
under the category of reversed discourse, and the relative brevity of this chapter, I have 
opted only to highlight the particularly apposite instances from a broad spectrum that 
exists, with the aim of outlining a basic typology. This typology is constructed by 
showing some key methods or styles in which racial stereotypes are employed and 
attacked in reversed discourse, and by explaining the potential degrees of functional 
influence that particular reversed discourses might have on both the ambivalence of 
racism and the ambivalence of the reversed discourse. 
The chapter begins with a definition of `reversed discourse', before connecting the 
definition with the existing literature that theorises humour as an expression of 
resistance or as a counter discourse. Following this brief theoretical discussion, I divide 
reversed discourses into two broad types along the lines of racial categorisation. First, I 
outline the reversed discourses produced by black comedians, before giving a specific 
analysis of the use of `nigga', a derivative of the racist epithet `nigger', in the reversed 
discourse of embodied racism. The use of `nigga' in reversed discourse is described and 
evaluated, in some instances, as an attempt to overcome semantic alienation, as the 
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altered semantic focus of the term and the placing of it in a humorous rhetorical 
structure can increase the chance of diverting the earlier meaning of the word. Second, 
the chapter maps the reversed discourses in British Asian comedy, by showing how this 
comedy also reverses stereotypes but also, significantly, resolves the ambivalence of a 
hybrid identity. It is noted that the most successful responses to embodied racism come 
from African-American comedians. Apposite examples of reversed cultural racism are 
drawn from British Asian comics. This maintains the logic of selection used in Chapters 
Three and Four. 
Throughout the chapter I employ Bauman's concepts of proteophobia and 
proteophilia in order to analyse responses to some of the comedians mentioned, which 
highlights the ongoing struggle to fix the meaning of the `other'. Reversed comic 
discourses often act as a form of resistance by attacking the ambivalences of racism, or 
work to resolve their own ambivalence, all in the effort of establishing, maintaining or 
changing definitions of race and ethnicity. In Chapters Three and Four we saw that 
proteophobic exclusion appears as a reaction to the `other' in racist joking, and acts to 
combine with incongruous/rhetorical structures to produce more robust or `layered' 
techniques for ambivalence removal. In a reversed discourse, with the `other' of 
embodied and cultural racism creating humour that openly attacks this racism, the 
discourse may actively produce further ambivalence for the racist discourses. In some 
instances proteophobia and proteophilia are mobilised as a reaction to the comic `other', 
which acts as a further attempt at fixing the ambivalence that these comedians, or the 
`other', provokes. Hence, these reactions begin to appear outside of the comic frame. 
Reversal and Resistance: An Effective Counterstrategy? 
While reversed humour may develop many of its own sign-systems, it is principally a 
discourse or an element of a discourse whose etymology can be traced, often in a quite 
evident manner, to an earlier discourse that uses identical signs but which employs 
these signs with a reversed semantic effect. It is a discourse that is produced, situated 
and directed in clear opposition to the embodied and/or culturally racist meaning of the 
earlier discourse. 
This reversed semantic focus or change of `direction' is created by a change in the 
social dynamics of the speaker, and the audience or reader, which amounts to a change 
of context. Billig has described the relationship between comedic context and meaning: 
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`if joke-telling is a social phenomena then the meaning of a joke can be affected by the 
context of its telling' (2005: 31). While in previous chapters it was shown that both the 
structure and the content of humour are important for the generation of rhetorical/comic 
meaning, here context is brought to the forefront as the third area that affects meaning. 
This, therefore, is a chapter that discusses humour that is linguistically comparable to 
racist humour, but differs, primarily, because it is the `other' of the earlier discourse 
that articulates it and is often, but not always, the preferred reader of the text. One 
consequence of this shift is that debates are often provoked over the denotative meaning 
of the text and the racist connotations that it may provoke. This is because, while in any 
linguistic utterance the preferred meaning of the speaker cannot be guaranteed, in a 
reversed discourse the antagonism between the earlier discourse and the reversed 
discourse often aggravates, encourages or increases its polysemic potential. As stated in 
Chapter Two, such interactions or discursive confrontations may not have a `winner', 
and polysemic expression may form the outcome of the utterance, thus leading to the 
simultaneous existence of the earlier and reversed meaning from a single utterance. 
The interaction between the generation of a reversed discourse and a racist meaning, 
or the problem of polysemic meaning, is confronted in some studies although most do 
not outline or evaluate the racist potential of the reversed discourse. For example, 
Berger (1998) suggests of this type of ethnic comedy that `the situation is always 
perilous, for the comedians always face the risk of being thought of as ashamed of their 
racial or ethnic identity' (1998: 70). Berger's analysis does not develop a description of 
the potential effects of the humour, so while he may articulate one concern that the 
comedian may have, missing from his comment is a consideration of the way in which 
the comedian might support various racist meanings, or the earlier meanings to which 
the stereotypes are connected. 
Malik (2002) provides an alternative approach to the analysis of reversed ethnic 
comedy. In comments on the British Asian comedy sketch show Goodness Gracious 
Me (which is examined later in the chapter), she, like Berger, both acknowledges and 
questions the use of race and ethnic stereotypes in humour. She asks, "'[w]hen is a 
stereotype not a stereotype? " Because these stereotypes are negotiated by Asians and 
deliberately subverted through visual puns, spectacle and parody, can we safely say that 
racist meanings are not gleaned from the text? ' (2002: 103). Malik also articulates the 
same dilemma in relation to Black clown stereotypes: 
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The central question has always been one of whether images of Blackness in 
television comedy `play on' or `play off' the long-established Black clown 
stereotype, and whether we are being invited to laugh with or at the Black comic 
entertainer. (ibid: 92. Original emphasis) 
While Malik does explain this as a problem of polysemic discourse, of multi-faceted 
considerations, she does not undertake any mapping of meaning or begin to elicit the 
presence of racism in polysemic discourse. In the second extract, by focusing on what 
we are being invited to laugh at, Malik implicitly points towards the preferred meaning 
of the text as central for identifying a particular instance of racist meaning. I argue this 
should not be the focus of a consideration of meaning in a reversed discourse. Malik's 
articulation of a dichotomy between the direction of laughter as being one `with' or `at' 
the `other' is initially problematic - because it does not consider the polysemic nature 
of these discourses - and can be reframed. So instead of this, I approach reversed 
comedy by arguing that while in a reversed discourse we may see the presentation of 
the reversed voice of the `other' as the preferred meaning, there is always a prior 
reliance on the sign-systems of earlier racism. These earlier meanings have the 
potential to remerge, gain purchase and act rhetorically. Any evaluation of a reversed 
discourse should, therefore, be rephrased as a consideration of how the images of the 
`other' in humour both simultaneously `play on' and 'play off' e long-established 
stereotypes. I begin with an acceptance of the polysemic structure of the discourse and 
remove any overemphasis on the intentionality of the speaker, thus beginning from the 
position of the discourse as having a simultaneous, and paradoxical, racist and anti- 
racist potential, which is exaggerated by humorous rhetorical co-agitators. It is, 
therefore, antagonistically polysemic. 
In elaborating on this, the multiple meanings generated by the reversed comic 
discourse represent forms of sign-slippage. In Chapter One, I outlined how sign- 
slippage is a necessary constituent for the rhetorical/incongruous structure of humour 
(e. g. Eco, 1986: 272; Dorfles in Attardo, 1994: 176). In a reversed comic discourse a 
further semantic layering is added to this basic structure. While racist sign-systems can 
be reversed in serious communication and this is a type of slippage that specifically 
forms serious appropriation, the additional placing of this initial reversal in a comic 
incongruity multiples the structural potential for generating semantic movement. The 
additional layering complicates the interaction between anti-racist meaning, racist 
meaning and rhetorical effect in this type of humour. 
149 
Humour as Resistance 
The idea that humour and mockery can act as a form of resistance is a popular theme in 
humour studies. Early superiority theorists acknowledged it and sought to control the 
subversive potential of ridicule and mockery when it was directed at those in power by 
those who were not. A later and notable example of the theorisation of humour as 
resistance appears in Mikhail Bakhtin's description of the carnival culture of the Middle 
Ages. Gurevich summarises Bakhtin's argument as one that `stressed that at the heart of 
carnival was the idea of overturning reality, the tradition of turning the established 
social and religious order upside down' (1997: 57). There are numerous contemporary 
studies that provide examples of humour acting as a form of resistance, on topics that 
range from political satire to joking in the workplace (e. g. Benton, 1988; Dundes & 
Hauschild, 1988; Linstead, 1988; Rodrigues & Collinson, 1995; Stokker, 2001; Bryant, 
2006). An illuminating example appears in Bryant (2006), who describes how humour 
was used as a form of resistance by Czech nationals under Nazi occupation (see 
Stokker, 2001 for a similar example in relation to Norway). Importantly, and although 
only implicitly highlighted by Bryant, a part of the function of this resistance humour 
was the resolution of an ambivalence, through the presentation of the resistance 
movement as unambiguously united. This example is worth looking at in more detail. 
Bryant describes the joke as an ideal form of symbolic resistance because, `[o]vert, 
easily translated political statements could lead to trouble, but jokes were too nebulous, 
too slippery to get one arrested. Jokes, with their ironic tones and ambiguous messages, 
flew underneath the radar of the nazi authorities' (2006: 140). He also describes the 
existence of ambivalence in the social situation where resistance humour emerged, by 
outlining how in Nazi occupied Czechoslovakia, `ambiguity and uncertainty... 
constituted the essence of everyday life for most protectorate inhabitants' (ibid: 136). 
He goes on: `Rather than clearly staking out a Czech or anti-Reich position, 
Protectorate inhabitants were often befuddled by the greys' (ibid: 149). Existence in 
Nazi held Czechoslovakia was, therefore, not constituted by an unambivalent, 
unchanging resistance to Nazi occupation. Bryant theorises the function of resistance 
joke telling as a `safety value', or `a harmless vent that allowed Czechs to continue 
working in factories while maintaining a vague sense of patriotism and integrity' (ibid: 
148). He explains that the `[j]okes were also a way of coping, staving off despair and 
attempting to come to terms with a world that lacked order and clarity' (ibid: 149). His 
comments suggest then, but do not specifically state, that a significant connection exists 
between these jokes acting as a safety valve and the ambivalence or lack of order in the 
150 
situation in which the jokes were told. We saw in Chapter Two that Bauman describes 
order-building as a major concern of modernity, and that I propose that joking is one 
way of resolving its semantic side-effect, which is the creation of ambivalence. In Nazi 
held Czechoslovakia, a connection existed between the emergence of the humour and 
the ambivalence of the social situation for the protectorate inhabitants, and the humour 
helped resolve this ambivalence. Evidence of this resolution is strengthened because 
Bryant argues that the jokes were often transmitted from Czech resistance fighters to 
the government in exile in London, where the presentation of a particular unambiguous 
image of resistance would have been preferable. Although Bryant does not make the 
specific connection, in terms of the use of a Koestlerian concept of co-agitation, 
between the emergence of the resistance jokes and the ambiguity and angst that he 
describes in the social situation, this ambiguity would, no doubt, have proved a 
hindrance for the presentational aims of the resistance movement. 
The Reversed Discourse and Resistance of Black Comics 
Not all performances by black comedians can be subsumed under the category of 
reversed discourse. Forms of comedy that are not included were judged to not give a 
`voice' to the `other', could be seen to lack `authenticity', but perhaps most importantly, 
did not significantly alter the context of the text. Such texts do not develop a reversed 
semantic focus and are not situated in opposition to embodied or cultural racism. This 
section begins with an example of the historical scope of black performance that is 
included in the category of reversed comic performance. Reversed discourse constitutes 
a type of performance whose appearance cannot be simplistically ascribed to a 
particular social situation or historical period, rather, it is both as old as black 
performance and the race stereotypes that it works against. Because of this, discourses 
of reversal are not specific to post-colonial societies (c. f. Malik, 2002). 
Sotiropoulos (2006: 3-4) illustrates early twentieth century black resistance 
discourse in the work of early minstrel comedians Bert Williams and Ernest Hogan. 
These performers `celebrated black communities, denounced Jim Crow, and critiqued 
black elite pretension - all behind the minstrel mask' (ibid: 4). Paradoxically, their acts 
also perpetuated popular racist stereotypes of black people, which had to be an essential 
part of the content for them to be allowed to perform at all: 
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... white critics were particularly attentive to moments when 
black audiences in 
the balcony laughed but whites remained silent. These moments made all too clear 
that black performers had told jokes that went literally and figuratively over the 
heads of their white audiences. (Sotiropoulos, 2006: 6) 
Minstrel comedians such as Williams and Hogan would have actively played-up to race 
stereotypes for the white members of the audience, while offering alternative meaning 
for the segregated black audience confined to the balcony above them. It is also likely 
that the section of the show aimed at the white audience would have contained some 
subtle mockery of the race stereotypes expressed. Importantly though, as long as the 
white audience kept on laughing at the presentation of basic stereotypes, the 
performance, which contained resistance, would also have created a monosemic racist 
laugh, although we should not underplay the extent to which the white audience may 
have appreciated the polysemic aspects of the performance as well. 
Black Responses to Embodied Racism 
In this first section, on black comedic responses to embodied racism, two examples of 
humour are used to highlight its impact as a form of reversal. The first is a reversal of 
the savagery/civilisation dichotomy that is constructed in embodied racism (as outlined 
in Chapters Two and Three). This reversal is epitomised by the hugely influential 
African-American comedian, the late Richard Pryor. The second is a reversal of race 
sex stereotypes that also connect with this dichotomy as a specific subsection. This 
example is highlighted in the comedy of Reginald D. Hunter, a US born comedian who 
performs stand-up in the UK. These examples are shown to have varying levels of 
success as a form of resistance and reversal, principally because of their complexity, 
scope and exposure. 
In his lifetime, Pryor appeared in numerous stand-up concerts and films, and is 
perhaps the best known and most influential of black comedians. His work is noted for 
its critical comment on both US racial and cultural issues, with many citing him as one 
of the most influential black performers in the post-civil rights era. The recognition and 
controversy that Pryor provoked as a comedian relates not just to his ability to make 
audiences laugh, but is indicative of the content and the context of the material, which 
is connected to his resistance to racism and to the rhetoric of his comedy in attacking 
the ambivalences of that racism. This is exemplified in his diversion of one of the 
central dichotomies of embodied racism - civilisation/nature - which describes the 
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`other' as savage or corporeal in comparison to the civilised white European. Pryor 
enacts this diversion principally through a comic trope that matches Bergson's idea of 
the comic as `[s]omething mechanical encrusted on the living' (1911: 39). 
Bergson argued that laughter would result if a human appears as a mechanised 
being: `The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body are laughable in 
exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine' (ibid: 32). While 
ultimately incomplete as the universal theory of laughter that it was intended to be, and 
connected to his wider philosophical outlook that saw problems and dangers in a 
mechanised society, specifically as a break in `duration', Bergson's idea is 
acknowledged as a useful explanation of one specific comic trope (Berger, 1995a: 41- 
4). Pryor's comedy uses this trope effectively by depicting white Americans, in 
accordance with the racist dichotomy, as civilised but also as repressed and mechanised. 
African-Americans are depicted as natural, expressive and able to enjoy the basic 
pleasures of existence. This reversal is used throughout his performances. Pryor (2004) 
describes the difference between whites and blacks eating dinner. White people are 
depicted as not making any noise when they eat - in a civilised, orderly manner but also 
in a robotic style - whereas blacks are depicted as eating loudly and expressing 
enjoyment. The metaphor is extended to portray the mechanical, unemotional voice of 
the white American, to Pryor's enjoyment of picking his nose and farting, and to 
comparisons of black and white woman menstruating (ibid). The reversal is also used to 
describe a white machinelike denial of pleasure, especially of sexual pleasure. Pryor 
explains that `white folks don't cum, that's why they fuck quiet... niggas make noise 
when they cum' (ibid). His continued articulation and redirection of the 
civilisation/nature dichotomy creates the image of the white American existence as 
incomplete, thus situating his comedy in opposition to one of the central tenets of the 
embodied racism that is aimed at black people. Through this, Pryor provides a key site 
of reversal and resistance to the dichotomy and encourages its ambivalence through this 
disturbance. Thus offering a rhetorical redefinition of reality. 
I now examine some responses to Pryor's comedy. We saw in Chapter Two that 
proteophilia is, for Bauman, a reaction to the ambivalence or multiform of the `other' 
that displays adoration or deification towards the novelty of the `other'. Importantly, the 
`other' who exists for proteophilia is someone that performs rather than threatens or 
challenges, which makes celebrities apposite targets for this tendency. We saw that 
proteophilia often appears in relation to the construction of aesthetic space and is 
usually directed towards the `other' from left-wing or liberal political and social 
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commentators. Although proteophilia might emerge as a well meaning response to the 
'other', it always presents a simplification and an attempt to remove the ambivalence or 
anxiety of that `other'. 
Following the death of Pryor in December 2005, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown offered 
commentary in The Independent that, in paying tribute to Pryor and acknowledging his 
influence on African-American culture, acted to deify Pryor in the spirit of proteophilia. 
These comments begin with the description of her reaction on hearing of his death: 
I was ironing a pair of silk trousers - an early birthday present - when I heard of 
the death of John Lennon. I had just come home after celebrating my birthday in 
the West End with my family when I heard of the death of Richard Pryor. I felt the 
same blow in the gut. (2005) 
These comments may seem innocuous enough, but they set the scene for a posthumous 
deification of Pryor which is an instance of proteophilia (and does not consider much of 
the content of Pryor's performances). Specifically, Alibhai-Brown uses Pryor's death to 
make a political comment against black US Republicans Colin Powell and Condoleezza 
Rice. This centres on what Alibhai-Brown argues is the mutual exclusivity of being 
black and Republican. On this she states, `[b]y now Pryor will, I imagine, have started 
up his own rant against Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. I would pay a thousand 
pounds for a ticket at the afterlife show' (ibid). While this comment appears quite 
ridiculous, and also, again, quite banal, and apart from the obvious problems associated 
with the assertion of an `authentic' black political position that Powell and Rice are not 
supporting, the imagining of Pryor's comments from the grave are just that, an 
imagining, and are not aligned with his comic material. Pryor's comedy contains 
criticism of politicians, especially white politicians such as Richard Nixon, but 
throughout his career he rarely criticised African-Americans. In contrast, he did say at 
one point, `[b]e glad for any nigga doing anything' (Pryor, 2004b). Alibhai-Brown's 
posthumous imagining and strategic use of Pryor borders on misappropriation and 
deification of the `other', which are key aspects of proteophilia. It is only through the 
ignoring (or erasure through proteophilia) of Pryor's material that he can be presented 
as an iconoclast. 
A second example of resistance to embodied racism from a black comic appears in 
the comedy of Reginald D. Hunter. As a relatively unknown comedian, Hunter remains 
unsung in the British mainstream but has been courted by left-wing and liberal 
broadsheet critics for tackling challenging racial issues in his comedy. He began his 
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career as a stand-up comedian in Birmingham, after being sacked from a touring 
children's show (Cook, 2004b), and has taken three shows to the Edinburgh Fringe 
Festival -I Said What I Said (2002), White Woman (2003) and A Mystery Wrapped in a 
Nigga (2004) - all of which were nominated for the Perrier Award. This made him the 
first black comedian to receive nomination. In White Woman, Hunter concentrates on 
the subject of interracial sex and miscegenation, which I describe in Chapter Three as a 
recurring concern in embodied racism and a specific subsection of the 
civilisation/nature dichotomy. In one joke Hunter says, 
I remember the first time a English white woman asked me out, I reacted like a 
runaway slave. "Would you like to come out with me for a drink? " "Girl you 
better shut your mouth, shit woman you gonna get both us killed". (2005) 
Drawing on racist ideas of the prohibition of miscegenation, specifically from the US 
context, and the impact of that on Hunter's identity, the joke attempts to transfer the 
material into a British context. This forms the incongruity as examples of comparison 
and stereotype - which are comic tropes (1995a: 54). The extent to which the joke 
reverses racism is questionable, as a racist reading could assert the idea of the black 
man out of context as an example of him lacking civility or adaptation. 
At present Hunter's comedy, of which this is just an extract, does not develop the 
complexity or interconnectedness that appears in Pryor's work. While Hunter addresses 
racial stereotyping (Rampton, 2005) and violence against women, and has made critical 
comments that political correctness can only serve to cripple stand-up comedy 
(Gibbons, 2003a), his work, as yet, does not possess the strong themes of reversal 
shown by others. His comedy appears more obviously polysemic than that of Pryor's. 
So, for example, he has been known to begin a monologue by asking the audience, 
`[a]ny woman here ever been beaten up by a man? ' (Logan, 2005). The use of such 
material always runs the risk of invoking racial stereotypes of savagery and sexual 
violence, and if it is to act as a form of reversal it needs to be situated in a specific 
relationship to racism, in which mockery rather than affirmation of the dichotomy 
becomes the most obvious meaning. Reversed meanings have a polysemic potential that 
can rearticulate the earlier racist meaning, and Hunter has been accused of this; The 
Times comedy critic Alex O'Connell has charged him with being `flagrantly 
misogynistic and enforcing racial stereotypes of black people' (Gibbons, 2003a). 
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Black Responses to Cultural Racism 
Some sociologists have described cultural racism as the dominant form of racism in 
contemporary British society (Modood, 1997,2005b). It has also been suggested that 
cultural racism is directed at Asian ethnic groups, while black and Afro-Caribbean 
people are principally affected by embodied racism (ibid, 1997: 156-60). Nevertheless, 
black comedians do respond to cultural racism too. In line with the responses to 
embodied racism presented, these examples emphasise reversal, and work to attack 
some of the inherent ambivalences of cultural racism. 
Richard Blackwood, Felix Dexter and Curtis Walker are three of the most successful 
black British comedians who are still not as widely recognised as many white 
mainstream or alternative comedians, and are not household names. Lenny Henry, by 
contrast, is probably the most popular of black British comedians, appealing to many 
white Britons as well as blacks. 
Henry's early career saw him winning New Faces in 1975, appearing on The Black 
and White Minstrel Show and on the BBC sketch show Three of a Kind, with Tracy 
Ullman and David Copperfield. By 1984 he had his own Lenny Henry Show, and it ran 
for a decade. Following this, he returned to live stand-up before attempting more 
diverse projects. Issues of race, ethnicity and racism are most prominent in Henry's 
early material, but not all of this material, especially the later shows, offers a critical 
content (see Henry and Fuller, 1989,1994; Fuller, 1983a, 1983b; Henry, 1999). For 
example, in Three of a Kind (1983), aired from 1981 to 1983, Henry performs two 
characters with an obvious ethnic content, `P. C. Ganja' and `Delbert Wilkins', the 
latter also appears in his later stand-up shows. Neither of these characters are 
particularly critical of racism and play on race stereotypes in a fairly monosemic 
fashion. In Live and Unleashed (1989), a feature length video from the late 1980s tour 
of the same name, Henry does present examples that reverse cultural racism, most of 
which highlight and subvert stereotypical depictions of dichotomies of language use, 
mannerisms and dispositions between ethnic groups (see also, Henry and Fuller, 1994 
for similar examples). Here is one such joke: 
People react to blackness in different ways. I had a friend called Dave who was 
a white guy and he really wanted to be black. With his whole heart, Dave 
wanted to be black. All his friends were black, he had a black girlfriend, he 
knew all the words to the Bob Marley records, we're talking commitment here. 
We were so different, I'd go round to his house, knock, knock, "Dave, coming 
out for a game of football" [said with a Dudley accent]. "Well Len, my woman 
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just put in a pot of chicken and some rice. I feel like I just want to rest tonight. 
Easy Lenny" [said with a stereotypical West Indian accent]. I'd say "alright 
dude". I had a lot of white friends. I don't mind, they could hangout with me. 
They'd be out stealing hubcaps otherwise, you know what they're like, give 
them a break I say. (Henry in Henry and Fuller, 1989) 
Henry directly reverses stereotypes of black linguistic competence and criminality. The 
first part of the example shows a fairly straightforward and gentle mockery of cultural 
and racist stereotypes, by highlighting in the joke content that not all black people, or 
white people for that matter, speak in a prescribed fashion. In the second section of the 
joke a similar technique is used towards cultural stereotypes of black criminality (this is 
a recurring theme in Henry's comedy, e. g. Henry and Fuller, 1989,1994; Fuller, 1983a, 
1983b). This represents an explicit reversal of a dichotomy, rather than the deviation we 
saw in Pryor's work. Reversal is outlined by Berger as one rhetorical device that can 
structure humour (Berger, 1995a: 55). While Henry attempts to show the absurdity of 
such stereotypes through this technique, and attacks the content of cultural racism, the 
examples do not remove the polysemic potential in the discourse and the jokes could 
also support the earlier stereotype. In the first example a racist reading might mock 
white men who choose a `lesser' racial group or culture with which to identify. In the 
second, the reversal might simply be taken as an absurdity, rather than seeing the 
absurdity in the original stereotype of black criminality. Thus the rhetorical potential is 
ambiguous. 
Henry's comedy is not as deliberately brash or vulgar as a great deal of African- 
American comedy (e. g. Pryor, 1971,1975,1978,1982,1991; Murphy, 1983,1987; 
Rock, 1996,1997,2004,2005; Foxx, 2004 [1997]; Chappelle, 2004; Curry, 2004) and 
is generally aimed at a mainstream and family audience. It therefore only develops quite 
mild reversals of cultural racism and comments on ethno-cultural hybridity. My next 
example, from the stand-up comedy of the US comedian Chris Rock, attacks culturally 
racist attitudes to speech in a very different way. 
While discovered by Eddie Murphy, Rock came to prominence as a stand-up 
comedian with a tour-de-force performance in his first HBO special Bring the Pain 
(1996). Before that he had received only limited recognition as a comedian (e. g. 
Saturday Night Live from 1990-3) and bit parts as an actor (e. g. Beverly Hills Cop II, 
1987). He has since gone on to receive an increased level of exposure in two more HBO 
specials (Rock, 2004,2005), in appearances in several Hollywood films (e. g. Dogma, 
2001; The Longest Yard, 2005), and in the British context, with his stand-up being 
broadcast on British terrestrial television. Rock's comedy deals uncompromisingly with 
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American race and ethnic relations, and racism, providing many examples of reversed 
discourse (Rock, 1996,1997,2004,2005). What follows is an example of Rock 
resisting and attacking white racist attitudes to black vernacular and linguistic 
competence, through mimicking and mocking comments directed at Colin Powell: 
Colin Powell can't be president... whenever Colin Powell's on the news white 
people always give him the same compliments, always the same compliments, 
"How do you feel about Colin Powell? " "He speaks so well", "he's so well 
spoken", "he speaks so well", "I mean, he really speaks well", "he speaks so well". 
Like that's a compliment! Speaks so well's not a compliment okay, speaks so 
well's some shit you say about retarded people that can talk. What do you mean he 
speaks so well?... He's a fucking educated man, how the fuck do you expect him 
to sound? You dirty motherfuckers, what're you talking about? "Speaks so well", 
what you talking about, "he speaks so well". What voice were you looking to 
come out of his mouth? What the fuck did you expect him to sound like? "I'm 
gonna drop me a bomb to-day, I be pres-o-dent", get the fuck out of here. (Rock, 
1996) 
Rock performs all of his comedy and film roles with a characteristic and caricatured 
shriek that gives his voice an added impression of contempt that is not transferred in the 
text. In discussing white attitudes to Colin Powell, Rock uses repetition and 
exaggeration or hyperbole, which are included in Berger's list of comic rhetorical 
devices (1995a: 55), to unpack culturally racist views of black speech. Through the 
comparison of the white `compliment' and typical comments about the `retarded', Rock 
is able to construct a very effective incongruity. This incongruity is strengthened by the 
context Rock develops, and it is because of his outright mockery of white racist 
attitudes that the chance of reasserting the racist stereotype - or the chance of polysemic 
meaning - is reduced. A racist reading would need to distance itself completely from 
Rock's preferred meaning, perhaps by concentrating on the final line of the quote, that 
impersonates the stereotypical depiction of Powell. The extent that Rock, and Pryor, use 
techniques to stretch the incongruity, so that the stereotypes are pushed away from the 
racist habitus in which they emerge, creates far more effective reversal and resistance 
humour, which is perhaps why they are recognised as two of the most significant black 
US stand-up comedians vis-ä-vis their specific stance on racism. This is something that 
is not achieved in the British comedy of Hunter and Henry, but is also something that is 
framed in the specific context of black resistance to US race relations in the post-civil 
rights era. 
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The Use of 'Nigga' in Reversed Discourses 
In Chapter Three I presented a rhetorical analysis of the word `nigger' in embodied 
racism, its etymology was mapped, and it was described as one of, if not the most 
offensive of racist epithets. The word was described as a `master signifier' and as a 
means of denoting a history of oppression and violence. In addition, I argued that its 
denotive capacity is relatively fixed, thus denying connotation. However, as with most 
words, its context of utterance still does have an impact on the meaning that is 
generated by the term (for a similar discussion see Billig, 2005a: 31). For example, 
attempts to appropriate the word from its racist context and disempower its racist 
meaning may be successful but can also rearticulate the racist meaning. Such attempts 
usually involve the use of the word `nigga' rather than `nigger', which, it would seem, 
helps create a paradigmatic separation from the term `nigger' and set up the potential 
for this new line of connotation to emerge. The word `nigga' is used in many forms of 
media, in film dialogue and hip hop lyrics, and has been described equally as a positive 
and pernicious expression. The word and debates on its use also appear in, and around, 
various instances of humour. 
I examine its potential as a form of resistance to the meaning of `nigger' and any 
racist meanings that are rearticulated by the use of the term. This, therefore, is a 
discussion of the term's polysemicity, or whether or not the attempt at expropriation is 
successful. As stated, the term is used extensively in African-American stand-up 
comedy (e. g. Pryor, 1971,1975,1978,1982,1991; Murphy, 1983,1987; Rock, 1996, 
1997,2004,2005; Foxx, 2004 [1997]; Chappelle, 2004; Curry, 2004), so I will take two 
well known examples from Pryor and Rock and outline the differences in use. 
Specifically, Rock's use of the word in Bring the Pain (1996) where it is used to 
describe a certain type of black person, and Pryor's early use of the word and later 
change of attitude towards it. 
As stated, Rock uses the word to distinguish between types of black people: 
Now we've got a lot of things, a lot of racism going on in the world, who's more 
racist? Black people or white people? Black people, you know why? Because we 
hate black people too. Everything white people don't like about black people, 
black people really don't like about black people. There's some shit going on with 
black people, there's like a civil war going on with black people and there's two 
sides, there's black people and there's niggas, and niggas have got to go. Every 
time black people want to have a good time, ignorant ass niggas fuck it up. You 
can't do shit, you can't do shit without some ignorant assed nigga fucking it up, 
can't do nothing, can't keep a disco open more than three weeks, "grand opening", 
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ýý, 
"grand closing". Can't go to a movie the first week it comes out, why? Because 
niggas are shooting at the screen, what kind of ignorant shit is that? "It's a good 
movie, it's so good I gotta bust a cap in here". Hey I love black people but I hate 
niggas, oh I hate niggas, boy I wish they'd let me join the Ku Klux Klan, shit, I'd 
do a drive-by from here to Brooklyn. (1996) 
For embodied racism, `nigger' is used to depict the black man as subhuman, as 
representing the `other' that exists at the negative pole of all racist dichotomies. It is, 
therefore, always used in discourse that constructs the `nigger' in relation to something 
that is more human, more civilised, to something that has a greater social worth. Rock, 
in this example, is using the term `nigga' (although the pronunciation does not allow for 
a clear distinction), to construct a difference between normal or respectable, and anti- 
social or ignorant, black people. This represents the key paradigmatic construction in 
this text, which is voiced as the dichotomy between `black people' and `niggas'. 
Importantly, the construct created is a dichotomy between the moral and the immoral, 
Rock is describing an element of the black community that is involved in crime and 
anti-social behaviour, that lets the rest down. While Rock is creating a distinction 
between his use of `nigga' and a racist use of `nigger', because the latter would, in all 
likelihood, not want to make a conscious separation of African-Americans into two 
groups, there are key connections between his use of the term and the racist meaning of 
`nigger'. We have seen that racism, while asserting universal dichotomies, will use 
techniques that excuse the ambivalence of these dichotomies. Often these techniques 
excuse or particularise some of the `others' as not `other', as acceptable and `not like 
the rest'. Rock's example divides African-American's into `black people' and `niggas', 
and while Rock may say rightly so (see below) this has the effect of producing a 
rhetorical/comic expression of an important racist ambivalence, which is the negotiation 
of acceptable and unacceptable `others' in the context of an overarching racism. Later 
in the performance Rock pre-empts criticism of the joke: 
And I see some black people looking at me, "man, why you gotta say that? Why 
you gotta say that? It ain't us it's the media, it ain't us it's the media, the media has 
distorted our image to make us look bad, why must you come down on us like that 
brother? It ain't us it's the media". Please cut the fucking shit okay, okay, okay, 
when I go to the money machine alright, I ain't looking over my back for the 
media, I'm looking for niggas. (1996) 
This addition to the joke attempts to construct a further realism for the statement, all of 
which takes place, paradoxically, in a comic situation that allows for meanings to be 
judged without truth criteria. 
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In an interview between Rock and Nelson George, Rock gives some explanation of 
the joke, which received a great deal of media attention. A part of the explanation of 
the joke relies on its perceived truth value: 
C. R.: I didn't think about it in political terms, I never think about the stuff in 
political terms. I think about it, it's funny, is it funny... A lot of times I'd do press 
and um, you know, especially white journalists, and I guess some black journalists 
too, "how does a black audience feel about the niggas and black part", and I'm like 
"watch the special", it's a whole black audience. Thank god I'm not, thank god I 
came up in this era of video and DVD and everything so it's there, there's no 
misinterpretation of it. Where, you know, Lenny Bruce, if I'd done the same 
routine in the 50s. I probably couldn't have walked through Harlem because it 
would be all misconstrued. You know what I mean? It would have been taken all 
out of context. 
N. G.: Why do you think that white people like it so much? That's always the big 
bone of contention, "Well they like it so much", so it can't be, there must be 
something wrong. 
C. R.: I don't know everyone's got it, you know everyone's got there own version 
of it in their, you know, Italians have their version of it, Jewish people have their 
own version of it. I definitely know gay people who go "I'm gay, but I hate 
faggots". I've heard that, you know what I mean, everyone's got their version of it. 
N. G.: Did you feel that it did pigeonhole you? Or people attempt to pigeonhole 
you through that particular bit? 
C. R.: Hey it's good for me, it really helped my career like nothing else, but people 
politicised it more than it maybe should have been, you know it's just jokes man. 
(Rock and Nelson, 1996) 
This is interesting for a number of reasons. In Rock's comments we can see the 
simultaneous assertion that the statement that `black people' and `niggas' exist has a 
truthful value to it and that it is not a political statement because `it's just jokes man' - 
that it is not serious - all in a comic incongruity that can generate rhetorical meaning 
around the `truthful' reading of the discourse. I now give a quite different example 
from Richard Pryor's comedy. 
It has been suggested that Pryor was one of the first black performers to attempt 
appropriation or reclamation of `nigga' and 'nigger' (Cook, 2004a). In his earlier 
comedy he uses the term frequently and indeterminately. In an interview he once said of 
this, `one day I said "Hello, I'm Richard Pryor, I'm a nigger". I wanted to take the sting 
out of it. Nigger. Nigger. Nigger. It was the truth and it made me feel free to say it' 
(Pryor in Sullivan, 2005). Pryor's approach adheres to the general philosophy that the 
meaning of terminology can be wrestled with and redefined, but does not consider the 
rearticulation of earlier racist meaning. Despite this statement, Pryor famously changed 
his mind on the use of `nigga' following a trip to Africa: 
One thing I got out of it was magic I'd like to share with you. I was leaving and I 
was sitting in the hotel and a voice said to me, said "look around, what do you 
see? " And I said "I see all colours of people doing everything", and the voice said 
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"Do you see any niggas? " And I said "no", and said "you know why? Cos there 
ain't any", and it hit me like a shot man. I started crying and shit. I was sitting 
there and I said "I've been here three weeks and I haven't even said it, I haven't 
even thought it", and it made me say "oh my god, I've been wrong, I've been 
wrong, I've got to regroup my shit. I ain't never gonna call another black man a 
nigga". You know cos we never was no niggas, that's a word that's used to 
describe our own wretchedness, and we perpetuate it now, cos it's dead, that word 
is dead. (1982) 
Although the extract may be an exaggeration designed for performance affect, from this 
point on Pryor's use of the word diminished (although he did use it occasionally). 
Interestingly, Pryor's description of the word as `dead' matches the comments on 
denotive signification from Barthes (see Chapter Three), that it is the truly traumatic 
signs that become fixed and deny connotation. Although the meaning of `nigga' has 
variation from context to context, it would seem that while not denying connotation 
absolutely, because `nigger' is so denotive of racism, the connotations of `nigga' are 
often monosemic and can easily revert to the earlier meaning. It therefore remains 
problematic when placed in rhetorical humorous structures, something that Pryor 
realised when his own context of thought shifted during his visit to Africa. Therefore, it 
is the denotive specificity of `nigger' that prevents the use of `nigga' being a reliable 
element of resistance or reversed discourse. 
The Reversed Discourse and Resistance of British Asian Comics 
British Asian comedians are as underrepresented in the British media as black 
comedians, but in addition to this, the US does not provide a supply of Asian comedy as 
notably as it does African-American. There are Asian comedians in the UK who have 
developed cult recognition, most of which use race and ethnicity as a dominant theme 
in their comedy, and develop reversed discourse. Two lesser known examples include 
Paul Chowdry, a second-generation British Asian who was described as using 
`conventional racist humour - the kind Bernard Manning still spews out - to invert 
prejudice rather than reinforce it' (Hari, 2005), and Patrick Monahan, who is from 
Newcastle and of Irish Iranian heritage (Hall, 2005a). Neither of these comedians have 
received mainstream recognition. 
The comedy sketch show Goodness Gracious Me (Bhashar et al, 1998,1999,2002, 
2003), starring Sanjeev Bhashar, Meera Syal, Nina Wadia and Kulvinder Ghir, which 
ran for three series on BBC television from 1998 to 2001, offers many examples of 
reversal relevant to this section. Malik explains how the show contains, 
162 
satirical sketches on the "institutional Whiteness" of broadcasting boardrooms, on 
"Going for an English" meal in a restaurant, and on anthropological travelogues of 
"exotic India" 
... the series 
is also based on traditional and updated stereotypes of 
British-Asians (the spiritual guru who exploits mysticism-loving Westerners, the 
Bollywood macho man, the restrictive parents, the Indian `wide-boy', the 
inexhaustible bhangra dancers, the more-English-than-the English Asian social 
climbers' (2002: 103). 
Originally to be entitled Peter Sellers is Dead (Thompson, 2004: 334) (which is, 
ironically, a much more effective resistance/reversal title but less funny), the show's 
final name seems indicative of the polysemia that it does not escape from. Some 
sketches are very successful in their attempts at reversal. For example, the `going for an 
English' sketches, which show a group of young Indians finishing a drunken evening 
with an English meal, highlight one site of both continued racist abuse and proteophilia, 
which seems obviously illuminated and problematised when reversed. There are, 
however, other sketches that do not seem to work so well: 
Caroline Aherne - acerbic as ever - describes the show as being `like Bernard 
Manning, but without the timing'. This seems a little harsh, but there are certainly 
times when the Goodness Gracious Me team fall back a little too readily on old- 
fashioned notions of ethnic difference... (ibid: 336) 
Examples included in this sentiment are those that seek to criticise British Asian culture 
- the depictions of parents, `Ali G' styled youths, single and sexist Asian men and 
Bollywood actors - all of which can be seen to reassert traditional stereotypes. 
Returning to Asian stand-up comedy, two of the more well known comedians are 
Omid Djalili and Shazia Mirza. Both have received critical attention from particular 
sections of the media. I outline, first, their attempts to reverse stereotypes and form 
resistance in humour, principally by charting their expression of race and ethnic 
stereotypes of Asians. The second section examines ambivalence resolution by the 
comedians. Here, issues of ambivalence and identity are examined. In each case 
potential racist meanings are elicited. 
Resistance to Cultural Racism 
Djalili is a British comedian of Iranian heritage and a member of the Baha'i faith. He 
has performed stand-up comedy since 1995 and appeared in a number of films, 
including The Mummy (1999), Gladiator (2000) and Sky Captain and the World of 
Tomorrow (2004). Ethnicity frequently forms a significant section of the content of his 
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ostentatious and lively comedy act, although his use of it has changed over time, as the 
titles of his shows signify. Early shows included Kebab Shop Owner's Son (1995), The 
Arab and the Jew (1996), and Omid Djalili is Ethnic (1997), which are contrastable 
with his latest show, No Agenda (2006a, 2006b), and signify an expressed desire to 
move into the mainstream (Hall, 2005a, 2005b). 
Djalili's stance on stereotypes is explained by Pickering. Djalili will `play with 
stereotypes in order to make people realise they are stereotypes, then ... subvert the 
stereotype' (Pickering in Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 109. Original emphasis). 
Djalili adds `I know it's about subverting those stereotypes. The whole point of 
subverting stereotypes is to create instead some sense of the whole character' (Djalili in 
ibid: 110). For example: 
One is the joke about "you think we're all so sexist in the Middle East and that's 
rubbish. People always accuse me and even when I go shopping with my wife, 
people always say why does your wife walk 20 paces behind you? That's not 
sexist, she's weighted down with the shopping. ' You turn that around. (Djalili in 
ibid) 
By placing this material in the incongruous structure of the joke, Djalili may well 
momentarily divert the major premise - the literal impression of sexism in the Middle 
East - but this does not divert the stereotype. The minor premise clearly relies on a 
simple rearticulation of that sexism. There is a very clear reading that would gain 
pleasure from the comic sexism and racism, and so no real subversion is created. 
Djalili, in part, acknowledges the problem he faces: 
You play with the stereotype and what you do is try and dispel the stereotype, but 
then sometimes you realise you've just confirmed it. That's when I've gone 
through and analysed it afterwards, but I think that's the kind of structure to it, 
playing with the stereotype and then undermining it. (Djalili in ibid: 110) 
While it is clear that Djalili has no liking for racism, and hopes to resist it through 
humour and improve cultural understanding, some of the material could too easily be 
read in the original format. If the progressions through Djalili's understanding are not 
made, or are resisted, there is a racist laugh available in much of the comedy. So, for 
example, when he says of Arabs and Jews that they are "two sides of the same coin: 
hooked-nosed, penny-pinching liars" (Djalili, 2006a, 2006b; also Hall, 2005b), the 
racist meaning of the utterance is not difficult to locate. Likewise, when Djalili (2006a, 
2006b) asks a section of the audience to impersonate Indians as outboard motors - 
producing `but-but-but' noises - we are back in the territory of Jones' and Davidson's 
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1980s material, with an exact replication of the inferiorizing linguistic humour. Djalili 
thus presents an undeveloped form of resistance humour. 
In outlining responses to his comedy, Djalili gives comments that suggest 
proteophobia and proteophilia are encouraged in the policies and attitudes of 
broadcasters. On an appearance on the Jack Dee Show, he explains how the political 
content of the act was cut from the final broadcast: 
I don't think it was direct censorship, but this was around the time of the Ken 
Bigley kidnap. It was a very sensitive time and the BBC was understandably 
nervous. Every day, they kept moving the broadcast date of my show back, `can 
we take this joke out? That joke? ' I don't particularly think I'm an offensive act at 
all. But they cut out the routines I thought would make the most cultural and 
political impact (Djalili in Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 103). 
This leaching of the political and cultural content of Djalili's act shows the policing of 
the `other' in proteophobia that necessarily pre-empts the creation of the safe `other' 
that proteophilia demands. Parts of the performance are policed in the creation of an 
inoffensive, playful and unthreatening `other' that the proteophile can enjoy consuming 
in her aesthetic region, without being politically or intellectually challenged by the 
performance outside of the aesthetic space. This leaves the BBC's audience to view 
Djalili, as he describes in his own words, as the `funny belly-dancing Iranian comedian, 
rather than a heavy political comic' (ibid: 103). The `other' in this instance remains 
well-policed. 
A second incidence of proteophilia surrounds the content of the Bloody Foreigners 
documentary that Djalili presented for Channel Four. Proteophilia is generated through 
both the presentation of a certain image of Djalili and the style in which the topic is 
discussed. Djalili discusses this documentary, on asylum seekers, in a Guardian article, 
explaining how he became sceptical about the motives of Channel Four in having a 
comedian present a documentary on this serious topic: 
Djalili's mixed feelings highlight an increasing dilemma for broadcasters 
determined to play the ratings game at every opportunity: they want to look as 
though they have a social conscience, and they need to fulfil their multicultural and 
non-British programme remits. (Morrow, 2001) 
Djalili's reservation is expressed through the statement: `My whole problem was with 
the notion: "It's about asylum-seekers, now let's make it fun"' (ibid). Following the 
success of the documentary, Djalili was asked to appear in similar programmes. 
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Channel Four saw the potential in this sanitised and humorous view of the `other' in the 
documentary setting: 
Channel 4 was impressed enough to offer him six more films: "They keep on 
saying things like `It would be good if you could go to Cuba and interview Fidel 
Castro', and I'm like: `And say what? ' They don't have a clue, " he laughs. "They 
want me to be a cross between Louis Theroux and an ethnic Mark Thomas". 
(Djalili in ibid) 
In wishing to create programming that is both popular and adheres to the non-British 
programme remits, images are created that can provoke proteophilia. The presentation 
of what Bauman describes as the vagabonds, `the dark moons reflecting the shine of 
bright suns; the mutants of postmodern evolution, the unfit rejects of the brave new 
species' (1997: 92), has a great entertainment value. A comic, consumer and viewer 
friendly setting allows the `other' to be neatly processed and consumed, representing a 
key process for resolving the ambivalence and anxiety of the `other' as proteophilia. 
Shazia Mirza, a British Muslim of Pakistani heritage, has received little television 
coverage and thus far released no videos or DVDs. Nethertheless, she does have a 
significant cult following and has become more widely recognised for some of her post- 
9/11 material, which has received significant review coverage in the broadsheets. She is 
one of few female British Muslim comedians, and in developing a reversed discourse, 
Mirza is acknowledged for using her comedy to challenge two issues: `the prejudices of 
non-Muslims and the particular conservative views held by Muslims on woman and 
their position and role in society' (Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 100). 
First, Mirza offers a series of jokes on issues relating to the threat of terrorism and 
the rise of Islamophobia since 9/11 that examine non-Muslim perceptions of Muslims. 
These jokes are worth considering as a group. On introducing herself she often says, 
`My name is Shazia Mirza. At least, that's what it says on my pilot's licence' (Gibbons, 
2003b; Mirza in Hari, 2005; Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 101). She has also 
remarked, in building on the well known joke from The Fast Show, `[d]oes my bomb 
look big in this? ' (Mirza in Hari, 2005). On a radio show she suggested that GCSE 
results for Muslim boys had improved because, `[o]bviously the boys are doing well at 
chemistry, because they've got to make the bombs' (Hall, 2005a). On a tour of 
Denmark she appeared on the news programme Deadline, and gave some advice on the 
Iraq war effort, `[t]hey asked me where I thought Saddam was hiding his weapons of 
mass destruction. As if I'd know. I said up his wife's burkha, because no one would 
think of looking there' (Bedell, 2003). Finally, she explains of a personal predicament, 
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`I'm terrified I'll die a virgin. Not because I'm obsessed with sex. I'm not, I don't want 
to get to Paradise and have to sleep with one of the suicide bombers' (Mirza in Hari, 
2005). 
While these jokes are all entertaining and play with the prejudices, stereotypes and 
anti-Muslim racism that has proliferated post-9/11, they do not match the reversal 
achieved by Pryor and Rock in the US context. This may not, or need not, be the `aim' 
of the comedian, as humour is an aesthetic enterprise rather than a political one, and it is 
important to acknowledge the progressiveness of Mirza's emergence, and the cultural 
importance of a Muslim woman being a successful stand-up comedian. Despite this, the 
material tends to remain rather weak as reversed discourse and readings generated may 
not differ from the cultural racism outlined in Chapter Four, where the `other' is 
inferiorized in order to reduce anxiety. This certainly is not Mirza's intended meaning. 
Mirza's material on Muslim and non-Muslim sexism presents examples that are 
closer to the exaggeration and mockery exhibited by Pryor and Rock. These jokes are 
more vulgar in many respects than the jokes above, and are uncompromising in their 
attack on sexism. For example, she says: `[m]y mother would constantly say "Don't go 
out after 4pm - you will get raped". Do all rapists come out at 4.01pm? Do they say, 
"Oy, Ahmed, let's get her before Countdown? "' (Mirza in Hari, 2005: 4). On strict 
attitudes of Muslim women's dress she adds, "`If men are the ones with no self-control, 
why do we have to be covered head to toe? " she demands. "Surely it's them who should 
be covered up - or better yet, chained"' (ibid). Finally, on female chastity she comments 
on 'a Turkish friend who has been told constantly she must have her hymen intact on 
her wedding night, so she only has anal sex on dates. "I'll be a virgin on my 
honeymoon, " she says. Yeah, a virgin with haemorrhoids. ' (ibid). These jokes do not 
lend themselves so well to polysemicity and so form robust counter-sexist rhetoric. 
The following reaction to Mirza's humour is a little different than what might be 
anticipated on the proteophobia/philia spectrum. The stranger or `other' in Bauman's 
writing does not always have to be one that is constructed by race or ethnic difference, 
but can be created by any configuration of socio-structural difference. It is quite 
possible that other individual or socio-structural characteristics can become the focus of 
proteophobia if attempts are made to control any ambivalence or anxiety that the `other' 
might provoke. Mirza has described a reaction directed towards her from, among 
others, some Muslim men. Lockyer and Pickering (2005b) summarise the opposition 
she has faced: 
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She has been criticised by those both within and outside her faith. She has received 
vicious hate mail and death threats, and whilst performing, has been physically and 
verbally attacked by Muslim men who believe Muslim women should not appear 
on stage. (ibid: 100) 
The proteophobic urge, in its most extreme form, often manifests as the urge to 
annihilate. In this case, the threat of death and physical attack are directed at Mirza 
because her otherness has entered an unusual social space, the comic stage. 
Undoubtedly, hate mail and death threats represent an extreme and unjustifiable 
reaction to Mirza's comedy, but in offering some analysis of this as a reading, it 
represents a reaction from a very rigid and uncompromising view of the female Muslim 
`other'. In such reactions the ambivalence, or the inability to conceptualise a Muslim 
women performing stand-up comedy of this kind, with humorous comments on 
ethnicity and religion, leads towards the expression of the proteophobic reaction and the 
attempted exile of the misplaced `other'. She represents a challenge to specific 
categories of social space. In defending her humour, Mirza reflects this by suggesting 
that these reactions are of a certain type: 
often they do have a problem themselves, and their problem is more to do with me 
than it is to do with my material, it's that they don't like me as a woman getting on 
stage being a comedian, regardless of what I say. Sometimes there are Muslim 
men who say, `I don't think it's appropriate you doing comedy, to get on stage and 
do what you're doing, we don't find that appropriate'. Muslim women aren't 
meant to do that. (Mirza in ibid: 121) 
In this example of proteophobia, the transgression of the gendered `other', which 
discusses a particular culture or cultural knowledge in front of those who are both inside 
and outside of the cultural group, generates a transgression of categories that leads to 
the proteophobic reaction from those with fixed ideas of gendered social spacing. 
Ambivalence and Ethno-Cultural Hybridity 
This section outlines ambivalence resolution in British Asian comedy, specifically the 
ambivalence of ethno-cultural hybrid identity. This is achieved through an examination 
of ambivalences expressed by Djalili and Mirza, which are generated from the 
interactions between the effect of social influences on their identity and ethnicity. Thus, 
the humour will have a wider functional effect for ethnic identity. 
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Djalili shows the importance of anxiety for his humour: `I'm far more interested, 
right now, in comedy set up more in terms of what I'm thinking about, something 
internally directed towards outside events... internal stuff is more about your angst' 
(Djalili in Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 114). Djalili's identity provides the motives 
that drive the negotiation of ambivalence through the presentation of concerns 
surrounding ethno-cultural hybridity. This co-agitates dilemmatic aspects of his 
identity, but also an awareness of the ignorance that dominant groups might have 
towards hybridity. For example, Djalili often begins his stand-up routine by talking 
with a mock Arabic accent. He then, after a few minutes, talks with a Kensington 
accent. This forms the first expression of a series of juxtapositions that run throughout 
the performance, which Djalili uses to express his sense of being between cultures. This 
is expressed by the Jekyll and Hyde impression that runs throughout some of his shows, 
which he uses as a metaphor for highlighting what he calls cultural `blind spots' 
(Djalili, 2006a, 2006b), or the cognitive misunderstandings that we are all capable of. 
This expression of hybridity takes place comfortably in humorous incongruity, 
which allow for the co-agitation of disparate elements, without either a contradiction of 
the rules of humorous expression, or without moving outside of the potential of this 
linguistic structure. In continuing this theme, Djalili uses a joke at the beginning of the 
performance to explain his habitus position as one that is both anti-racist and culturally 
`other': `I'm a part of a comedy cultural exchange, tonight I'm in Bristol and Jim 
Davidson is being buggered in Baghdad' (ibid; see also Djalili in Lockyer and 
Pickering, 2005b: 104). By presenting Davidson as his perceived comic antithesis, 
Djalili highlights his political and cultural position as being a reversal of bigoted 
attitudes: 
If you can get that across in your first minute, then people can trust you... `it's Jim 
Davidson being buggered senseless in the Middle East which also means `I don't 
like what he stands for (i. e. racism, bigotry) neither do you... the subliminal 
message here is that I am affirming the principle of unity and diversity. (Djalili in 
Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 105). 
This represents one position in Djalili's comedy - and directly aids resistance to 
cultural racism - but there are other aspects to Djalili's comic identity, that do not give 
the impression of cultural `unity and diversity'. 
This opposition manifests itself in two ways. First, he juxtaposes his Kensington 
upbringing with a yobbish and violent Chelsea-supporting persona that appears when 
Djalili is either watching football, is irritated, or becomes too hot (Djalili, 2006a, 
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2006b). Added to this Chelsea-supporting persona are the frequent Godzilla 
impressions that appear throughout the show, which also represent a change of 
personality on becoming overheated. These examples act as an alter ego to the 
politically and culturally astute Djalili (Djalili, 2006a, 2006b; Lockyer and Pickering, 
2005b: 102), and reinforce the idea that Djalili believes that everyone is capable of 
having cultural blind spots. An example shows Djalili expressing his own reversion to 
cultural stereotypes, where he bemoans prejudice towards Asians following 9/11 before 
describing his own paranoia at seeing Arabs in airports. In the joke he asks an airport 
security guard about their presence, saying `I'm as alarmed as anyone here by the sight 
of Arabs at airports. "What about the Pakistani blokes in the uniform? What's that all 
about? " "Those are the pilots sir"' (Djalili, 2006a, 2006b; see Hall, 2005c for a slightly 
different version). The joke presents a stark contradiction to the image of him as 
embracing unity and diversity, and shows him experiencing the dilemmatic - white 
prejudice and minority discrimination - all of which are expressed and resolved in the 
rhetorical device. 
Djalili's work, like much reversed comic discourse, contains polysemic meanings, 
some of which are racist, but his aim is to express the various imprecisions that the self, 
perhaps as a node in discourse, may have in understanding the nuances of hybridity. He 
says `[l]ife isn't clear cut, there are grey areas, and I think we should listen to those grey 
areas because that's where the truth lies' (Hall, 2005a). 
An ambivalence in the humour of Mirza principally focuses on issues of cultural 
prohibition and transgression. Hence her material expresses `cross-cultural anxiety' 
(Benedictus, 2005). Mirza states the importance of sharing her own experiences in her 
comedy (Mirza in Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 117), but has also faced pressure from 
her family and community because she became a stand-up comedian, and has stated that 
she did not tell her parents about it for two years. The co-agitated ambivalence is, for 
Mirza, principally constructed by the incongruity of the stereotype of what a Muslim 
woman should do and that of a stand-up comedian. This has been described as the 
`pressure to be all things to all people - the devout, dutiful daughter and the cross- 
cultural iconoclast... "Our culture doesn't encourage women to speak, never mind do 
stand-up"' (Mirza and Gibbons in Gibbons, 2003b). Again, this ambivalence resolution 
simultaneously reverses cultural prejudice. This manifests as the presentation of 
temptation in jokes: 
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I talk about my travels and my experiences of being in those countries and it's also 
about temptation, how I'm tempted to do things, like I don't smoke and I don't 
drink and I don't take drugs and I don't gamble and then I go to all these places, in 
all these different countries all over the world and every time I go somewhere I'm 
always tempted to do something. (Mirza in Lockyer and Pickering, 2005b: 116) 
This represents a straightforward transference of temptation into her comedy, and of 
course comedy allows such material to be presented without consideration of its 
seriousness. Mirza can present an anxiety from her temptations at the available vices of 
society and the incongruity of this with her cultural beliefs, and achieve some rhetorical 
and cathartic resolution. On gambling she says, `I was so scared that if I did something 
once then I'd be an addict' (ibid). This is extended to other areas of life, so for example, 
she says `I wonder what it might be like to have a drink. I've never had bacon in my 
life' (Mirza in Giddons, 2003). 
This temptation is then co-agitated with an evaluation of identity in relation to 
cultural practice, which creates the two elements of the humorous incongruity. This 
emerges as she gives examples, not of weakness or temptation, but of actual conscious 
evaluation of her faith. Bednall explains this: `She does draw a distinction between the 
`cultural things I don't believe in, like arranged marriages', and her faith. But, as she 
also accepts, faith is a personal matter, and the distinctions she makes are subtle and 
individual' (Bedell, 2003). Mirza's presentation of both temptation and evaluation 
represent the resolution of cultural practice and identity in her comedy as a form of 
ambivalence. It is likely that the success of this material is related to its collective 
purchase with her audience. 39 
Conclusion 
The chapter began by defining a reversed discourse, by giving historical context and 
connecting the idea with studies that examine humour as a means of resisting dominant 
power relations. In line with this, I outlined how black comedians reproduce stereotypes 
from embodied and cultural racism in order to produce resistance meaning. After this, I 
outlined some of the ambivalences that are negotiated in Asian comedy, through an 
39 In more recent material, Mirza, like Djalili, has begun to move away from ethnic joking. On 
this she says `I have to tell the truth about being Shazia Mirza, not some Asian woman from 
Birmingham' (Mirza in Akbar, 2006: 27). Akbar adds that, `[t]he material for her current show, 
Fun, focuses on shoplifting from budget fashion stores and waxing body hair rather than the 
trials and tribulations of being a British Muslim' (ibid). This movement does not detract from 
the rhetorical reading of her earlier material. 
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examination of stereotypes and ambivalence. The discussion of proteophobia and 
proteophilia towards the end of various sections examines how definitions of the 
`other', in both racist and reversed humour, is a dynamic process that despite 
determined attempts, lacks the fixity that racism, proteophobia and proteophilia desire. 
The overriding observation from the chapter though, is an understanding of the 
polysemicity of this humour, and from this, a consideration that reversal in humour is 
never automatically `successful'. In fact, reversal humour throws into doubt the very 
notion of `success' in humour. As humour increases its structural polysemia through the 
material of reversal, ambiguity increases, fixed meaning becomes even less likely to 
appear and the potential for multifarious political and ethical interpretations map 
themselves onto the socio-linguistic space. In the next chapter I will examine 
`postmodern humour', which multiples the lack of fixity in humour and removes the 




Postmodern Humour: The Case of Ali G and Borat 
Introduction 
Chapter Five observed how reversed discourses, created and articulated by the `other', 
act as a form of resistance to humorous and non-humorous embodied and cultural 
racism. The chapter also explained how this reversed humour contains a significant 
polysemia, because while the comedy acts as an intentional diversion of racist 
semantics it occurs through the re-employment of identical or similar sign-systems that 
have the potential to re-convey the `original' racism. In building on this identification of 
polysemia, this chapter presents a further complication in race and ethnic humour and 
illustrates `postmodern humour' and the `liquid racism' that can appear in it. 
The polysemic element present in all humour, and which increases in reserved 
discourses, is multiplied in postmodern humour at the expense of a dissipation, or 
alongside a disguise of, authorial intention. The chapter highlights postmodern humour 
and liquid racism in Sacha Baron Cohen's characters Ali G and Borat, as well as a 
number of other television and cinematic comic acts. Liquid racism is presented as a 
complicated, ambiguous and diluted form of postmodern racism. 
The chapter begins with a description of postmodern humour as a distinct type that 
exhibits Bauman's characteristics of postmodemity. This definition is distinguished 
from the cliched assumption of the postmodern mood as ironic - of a conflation between 
comic irony and societal ambiguity. Second, I give a definition of liquid racism as the 
polysemic and elusive racism of postmodemity, including postmodern humour, one that 
requires reflexivity in the viewer, and one that often involves real people in its 
performance. After this, an introduction of the central protean protagonist - Ali G- 
explains why he is ambiguous and how his misidentification aids his ambiguity. The 
discussion of liquid racism follows this. Ali G is described as expressing three strands 
of liquid racism. These are labelled `postmodern minstrelsy', `ethno-cultural hybrid 
racism' and `anti-Asian racism'. It is the combination of the three, and the erasure they 
inflict on each other, that renders these forms liquid. The chapter also charts the 
appearance around Ali G of both of Bauman's tropes for ambivalence removal, 
proteophobia and proteophilia. The penultimate section outlines some non-racist themes 
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in Baron Cohen's comedy that add to the polysemia and encourage analytic confusion. 
Finally, Baron Cohen's character Borat Sagdiyev is then examined as a second 
postmodern character, particularly influenced by Jewish humour. 
Postmodern Humour 
For Bauman, postmodernity and liquid modernity are social formations whose central 
characteristic is the notable multiplication in the appearance and experience of 
ambivalence. 0 Primarily created by the disembedding effects of globalisation, Bauman 
describes ambivalence as nebulous in these social formations, as appearing in the 
political sphere, the economic, in relationships with others and in concepts of personal 
identity. I propose that postmodern humour is the humorous product of postmodernity 
and reflects its construction as a form of humour with a noticeable multiplication of 
ambiguity. This ambiguity exists as a surplus to that needed to construct humorous 
incongruity. 
Before any more detail is given on this definition, I explain what I do not mean by 
postmodern humour - specifically the distinction between my definition of postmodern 
humour and popular notion of the postmodern zeitgeist as broadly ironic. While 
postmodern humour is a particular type of humour in postmodernity, irony is a trope 
that has been identified in a multiplicity of social and historical contexts. 
40 The difference between Bauman's definitions of `postmodernity' and `liquid modernity' are 
slight. The term `liquid modernity' replaces 'postmodemity' in Bauman's work, first, because of 
the potential confusion in popular and numerous uses of `postmodernity', and second, because of 
the metaphorical potential he exploits from the term `liquid', which is used to describe social 
formations that have less fixity than traditional modern social formations. For example, Bauman 
describes how: 
We are now passing from the `solid' to the `fluid' phase of modernity; and `fluids' 
are so called because they cannot keep their shape for long, and unless they are 
poured into a tight container they keep changing shape under the influence of even 
the slightest of forces... Frames, when (if) they are available, should not be 
expected to last for long. They will not be able to withstand all that leaking, 
seeping, trickling, spilling - sooner rather than later they will drench, soften, 
contort and decompose. (2004b: 51) 
See Bauman (2000,2003,2005) for numerous examples of the metaphorical potential exploited 
from the term 'liquid modernity'. As stated in Chapter Two, I see no real difference between the 
concept described by the terms and use `postmodernity' as the dominant label. 
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In congruence with what I do not mean by postmodern humour, Pye describes how it 
is popular to view the comic or the ironic as `particularly appropriate to the crisis of 
representation which characterises the postmodern mood' (2006: 53), that there is a 
`current tendency to confuse self-conscious, self-reflexive modes of expression with 
irony and the comic' (ibid: 64). This view of the postmodern conflates the comic or 
ironic with postmodern ambivalence, ambiguity or uncertainty, and produces a reduced, 
inflexible and overly positive or celebratory notion of postmodernity, and an equally ill- 
defined and exaggerated depiction of postmodern humour. Put simply, irony is not the 
same as ambivalence. 
Expressing this problematic conception, Flieger suggests the postmodern represents, 
`an active embrace of the uncertainties of discourse' (Flieger, 1991: 21 in ibid: 62), and 
that, `the comic subject is both pervasive and elusive, ubiquitous and absent, 
everywhere and nowhere in the postmodern maze' (Flieger, 1991: 7 in ibid). 
Alternatively, we can, through Bauman, see that to view the denizens of postmodernity 
as `ambivalent subjects' rather than `comic subjects', that is, subjects confronted with 
ambivalence, provides a far wider description of the range of postmodern situations and 
experiences - both `good' and `bad' - that social actors experience. Flieger's 
explanation of interactions with postmodern elements as an `embrace' is a flawed 
analysis, and while I do not embrace Bauman's obvious pessimism, postmodern 
humour will not receive prior wholesale celebration or conflation. 
Inaccuracy arises in some accounts because ambiguity, ambivalence, incongruity 
and paradox construct humour and characterise postmodernity, but this does not mean 
that all postmodern formations are funny or that all incongruities are postmodern. 
Chapter One explained that not all incongruities are humorous, and so an appreciation 
of the wider paradoxes of discourse and knowledge in a postmodern setting cannot 
coherently be taken to equal an extension of the comic. Pye encapsulates this sentiment, 
adding that the comic in postmodernity has been `misused as a cover-all substitute for 
broad notions of ambiguity and incongruity' (ibid: 63). Bauman clearly does not do 
this, and the lexicon of postmodern ambivalence is firmly established and repeated in 
his work, but I would like to remove any confusion for the reader in my use of the term 
`postmodern humour', which specifically is not the image of irony or comic irony as the 
zeitgeist of postmodernity. Postmodern humour is, therefore, a particular type of 
ambivalent humour, rather than irony per se, which is a much older literary trope. 
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As a manifestation of the postmodern, the constitution of postmodern humour will 
not wholly fit into particular or traditional humorous genres. Principally, it is humour 
that has multiple characteristics and gives multiple readings. Likewise, these readings 
will provoke ambiguity because the semantics of one may inflict erasure on others, and 
indeed, the trenchant acceptance of a particular reading may involve erasure as a 
necessary constituent. It will be funny for more than one reason and not funny for more 
than one reason. It will be understood on many levels and not understood on many 
levels. It is humour that is postmodern in the sense that Bauman describes the 
postmodern as an expression of unfinishability - it is humour whose readings and 
critical interpretations remain unfinished and unfinishable. The increased level of 
ambiguity in postmodern humour will also impact on its potential for rhetorical effect. 
The functionality of the humour will be increasingly confused and unpredictable, and 
may be said to be `strained' so that no one rhetorical interpretation is allowed time to 
develop. Social actors will find the fleeting appearance of fixed meaning more difficult 
to draw on as a content for a rhetorical device. In terms of its relation to irony, one 
element of postmodern humour may be an ironic reading, but this need not be a 
constituent of it. It may, therefore, contain more than one particular trope or structure. 
This exemplifies the ambivalence of postmodern humour. 
Liquid Racism 
Postmodern humour will produce numerous particular meanings as an assemblage and 
in some instances any or all of these meanings can be racist. This layered racism, or 
racism inside layers, is called `liquid racism'. In Chapter Two, I explained a preference 
for the term `liquid racism' rather than `post-racism' because the former does not 
literally suggest that we have moved to a state of society beyond racism, as post-racism 
would. Liquid racism confronts us as a different form of racism with which to deal, one 
that is fluid, one that is difficult to collect or to identify because it may escape or 
dissolve before it can be contained, and one that is explicitly encouraged and given 
coverage in particular forms of media. This is a racism that requires reflexivity in the 
reader as questions are asked on its meaning, social impact or implications for the self. 
Bauman, while imprecise on the issue, describes the dominant racism in 
postmodernity and liquid modernity as one that resembles cultural racism (1997a, 
1997b). Cultural racism represents a definition of racism via its semantic content. 
Liquid racism is an additional and specifically structural form and one whose 
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characteristics match those of postmodernity. Despite its elusiveness, liquid racism can 
appear as a structural form that is a reproduction of either embodied or culturally racist 
sign-systems. Chapter Four saw how cultural racism, in comparison to older racisms, 
becomes more complex and increasingly able to deny its racism - its content becomes 
manipulatively polysemic. This is not identical to the structured polysemia of liquid 
racism, which might see its own intentionality erased rather than disguised. Liquid 
racism also has the potential for a curtailed duration and can appear alongside quite 
contradictory or divergent meanings that encourage this curtailment, as racism is seen, 
then disguised, by the other available meanings. 
Racist semantics usually stay in one place and are critiqued on the basis of staying in 
that one place and not becoming non-racist semantics. Liquid racism in humour dilutes 
any fixity of interpretation and so leaves the task of critique, and that of the reflexive 
reader, more difficult. In analysing this problem, we can accept that while racism may 
be difficult to locate from outside of particular readings, it can still be experienced in 
one or more of the particular meanings or readings. It is, therefore, a hidden or furtive 
racism. Critiquing it involves recording the assemblage, highlighting its connection to 
pre-existing embodied and cultural racism and highlighting any non-racist meanings 
that may work to conceal or remove liquid racism, implicitly or explicitly, accidentally 
or deliberately. It also involves critiquing the media forms that encourage it. It should 
be emphasised that while the humour has many meanings, any racist meanings still 
have the potential for racist effects, but these are more confused. 
Chapter Two explained that postmodern humour will create a saturation of slippages 
and meanings, and prevents a dominant or solid connection of rhetorical effect and 
serious racist discourse, or makes the linkage seem less solid from particular angles. 
Hence the rhetorical effects created by a relatively stable expression of comic meaning 
are unlikely to be reproduced. While an increased level of ambiguity would present 
more opportunities for a divergence of literal meaning and so might suggest an increase 
in potential rhetorical generation, this generation is propelled in numerous directions 
and so does not develop the same level of collective or naturalised ideological presence. 
It represents, in essence, a mixing of metaphors. This contrasts sharply with the 
embodied and culturally racist humour presented in Chapters Three and Four, where the 
recurring similarity of meaning and relative lack of semantic movement outside of the 
particular rhetorical incongruity of humour can produce rhetorical effects and reinscribe 
truth perceptions. Because of this difference, any racist discourse will only appear 
momentarily in postmodern humour - forming liquid racism - and overall these 
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processes, while showing an increase in ambiguity, will curtail the potential for 
postmodern humour to act rhetorically to remove ambivalence and anxiety from racism. 
It is, therefore, less effective as a form of functional humour. 
The Ambiguity of Ali G 
Ali G is a comic character created and performed by Sacha Baron Cohen, a British Jew 
and graduate of Cambridge University. Having originally appeared on The 11 O'Clock 
Show, a Channel 4 comedy first aired in 1998, Baron Cohen's Ali G has since hosted a 
number of his own series and starred in a feature film entitled Ali G Indahouse, The 
Movie. In 2003, Baron Cohen exported Ali G to the United States for two HBO seasons 
of Da Ali G Show. Both have been broadcast in the UK by Channel 4 as Ali G in da 
USAiii and like his other material, are available on DVD and video. Most recently, one 
of these began on Channel 4 in September 2006. For those unfamiliar with the 
character, Ali G can best be described as constructed through the incongruity of a 
young working class, possibly white or Asian, inhabitant of Staines in Berkshire 
pretending to be a stereotypical, poorly educated, sexist, homophobic, possibly black, 
male inhabitant of a US ghetto, with interests in gang warfare, drug culture and gangsta 
rap. 
The ethnic or racial identity of Ali G is ambiguous. All G frequently implies that 
he is black or a `brother' - one of his most famed catchphrases is, `is it 'cos I is 
black? '. An early utterance of the phrase came at an environmental protest, during a 
conversation between All G and a police officer. 
Ali G: `Is it possible for us to get in? ' [to the site of the protest] 
Police officer: `Not at this stage, because it's still dangerous. ' 
AG: `Is it 'cos I is black? ' 
PO: `No not at all. ' 
(Baron Cohen, 1999) 
Despite his claims of being black, which are often believed or not challenged, the 
character is played by Baron Cohen who is a white male. As Howells explains: `Baron 
Cohen is white; he does not `black up' (that is to say darken his face with stage make- 
up) to play the character' (2006: 159). 
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Following the rise of Ali G, media commentary and debate sprang up to discuss the 
character's ethnicity and ethnic ambiguity, with some describing him as funny, satirical 
and positive, while others saw him as offensive and racist. This exemplifies the media 
interest that liquid racism encourages. In essence, this reversed the pattern presented by 
earlier race humour, where dichotomous racist language is given rhetorical support in 
jokes. In the case of Ali G, a racially ambiguous character is discussed in serious 
discourse, a realm with different rules, and defined and dichotomised in a response to 
its liquidity. The comic then responds with further protean representations. 
In terms of authorial intention, Baron Cohen rarely discusses his comedy. When he 
has, the comments have been meagre and uncomplicated. In a rare example, originally 
printed in the New York Times, and reproduced in the Guardian, he defines the appeal 
of the character: 
Virginia Heffernan: Why is Ali G so funny? 
Sacha Baron Cohen: It's a pretty simple joke, which is why even some kids get it. 
Essentially you have two people who look totally different - one guy dressed in an 
absurd yellow jumpsuit, and the other guys dressed in a suit. They're speaking in 
different ways, with different body language and totally different levels of 
intelligence. (Heffernan, 2004) 
This rare authorial explanation highlights how Ali G is, in part, created from the 
juxtaposition of differences in dress, mannerisms, speech and intelligence, yet nothing 
is said about the relationship between Ali G's race or ethnicity and the laughter he 
provokes. By 2004 much debate had taken place and it is inconceivable that Baron 
Cohen was unaware of the media debates that surrounded Ali G, so this statement 
probably represents a deliberate simplification, at a late point in the debate, as a further 
attempt to subvert or confuse. In line with a post-structuralist stance on authorial 
intention, it would not just be naive to privilege this statement over others, it would 
specifically ignore the semantic assemblage generated by All G, which these comments 
fail to account for. 
Non-authorial interpretations of Ali G's racial or ethnic identity form a tripartite 
typology, with media debate focusing on which is most correct (e. g. Gibson, 2000; 
Younge, 2000). These explanations suggest that Sacha Baron Cohen, in performing Ali 
G, is a white Jewish man who is; 
0 pretending to be black 
0 pretending to be another white man pretending to be black 
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" pretending to be an Asian pretending to be black 
The three interpretations provoke a semantic correlation with three forms of liquid 
racism. These are discussed later as respectively: 
0 postmodern minstrelsy 
9 ethno-cultural hybrid racism 
" anti-Asian racism 
Although Ali G's racial ambivalence exists from the beginning, it is also possible to 
identify three presentational stages or styles in the material that encourage further 
ambiguity. These are: 
" the hoax interviewer 
0 the celebrity interviewer or `celeactor' 
0 the film subject 
When different interpretations or hints at fixed racial identity are presented in each of 
these, further layering takes place. 
In the original `hoax interviewer' stage, Ali G interviews public figures, politicians, 
various officials and members of the public under the guise of being a television 
presenter of youth educational programmes. In this stage most of the jokes centre on 
differences in language use between the habitus of the `street' and the `establishment'. 
At this point Ali G is anonymous and participants treat him `seriously', and when he 
makes claims of being black they appear to be accepted without question (Baron Cohen, 
1999). All G in da USA iii (Baron Cohen, 2003) reconstructs the original format through 
exporting his hoax interview act to the US at a time when All G was unknown across 
the Atlantic, although All G's visits to the US began much earlier as his UK celebrity 
status increased (e. g. Ali G visiting the FBI, NASA and the NRA in Ali G Aiii [Baron 
Cohen, 2000]). 
From the second series onwards, entitled Ali G, Afii (ibid) in its video or DVD 
format, his unknown aspect had dissipated in the UK and Baron Cohen could only 
occasionally rely on the persona of the hoax youth television presenter in interviews 
with more naive or detached social actors. Due to his popularity (which was in part 
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fuelled by his ambiguity), Ali G had become a celebrity, and a celebrity interviewer. 
Rojek describes All G as a `celeactor': `celeactors are adjuncts of the mass-media. They 
cater to the public appetite for a character type that sums up the times' (2001: 23). If the 
zeitgeist of postmodernity is one of increased ambivalence, then All G can be seen as a 
celeactor for it. As Bauman states, `[i]n our liquid modern times, when the free-floating, 
unencumbered individual is the popular hero, `being fixed' - being `identified' 
inflexibly and without retreat - gets an increasingly bad press' (2004b: 29). In this 
second stage, participants realise that he is not a `real' person and participate for comic 
value rather than with serious intent. Ali G's Comic Relief interview of David and 
Victoria Beckham represents an example (Baron Cohen, 2001b). At this point, 
ambiguous claims of ethnic membership are not treated seriously and become a central 
part of the joke for the participants as well as the audience. 
Finally, Ali G becomes the subject of a film in Alf G Indahouse, The Movie (Baron 
Cohen, 2002). While the film appears to offer resolution of All G's racial ambiguity, it 
can be read to play with this ambiguity. For example, the film frequently distinguishes 
between Ali G remembering the past and imagining the future, dreaming or fantasising. 
All memories of the past depict Ali G as a white male with a now abandoned dress 
sense closer to that of a heavy metal than hip hop fan. All fantasies depict All G as a 
black male. While this might support the notion of Ali G as a `wigger', as a white man 
pretending to be black, the film is occasionally interrupted, through the use of a split 
screen, by the `real' Ali G, which serves to additionally layer or `fictionalise' the film. 
The interjection of Ali G is a firm reflection of the `sly' All who is popularly applauded 
by some (Gilroy, 2002,2004), and is the version of All G most closely associated with 
displaying `convincing' ethnic ambiguity. 
Coupled with the various racial meanings in the performance, these stages create a 
complex matrix of meanings for Ali G, which is perhaps unrivalled by any other comic 
performance. Exemplary of postmodern humour, Baron Cohen's Ali G produces 
multiple meanings simultaneously, none of which, we will see, can be privileged 
unproblematically in terms of situational logic, textual stability or the preferential 
intention of the author. 
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Seeing Ali G as `Real' 
Coupled with the ambiguities Ali G encourages, the character also undergoes a process 
of misidentification - of seeing Ali G as a real person - that, paradoxically, through 
giving the impression of a fixed identity, serves to increase the occurrence of 
situationally specific readings and thus overall ambiguity. 
Unlike most comedians Baron Cohen rarely gives interviews. By providing no 
answers to the `problem' of All G, he encourages media debate over the meaning of the 
character, fuelling speculation on the intended or preferred meaning. This silence has 
two connected effects: first, it constructs Baron Cohen as a personality who presents a 
semantic void, and second, it leads to the misidentification of Ali G as a real person or 
the celebrity that Baron Cohen does not become. For example, it is Ali G, not Baron 
Cohen, who attends the premier of Ali G Indahouse, The Movie (Baron Cohen, 2002), 
and is photographed meeting the protesters who argue the character depicts racism (see 
Kelso, 2002). 
Baron Cohen's encouragement of this process of authorial void and character 
misidentification is highlighted in the following depiction of the rehearsals for the 2002 
Brit Awards, where only Ali G is seen: 
Only one performer rehearsed in full kit: Ali G, in a gold Lurex jump suit. He has 
no day wear. He's either full on or he simply doesn't exist. Sacha Baron Cohen, the 
Jewish Cambridge graduate who performs him, will not let himself and his creation 
appear anywhere together. While Ali G speaks, Baron Cohen stays silent, never 
giving interviews... The separation is total. (Rayner, 2002) 
The misidentification of Ali G is expressed in responses to the character, responses 
that also discuss his racial identity. Howells records one from a black comedian: 
Roger D ... admitted that he found the comedy effective while stating: "Ali G is a 
white Jewish guy taking on this black persona". Roger D's statement, however, is 
both less precise and more revealing than it originally appears. D says that `Ali is a 
white Jewish guy... ' What he does not say is 'Sacha Baron Cohen is a white 
Jewish guy... ' (Roger D in Slater, 2000, quoted in Howells, 2006: 166. Original 
emphasis) 
This misidentification is repeated by Linda Lee-Potter in the Daily Mail (Lee-Potter, 
2002), which is discussed later as a proteophobic response. Howells does not add 
specific discussion. on the effect of this misidentification, but does invoke a metaphor to 
describe the style of impersonation Baron Cohen uses in the Ali G act: `[a] more fitting 
metaphor... might be of the music-hall ventriloquist whose doll speaks and behaves 
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perversely to the feigned embarrassment of the performer and the delight of the 
audience' (2006: 164). This metaphor can be extended with the addition of the idea of 
Baron Cohen as a semantic void. It is precisely the image of the doll mimicking the 
man that Ali G becomes, talking without its master, as he is misplaced as real. 
The misidentification of Ali G serves to increase the ambiguity of the character. 
This is achieved because, and in a paradoxical fashion, the view of All G as a real 
person allows individuals to attribute real socio-structural characteristics to All G. This 
allows us to ask: `What is All G? '. We forget that All G exists in a realm without the 
rules of serious identity formation. The question remains plausible because All G is 
seen as a fixed entity -a personality - rather than a comic incongruity which could, 
following the logic of the absurd, be racially protean. While the content of the comedy 
is ostensibly constructed from various racial markers, many accounts do not describe 
Ali G as essentially protean, seeing `him' as fundamentally person-like. This serves to 
multiply the overall ambiguity of the character because it allows for the entrenchment 
of more than one `plausible' explanation to develop, each of which is tied to a fixed 
reading of a misidentified persona. This process is no doubt encouraged because Ali G 
interacts with real people in an everyday context. 
Three Liquid Racist Readings 
This section outlines the three central readings of Ali G that form liquid racism and 
became the focus of media debate. These are, those that see Baron Cohen, in 
performing Ali G, as a white Jewish man pretending to be black - which creates a form 
of liquid racism labelled `postmodern minstrelsy'; those that see Baron Cohen as a 
white Jewish man who is pretending to be another white man pretending to be black - 
which is labelled `ethno-cultural hybrid racism'; and those that see Baron Cohen as a 
white Jewish man who is pretending to be an Asian pretending to be black - which 
connects with `anti-Asian racism'. Before that though, I briefly introduce relevant 
academic responses to Ali G. 
In addition and in response to media and public reactions, there has also been an 
amount of academic focus on All G, which both celebrates the character and situates it 
in relation to racism. However, most academic identifications of racist meaning remain 
tentative, and are often caught up in the liquid aspects of the debate. 
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Gilroy (2002,2004) presents perhaps the most celebratory commentary on Ali G, 
arguing that he, `for a year or two recently managed to encapsulate all the larger 
political moral debates over the character and direction of contemporary British social 
life' (2004: 78). Gilroy gives a rather pious reading of Ali G, which will be discussed in 
detail later as an expression of proteophilia. Rojek (2001) paints All G in a still positive 
but less celebratory light, arguing that: 
Some sections of the media have criticised Cohen for perpetuating racist and sexist 
stereotypes. Yet a careful reading of Ali G reveals that the comedy operates to 
deflate cant and humbug, whether articulated by racists and sexists or by those 
elected to serve as our moral guardians. (2001: 24) 
The satirical purpose in Ali G is clearer in the earlier comedy that Rojek is writing 
about, but it is difficult to see how much of the later material, when Ali G is most like 
Rojek's `celeactor', achieves any satirical impact. 
While Nobil Ahmad (2002) describes All G's creator as a `rich racist jew' (2002: 
82), most academic discussions of racism in All G are more sophisticated and less racist 
than this. Malik (2002) explains how black comedians' criticisms of Ali G `touch on 
broader issues around how Black comedians still feel their performance repertoires and 
points of access are restricted' (2002: 104). Lockyer and Pickering (2005c) also provide 
a critical assessment of Ali G, arguing that: 
The impersonation is neither susceptible to being used in a two-way manner, nor 
amenable to being used by blacks themselves... Since it is not it tends to block 
subversion of the stereotype from within, and encourage its reinforcement from 
without. (Lockyer and Pickering, 2005c: 196) 
In an account most comparable to my own, Howells (2006) asks how it is that 
Baron Cohen can get away with his act and why outrage is not provoked in times as 
sensitive to race as ours. Arguing that Ali G is polysemic, Howells dissects the comedy 
to `help explain why Baron Cohen's act is greeted with amusement rather than odium' 
(2006: 164), arguing that first impressions would suggest that, `[s]urely on such 
combustible matters of race, stereotyping and prejudice, people should be queuing up to 
take offence at this privileged, middle-class white comedian and his apparent mockery 
of black `street' culture' (ibid: 160). In downplaying the existence of criticism, 
suggesting that `there was some criticism, but the alleged outrage was, in reality, hard 
to find' (ibid), Howells sees the polysemia as crucial for explaining why All G is 
generally well received. For Howells, the polysemic elements are, first, that All G is an 
impersonation, which distances Baron Cohen from the character (ibid: 164), second, an 
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example of the humour of transgression - that `the audience actually wants Ali G to 
transgress the boundaries of acceptable behaviour' (ibid: 165), and third, that Baron 
Cohen has remained out of the media spotlight (ibid). Howells goes on to identify the 
three central readings of Ali G's racial identity before concluding that `[m]y optimism 
lies... in the public reaction to him... the discussion in all sections of the media has 
been essentially intelligent, sophisticated and constructive... [and that] [w]e needn't 
always be embarrassed to talk about race in the future' (ibid: 171). 
I diverge from Howells on a number of points. Howells concentrates on the effect of 
the polysemia as significant for the All G act not being denounced as racist. Rather than 
Howells' three point explanation for why Ali G is not denounced, it is the combination 
of racist readings, each erasing the others, that make critics tentative. Moreover, 
elements of the comic audience may be specifically attracted to this liquid racism and 
enjoy laughing at the `other' without racist guilt (consciously or unconsciously), which 
because of its construction, would soon drain away (or be removed by serious 
discussion). In essence, I do not share Howells' acceptance of the benevolence of all of 
the Ali G audience towards otherness. While there are a number of similarities between 
the polysemia of Ali G outlined by Howells and my own, I emphasise how the 
polysemia seeks to present race meaning that is liquid, slippery and thus harder to pin 
down - but paradoxically easier to debate. So while Howells looks positively at the Ali 
G debate as an emerging discussion of race, I distil the racist readings, emphasising 
how a variety of racist laughs can be extracted from Ali G, but which erase each other 
when combined, and see the debate as a dichotomous media construction that disallows 
more sophisticated interpretations. 
Postmodern Minstrelsy 
The first liquid racism in Ali G is labelled `postmodern minstrelsy'. Traditional 
blackface minstrelsy is a genre well known for its display of a wide range of race and 
racist stereotypes, and had an infamous success in mainstream media. The idea of All G 
as a minstrel act occurs because he conforms to a stereotypical black street culture, 
specifically through dress and use of accessories, mannerisms, speech and behaviour. 
The behaviour mimics a stereotype of young black males, both British and American, 
whose cultural background are said to emerge from a combination of Rastafarian 
influences and US or global hip hop consumer culture. Importantly though, All G does 
not black-up and this is the key element of ambiguity in this reading that allows for 
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other readings to erase it. This missing element makes the reading a form of liquid 
racism - it is incomplete. 
In defining minstrelsy, Pickering outlines the collection of stereotypes articulated in 
it: 
Blackface impersonation was built around a repertoire of racially inspired 
stereotypes, many of which confirmed the general conception of `negritude' as 
close to nature, deficient in the faculty of reason, naturally prone to indolence, 
indissolubly tied to bodily pleasures and incapable either of engagement with the 
higher arts or of participation in any significant social achievement. (1994: 313) 
The minstrelsy of Al Jolson in his films Mammy (1930) and Big Boy (1930), the latter 
being an adaptation of Jolson's stage play of the same name, are well known examples 
of a genre that displayed race stereotypes of embodied, cultural and linguistic 
characteristics. British Minstrelsy dates back to the 1830s and was a staple of BBC light 
entertainment in the form of the radio show The Kentucky Minstrels from 1933 to 1950, 
and as the television programme The Black and White Minstrel Show from 1957 to 
1973 (Pickering, 1994: 311). 
Aside from Ali G, there are other representations of minstrelsy in comedy that 
appear postmodern. Reeves and Mortimer (1993) present a series of sketches in which 
they provide the faces and voices for blacked-up puppets of Otis Redding and Marvin 
Gaye, sitting on the dock of the bay. The sketches have received criticism, with 
Thompson arguing that, 
[a]n Anglo-supremacist strand persists in what you might call the neo-colonial 
school of British comedy - i. e. those who are influenced by Milligan above all 
others - from Reeves and Mortimer being unable to understand why anyone should 
be offended by them blacking up as Marvin Gaye and Smokey Robinson [sic] to 
Harry Hill's mystifying insistence that there is something intrinsically funny about 
the name of Channel 4 newsreader Zeinab Badawi. (Thompson, 2004: 326) 
Despite Thompson's comment, the absurdism of the sketches comes nowhere near 
reflecting any of the behavioural race stereotypes of minstrelsy. All that connects the 
sketches to minstrelsy is the use of blackface, which is also removed in the second 
series (perhaps as a respectful response to criticism), and the characters are distanced 
further by the use of high-pitched Yorkshire accents. Reeves and Mortimer's absurdism 
severs any connection with racism as the ambiguous combination of elements leaves the 
" Thompson comments that Reeves and Mortimer imitate Marvin Gaye and Smokey Robinson. 
The characters in the sketch are in fact Marvin Gaye and Otis Redding. Reeves plays Otis 
Redding and Mortimer plays Marvin Gaye (Reeves and Mortimer, 1993: 36). 
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reflexive reader at a distance from traditional racist meaning. The surreal black comedy 
The League of Gentlemen also use a blackface character - Papa Lazarou - who as a 
Romany traveller, has the profession of door-to-door peg salesman that he uses as a 
front for `wife collecting'. This involves kidnapping women (League of Gentlemen, 
2001,2002). The character is more problematic and essentially aggressive, yet its 
postmodern and satirical dimensions remain, and like most of the characters in The 
League of Gentlemen, intentionality and exact readings are hard to pinpoint. 
These characters show the diversity, and lack of connection, between postmodern 
minstrels. Returning to Ali G, while the painted blackface acted as a central, unifying 
signifier in minstrelsy, and Baron Cohen does not `black-up', most of the stereotypes 
mentioned above do appear. To reiterate, the lack of blackface in Ali G serves to 
encourage its liquid dimension. 
A number of minstrel stereotypes directly appear in Ali G. For example, the 
indolence of Ali G is wonderfully expressed when he asks Tony Benn, `Netha mind the 
right to work, what about the right to be lazy? ' (Baron Cohen, 1999). `Clowning' is one 
irreverent characteristic that appears in minstrelsy (Pickering, 1994: 313), and in Ali G. 
Pickering adds that minstrelsy displayed the blackface characters through `physical 
aggression, a propensity to be light-fingered, an entrenched aversion to work and an 
incorrigible fondness for drinking, smoking and shooting dice' (ibid: 317). All of these 
stereotypes appear in Ali G and descriptions of him (with the exception of shooting 
dice). 
Malapropisms are also used both by minstrels and Ali G. In The Kentucky Minstrels, 
in a typical minstrel conversation, `[b]oth `Cuth' and `Puss' regularly misused items of 
half-digested vocabulary. For example, in the show transmitted on 14`h October 1942, 
Cuthbert exclaimed: "honest Puss, your ignoricity amazes me" thus manifesting his 
own `ignoricity' in the process' (ibid: 318). All G has many malapropisms of his own. 
He asks the President of the FBI Agents Association: `what is integeration? ', a boy in a 
wheelchair is told: `this is serious, you is a real disablist? ' and when boasting he says: 
`that's nothing, I have done it with Kate Moss' [putting his finger to his earpiece] 
`what?... Illegibly' (Baron Cohen, 2000). His book The Gospel According to Ali G has 
a vocabulary littered with spelling errors, phonetic spellings and colloquialisms related 
to `street' culture (Baron Cohen, 2001a). Such examples suggest that Lockyer and 
Pickering are correct to argue that, `we have inevitably to ask if or to what extent Ali G 
represents a latter-day version of the practice of blacking-up' (2005c: 195). 
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This complaint was also debated in the media. During 2000, at the height of All G's 
ethnic ambiguity, The Guardian held an 'Ali G debate' which presented opinions from 
black comedians first published in New Nation. Curtis Walker provides damming 
criticism, comparing All G with Al Jolson: 
The only real voice of dissent among the six black comedians interviewed for the 
New Nation article came from Curtis Walker, who called Baron Cohen and his 
material `quite offensive'. He claimed that Baron Cohen was trading cliches and 
stereotypical language in an act reminiscent of Al Jolson and former British TV 
series Love Thy Neighbour. He found it `degrading and sad' that Ali G was 
catching people's attention and even being featured in New Nation. `I don't like 
the concept of a white guy playing a black guy anyway and when he is playing to a 
stupid stereotype it is even worse. People have to ask themselves just what it is 
they are laughing at'. (Howells, 2006: 161) 
Two years later, at the premier of Ali G Indahouse (2002), Peter Akinti, the editor of 
Untold, organised a protest against Ali G on the basis that the act is racist: 
He is the new Al Jolson - he's effectively blacked up to take the piss out of a 
stereotype of young black men that is deeply offensive. He is a white Jewish 
Cambridge graduate, and uses the word `nigger' and asks `Is it 'cos I is Black'. 
(Kelso, 2002) 
While there are debated readings of minstrelsy, and we saw in Chapter Five that it too 
was polysemic, many elements of minstrelsy appear in Ali G. The postmodern 
minstrelsy presented forms a liquid racism, it is not as solid as the original form and the 
partiality of each depiction adds to this. It is also specifically presented as a coherent 
reading in media debate. So while Walker and Akinti highlight the reading of Ali G as 
a minstrel, they miss the necessary ambivalent and liquid aspects of the performance 
that erase this meaning. In the case of Ali G, the partiality is encouraged by the lack of 
blackface and the appearance of other meanings. One other liquid racist meaning that 
submerges postmodern minstrelsy is ethno-cultural hybrid racism. 
Ethno-Cultural Hybrid Racism 
At one point in All G Indahouse, The Movie, All G thinks back to when he first met his 
girlfriend, `me Julie', on the dance floor of a night club. In the flashback, Ali G is a 
white man with shoulder length hair, dressed in a grungy vest top reminiscent of the 
attire of a heavy metal fan. This scene represents the clearest authorial statement on the 
character's ethnicity - that he is a _`wigger' -a 
white man pretending to be black. lt is 
supported in the film when All G wins the Staines by-election and is announced by the 
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returning officer as Alistair Graham. Interestingly, of the three readings of his racial 
identity, this is most often described as satirical or least problematic. Rather than this, in 
this section I argue that it represents an emerging liquid `ethno-cultural hybrid racism'. 
All G as a `wigger', as a satire of young whites, is described in the extract below 
from a fan posting on the BBC website after the initial airing of Ali G in da USAiii: 
To say he isn't funny either shows a real lack of understanding about the concept 
of Ali, or a lack of a sense of humour. To say he is racist is just plain idiocy - he is 
making a joke of young white Brits who dress and act like black gangsters to the 
point where they are almost convinced they are black gangsters themselves. To 
have to explain this really is disappointing - get a life. Andy, UK. (BBC News, 
2003) 
Howells also describes this meaning: '[t]he assumption here is that All G is a satire on 
British white suburbanites who affect the style and attitude of black (and especially 
American black), inner city gang members' (2006: 166). Gilroy suggests that many 
reactions to the character naively saw that, if he was a `wigger', and `if he was not in 
fact pretending to be black then he could be absolved of the most serious charges of 
cultural theft and exploitation, which make us laugh without making us feel guilty in 
doing so' (2004: 148). Gilroy describes such charges of cultural theft as anachronistic 
while also seeing such real life `wiggers' who mimic the character as `hordes of 
illiterate juveniles and pathetic hedonists ready to hail him as their hero' (ibid: 147). 
Overall, I argue the reading of Ali G as a `wigger' is by no means as unprejudicial as 
these commentaries suggest. 
My critique begins with an outline of the connotations associated with the notions of 
imitation, authentic practice and identity. Ethno-cultural hybridity can be described as 
the mixing of cultures, both those in close proximity to one another or those connected 
by global media, to the extent that they impact and create altered cultural forms. An 
ethno-cultural hybrid racism can be described as a racism directed towards these hybrid 
forms, or parts of these hybrid forms, on the basis that they are `other' and inferior 
because of their inauthenticity and illegitimacy. Harvey Sacks (1995) insightfully 
describes how activity is often interpreted as an imitation if actors transgress social 
boundaries. He explained that: 
If you look especially at the pre-Civil war literature on slaves - and even, indeed, 
some current discussions, and certainly current lay talk on the matter - one gets 
something that can be summarised in the sentence, `Negroes and children are great 
imitators'. (1995: 479) 
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He goes on to explain that to be labelled an imitation relates to: 
"who owns reality" and what the import of owning it or not owning it is for some 
category of persons who are apparently not entitled to be seen to be doing some 
given social action, which they technically are perfectly able to do... the notion 
that, say, an adult Negro is a `terrific imitator' is to say that what he's doing can 
hardly be distinguished from the thing which, if somebody else were doing it, 
would be seen as the real thing. (ibid) 
Sacks shows how competence is sometimes judged not in relation to the ability to 
perform an activity but in relation to the appropriateness of the actor's social position. If 
Ali G is read as a `wigger', he is read as an example of one race imitating another. 
Further to this, he is seen to be childish or silly - socially out of place - in his attempt to 
do this. This childishness is directly born from his `imitating'. Sacks adds that, `[t]o do 
such activities mockingly, kiddingly, and the like, in play, is more or less explicitly to 
recognise that in doing them one is making no claim to doing them seriously' (ibid: 
481). This comment nicely explains the amusement generated from placing the'wigger' 
in humour. 
When something is seen as an imitation a set of questions are asked about the activity 
that are not asked if the activity is seen as authentic, or in the correct social context, and 
in these cases `no matter how many times one does an activity, no matter how well one 
does it, it's never a possession; it's always borrowed' (ibid). Ethno-cultural hybridity and 
its association with mixing and confusion can quite easily become the subject of racist 
humour, as the ridicule of inauthenticity and imitation. This racism depends on the 
ontological premise that white people who have `black' mannerisms are not a part of a 
`genuine' hybrid culture but in fact inauthentic social actors involved in the 
appropriation of `cool' elements of an alien culture. This reading of the authenticity of 
the `wigger' represents a thinly veiled class and race prejudice. 
Humour that uses hybridity can produce racist meanings when laughter is generated 
because one social group shows an amount of ethno-cultural difference, yet from an 
essentialist description of culture, these differences appear mixed or partial, confused, 
diluted or an imitation. The hybrid appears to contain an inherent, even incompatible 
combination of elements. The joker still laughs at racial, ethnic or cultural difference, but 
it is the specific mix of hybrid elements in the `wigger' and their classification as 
imitation that are seen as humorous. So when Ali G says `is it 'cos I is black? ' and the 
audience believe that Ali G is not black but a `wigger', the joke centres on the `wigger' 
being unaware of what he is, or what he should be. This creates a joke because All G 
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does not know what he is; because he actually thinks that he is black, yet he clearly is 
not, and laughs at the hybrid that believes himself to be authentic. This is because, while 
it may appear that we are laughing at racial misidentification, this misidentification 
cannot be disconnected from how misidentification is constructed, which is always a 
definition shaped by status laden readings of social structure. 
Anti Asian Racism 
The third liquid racism in Ali G and media reactions to him is also an ethno-cultural 
hybrid racism but one more concisely described as anti-Asian racism. This liquid 
racism directly relates to the reading of Baron Cohen as a white man pretending to be 
an Asian pretending to be black. 
British Asian hybridity has a recent and progressive record of depiction in comedy, 
which often centres on ambivalence in hybrid identities. The frustrated hybridity of 
Sanjeev in The Kumars at No. 42, many of the sketches in Goodness Gracious Me 
(Bhaskar, S. et al, 1998,1999,2002,2003) and the comedy dramas East is East (2000) 
and Bend it like Beckham (2002) all depict British Asians negotiating ethno-cultural 
hybridity and racism. 
The reading of Ali G as a white man pretending to be an Asian pretending to be 
black is a reading that is not sensitive to Asian hybridity in the same way that any of the 
above examples are. The meaning initially develops because `Ali' is often assumed to 
be an Asian name. Rojek identifies this: `[t]he name `Ali' suggests that the character 
may in fact be of Asian descent, thus embodying another layer within the comedy of 
role and status confusion' (2001: 23-4). Howells explains that, `[t]he concept here is 
that certain young British Asians nowadays adapt the street style of British and 
American blacks because they consider black culture `cooler' than their own' (2006: 
166). While we see Ali G exposed as `Alistair Graham' in Alf G Indahouse, the `truth' 
of this information also becomes a part of the increasing polysemia in other media: 
Interestingly, original series producer Harry Thompson (according to The Sunday 
Times): `suggested the Asian name Ali G, further blurring the character's ethnic 
identity'. They quoted Thompson: `if he had a whiff of Islam about him, we 
thought people would be afraid to challenge him... If Muslims took offence, there 
was a plan to explain that the name was short for "Alistair Graham". (ibid) 
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Ali G as a'wigger', as Alistair Graham, becomes a smokescreen for his Asian identity. 
The polysemia takes hold as the assertion of Ali G as an Asian pretending to be black 
negates the idea of All G as a `wigger' (and vice-versa). 
This reading, like the Ali G as a `wigger' reading, does not receive a great deal of 
criticism on the grounds of racism. Media descriptions often state the meaning without 
seeing it as problematic. Howells quotes two such examples from the Guardian: 
As one impassioned reader wrote to Guardian columnist Gary Younge: `Ali G is 
ASIAN. That's half the joke; Asian guys trying to be cool like black guys'. Stuart 
Jefferies, also writing in the Guardian, agreed that Sacha Baron Cohen was `a 
jewish comedian posing as an Asian wannabe rapper' who `plunders and mangles' 
Caribbean speech patterns and hip-hop culture while at the same time embracing 
the `homophobic and sexist attitudes as well as the drugs purportedly beloved of 
gangsta rappers'. (ibid) 
Jefferies' comments, when read through Sacks' description of the link between 
imitation and social position, can be seen to implicitly authenticate yet degrade black 
culture, while simultaneously ridiculing any emerging Asian hybrid culture as a poor 
imitation. The rhetoric of Jefferies' comments towards black culture disguises this 
degradation by the positioning of positive Caribbean characteristics with the negative 
gangsta rapper characteristics. Once again, there is the implicit assumption that Asian 
Ali G's are downgrading, are embracing an inferior culture, and are mimicking that 
culture badly. 
As in other parts of the polysemia, Baron Cohen includes elements that throw us off 
the scent of the reading and prevent us from viewing it fully. For example, All G makes 
several comments about `pakis' in the third person that would suggest that he is not one 
(Baron Cohen, 1999). He asks Jacob Rees-Mogg, son of the aristocrat Lord Rees-Mogg, 
during a discussion on social class, `what class is pakis in? ' (ibid). Most such comments 
are problematic yet seem to have remained uncriticised because of close-by satirical 
meanings in this early work. The description of this meaning, the comments of 
Thompson on Islam and the potential Muslim All G, lead to the question of why the 
character is not criticised with the same ferocity as other satire aimed at Muslims, for 
example, in comparison to the attention given to the recent Prophet Mohammed 
cartoons (examined in Chapter Seven). It seems that the critique of humour aimed at 
Muslims remains focused on ostensive depictions of stereotypical images of 
fundamentalist Islamists (e. g. The Runnymede Trust, 1997; Modood, 2006a, 2006b, 
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2006c; Sardar, 2006), with characters such as Ali G slipping under the radar. This is 
perhaps encouraged by the character's liquidity. 
Proteophobia and Proteophilia in Reactions to Ali G 
Using Bauman's concepts of `proteophobia' and `proteophilia', I now outline how 
certain media and sociological responses to Ali G have polarised as reactions to 
ambiguity that display adoration or phobia, thus attempting to fix his liquidity. While 
the character himself generates both non-racist and racist meanings, it is argued that 
individual, media and sociological interpretive reactions themselves often form a 
problematic, and in some cases, racist response to Ali G, which fails to accept the 
intrinsic and deliberate ambivalence of the comedy, and which functions specifically to 
remove this ambivalence. 
In Chapters Three, Four and Five we saw how the second element of Wieviorka's 
dual logic of racism - exclusion - is expressed in racist humour as proteophobia. This 
takes the form of derogatory, disposing or destructive images of the `other' in humour, 
and is usually the product of authorial intention. In this chapter and the last, a change in 
tropes aimed at the `other' sees humour become more polysemic and more ambiguous 
in its classification and sentiments towards the `other'. Likewise, as humour becomes 
the property of the `other', proteophilia begins to emerge, with both tropes appearing as 
reactions to the comedians or comic objects. So while the liquid racism of postmodern 
humour has a decreased ability to act rhetorically, the tropes that aid this process are 
still employed to attempt fixity. 
The two concepts are directly applicable to a number of media descriptions 
surrounding Ali G, which contains ambivalence that some descriptions seek to dispel. 
Therefore, certain responses to Ali G react to him as an ambivalent outsider who either 
disturbs the normal methods of defining the content of social space and is in need of 
exile, or attempt to assimilate him into the enjoyment of social space before he is 
similarly discarded. 
To reiterate, proteophobia is fear or hatred of this multiform. Ali G draws on and is 
described by stereotypes that match Bauman's description of stereotypical 
classifications of the outsider. These responses generally originate from the political 
Right. Bauman describes how proteophobia often describes the outsider as being in 
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opposition to rational, non-ambivalent characteristics. These characteristics include 
dirtiness, unreliability, being erratic, laziness, being immoral, dishonest and 
promiscuous (Bauman, 1993: 162). This description of proteophobia matches a 
description and critical attack on Ali G by Linda Lee-Potter in the Daily Mail: 
This week on Radio 1, Ali G poured out a sick torrent of obscenities. He was 
vicious, vile and cruel on a programme which is listened to mostly by children. He 
called Sara Cox a bitch, made suggestive remarks about lesbian sex, ejaculation 
and homosexuals. He then described Gareth Gates... as `spasticated', and rounded 
off his nasty bout of self-indulgence, which he no doubt saw as boldness, by using 
the word `motherf*****' ... 
Ali G feels neither shame nor regret.... because his 
unpleasant, sleazy suggestiveness was planned, orchestrated and deliberate. He 
thinks he's a funny, courageous revolutionary smashing down inhibitions and 
conventions. No doubt he believes that anyone who was shocked is puerile and 
suburban.... Radio 1 has a huge influence on adolescents and the subliminal 
message they receive day in day out is that it's smart to be rude and foul.... The 
BBC still has many qualities but it's time it stopped pandering to the nastiest side 
of human nature. (Lee-Potter, 2002) 
Lee-Potter reacts to Ali G as an individual - she misidentifies him - missing the point 
that this episode, whether offensive or not, was a part of a comic act. The proteophobia 
expressed relates to Ali G, in his misidentified condition, being morally deficient and 
socially alien for Lee-Potter. It can be seen to deal with the anxiety, disgust and 
possible ambivalence provoked in Lee-Potter's normal moral categories. Lee-Potter 
expresses this by describing Ali G with a very specific moral meaning; he is morally 
lax and unpredictable, and she expresses this through her disgust at the type of 
language used at a particular time towards a specific audience, all factors involved in 
the demarcation of social space. It is evident that Lee-Potter's description fits 
Bauman's outline. It is also clear the ambivalence Bauman describes as being generated 
from the stranger/outsider exists and is heightened in Ali G because his multiple 
meanings resist a singular definition. Because of this, it is apparent that this description 
of the character is particularly active in its proteophobia. Exclusion for Lee-Potter 
means that Ali G should not be heard on breakfast radio. 
Proteophobic reactions to Ali G also occur from people he encounters in person. For 
example, the vitriolic reaction of the environmental protester in Ali G, innit (Baron 
Cohen, 1999) displays anger because Ali G interferes with the serious protest and so 
fails to see the protest through the same political lens as the protester. It is Ali G's 
overall and ostensive difference in appearance, ideology and behaviour that provokes 
the protester to shout `fuck off - this is serious' (ibid) in response to Ali G's human 
beat-box, which is performed through the protester's loudspeaker. This act challenges 
the staging of the protester's political position by showing the gap, or area of ambiguity, 
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between her intentions and actions, and the plan to build a bypass. These two politico- 
cognitive plans are incommensurable, hence the intervention of Ali G's human beat-box 
serves to mock the protester and highlight the potential failings of her particular 
politico-cognitive map. In essence, Ali G represents a disruptive alien, moving into a 
cognitive space that he is not welcome in and so removal is once again called for. Both 
this and the previous example highlight symbolic exclusion or exile. The context of a 
reality television setting for this interaction encourages such a response because All G 
is naturally seen as real. 
Bauman describes proteophilia as a reaction to otherness or multiform that is 
connected to aesthetic spacing. It appears after proteophobia, once the space has been 
made safe for the viewer, and involves the consumption of the `other' through 
deification and, once the novelty has worn off, disposal. Not all media responses to Ali 
G are overly hostile and express proteophobia. Many from a central or leftist political 
stance - from fans - mirror the tendency of proteophilia. These responses express and 
define Ali G's ambiguity and so are involved in a process of inscription. Here is a 
general summary from the 2000 `Ali G debate' in the Guardian: 
The expectations and anticipations surrounding the new Ali G series is such that 
industry insiders are going to extremes to get access to information. You could be 
forgiven for thinking we were about to witness something as significant as 
Princess Diana's Panorama routine. (Collins, 2000) 
This hints at both deification and excitement aimed at Ali G from inside the media. It is 
the inconsequential play of Ali G, the visual unreality and ambiguity, that becomes the 
focus of aesthetic consumption and so enters a process of ambiguity management in the 
mind of the proteophile. This is preferred to confrontation with ambiguity in other 
social spaces. Proteophobia has made the social space safe for the actor's proteophilia 
and an interaction with play reduces the need for, and distinguishes this process from, 
the more disturbing proteophobic reactions to ambivalence in cognitive mapping. In 
essence, the protean loving journalist can revel without fear in the debate, and the 
ambivalence, that is generated by the character. Proteophilia is also displayed by some 
of Ali G's interviewees: 
Sometimes they totally forget who they are. And they come out with a totally 
different side of themselves. Some try to appear cool with All G and down with 
the kids... Boutros Boutros-Ghali kept on telling me he used to be a bit of a bully 
in school, and used to muck around. They want Ali G's approval. They're in the 
room with a total idiot, and yet they're seeking his approval. As if it somehow 
makes them cooler. (Baron Cohen in Heffernan, 2004) 
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This mimicking of Ali G is also demonstrated by celebrities who dress up in Ali G 
outfits and copy his speech through mock patios or by taking part in raps. This forms a 
specific assimilatory and consumptive reaction to difference or multiform. Paul Daniels 
in Ali G Aiii (Baron Cohen, 2000) provides an excellent example of this. 
Felix Dexter describes the `middle class' laugh at Ali G and highlights the well- 
policed space needed for the manifestation of proteophilia: 
A lot of the humour is laughing at black street culture and it is being celebrated 
because it allows the liberal middle classes to laugh at that culture in a safe context 
where they can retain their sense of political correctness. (Gibson, 2000) 
The multiform of Ali G allows a safe mockery of the `other' without those laughing 
having to feel guilty for their reactions to otherness. After Ali G's initial success, there 
were mounting calls for his removal, not based on charges of racism, but because the 
novelty had worn off. The BBC website published a number of such views: 
`Okay so Ali G can still make me laugh, I'm not denying that. But when 
something is over it's over' Dan, UK. 
`Stale and well past its sell-by-date. The characters have to be killed off, and 
replaced' Colin B, UK. 
`Is it just me or has the novelty of having him on telly worn off? ' Zak, Leicester, 
UK 
(BBC News, 2003) 
Alongside these media and individual reactions, proteophilia also emerges in a 
sociological description of the character. Gilroy (2002,2004) draws on the concept of 
proteophobia in his analysis of Ali G, arguing that media debates of Ali G's ethnicity 
and hybridity are distinctively proteophobic (2002: 4-5). Gilroy (2004) outlines 
opposed tendencies of melancholia and conviviality in British culture. Ali G is seen as 
an example of the convivial. While Gilroy's account is productive to an extent, because 
he does not employ the concept of proteophilia, he overemphasises the role of 
exclusionary tendencies in media descriptions of the character and is unable to properly 
describe less confrontational or non-racist descriptions of Ali G in publications such as 
the Guardian (e. g. Collins, 2000; Rayner, 2002). Proteophobia and proteophilia are best 
used together, thus highlighting how actors from different positions in the political 
spectrum have different methods of resolving the ambivalence of the `other'. These 
methods form a complex interaction that polarises responses and opinions, so leaving 
little space for the existence or acceptance of multiform. 
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More importantly, as well as not employing proteophilia, Gilroy exhibits a 
proteophilic tendency of his own. This is exhibited by his general deification of Ali G 
as an exemplar of an emerging British hybrid and convivial culture, which is presented 
as a central meaning in the comedy. This deification is best highlighted when Gilroy 
states of Baron Cohen's lack of comment on the character, `I'm sure he knows that a 
new sense of what it means to be English is at stake. No wonder he wants to conceal the 
political intelligence that guides this liberating project' (2002: 5). This celebratory 
comment forms a part of a discussion that downplays the liquid racism generated by the 
character, without providing an adequate theorisation of why these meanings are 
mistaken or less `central'. This central meaning is also used as a means of critiquing the 
influence of US hip hop culture on black British youth culture: 
It is significant that the central unifying joke underpinning all his work is supplied 
by an antipathy towards the stultifying US styles and habits that have all but 
crushed local forms of black vernacular and replaced them with the standardised 
and uniform global products of hip hop consumer culture. (ibid: 3) 
The articulation of any central meaning in Ali G is problematic because of his layered 
construction, and requires a certain focus, or a fixation on certain facets of the comedy, 
that inevitably leaves some material unexamined, and interpretations from other 
positions unheard or obscured. This creates the potential for an account that will 
collapse in on itself as other meanings appear around it. So, for example, in arguing 
against Gilroy, it is debatable whether US habitual practises have crushed local black 
vernacular in the UK, where regional variations are highly prevalent. Moreover, there 
are several examples, especially in Ali G innit (1999), where hip hop culture is 
positively affirmed, often at the expense of British establishment dispositions. An 
interview with Sir Rhodes Boyson, a former Minister of Education, highlights this: 
Ali G: do you believe kids should be caned? [Ali G sniffs his fingers, which is a 
reference to nasal drug taking]. 
Sir Rhodes: I do. 
AG: You do! Wicked man, you believe kids should be caned [sniffs fingers again]. 
Even in school? 
SR: Even in schools. 
AG: Do you think, Sir Rhodes, that if you get caned in school you can't 
concentrate as well, 'cos a lot of people out there say that if you're getting 
caned.... 
SR: Well I was caned and I've concentrated all my life. 
AG: You were caned? Respect man, respect. 
SR: It shouldn't be done badly. 
AG: Yeah you got to have good stuff. 
SR: You have to have rules. 
AG: You've got to have good cane. 
SR: You have to have a good cane. 
(Baron Cohen, 1999) 
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The inability of Rhodes-Boyson to make the linguistic gestalt shift, to observe slippage 
around the meaning of `caned', creates the joke. It is Boyson's failure to move between 
the language of different habitual groups that allows Ali G to establish the pun and to 
be, in effect, more socially skilled than the established Sir Rhodes, whose political 
beliefs seem so coherent and unambiguous in his serious realm. Clearly the vernacular 
of Ali G is not the subject of the joke in this example. As Lockyer and Pickering 
suggest on this interview: `Popular culture rose in splendid ascendancy over official 
culture' (2005c: 190). 
Although Gilroy might reply that of course his central meaning does not appear in 
all examples, the footing on which he asserts its centrality remains unstable because of 
the simultaneous emergence of contrary meanings. Gilroy's commentary falls down 
because he simultaneously privileges his own preferred meaning while also 
highlighting the ambiguity of the character. This prevents Gilroy from emphasising the 
postmodern style of the humour, a type of humour that has no central point, whose 
meaning morphs and is manipulated as conditions and viewing subjects change. In Ali 
G, it is the lack of fixation that is central, rather than any one interpretation of the 
assemblage. 
Gilroy continues to understate the comparable textual stability of various elements 
of All G's assemblage and confidently describes Ali G through a central meaning that 
has a specific political logic: 
The character of Ali G should be understood as a subtle reply to the fact that the 
influential pages of publications like Prospect and the Salisbury Review were 
groaning under the weight of speculations about the pathological characteristics of 
black culture. (2004: 148) 
While Ali G is a `subtle reply' to the centre Left and Right, those who instead criticise 
Ali G for racism and/or cultural theft are described by Gilroy as `anachronistic' (ibid: 
146). Gilroy continues in his veneration of the character: 
If we accept Ali G as his feature film presented him, that is, as a young white 
Briton, we can appreciate him as a comment upon as well as an ambassador from 
the emergent, multicultural Britain that exists, largely unnoticed and always 
unvalued... (ibid) 
I argue that the basis of the humour involved in seeing Ali G as a white Briton -a 
`wigger' - is an emerging ethno-cultural hybrid racism. It remains difficult to 
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conceptualise exactly how the `wigger' Ali G makes a significant ambassadorial 
comment for Gilroy. 
Gilroy articulates one specific meaning that emerges from one particular habitus 
formation, and which interacts with the assemblage of meanings generated by the 
character. While he acknowledges the assemblage, Gilroy's reading remains both 
partial and problematic because he exaggerates and deifies one aspect of it, yet can 
provide no basis on which to establish or assert this supposed semantic superiority. Not 
only does he fail to employ or analyse proteophilia, he expresses it. 
Non-Racist Readings: Mocking the Establishment 
This section outlines some of the non-racist readings of Ali G which serve to 
complicate the assemblage and increases its liquidity. 
Rojek outlines how `[t]he comedy lies not only in All G's stringent sincerity but also 
in the jaw-dropping credulity of the powerful, often rich, people he interviews, who 
take the Ali G character at face value' (2001: 24). Mocking the establishment is one 
theme that humour studies has theorised extensively, usually as an important means of 
resistance to dominant power relations. The theme has a tradition in British television 
comedy, although it is relatively new, which reflects wider changes in popular attitudes 
towards social stratification. Peter Cook's mockery of Harold Macmillian in the 1960s 
constituted a radical form of comic expression (Bloomfield, 2005), and an early 
example of comic mockery of the establishment, although the tradition of political 
satire is much older. 
This style of comedy is specifically double-edged. Returning to Harvey Sacks and 
the previous discussion of imitation, he adds: 
We get a correlate to the fact that `Negroes and children are great imitators' which 
is 'Negroes and children are great mockers'. Which is imitation `in such a fashion 
as to make it clear that you're not seriously doing it, but that you're competent at it 
- and, of course, treating it in a fairly negative way. Children mock their parents, 
lessers their betters, students their teacher, etc., when the given thing, were it to be 
done in an unmocked fashion, would be `but an imitation' (1995: 480). 
Mocking does not simply undermine dominant power relations. Sacks suggests there 
might always be an implicit problem involved in mocking the establishment and while 
it may seem to be a form of resistance to dominant power relations, the act of mocking, 
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through appearing as not serious, is constrained by its connection to imitation or to `not 
being real'. Mocking, therefore, cannot transgress the social boundary. Despite this, the 
humour of mockery has a rhetorical potential, but it is a potential that negotiates, and 
succeeds or fails, on the basis of the congruence between the comic and the mocked. 
In the early material, Baron Cohen interviews members of the establishment who 
have no idea who he is. These interviews often appear to mock both the interviewee's 
political beliefs and their methods of habitual distinction. This is successful because no 
one knows who Ali G is. Later, once immersed in a complex symbolic landscape of 
meanings related to ethnic origin, he becomes a celebrity figure that exists in stark 
contrast to his original state. He is recognisable, understood and endowed with a certain 
amount of celebrity capital. In the early work, Ali G gives each interviewee a similar 
satirical attack, treating each political position equally. To Ron Davies, the former 
Labour candidate for First Secretary of Wales, he says, `[s]o what is good about Wales 
'cos with no disrespect, me heard it's crap.... For them people out there, what they 
don't understand is why is you lot blowing up the Catholics? ' (Baron Cohen, 1999). 
Another example shows Ali G mocking Sir Rhodes Boyson, with some words of 
agreement on teaching the imperial over the metric system: 
All G: Why don't they teach proper math in schools? 
Sir Rhodes Boyson: What do you mean by proper Maths? 
AG: Why do they teach in kilos and grams when you should really deal in ounces, 
quarter of ounces, eights of ounces. Why don't they modernise and teach in 
ounces? 
SR: Well I prefer the old ones. 
AG: Aiii. 
SR: As being a traditionalist, I would have the old things back again. 
AG: Wicked and you need to know about quarter ounces, eight of ounces, all that 
sort of thing. 
SR: If you were doing baking or anything like that. 
AG: Aiii baking, for real. 
SR: I bake my own breakfast everyday. 
AG: Aiii I bake me own breakfast. 
SR: Very good. 
(ibid) 
The established Boyson is mocked through punning of the word `deal' which means, 
for Boyson, simple usage or conduct relating to general transactions, whereas for Ali G 
and a particular section of the audience it suggests the buying and selling of drugs, as 
the imperial system of measurement is commonly used to measure cannabis and other 
drugs in small transactions. In a third example, Ali G mocks the most highly decorated 
British solider, Major-General Ken Perkins. 
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Ali G: What about the SOS? They is wicked no? 
Ken Perkins: The SAS? 
AG: They is the hardest? 
KP: They are the best soldiers in the world, probably, I'd say yes. 
AG: Is it hard to get in? 
KP: Extremely hard yes. 
AG: Does it help if you have already killed someone? 
(ibid) 
The traditional deference with which such a decorated soldier would be addressed is 
turned on its head or realigned by the stereotypical street values of violence and 
indiscipline, which are also sometimes expressed in hip hop language. 
Of significance in these examples is that the comedy, while satirical, does not simply 
mock the establishment and therefore attack dominant power relations in a way that 
might be progressive to social equality. Sacks argues mocking is a specifically comic 
activity and is distinctly connected to imitation. The out-of-place social actor must 
negotiate the rhetorical potential, against the simplistic presentation and confirmation of 
existing social relations, if they are to achieve effective mockery. While Baron Cohen is 
quite effective in these examples, the later expressions of Ali G, and the obvious liquid 
racist readings, seek to add to the instability of mockery. 
Borat Sagdiyev and Negative Kazakh Stereotyping 
Baron Cohen's Borat Sagdiyev, commonly known as Borat, the anthropological 
interviewer from Kazakhstan, is less ambiguous than Ali G but has raised eyebrows in 
relation to the generation of prejudice, especially with the international box office 
success of Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of 
Kazakhstan (2006). 1 argue that Borat is also a character that expresses liquid racism. 
In what Gilroy explains as an extension of Baron Cohen's Montesquieuian stranger, 
of the `other' that gives critique of the home territory (2004: 78-9), Borat appears as an 
anti-Semitic, homophobic, misogynist who is also cruel toward animals. In the 
Guardian, Morris outlines Borat's arrival at the MTV Europe Music Awards show: 
The character arrived in an "Air Kazakh" propeller plane controlled by a one-eyed 
pilot clutching a vodka bottle. Later he described an all-woman band as 
"international singing prostitutes" and said it was brave to have Madonna - "a 
genuine transvestite" - on the show. (Morris, 2005) 
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Baron Cohen can, at times, be seen to attack traditional prejudices through the 
character, but ambivalence developed because of the extended period of lack of 
comment on its meaning. On the one hand, and as one Kazakh argues, `Borat's not 
making fun of Kazakhs, he's making fun of Americans' (2003), yet on the other, the 
jokes about fictional Kazakh traditions and customs are not dependant on Americans 
being present in the context of the joke and often simply encourages humour directed at 
the `other'. Overall, the Borat character has received criticism in the West for his anti- 
Semitism, and in the East for his negative Kazakh stereotyping. In particular, the 
Kazakh goverrunent have voiced concern: 
The great and good of Kazakhstan are getting tired of having to clear up wild 
misconceptions about their republic. They are tired of having to insist that shooting 
a dog and then having a party is not a favourite national pastime and of denying 
that their wine is made of fermented horse urine and that women are kept in cages. 
(Morris, 2005) 
These emerging Kazakh stereotypes, and others such as `cow-punching' (Chortle, 
2005), have led to protest and threats of legal action. 
The Kazakh Foreign Ministry described his portrayal as "utterly unacceptable, 
being a concoction of bad taste and ill manners which is completely incompatible 
with ethics and civilised behaviour". The ministry later threatened to take legal 
action against the comedian. (BBC News, 2005) 
For many viewing the humour outside of Kazakhstan these stereotypes are new, they do 
not belong in the repertoire of ethnic, racial and national stereotypes that usually appear 
in humour. It would not need a great deal of empathy to see that Kazakhs might be 
unhappy with the negative publicity they receive through the Borat character, although 
there is an element of hyperbole in some of the responses that add to the humorous 
nature of the situation. For example, the Guardian quote the Kazakh foreign ministry 
spokesman: `Yerzhan Ashykbayev, said yesterday: "We do not rule out that Mr Cohen 
is serving someone's political order designed to present Kazakhstan and its people in a 
derogatory way" (Morris, 2005). 
The Borat character is influenced by two dominant themes in Jewish humour. First, 
self-deprecation, and second, humour directed towards fascist, fanatical or abusive 
power relationships - as Dorinson suggests, `Jewish wit shifts from paranoia to 
masochism' (1998: 29). Baron Cohen's early career highlights this heritage: 
Together with his younger brother, Erran, he ran a comedy club in Hampstead 
where they performed a song called `Shvitzing' (Yiddish for sweating), about two 
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old Hassidic Jews who would strip down to their underpants because their black 
felt garb was too hot. They took the sketch to the BBC. It was turned down for 
being offensive. (Rayner, 2002) 
Both themes have a linage in Jewish comedy. Dorinson (1998) discusses pain in the 
comedy of Lenny Bruce, Mel Brookes and Woody Allen. The latter displays many 
examples of self-deprecating humour, which he regularly connects with the themes of 
self-analysis and internalised personal suffering. Likewise, the jokes of Rodney 
Dangerfield contain similar examples. Born Jacob Cohen, Dangerfield's humour is 
exemplary of self-deprecation. Ronald Bergan writes in Dangerfield's Guardian 
obituary that he `suffered from depression, and that many of his one-liners were derived 
from an unhappy childhood and personal pain: "I could tell that my parents hated me. 
My bath toy was a toaster"" (Bergan, 2004). While such jokes are inspired by 
Dangerfield's own life, they also correspond with the wider trend of self-deprecation in 
Jewish humour encouraged by the particular habitus. Baron Cohen's comedy balances 
the theme of self-deprecation with exposing racism through presenting Borat as anti- 
Semitic in order to extract anti-Semitism from interviewees. 
For the second theme, that of laughing at power holders, there are also habitus 
elements that explain why this particular trend is prevalent in Jewish humour, which 
also relate to historical experiences of marginalisation, persecution and victimisation. 
Freud (1991 [1905]) mentions this theme, as Billig explains, `many of the Jewish jokes 
that he included ridicule the logic of the world. They bring the conventionally 
successful down to earth and delight in the subversion of authority' (2002: 454). Davies 
explains that many Jewish jokes `outwit a prejudiced anti-Semite in a particularly clever 
way' (1998: 80). Mel Brooks provides examples: in his spoof western, Blazing Saddles 
(1974), a black sheriff is appointed to a redneck town as the film mocks dominant racist 
attitudes and The Producers provides a musical mockery of Nazism (Brockes, 2004). 
There are many more examples. One in the UK would be the character Sol Bernstein, 
created by Steve Jackson. Examples of his humour follow: "`he could pull a big 
crowd, " he says of Hitler, "but he could never get a laugh... I'm a survivor, " he says. "I 
survived the camps - the holiday camps"' (Cook, 2003). 
Borat, as a native of Kazakhstan, is often depicted as an anti-Semite: 
Virginia Heffernan: Is Borat an anti-Semite? 
Sacha Baron Cohen: Yeah, yeah. Part of the idea of Borat is to get people to feel 
relaxed enough that they fully open up. And they say things that they never would 
on normal TV. So if they are anti-Semitic or racist or sexist, they'll say so. 
(Heffernan, 2004) 
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It is not just explicit expressions of racism, anti-Semitism or sexism that Borat extracts 
from the people he interviews. He highlights how people will often implicitly excuse 
racist expressions. At a dating agency, Borat was asked about his preferences, "`what 
about race? You're open to all races? " "Umm yes but no Jew", "no Jewish, okay"' 
(Baron Cohen, 2003). At an acting class a comparable comment goes unchallenged. He 
is asked by the acting instructor "let's say you're in a movie", "yes I have been in a 
movie: Dirty Jew", "okay"' (ibid). Similarly, at a country and western bar in Tucson, he 
infamously sings, `throw the Jew down the well, so my country can be free' (ibid), 
which provokes no protest from his audience. 
The US and UK box office hit Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make 
Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (2006) has only served to entrench the confused, 
liquid or postmodern element of Borat's relationship to racism. The elements that 
appear in the film include its anti-Semitism, on which Borat states `[a]t first, the Kazakh 
censors wouldn't let me release this movie, because of anti-Semitism... But then they 
decide that there was just enough' (Strauss, 2006: 2). As a reversed discourse, this 
follows the theme of much Jewish humour, but it could also be read and enjoyed as 
anti-Semitism. Interestingly, when Borat responds in subtitled Kazakh during the film, 
he is actually speaking Hebrew in an Israeli accent - thus presenting a specific in-joke 
for Hebrew speakers - and presents another hidden, liquid reading, as a fictional Jewish 
journalist pretending to be a Kazakh journalist (Garay, 2006). A third element sees the 
Kazakh stereotyping mentioned above, which can be taken as a stereotyping of ex- 
soviet backwardness and Muslims, because Kazakhstan is 47 per cent Muslim 
(religioustolerance. org, 2001). 
Then there is the authorial reading - Baron Cohen, in a rare interview, has sought to 
clear up some of the confusion over Borat: `The joke is not on Kazakhstan. I think the 
joke is on people who can believe that the Kazakhstan I describe can exist' (Baron 
Cohen in Strauss, 2006: 2). He adds: `I think part of the movie shows the absurdity of 
holding any form of racial prejudice, whether it is hatred of African-Americans or of 
Jews' (ibid). Baron Cohen sees a functional and serious task guiding his comedy, a task 
that is paradoxically and frequently not completed by the postmodern structure of the 
humour, or its increased polysemia, and the surrounding dichotomous media debate. 
There are also proteophobic reactions to Borat, although no reactions of proteophilia 
were found. This implies there are very few positive aesthetic reactions to the otherness 
of Borat, or that cognitive spacing and proteophobia was still underway. The snobbish 
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or over-serious often express proteophobic reactions towards Borat. His reception at the 
Middleton Place Plantation, South Carolina, a working museum of life in the American 
old south, appears proteophobic when Borat mentions slavery, as he scratches at the 
veneer of civility to uncover the `hidden' recent history of the area (Baron Cohen, 
2003). There are other subtle or non-verbal proteophobic reactions to Borat, such as the 
actress who recoils from him as he tries to kiss her after a disastrous improvisation class 
(ibid). In these examples, Borat is seen as an outsider with incommensurable cultural 
differences that might as well be placed at a distance. Borat has also been physically 
excluded from a territory: 
He is already barred from returning to Arizona after an incident in which Borat 
recorded an interview with a new-age healer in Sedona. When the cultist asked 
him to relax on a giant stage. Borat took it too literally and, naked but for a 
towel, became sexually aroused. (Chittenden, 2004) 
Conclusion 
The chapter has outlined an additional complication in race and ethnic humour in its 
relationship to the generation of racism. We saw how All G is formed as ambiguous and 
misidentified as a real social actor. We then saw that the character can be read to create 
three liquid racisms, liquid because they each erase the other two readings. This has led 
to the character being described as racist by various commentators but also to the 
character being theoretically difficult to analyse and critique. Overall, the comedy 
cannot attach itself to, or support, a serious discourse in the same non-contradictory 
way that other forms of humour can because it produces both racist and non-racist 
meanings simultaneously. 
In All G, proteophobia and proteophilia were shown to emerge as responses to the 
character, each as readings of the ambivalent comic form. Then, non-racist readings 
were highlighted as adding further confusion. Overall, none of the meanings are 
dominant and so serious racism is not rhetorically affected as much through this type of 
comedy. In postmodern humour, meaning is far too saturated for `true' meaning to 
develop, hence media attention has not developed a stable interpretation on which to 
build a critique, remaining in a debate about meaning. After this, Borat was also 
signalled as being in a similar postmodern process and also as generating liquid racism. 
Borat is thus also impossible to place in unambiguous definitions. 
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At this stage in the All G debate it seems to be a sociological truism that Ali G is 
polysemic. Specifically though, what has not been established in any convincing 
fashion is how to deal with the racist readings of the character. The concept of liquid 
racism can explain how polysemic expressions do not play by the same rules that older 
embodied or cultural racisms observed, so while postmodern humour may leave the 
analyst in a state of reflexive ambivalence, or, if old concepts are relied on, in a 
vulnerable or untenable position, liquid racism allows for a more complete description. 
Importantly, it is in the habitus that the humour receives the most fixity and which is 
expressed in dichotomous media debate. It is in the specificity and relativity, or the 
univociality, of the habitus that experiences of racism in postmodern humour have 
effect, but these racisms are never total, and always remain in a process of erasure. 
206 
Chapter Seven 
Postmodern Satire: The Case of the Prophet Muhammad 
Cartoons 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw how certain forms of humour become increasingly 
polysemic in postmodernity and can produce liquid racism. It was also explained that 
because of the increased layering in postmodern humour, the reading of any particular 
`total' or `strong' interpretation requires the reader to erase other interpretations of the 
humorous message. 
This chapter develops this idea in relation to another case study, the January 2006 
reaction to the October 2005 publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons in the 
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. The controversy arose because it is considered 
blasphemous by many Muslims, but not all, to create images of the Prophet 
Muhammad. I argue that the meaning of the cartoons is multidimensional, and that their 
analysis is significantly more complex than most commentators acknowledge. The 
chapter begins with a brief outline of the events surrounding the publication of the 
cartoons, before concentrating on a description of the cartoons themselves, specifically 
considering the two cartoons that are usually viewed as most offensive. These two are 
given a specific analysis with a view to outlining the trajectory of liquid meanings 
produced by their incongruity. Following this, I outline the general arguments of those 
who consider the cartoons offensive, evaluating the concepts of blasphemy, and 
importantly for this thesis, Islamophobia and racism in relation to the cartoons. Third, I 
outline the liberal secular defence of the publication of the cartoons, on the basis of 
freedom of speech, and explain how the cartoons fit the European tradition of satire. 
Finally, some comments are made on the relationship between the rise of postmodemity 
and fundamentalism, as while I argue the cartoons have a postmodern dimension to 
them, so too does Islamic fundamentalism42, which is the target of their intended 
meaning and present in some reactions to them. 
42 Fundamentalism (Islamic and other forms) is defined as an appeal `to the inerrancy of sacred 
texts to legitimate conceptions of purity' (Springett, 2003: 325). It has also been defined as 
fixating on `society's desertion of eternally valid, divinely revealed and textually literal received 
principles of order' (Riesbrodt, 1993: 16 in ibid: 328-9). These cultural discursive interpretations 
can be linked to violent activity, but they are not always. 
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An Analysis of the Prophet Muhammad Cartoons 
Twelve cartoons depicting the Islamic Prophet Muhammad were originally published in 
the conservative Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 300' September 2005. The 
events that followed have been well documented (e. g. Modood, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; 
Hansen, 2006a, 2006b; Bleich, 2006; O'Leary, 2006; Carens, 2006) and so this chapter 
begins with what has not been covered in these accounts, the specific detail of the 
incongruous and rhetorical structure of the cartoons, and the effect this had on the 
debates and reactions that followed. These debates and reactions take the specific 
dimension of liquid racism. I argue that the satirical and comic frame created by the 
cartoons specifically allowed for, and encouraged, tension and debate of a liquid comic 
frame that does not allow for a clear outcome or `winner', and perhaps follows Jonathan 
Swift's image of satire as `a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally discover 
everybody's face but their own' (Swift, 1984: 104 in Stott, 2005: 114). 
So while all ideological signs are polysemic and can be read in a number of ways, I 
have shown throughout this thesis that humour is significantly different. In Chapter 
One, the ability of humour to generate ridicule was emphasised as an important factor 
in the emergence of the superiority theory. Ridicule is created because of the structure 
of humorous incongruity, which is a device that can divert literal meaning rhetorically. 
Therefore, humour is `just humour', and not necessarily truthful, yet it is formed by a 
rhetorical device that has the paradoxical ability to have an impact on truth perceptions. 
In the case of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, a critique of religious fundamentalism 
or a comment on freedom of speech is placed in a satirical incongruity that has a 
destabilising and unpredictable rhetorical effect, and allows for the creation of multiple, 
liquid readings from the image. In essence, this highlights a point made on polysemia 
and humour in the introduction and reiterated in Chapter Five, and suggests that there 
may not be a winner, or a semantic outcome, in debates about the serious meaning of 
signs in a humorous frame. The criteria for judging meaning are, paradoxically, 
fundamentally different but inherently connected. Usual ideological signs may, of 
course, have the ability to be read in a variety of ways, but they do not necessarily 
contain the rhetorical/linguistic `smoke and mirrors' produced by humour. 
Briefly explained, the events that followed the publication of the cartoons included a 
series of protests from Danish Muslims, subsequent reprinting of the cartoons in over 
fifty countries and the escalation of protest, and of increasingly violent protest in some 
Muslim countries (Butler, 2006). The original cartoons were published with an article 
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by the Jylland-Posten culture editor Flemming Rose. This discussed freedom of speech 
and self-censorship, and explained how the Danish writer KAre Bluitgen had difficulty 
finding an illustrator to draw Muhammad for a children's book. The article also reported 
`that a local comedian said he didn't dare make fun of the Koran' (Whittam Smith, 
2006). The controversy was specifically escalated by a delegation of Danish Imams 
touring the Middle East and lobbying governments there (Hansen, 2006a, O'Leary, 
2006). This impacted on Denmark with the closure of a number of Arab embassies and 
a consumer boycott of Danish products in the Middle East. 
More widely, reaction included government organised rioting in some Muslim 
countries, which resulted in a number of deaths (Butler, 2006). The organisation of the 
Islamic Conference and Arab League also requested the United Nations enact sanctions 
against Denmark and introduce blasphemy laws. The Danish lobbyists had presented a 
dossier in the Middle East entitled `Dossier about championing the Prophet Muhammad 
peace be upon him' (Hansen, 2006a: 9), which included the twelve cartoons and, it was 
reported, `three additional cartoons of unknown origin: one shows Mohamed with a 
pig's snout, one shows the Prophet as a dangerous paedophile and the third shows a 
Muslim at prayer being buggered by a dog' (Lawson, 2006). It was later uncovered that 
the image containing the pig's snout was in fact a contestant at a French, not Danish, 
pig-squealing contest and had nothing to do with insulting Islam (Hansen, 2006a: 9). 
The dossier also included `pictures from another Danish newspaper, anti-Muslim hate 
mail, a televised interview with Dutch member of parliament Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who 
received the Freedom Prize from the Danish Liberal Party' (ibid: 9). Despite the 
eclectic contents of the dossier, most protestations and subsequent commentary have 
concentrated on the twelve cartoons, although it is unlikely that the cartoons would 
have caused as much outrage without the additional material. The cartoons are shown in 
Appendix Two, as they originally appeared in Jyllands-Posten. 
As can be seen in Appendix Two, the twelve cartoons are all very different and 
could only be argued to be equally offensive, blasphemous, racist or Islamophobic by 
the most rigid of sensibilities. So, for example, the third cartoon down on the right 
simply shows Muhammed with a stick, walking through a desert. The cartoon in the 
bottom left-hand corner is benign towards all versions of Islam that understand irony. 
As Hansen explains, `[o)ne was a subtle attack on the paper itself: in it, Muhammed is 
not the Prophet but rather a young boy, a second generation migrant. He points to the 
chalkboard script: "The editorial team of Jyllands-Posten is a bunch of reactionary 
provocateurs"' (Hansen, 2006a: 8). Similarly, the drawing in the top left-hand corner is 
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of Kare Bluitgen in a turban, holding a stick figure of Muhammad, as an orange 
inscribed with `publicity stunt' falls into the turban. As one report explained, `[t]he 
proverb "an orange in the turban" is a Danish expression meaning "stroke of luck": 
here, the added publicity for the book' (Anon, 2006). It is, therefore, fairly implausible 
to argue that three of the twelve cartoons are at all offensive. They are, however, not all 
equally benign. The two most offensive cartoons are pictured below: 
*; 
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Figure 1. Muhammed: Kurt Westergaard 
(Newspaperindex. com, 2005a) 
_ýýý 
Figure 2. Prophet Muhammed. By: Rasmus Sand HÄ, yer 
(Newspaperindex. com, 2005b) 
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Berger highlights that `it is much easier to ridicule someone, to make allusions about 
someone's transgressions and crimes, and to express contempt and loathing for 
someone visually by using caricature than it is in prose' (1995a: 144). These cartoons, 
the first showing a sketch of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban, the second showing 
Muhammad with his eyes blacked out, holding a sword (with two women behind him 
wearing burkhas that only allow their eyes to be seen) are generally considered to be the 
most offensive of the group. They are what might be called successful satirical 
Caricatures. 
Importantly, each of these cartoons is necessarily constructed with a comic 
incongruity, or with a contrast. In the intended reading, the first juxtaposes an image of 
Muhammad with the image of a terrorist bomb, and creates an incongruity or contrast 
because, of course, Muhammad was not a terrorist. The intended reading of the second 
cartoon plays on the prohibition of depicting Muhammad by showing him with his 
identity obscured. The mark of the censor on Muhammad's face becomes the focus of 
the humorous incongruity, in contrast to the women behind who have everything but 
their eyes obscured. This forms a visual opposition or incongruity that mocks the 
prohibition of depicting Muhammad and the concept of women wearing burkhas. These 
intended meanings are not always read and thus, as I explain, various reactions emerge, 
creating the liquidity of the images. 
Descriptions of the two cartoons (and also by proxy, but falsely, all twelve) allow 
them several meanings, which can coexist because of the incongruity or ambiguity of 
each of the visual images. These can be categorised as: 
1) The cartoons are a criticism of Islamic fundamentalism. 
2) The cartoons are blasphemous because they depict Muhammad, thus insulting 
to Muslims and an attack on Muslims. 
3) The cartoons are suggesting Muhammad is a terrorist, and thus, infer that 
Muslims are terrorists by association. In presenting this stereotype, the cartoons 
are Islamophobic and racist. 
Most reactions to the cartoons see one reading and develop it as the most valid, or will 
see one as most offensive. Some see one as the most politically expedient and so 
construct a rhetorical argument for the realism of that reading and against its opponents. 
Such accounts do not read the cartoons as signs that exist in a specific semiotic `frame'. 
Most do not consider issues of polysemia in relation to any particular reading of the 
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cartoons presented. They also inflict erasure on each other. This is what I call the liquid 
aspect of the cartoons controversy, or its postmodern dimension. 
The first reading, a criticism of Islamic fundamentalism, is developed in the 
comments of the cartoonist of the turban/bomb cartoon, and by Flemming Rose. In the 
intended meaning, the cartoonist of the bomb/turban cartoon gives this explanation: 
The cartoon is not about Islam as a whole, but the part that apparently can inspire 
violence, terrorism, death and destruction. And thereby the fundamentalist part of 
Islam. I wanted to demonstrate that terrorists get their spiritual ammunition from 
Islam. There are interpretations of it that are incorrect. The general impression 
among Muslims is that it is about Islam as a whole. It is not. (Anon, 2006) 
The cartoonist insists that the bomb/turban cartoon should not be read as racist and 
Islamophobic. In line with this, but with a slightly less specific focus, the twelve 
cartoons surround an article on self-censorship and freedom of speech. The comments 
of Flemming Rose illuminate the sentiment of the article and express the close-by 
reading: 
The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special 
position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is 
incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you 
must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule. (Rose, 2005) 
Much has been made of the conservative politics of Jyllands-Posten (Modood, 2006a, 
2006b; Bleich, 2006; Carens, 2006) and it seems obvious that the cartoons were 
intended to provoke a reaction from some Muslims at some level, and to offend their 
religious sensibilities. While conservative journalists have equal rights of expression, of 
course, the comments of Flemming Rose do paint a rather stereotypical image of 
Muslims in Europe, although Rose is careful to only accuse `some Muslims'. As a 
conservative newspaper, Jyllands-Posten may have seen the exercise as a worthwhile 
task, for the greater good as they see it. 
At no point in this thesis has the argument been made in favour of censoring any of 
the humour presented. Censoring humour would likely prove self-defeating and simply 
encourage increasingly coded forms of racist expression, and where racism is debated 
or ambiguous, might lead to a subtle authoritarianism. Likewise, discussions of censure 
in the debates that followed seemed to miss the point of the initial article on self- 
censorship (e. g. Modood, 2006a, 2006b). Furthermore, the structural ambiguity of 
humour prevents a comparison with hate speech (c. f. Bleich, 2006). Humour is a 
linguistic frame that differs from serious communication and no argument has 
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convincingly suggested that it should be censored on the grounds of it being intended to 
generate particular, specific, serious reactions. Despite this, humour does support 
racism, and it is possible to outline the rhetorical potential of such images, and to argue 
that humour is often more than `just humour'. Importantly, the `seriousness' of humour 
is such that its rhetorical effects are often more pointed because they are ambiguous and 
thus impossible to place inside of categories such as hate speech. Returning to the 
cartoons, the intended meaning gives no basis on which to accuse anyone of hate 
speech, and as incongruities encourage ambiguous reading, mapping, rather than 
accusation, is probably the most productive method of analysis. 
Viewing the Cartoons as Offensive 
Well outside of the intended reading, but paradoxically close-by, are the second and 
third readings: 
2) The cartoons are blasphemous because they depict Muhammad, thus insulting 
to Muslims and an attack on Muslims. 
3) The cartoons are suggesting Muhammad is a terrorist, and thus, infer that 
Muslims are terrorists by association. In presenting this stereotype, the cartoons 
are Islamophobic and racist. 
I will now discuss, in turn, the veracity of each of these. 
The `blasphemous reading', the idea that the cartoons are an insult to Islam, appears 
in both direct protest and commentary. In outlining it, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown offers a 
description of the outrage caused by the cartoons: `Flemming Rose... sought out 
controversial cartoonists to create caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed, not because 
they had something bold and compelling to say, but simply to enrage, like bullfighters 
goading a bull' (Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, 2006). Hansen explains how in October 2005, 
`Muslim organisations in Denmark filed a complaint against the paper, claiming the 
publication constituted blasphemy under a rarely invoked section of the Danish criminal 
code' (2006a: 9). The blasphemous reading also gained purchase in Muslim countries 
where the dossier was publicised and unrest provoked. An example is reported by 
Katherine Butler: `the sense of outrage at what is being depicted as an orchestrated 
Western assault on Muslim sensibilities, appears to cut across Pakistani society' 
(Butler, 2006). She adds `Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, the President's 
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spokesman, said the "blasphemous sketches" could be "detrimental to world peace... 
Moderate or non-practising Muslims are as one on this. It is like shoving pork down our 
throat"' (ibid). These extracts highlight one reading of the cartoons, as they develop as a 
co-agitator of both anti-western prejudice and offence at blasphemy. 
There are differences of interpretation inside the group of readings loosely perceived 
as accounts of blasphemy. Some examples see the cartoons as a comment on the state of 
civilised society. These argue that because the cartoons show a lack of respect towards 
the faith of Muslims they are not reflective of ideal discourse in a civilised society. One 
letter to The Independent argues that, `[r]espect for other faiths is the basis of civilised 
society, particularly when we are living in an increasingly multi-faith and multi-cultural 
world where peace and harmony can only be achieved through understanding the 
sensitivities of others' (Malik, 2006). On the other hand, some expressions of this 
reading develop a vitriolic tone. For example, Robert Fisk reports how, 
The Islamic Army in Iraq, one of the main insurgent groups, made a blood- 
curdling call yesterday for violence against citizens of countries where caricatures 
of the Prophet Mohammed had been published. "We swear to God, if we catch one 
of their citizens in Iraq, we will cut him to pieces, to take revenge for Prophet, " it 
said in an unverified internet statement. [sic] (Fisk, 2006) 
While The Islamic Army in Iraq is not necessarily a fundamentalist organisation, it is a 
violent one, and this reaction to the cartoons, and other threats of violence, represent a 
response that specifically justifies the intended meaning, and exemplifies the stated 
purpose of the exercise. Many commentators see religion, religious fundamentalism and 
violent behaviour as fair game for satire. For example, Hansen argues that `[i]n liberal 
democratic society, religion is, like it or not, a fair target for criticism, satire and, 
fortunately or unfortunately, mockery and ridicule' (2006a: 12). He adds: `[p]ortraying 
the Prophet may be prohibited for Muslims, but it is not and cannot be for anyone else' 
(ibid: 15). 
Of course, many would see it as a retrograde and authoritarian act to reinstate 
blasphemy as a serious offence, and I agree. As such, other grounds of complaint are 
called upon to render criticism at the cartoons. The dominant sociological critique of the 
cartoons develops the argument that they are culturally racist and/or an example of 
Islamophobia. The culturally racist reading is not one that is widely articulated in the 
media; in fact, it is an important point that most protests against the cartoons do not say 
that the cartoons are racist. This idea emerges in sociological accounts and is 
specifically dependent on the concept of Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism. One 
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initial problem with this line of argument is that it forms an example of sociological 
mistranslation: the application of ill-fitting sociological categories to social discourse 
that expresses quite different terms and concepts. So, for example, Hansen, in a survey 
of 113 newspaper articles, found that `[o]f those who took a position, 58 (43%) argued 
that the cartoons were offensive to Islam, while seven (5%) said they were both 
offensive to Islam and racist' (Hansen, 2006b: 49). Racism does not, therefore, appear 
from the outset to be the major cause of complaint. I briefly outline definitions of 
Islamophobia, give a critique of the concept, before offering my opinion on the 
usefulness of Islamophobia for an analysis of the cartoons. 
In Islamophobia it is the religion of the Muslim as `other' that becomes the dominant 
cultural signifier to which prejudicial attitudes are attached. As Modood outlines, 
`religion can be the basis of racialisation as long as the religion of a group can be linked 
to physical ancestry and descent' (2005a: 11). Islamophobia is outlined by the 
Runnymede Trust (1997) in a ten-point guideline that distinguishes between open and 
closed views of Islam and Muslims (1997: 5). Islamophobia `refers to unfounded 
hostility towards Islam. It refers also to the practical consequences of such hostility in 
unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion 
of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs' (ibid: 4), and is always a 
closed, monolithic characterisation of Islam. Goldberg also describes how Muslims 
have historically signified the `other': 
In Elizabethan England, `the Moor' characterized the mix of religion, godless 
members of the `sect of Mahomet', and North African blackness... By the 
Enlightenment racial hierarchization of national character, Immanuel Kant could 
wedge `the Arab', `possessed of an inflamed imagination, `between the basest of 
(Southern) Europeans and the Far East, but significantly above "the Negroes of 
Africa". (Goldberg, 2006: 344) 
Goldberg describes how nineteenth century colonial ideology racialized Muslims, by 
suggesting they became `the quintessential outsider, ordinarily strange in ways, habits, 
and ability to self-govern, aggressive, emotional, and conniving in contrast with the 
European's urbanity, rationality, and spirituality' (ibid: 344-5). Incompatibility with 
European culture is regularly cited as a characteristic of Islam by Islamophobes (The 
Runnymede Trust, 1997: 5; see also Balibar, 1991: 24). 
Unfortunately for the coherence of this reading of the cartoons controversy, most 
definitions of Islamophobia are rather light and remain theoretically undeveloped or 
inconsistent. Of course, anti-Muslim and anti-Asian racism exists, and in Chapter Four I 
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documented a number of examples of culturally racist jokes from British comedians 
that focus almost exclusively on British Asians (and post 9/11, Muslims particularly). 
Despite this, there are aspects to the concepts of Islamophobia outlined above that are 
undeveloped and fail to distinguish between racism and criticism of Islamic societies or 
Islam. Take, for example, point five of the Runnymede Trust's definition of closed 
views of Islam: `Islam [is] seen as inferior to the West - barbaric, irrational, primitive 
and sexist' (1997: 5). This is contrasted with an open view: `Islam is seen as distinctly 
different, but not deficient, and equally worthy of respect' (ibid). Such criteria would, 
for example, leave Johann Hari's description of `misogynistic cultural practices that 
demand woman cover their hair and - in extremis - their faces while men proudly 
display theirs' (Hari, 2006c) as being open to charges of Islamophobia and racism. It 
could also be argued that to highlight such a negative example is suspicious, or a part of 
some sort of pervasive cultural discourse of Islamophobia. These criteria of judgement 
are, in my view, inadequate for distinguishing racism from cultural criticism. 
Generally, the distinctions between the Runnymede Trust's open and closed views 
of Islam are not ideal. As observed in Chapter Four, to describe cultural racism as new 
or more sophisticated is to describe it as increasingly polysemic. This is not reflected in 
the definition of a closed/racist view of Islam. For example, it would be quite 
elementary for racists to adopt the language of an open view of Islam to avoid criticism, 
yet still produce racist meaning. Such coding exercises are attempted in other examples 
of cultural racism yet do not appear in the Trust's considerations. Closed definitions 
could therefore ignore more sophisticated expressions of anti-Muslim racism. The 
Runnymede Trust report also devotes some attention to newspaper cartoons, where they 
argue, `closed views of Islam are seen with particularly stark clarity in cartoons. For in 
order to make their point, cartoonists simplify' (1997: 21). They add that, `[t]hey are 
arguably all the more insidious for being `funny', not to be taken too seriously - many 
an honest and offensive word is spoken in jest' (ibid). Their analysis does not examine 
the incongruity of humour generally, or any specific cartoons, and the effect of this 
incongruity. It is, therefore, poor humour analysis. The important point is not that any 
of the cartoons reproduced by the Runnymede Trust, or printed by Jyllands-Posten, 
literally exemplify the ten points of a closed view of Islam because they simplify or 
caricature. It is that they allow, because of their incongruity, for Islamophobia to be 
implied in readings of the cartoons. Paradoxically, this implication fails to allow for 
clear or serious racist intent to be proven. They are, therefore, anything but a closed, 
monolithic, simplified discourse. 
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Returning to the cartoons controversy, the idea that the cartoons stereotype Muslims 
or the idea of cultural racism appears in many press comments (although importantly, 
not articulated as such). One in The Independent expresses this: `As there is no 
suggestion in history that he was a terrorist, the figure is clearly a proxy for all 
Muslims' (Shamsad, 2006). Another suggests `[t]hese people have deliberately stirred 
up agitation against the millions of ordinary and decent Muslims throughout the world 
by denigrating and ridiculing their Prophet and their faith' (Iqbal, 2006). A final 
example argues: 
To imply that his teachings legitimate terrorist activities is in itself a deliberate act 
of incitement to hatred. The purpose behind the publication and re-publication of 
the cartoons was deliberate provocation, based on a belief that Muslims are fair 
targets for any kind of insults. (Hasan, 2006) 
The idea that the cartoons represent a deliberate act of provocation, that they are clearly 
a proxy for all Muslims, that this is the intended and only meaning, is semantically 
impossible to sustain. It is clearly one reading, but not the only one. Importantly, the 
intended reading of the bomb/turban cartoon presents an incongruity that does not 
suggest this. The two elements of the incongruity or the two premises are 1) the Prophet 
Muhammad and 2) the bomb, which are put together to form a contrast. They do not 
belong together - they are incongruous - because Muhammad was not a terrorist. 
Following the intended reading, it thus highlights a point about the way in which 
Islamic fundamentalism should be incongruous with Islam more readily than they 
suggest all Muslims are terrorists. This can be contrasted with a great number of the 
earlier jokes in the thesis, where stereotypes are attached to races through humour in 
ways that support the stereotype, rather than highlight its incongruity, by presenting a 
stereotype as a major premise before supporting it or another in the minor premise. The 
second cartoon focused on in this chapter develops a visual incongruity through tropes 
of comparison or opposition (Berger, I995a: 54-5) by positioning the censors mark on 
Muhammad (who also holds a sword) and contrasting it with two women wearing 
burkhas. This is seen to ridicule the prohibition of depicting Muhammad, the concept of 
women wearing burkhas and the notion that Islam is violent. This could more readily be 
argued to be racist because of these elements, but again the image is ambiguous because 
it could be read in three ways, as the ridicule of specific religious practice, of Muslims 
as a racialized group (thus as racist ridicule), or of Islamic fundamentalism. With only 
reference to the image these readings remain ambiguous. 
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The second point in the previous quote, on the republication of the cartoons, is 
neatly addressed by Charles Turner: 
As a sociologist ... I cannot 
help feeling that, had the self-appointed leaders of the 
Muslim world read Erving Goffman's Frame Analysis (fat chance, I know) then 
the fuss about the cartoons in France Soir and Die Welt at least could have been 
avoided. As Goffman would have pointed out, while a caricature of the Prophet 
published in a far-right newspaper is a provocation, the same caricature reproduced 
in a French or German newspaper as part of an article about the controversy which 
surrounded that caricature is an illustration, just as the same caricature presented at 
a blasphemy trial would be evidence. (Turner, 2006) 
In acknowledging that the cartoons have a certain polysemic element, that the reading is 
altered in their context of reproduction, Turner defines the meaning or frame through its 
situational logic. For Turner, the reading of the significance of the cartoons, and the 
degree of directness of responsibility for whatever the content of the cartoons is 
supposed to be, is governed by the site of reproduction, or at least it should be. 
However, the particular relation of the audience characteristics and the reading of the 
incongruity of the cartoon images short circuits this logic, as protest was evident against 
the later reproductions. So, for example, for Amir Cheema, who admitted to the 
attempted murder of the Die Welt editor for reprinting the cartoons, the `frame' of 
incongruity served to override the `frame' of contextual interpretation. 
Continuing with the racist reading, a number of sociological accounts have 
developed it. Modood (2006a) suggests: 
They are all unfriendly to Islam and Muslims and the most notorious implicate the 
prophet with terrorism. If the message was meant to be that non-Muslims have the 
right to draw Mohammed, it has come out very differently: that the prophet of 
Islam was a terrorist (2006a: 1). 
I have shown that not all of the cartoons are unfriendly to Islam. Modood's reading 
concentrates on the bomb/turban cartoon, giving a monosemic interpretation of it. 
While he later retracts this comment, suggesting that the cartoons are `a mixed bag' 
(2006b: 54), the two violent depictions remain racist and `in the category of the kind of 
images that ought to be banned' (ibid). The logic of reading the cartoons as culturally 
racist follows: 
the cartoons are not just about one individual but about Muslims per se - just as a 
cartoon portraying Moses as a crooked financier would not be about one man but a 
comment on Jews. And just as the latter would be racist, so are the cartoons in 
question. (2006a: 1. Original emphasis) 
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Many commentators present analogies between the Muhammad cartoons and various 
examples of anti-Semitism or anti-Semitic cartoons that highlight that religious groups 
can be racialized but loses its power as argumentation if taken too far. Modood's 
example does highlight that to see Islam and terrorism as inherently connected is a 
cultural stereotype and thus culturally racist but it does not prove that the `Muslim 
terrorist' is socially and historically entrenched in the same way as the `rich crooked 
Jew'. The analogy rhetorically draws on anti-Semitism for support and invokes the 
image of pre-second world war anti-Semitic stereotyping. Perhaps the most problematic 
aspect of this comparison is the implicit assertion that European anti-Muslim racism 
has, in recent history, impacted on Muslims in the same way that anti-Semitism 
impacted on Jews. Moreover, the analogy also erases the reality of European Islamic 
fundamentalism, which is, in my view, a legitimate target for satire. Modood goes on to 
infer the intention of the cartoonist and attempts to connect the culturally racist reading 
with the intended meaning: `If the intention of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten 
was not to cause offence, there clearly was a purpose of trying to achieve some kind of 
victory over Muslims, to bring Muslims into line' (ibid). On this he adds: 
The Danish editor cannot plead ignorance of what the effects on Muslims would 
be, for the whole exercise was premised on the view that a collective effort 
involving twelve cartoonists was necessary to withstand Muslim opposition. As for 
the republication of the cartoons across continental Europe, this was deliberately 
done to teach Muslims a lesson. (ibid: 2) 
This highlights perfectly the constant erasure that the liquid meanings of the cartoons 
undergo. Modood's interpretation of the republication of the cartoons clearly differs 
from that of Turner's. Motives for republication can range from simple reportage, 
defence of freedom of speech, or Islamophobia. All are equally arguable and relatively 
convincing. 
Sardar (2006) follows a similar logic and argues that a representation of Muhammad 
as a terrorist implicates all Muslims: 
The outrage is that the Prophet is represented as a terrorist with the clear 
implication that he preaches a violent creed and that all his followers are 
intrinsically violent. This is painting Islam and every Muslim in the conclusive 
colours of absolute darkness (Sardar, 2006). 
He also states that it is `a practical demonstration of President Bush's diktat that you are 
either with us or against us - accept what we do and join civilisation; object and be 
categorised as barbarians' (ibid) and adds that `[tjhis is the same choice Europe gave 
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the Jews in 1920s and 30s... They [Muslims] are being demonised with exactly the 
same vehemence:.. In other words, Muslims are being set up for the next holocaust' 
(ibid). Here, the anti-Semitic analogy appears again as the plight of early twentieth 
century Jews is connected to the cartoon controversy. 
There are further examples of the analogy. Returning to Modood, he argues that 
`[t]he suggestion that Muslims are not the subject of racism because they are a religious 
group is nonsense when one considers that the victimization of another religious group, 
the Jews, is paradigmatic of many peoples' understanding of racism' (Modood, 2006a: 
6). Bleich adds that `Muslims are being constructed as the newest ethno-racial outsiders 
in Europe' (Bleich, 2006: 17), and Carens speculates that, 
If a major German newspaper had published an anti-Semitic cartoon in the 1950s, 
would this have warranted (or received) only the same level of public criticism that 
it would have received anywhere else in Europe or North America at the time? 
Similarly, the specific circumstances of Danish Muslims do and should matter 
to our reactions. (2006: 40) 
Of course, the idea that Muslims are racialized is correct, and there is clear evidence of 
this, and they do suffer racism. Jews were clearly racialized by the Nazis in twentieth 
century Europe and others before this, in racist and political ideology, and in science. 
Whether this has happened or is happening to Muslims in the same way is unlikely. 
Specifically though, it is even more difficult to sustain that the only reading of the 
cartoons is to racialize Muslims. Muslims at present suffer from a combination of two 
themes or types of racism. First, they suffer a general immigrational racism that affects 
many migrants or second generation migrants in Europe, and second, they suffer a 
prejudice that sees Muslims as a threat to the nation, which, in the British case, is 
similar to that projected onto the Irish, Argentineans and Germans at various points in 
the last century, and is racially based, but varies in specificity. This second element is 
completely dependent on political circumstances and likely to subside once Islamic 
fundamentalism subsides too. This is not comparable to pre-second world war anti- 
Semitism and almost certainly began on September 11`h 2001. Hansen argues, rightly, 
that `the Jews of Europe suffered a level of hatred, discrimination, and suffering that 
makes anything Muslims in the EU are currently experiencing seem like comic relief 
(2006b: 46), or at least, in this instance, satirical representation. He adds that `an anti- 
Islamic cartoon cannot and will not have the same impact as an anti-Semitic one did 
before the war' (ibid). If the cartoons racialize then, it is a different and weaker form, 
and draws primarily on the second element of anti-Muslim racism. 
220 
Hansen adds on the specific issue of racialization that `[t]he question is open to 
interpretation, but none of the cartoons portrayed stereotypically looking Muslims; they 
were not, as many claimed, the equivalent of der Sturmer's hooked nose, bearded Jew 
reaching into a pot of gold' (Hansen, 2006a: 12, see also Hansen, 2006b: 48 for 
examples of such anti-Semitic cartoons). So, while Modood (2006b) counters that 
racialization does not depend only on phenotypical representation, and that seeing 
Muslims as terrorists would be an instance of cultural racialization, the key issue is not 
that anti-Muslim racism does not exist, it is that it is ambiguous whether or not the 
intention of the cartoonists was motivated by racism (that they wished to depict all 
Muslims) and it is even more unclear that the reading of the cartoons by the majority of 
non-Muslim Europeans provokes racism. What is clear is that many Muslims find the 
cartoons to be blasphemous - this is not the same thing. 
That said, an anti-Muslim racist reading of the cartoons has been developed by the 
British National Party, who use it for culturally racist ambivalence resolution. In this 
case the cartoons are used as a signifier of all Muslims, are situated as a way of 
expressing proteophobia and parallel the ambivalences outlined in Chapter Four. Robert 
Verkaik reports that, `[t]he British National Party has published some of the cartoons on 
its website. "British newspapers have united in their cowardice by refusing to carry the 
cartoons which have caused a storm of protest and anger amongst the Muslim world", 
read the accompanying statement' (Verkaik, 2006). The BNP was reported to have used 
one of the cartoons in the May 2006 local authority elections, as Andrew Grice writes 
that the BNP `will include in its campaign material one of the cartoons which sparked 
outrage among Muslims across the world, showing the Prophet Mohamed with a bomb 
in his turban' (Grice, 2006). Such uses simply confirm the ambiguity of the images and 
the necessary rigidity of the reader who can `overcome' this. In this case the cartoons 
are being used to say `look! Muslims really are all terrorists, the cartoons say so! ' Here, 
the problem is with the reader. The power of the cartoons, like any successful satire, lies 
in the distortions created. There is no literal sense in saying that every Muslim is a 
terrorist. In any rational dialogue it would be refuted instantly. In the racist reading of 
the cartoons this is not required to be true, yet it develops a rhetorical effect as racist 
truth. 
So, in concluding this section, we can argue that the cartoons generate a form of 
liquid racism. This is a form that is diluted to an extent that it requires the addition and 
subsequent negation of the other readings in order to sustain its persuasiveness. Overall 
though, while it is possible that the cartoonists may have been racist, and some viewers 
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of the cartoons certainly are racist, the actions of Danish lobbyists, the reaction of 
particular Muslim protesters, calls for censorship, the awakening of blasphemy and the 
obvious centrality of religious offence, coupled with the absence of any obvious cases 
of incitement of hatred or violence towards Muslims, suggests that anti-Muslim racism 
is not the only problematic aspect of expression in this case. This will be returned to at 
the end of the chapter. 
Viewing the Cartoons as Satire 
This section briefly outlines the idea that the cartoons make a satirical comment by, 
first, giving a concept of satire, explaining further the comments the cartoons make, and 
discussing whether their aim hits a justified target. 
In defining satire, Stott outlines that it `aims to denounce folly and vice and urge 
ethical and political reform through the subjection of ideas to humorous analysis' 
(2005: 109). This presents the idea that humour is able to give a particular type of 
`analysis' of serious events. This might represent the partisan ridicule of a particular 
position and the connected rhetorical strengthening of ideas linked to this, as ethics are 
rarely objective. It also points to the specific alienation of the object of humour, as 
outlined in Chapter One. Griffin adds a similar comment: `satire works like the 
preacher-rhetorician to persuade his audience to virtue' (1994: 37). I have explained 
that the specific targets of the cartoons are ambiguous. Contrary to this, for example, 
Sardar (2006) argues `[a] cartoon is a satiric device. Satire holds a mirror to the 
powerful, speaking truth to power. But European Muslims can hardly be described as 
powerful' (2006: 1). This firmly sees the cartoons through the culturally racist lens, but 
if one takes the target to be Islamic fundamentalism, then they do speak truth to power 
mongers, and do make an ethical comment. It seems then, that the targets of the 
cartoons are multiple, and thus, so are the ethical impacts. 
It is not a new phenomenon for satire to be offensive to its target. For example, Stott 
explains that in Aristophanes' comedy `[a]buse that we would now consider libellous 
was a fundamental part of comedy' (2005: 106). Following this trend of offensiveness, 
Greek satire became influential in the eighteenth century as `English authors 
rediscovered satirical models as a powerful form of social commentary' (ibid: 112). 
Many of the examples in Gatrell's City of Laughter (2006) clearly show the insulting 
nature of London's eighteenth century satire. In satire it is the stretching of incongruity 
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that encourages the ridiculous meaning. Hence, satire is not supposed to be nice, 
gentlemanly or civil, and has frequently encouraged the authoritarian response of 
reaching for the censors mark: 
In 1737, the fear of ridicule prompted Sir Robert Walpole to introduce the 
Licensing Act censoring the theatre and its satirical attacks on his government. 
Hitler "was so wary of the dangers of humour in the Third Reich that he had 
special "joke courts" set up for, among other things, punishing people who named 
their dogs and horses "Adolph" (Morreall, 1983: 102)... In Soviet Russia it was 
strictly forbidden to publish satire that criticised the party or its officials -a crime 
punishable by imprisonment in labour camps. In the United States during the 
1950s, the investigations of Senator Joseph McCarthy's House committee on Un- 
American Activities, established to root out communist sympathizers and 
treasonous plots at home, drove humorists underground for fear of blacklisting or 
incarceration. (Stott, 2005: 105) 
Returning specifically to the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, on the satirical side of the 
coin (or incongruity) is the liberal secular reading and defence of freedom of speech, 
which is also a defence of satire. The intended meanings of the cartoons, summarised as 
a comment on Islamic fundamentalism and a defence of freedom of speech in reaction 
to self-censorship, were, in the proceeding debates, championed by a number of writers 
and journalists. Some of these do acknowledge that the cartoons may be genuinely 
offensive to Muslims, but very few touch on the issue of racism in any depth. Johann 
Hari exemplifies this position: 
Surely the only position for a liberal and a democrat to take is to rally to the side 
of the cartoonists?... free speech is not freedom to be nice. It is freedom to be 
offensive, foolish or even racist, or it is nothing. (Hari. 2006a) 
As his argument develops, the defence becomes more determined: 
A poisonous cliche sprang up: that this is a fight between "Liberal 
fundamentalists" and Islamic fundamentalists, two equally extreme sides that 
reasonable people should reject. Do these people really believe there is a moral 
equivalence between a system of free speech that protects everyone, Muslims 
included, and a superstitious taboo that proposes to erect a wall around one man 
and silence all criticism of him? (ibid) 
The liberal secular reading develops from the intended meaning. While not specifically 
concerned with an interpretation of the cartoons, it becomes a defence of principle that 
exists externally of the meanings that are created by the cartoons. The second quote 
emphasises this, as Hari begins to give normative judgement on the wider arguments. 
Later he comments on the London demonstration against the cartoons: 
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This year, London has seen more than one mass rally in favour of censorship. The 
enemies of free speech recur throughout the ages, appalled by Michelangelo, 
Galileo, DH Lawrence... and today, it is cartoon depictions of Mohamed that stoke 
their rage. Tomorrow it will be something else, perhaps something you love. (Hari, 
2006b) 
This view is supported in many commentaries, for example, another cartoonist, Dave 
Brown, suggests that `[y]ou have to respect the right of people to express beliefs. I think 
some people's beliefs are ludicrous, and I need to be able to point fun, and ridicule them 
when it is warranted. (Brown, 2006). Likewise, Greg Dyke offers a viewpoint on why 
the British press had not reproduced the cartoons, through recounting comments made 
by Salman Rushdie: 
He told us that our tolerant liberal society which we had fought to establish over 
centuries, was in danger of being destroyed from within because that very 
tolerance meant we tolerated people who didn't share those same values and, as a 
result, they would undermine them. I have a horrible feeling that this is what is 
happening today. (Dyke, 2006) 
These debates assert the defence of a principle - freedom of speech. Being directly 
caught up in the unfolding discourse and characteristic of journalistic commentary, 
where opinion is paramount, there is little attempt to say anything about the way in 
which the debates have developed as a direct result of the semantic structure of the 
cartoons, thus they perpetuate the liquid aspects of the debates. Certainly the debates 
capture important points, my position and reasons for not censoring humour have 
already been outlined. I will now say a little more about postmodernity and 
fundamentalism, as the cartoons, and their incongruity, encourage a reaction to 
ambivalence that is postmodern in appearance. For this analysis we must return to 
Bauman. 
Postmodernity and Fundamentalism 
There is, a specifically postmodern form of religion, born of the internal 
contradiction of postmodern life, of the specifically postmodern form in which 
the sufficiency of man and the banality of dreams to take human fate under 
human control are revealed. This form has come to be known under the English 
name of fundamentalism... (Bauman, 1997b: 182) 
Throughout the chapter I have said that there is a postmodern tendency at work in the 
cartoons controversy, that the liquid readings of the cartoons specifically become racist 
when the position of the reader becomes more trenchant, or at a more extreme level, 
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more fundamentalist. This was evident in the BNP's use of the cartoons and in the 
violent reactions towards non-Muslim Europeans from some Muslims. 
To reiterate, I highlighted the BNP's use of the cartoons as one that encourages 
racism, alongside this, there is also an ostensive display of anti-European hatred 
expressed in the violent protest surrounding the cartoons. For example, Hansen outlines 
that `[o]n 30 January, armed gunmen in the Gaza strip stormed the European Union 
office in Gaza, threatening to kidnap the workers unless the EU issued an official 
apology. Hamas's leaders demanded that Denmark punish the cartoonists and Jyllands- 
Posten' (2006a: 9). Further to this, in Europe there were also expressions of violent 
intent: 
Demonstrations were organised outside the Danish embassy in London, during 
which radical Islamists brandished placards stating: "Slay [also 
butcher/massacre/behead/ exterminate] those who insult Islam", "Free speech go to 
hell", Europe is the cancer and Islam is the cure", and "Europe will pay, your 9/11 
is on its way" (ibid: 10). 
An organiser at the London protest, Umran Javed, was later found guilty of inciting 
racial hatred. Shenai Raif reports that `[h]e was said to have shouted: `Bomb, Bomb 
Demark, Bomb, bomb, USA' (Raif, 2007). Such expressions are much more 
monosemic than the cartoons and so far easier to gain conviction under race hate 
legislation. What is significant is the vitriol generated in these reactions are in response 
to a series of ambiguous satirical images. This is a fundamentalist reaction to 
postmodern ambivalence. 
Bauman argues that fundamentalism, both religious and non-religious, is a tendency 
that is a specific product of postmodernity. He suggests, 
... fundamentalism is the supreme 
(though radically simplified) embodiment of a 
tendency aided and abetted by the whole thrust of postmodern culture. One may 
conclude that religious fundamentalism is a legitimate child of postmodemity, 
born of its joys and torments, and heir to its achievements and worries alike. 
(1997b: 184). 
We might ask specifically what are the tendencies of postmodern culture that Bauman 
believes fundamentalism embodies? Bauman, as was explained in Chapter Two, sees 
postmodernity as an era in which there is a notable and significant increase in the 
occurrence and experience of ambivalence, instability, liquidity, and the predictable 
anxiety that might be expected to result from this. This postmodern condition is also 
said to lead to an increase in individualism, both chosen and prescribed. Bauman argues 
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that "`Fundamentalism", choosing to hold fast to inherited and/or ascribed identity, is a 
natural and legitimate offspring of planet-wide enforced individualisation' (2005: 27). 
Fundamentalism is, therefore, a reaction to an ambivalent world and an attempted 
reordering of that world through its reinscription. 
43 Following this rationale, 
fundamentalism has, for Bauman, an equivalent relationship with ambivalence as 
Fascism. Hence, he argues that `... religious fundamentalism belongs to a wider family 
of totalitarian or proto-totalitarian solutions offered to all those who find the burden of 
individual freedom excessive and unbearable' (1997b: 184), that it `is an offer of an 
alternative rationality' (ibid: 185. Original emphasis). Moreover, this reverses the 
pattern found around the humour examined in Chapter Three, where it is the hatred of 
the `other' that forms the impetus for joke creation, rather than hatred being expressed 
in the outrage to the created incongruity. 
Returning to the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, the cartoons are an ambiguous and 
liquid form, and the incongruity central to their construction is responsible for the 
manufacture of this liquidity. They are, therefore, an article of culture that one might, 
quite fairly, be ambivalent about, especially when we are discussing the serious 
arguments of what they are really intended to mean, and what should be done with 
them. From this chapter, and from the wider findings of the thesis, the idea of an 
understanding of polysemia and racism, especially cultural racism, becomes evident and 
necessary. On the issue of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons and the reactions to them 
specifically, returning to Bauman, I use one of his generic comments to suggest that 
`[t]he problem is not how to dismiss the gravity of the questions, but how to find 
answers free from totalitarian genes' (1997b: 185). 
Conclusion 
In this final chapter I have highlighted the development of a different type of liquid 
racism, one that is still ambiguous and follows from the development of specifically 
trenchant and fixed socio-discursive positioning, but one that is specifically political 
and satirical. First, I outlined the background to the Prophet Muhammad cartoons 
controversy, before explaining how three of the images are not offensive. I then gave a 
43 See also Springett (2003) for a commensurate psychoanalytic account of anxiety, ambivalence 
and the resulting discursive fixity in all religious fundamentalisms, and sociological accounts 
(Alam, 2007: 32, and Brighton, 2007: 13) of the reordering, reactive and monosemic 
characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism. 
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sketch of the two cartoons generally considered to be the most offensive. Following 
this, I outlined the intended reading of the cartoons before discussing how they come to 
be seen as offensive. This was then juxtaposed with a brief outline of the importance of 
the European tradition of satire and the arguments behind the liberal secular defence of 
freedom of speech. Finally we saw that some violent reactions to the cartoons (which 
are liquid and ambiguous images), follow the logic and characteristics of Bauman's 
description of fundamentalism. An important need of postmodernity is emphasised in 
the trenchant or fundamentalist reading of solid racism where there is, in reality, liquid 
racism, and that is a necessity for an increased reflexivity and self-analysis in the 
postmodern world, and for the understanding of the need for meaningful, collective 
identification and belonging. 
227 
Conclusion 
In this concluding statement I rearticulate the central arguments of the thesis, present 
the relevance of this research for sociology and humour studies, and outline the wider 
applicability of the theory and method developed in the thesis. Such examples as are 
discussed in the thesis signal the interest, debate and moral outrage that racist and other 
forms of humour often provoke, and the media content and coverage devoted to it. 
These factors point towards the importance of the sociological reporting, explanation 
and analysis of humour and its rhetoric. Hopefully this thesis has gone some way 
towards helping to begin these tasks. While in the past most analysis has struggled to 
find stable ground on which to build a position, the development of sociological 
humour studies may help to remedy such failings. 
The Relevance of this Research for Sociological Humour Studies 
I will now reiterate the important observations from the thesis with a view to outlining 
their wider applicability. Chapter One outlined not a universal explanation of humour 
but an account that elicited significant developments for a typology of theoretical 
processes that help highlight the rhetorical processes of humour, and allow for a critical 
analysis of it. I explained how humour can redefine reality, co-agitate disparate 
discourses and create semantic alienation. All of these processes depend on humorous 
incongruity as a rhetorical device. Following this, I integrated these ideas into a three 
stage `rhetorical analysis' of humorous texts. This considered discursive content, 
discursive connotation, and discursive/rhetorical structure. I also showed that humour 
can affect ambivalent social discourses. Chapter One provided a `tool kit' of theoretical 
techniques that help explain the rhetoric of humour, this tool kit need not be specific to 
racist humour and could be used for the analysis of other forms. 
Chapter Two took these observations and outlined the effect that humour is able to 
have on the ambivalence, incongruity, ambiguity and incoherence of racist ideology. I 
explained that ambivalence represents what Zygmunt Bauman calls the alter ego of 
language, the waste product that is inherent as the catalyst and the product of order- 
building systems. I signalled that these order-building processes draw on humour as a 
rhetorical device that consumes the ambiguous waste of signification. These claims 
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were central for the analysis presented in later chapters but, again, need not be limited 
to the study of racist humour. 
In Chapter Three I began my analysis with the first specific case study or type of 
humour - embodied racist humour - principally but not exclusively drawn from US 
internet websites. Wieviorka's dual logic of racism was applied to racist humour to 
show how it depicts, first, the inclusion of the `other' through inferiorization, and 
second, the exclusion of the `other' through expulsion. I outlined non-stereotyped jokes 
that express the exclusionary logic (and proteophobia) through images of refuse 
categorisation and disposal. After this, I explained how the second logic, inferiorization, 
appears in racist dichotomies. Dichotomous stereotypes develop ambivalence because 
they are binary arrangements that provoke an `outside'. 
Chapter Four opened with an outline of cultural racism as a racism of cultural 
difference, but also one that can be specifically broken down into what are often more 
coherent elements, such as nationalism, xenophobia and immigrational prejudice. This 
case study of cultural racism in humour was drawn, in the main, from British stand-up 
comedy of the past thirty years, but specifically focuses on that which is still easily 
available and consumed by the general public. I outlined that cultural racism also 
expresses the dual logic of racism as exclusionary and inferiorizing. The rhetorical 
themes that appear in it are 1) a specific form of coded racism that appears in response 
to the increasing unacceptability of biological racism, 2) a negotiation of national 
territory that fixates on the maintenance, and fears the transgression of national 
boundaries that enforces the exclusionary logic of racism, and 3) an ambivalence of 
social identity that negotiates the competing categories of the `other' as an alien and a 
neighbour, and focuses on the logic of inferiorization. 
The next chapter of the thesis, Chapter Five, saw a movement away from the 
analysis of racism created by white comedians towards an analysis of the `reversed 
discourse' of black and Asian comedians, which employ the same sign-systems and 
stereotypes as embodied and cultural racism but do so with a reversed semantic effect. 
The central point from the chapter relates to polysemia in humour, and from this, a 
consideration that reversal in humour is never automatically `successful'. The chapter 
threw into doubt the very notion of `success' in humour. 
In Chapter Six the shift towards increased polysemia continued as I examined 
`postmodern humour', which multiples the lack of fixity in humour and removes 
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authorial intention. Overall, the humour cannot attach itself to, or support, a serious 
discourse in the same non-contradictory way that other forms can, because it produces 
both racist and non-racist meanings simultaneously. None of the meanings dominate 
and so serious racism is not rhetorically impacted on as effectively through this type of 
comedy. Liquid racism allowed for a more complete description of these processes. 
Chapter Seven saw a different type of liquid racism develop, one that is called 
`postmodern satire', and one that has significant political implications not generated by 
the humour outlined in Chapter Six. I examine the case of the Prophet Muhammad 
cartoons as ambiguous and polysemic images that simultaneously express a clear 
satirical attack on Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Muslim racism. These readings 
have very different ethical interpretations and implications, and thus present the ethical 
complexity of evaluating the polysemicity of humorous incongruity. 
A Way Forward 
The approach I have developed in this thesis is effective because it combines linguistic 
models of incongruity analysis with critical interventions on the content of racist 
humour (c. f. the semantic script theory of Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1994,2001; and 
empirical collections by Davies, 1996,1998a, 2002). This allows sociological humour 
studies to be viewed as critical theory. This is the specific originality of the thesis - the 
critical textual analysis of a discursive frame that does not follow the rules of the 
serious - but which has a number of implications for it. 
Of course, this analysis is very important for both sociology and `good' humour. 
Much sociology might wish to account for laughter and the humorous, and might want 
to present critical interventions. This cannot be a simplistic or ideological exercise 
because humour is not a simplistic linguistic frame. As was seen in Chapter Seven, on 
the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, accounts that remain in the ideological rather than 
analytic register ignore or erase polysemia, and are unconvincing as critical theory. One 
important implication from this thesis is that we might see the analysis of racist or 
offensive humour as a substitute for censoring it, as its rhetorical effects can be 
combated if they can be understood, providing arguments on how it works and what it 
does, rather than emotively charged, serious proclamations calling for its removal. Thus 
no reasons exist for why critical humour research programmes cannot flourish. 
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Overall, the thesis has outlined the rhetorical structure and potential effects of 
humour. The ideas drawn on are original in the form they are applied, and have been the 
victim of an intellectual amnesia - no longer forming a part of commonsense 
understandings in comparison to positive or exculpatory positions. I have demonstrated 
that the typologies, contents and structures of racist humour can be analysed from 
inside of serious sociological humour studies, that this can yield understandings of the 
multidimensional functional and rhetorical effects of racist humour. With the insight 
firmly established that jokes are rarely `just jokes', that their rhetorical ability is a 
structural prerequisite, we can certainly see a new analytical avenue for sociological 
humour studies, and perhaps, in the long run, even for humour itself. We might even 
say that sociological humour studies can liberate humour, that observation of the 
rhetorical processes of humour and associated issues of polysemicity might even begin 
to push sociological humour studies into the sociological mainstream. This is something 
that would add freshness and subtlety to the discipline, as well as leading to a more 
sophisticated typology of humour. And so, in the future, we might be better equipped to 
appreciate that, in the words of Mark Twain, `laughter without a tinge of philosophy is 
but a sneeze of humour. Genuine humour is replete with wisdom' (1992: 59). 
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Appendix One 
Berger's (1995a: 54-5) List of Forty-Five Humour Techniques. 
Technique Category Technique Category 
1. Absurdity Logic 
2. Accident Logic 
3. Allusion Language 
4. Analogy Logic 
5. Before/After Identity 
6. Bombast Language 
7. Burlesque Identity 
8. Caricature Identity 
9. Catalogue Logic 
10. Chase Scene Visual 
11. Coincidence Logic 
12. Comparison Logic 
13. Definition Language 
14. Disappointment Logic 
15. Eccentricity Identity 
16. Embarrassment Identity 
17. Exaggeration Language 
18. Exposure Identity 
19. Facetiousness Language 
20. Grotesque Identity 
21. Ignorance Logic 
22. Imitation Identity 
23. Impersonation Identity 
24. Infantilism Language 
25. Insults Language 
26. Irony Language 
27. Literalness Language 
28. Mimicry Identity 
29. Mistakes Logic 
30. Misunderstanding Language 
31. Parody Identity 
32. Puns, Wordplay Language 
33. Repartee, Outwitting Language 
34. Repetition, Pattern Logic 
36. Ridicule Logic 
35. Reversal Logic 
37. Rigidity Logic 
38. Sarcasm Language 
39. Satire Language 
40. Scale, Size Identity 
41. Slapstick Visual 
42. Speed Visual 
43. Stereotypes Identity 
44. Theme and Variation Logic 
45. Unmasking Identity 
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Appendix Two 
The twelve cartoons of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad as they appeared in Jyllands-Posten on 
30th September 2005. The centre of the page features an article on self-censorship and freedom 
of speech. 
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